Re: KMS Admiral Hipper v HMS Berwick-25th Dec.1940
Posted: Sun May 16, 2021 11:29 pm
Hello All,
A factor in Kapitan Meisel's decision making was the chronic unreliability of Hipper's propulsion system. M J Whitley provides considerable detail in his book German Cruisers of WWII (cites Hipper KTB). After spending August 1940 in dockyard hands repairing defects accumulated on the Norwegian invasion and a short Arctic deployment, and after final trials and training through September, Hipper sailed for a raid on the Northern Patrol (Faroes -Shetland gap) on the 24th. The following day the starboard main cooling pump broke down and the ship had to go into Kristiansand for repairs. 24 hours later she was underway again, but the following day in bad weather off the Norwegian coast the starboard turbine lubrication system came adrift and sprayed oil which then caught fire.
Once the fire was out, the turbine could not be run without lubrication and could not even be allowed to "windmill" as this could cause seizure. Unfortunately there was no method to easily decouple the prop from the turbine, without the ship having to lay stopped for some hours. She then proceeded to Bergen but temporary repairs meant she had to head back to Germany. Repairs took the whole of October. Further training and repairs took up most of November.
On the 30th November she sailed again, this time with a mission into the Mid-Atlantic, to attack convoys. Intelligence analysis suggested mid ocean escort might only be an an AMC. Running into very bad weather various systems were damaged by seas breaking across the decks, and on the 10th December the starboard low pressure turbine broke down. It was estimated this would require dockyard repair, but a temporary fix was done.
Another concern was high fuel consumption and the limited transfer capability of the available supply ships, 12 hours being spent on this on the 13th Dec. After more bad weather resulting in some electrical problems with turrets and torpedo tubes, further refuelling periods were necessary on the 16th and on the 20th. On the 22nd the centre engine bearings started to run hot. After another refuelling session, Hipper located WS 5A late on the 24th.
In the prevailing low visibility of the early hours of the 25th, a radar-directed torpedo attack on the convoy in general was launched at a measured range of 4,600m but no hits were scored. Closing in later in the murky conditions it was with dismay that the outline of HMS Berwick was discerned. Not the weak AMC protection anticipated. Once again Meisel decided to engage initially with torpedoes, and unfortunately Whitley gives no range information, but this must have been well inside gun range. However confusion over a changed decision to only use 3 tubes initially followed by gun blast disabling the training mechanism meant no torpedoes were actually fired. Hipper opened 8" fire at 0639/25 and Berwick returned fire a couple of minutes later, with the German cruiser turning away. Conditions were too bad for any accurate gunnery but improved after 0658 and Hipper scored the X turret hit at 0705. By 0714 having scored other hits Hipper was clear and further rain squalls hid both sides. Berwick and the other cruisers' first responsibility was to return to the convoy's protection and with temporary repairs on his starboard engine and a question mark over the centre, Meisel realised Brest was his only sensible option. By 1430/25 Force H had left Gibraltar in response to Berwick's enemy report having been in harbour only about 12 hours, returning from being off Sardinia on the 22nd. German observers in Algeciras of course reported this.
Meisel's success was that WS 5A scattered prematurely and Force H and the escorts spent several days rounding up the merchant ships and reforming the convoy. Another month of dry docking and repairs was necessary for Hipper in Brest.
HMS Berwick was unfortunately a bit of a "bullet magnet", but was operational enough to continue with the rounding up process.
All the best
wadinga
A factor in Kapitan Meisel's decision making was the chronic unreliability of Hipper's propulsion system. M J Whitley provides considerable detail in his book German Cruisers of WWII (cites Hipper KTB). After spending August 1940 in dockyard hands repairing defects accumulated on the Norwegian invasion and a short Arctic deployment, and after final trials and training through September, Hipper sailed for a raid on the Northern Patrol (Faroes -Shetland gap) on the 24th. The following day the starboard main cooling pump broke down and the ship had to go into Kristiansand for repairs. 24 hours later she was underway again, but the following day in bad weather off the Norwegian coast the starboard turbine lubrication system came adrift and sprayed oil which then caught fire.
Once the fire was out, the turbine could not be run without lubrication and could not even be allowed to "windmill" as this could cause seizure. Unfortunately there was no method to easily decouple the prop from the turbine, without the ship having to lay stopped for some hours. She then proceeded to Bergen but temporary repairs meant she had to head back to Germany. Repairs took the whole of October. Further training and repairs took up most of November.
On the 30th November she sailed again, this time with a mission into the Mid-Atlantic, to attack convoys. Intelligence analysis suggested mid ocean escort might only be an an AMC. Running into very bad weather various systems were damaged by seas breaking across the decks, and on the 10th December the starboard low pressure turbine broke down. It was estimated this would require dockyard repair, but a temporary fix was done.
Another concern was high fuel consumption and the limited transfer capability of the available supply ships, 12 hours being spent on this on the 13th Dec. After more bad weather resulting in some electrical problems with turrets and torpedo tubes, further refuelling periods were necessary on the 16th and on the 20th. On the 22nd the centre engine bearings started to run hot. After another refuelling session, Hipper located WS 5A late on the 24th.
In the prevailing low visibility of the early hours of the 25th, a radar-directed torpedo attack on the convoy in general was launched at a measured range of 4,600m but no hits were scored. Closing in later in the murky conditions it was with dismay that the outline of HMS Berwick was discerned. Not the weak AMC protection anticipated. Once again Meisel decided to engage initially with torpedoes, and unfortunately Whitley gives no range information, but this must have been well inside gun range. However confusion over a changed decision to only use 3 tubes initially followed by gun blast disabling the training mechanism meant no torpedoes were actually fired. Hipper opened 8" fire at 0639/25 and Berwick returned fire a couple of minutes later, with the German cruiser turning away. Conditions were too bad for any accurate gunnery but improved after 0658 and Hipper scored the X turret hit at 0705. By 0714 having scored other hits Hipper was clear and further rain squalls hid both sides. Berwick and the other cruisers' first responsibility was to return to the convoy's protection and with temporary repairs on his starboard engine and a question mark over the centre, Meisel realised Brest was his only sensible option. By 1430/25 Force H had left Gibraltar in response to Berwick's enemy report having been in harbour only about 12 hours, returning from being off Sardinia on the 22nd. German observers in Algeciras of course reported this.
Meisel's success was that WS 5A scattered prematurely and Force H and the escorts spent several days rounding up the merchant ships and reforming the convoy. Another month of dry docking and repairs was necessary for Hipper in Brest.
HMS Berwick was unfortunately a bit of a "bullet magnet", but was operational enough to continue with the rounding up process.
All the best
wadinga