Books on British Battlecruisers?

From the birth of the Dreadnought to the period immediately after the end of World War I.
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2471
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by wadinga »

Hi Admiral Semmes and others,

After a little on-line research of reviews of the mighty (and expensive) strategical tomes created by the academical behemoths Sumida, Seligmann et al it seems that their major fight is whether the mercurial mind of Fisher had eventually decided naval war in the constrained waters of the British Home Waters would be decided by submarines, mines and "Flotilla War" rather than cumbersome battle fleets, marching and counter-marching in parade ground formations. The rapid developments in torpedoes and mines, with speedy turbine driven surface launchers or stealthy underwater ones were something that had fired up his restless energy. In such a view speedy battle cruisers would race around the world protecting British trade and eliminating raiders of any ilk. In this they were just "super cruisers" bigger, better and faster. This seems to be re-inventing the French "Jeune Ecole" concept. Fisher's December 1905 observation on the two latest British potential AMCs:
But such vessels when armed will only be equal to the German vessels, and in war equality only would not suffice—as Nelson said, “You ought to be 100 per cent stronger than the enemy if you can!” If two ships of that type met, the result of the fight would be a “toss up,”
was merely a transparent opportunistic attempt to divert monies to his favoured vessels which could handle both powerful enemy armoured cruisers and any unfortunate AMCs they encountered.

If a British AMC encountered a similar German liner the result might indeed be a toss-up, but that would not matter because in the tussle the German would almost certainly have her speed curtailed and be easily destroyed subsequently. There were plenty of British liners to expend in this way. The Carmania/Cap Trafalgar and Alcantara/Greif actions proved what anyone could have foretold, these armed merchantmen were soap-bubbles armed with hatpins, which could only ever win Pyrrhic victories against armed opposition. (Except as Q ships and an ocean greyhound cannot do disguise).

However the reality was that the battlefleets of Britain and Germany continued to grow and prosper but the geographical position of Germany and her lack of any developed overseas colonies with dockyards and logistical support where detached fleets could be based meant the antagonists would be constrained to the North Sea. The Hochsee Fleet would never sail the High Seas. Whilst the Austro Hungarian fleet remained a threat, the Goeben was on the loose and the Italians were undecided, a detached British battlecruiser fleet was maintained in the Mediterranean, but once the Adriatic was shut down, they were drawn back to the North Sea battlefleet scouting role. There they were intended to punch their way through enemy cruiser screens as Hood with the Invincibles did at Jutland, or screening the battlefleet from enemy scouts as Beatty did at the same time as he pushed Hipper round to the east, keeping Scheer unaware almost until Jellicoe's first salvoes landed.

There were casualties to be risked, and accepted, since the ruling triangle of armament vs protection vs speed still prevailed, and British designs favoured the first and last over the middle.

I believe Andrew Gordon's book to be a valuable source because in addition to factual and detailed description it explains the ideas and attitudes of the RN in that time and their influence on decision-making. It also highlights the cataclysmic impact between the attitudes of the "Fishpond" and more conservative elements. Nowhere is the disjunct between modern liberal thinking with encouragement and acceptance of initiative by subordinates and the attitudes of those far off times clearer than around p139. The stolid and unimaginative Evan-Thomas continues to steam towards inevitable doom at the hands of the entire HSF as Beatty races past in the opposite direction, because the flag signal ordering his turn has not been hauled down.



All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
HMSVF
Senior Member
Posts: 347
Joined: Sun Jun 17, 2018 10:15 am

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by HMSVF »

wadinga wrote: Sun Jan 31, 2021 4:20 pm Hi Admiral Semmes and others,

After a little on-line research of reviews of the mighty (and expensive) strategical tomes created by the academical behemoths Sumida, Seligmann et al it seems that their major fight is whether the mercurial mind of Fisher had eventually decided naval war in the constrained waters of the British Home Waters would be decided by submarines, mines and "Flotilla War" rather than cumbersome battle fleets, marching and counter-marching in parade ground formations. The rapid developments in torpedoes and mines, with speedy turbine driven surface launchers or stealthy underwater ones were something that had fired up his restless energy. In such a view speedy battle cruisers would race around the world protecting British trade and eliminating raiders of any ilk. In this they were just "super cruisers" bigger, better and faster. This seems to be re-inventing the French "Jeune Ecole" concept. Fisher's December 1905 observation on the two latest British potential AMCs:
But such vessels when armed will only be equal to the German vessels, and in war equality only would not suffice—as Nelson said, “You ought to be 100 per cent stronger than the enemy if you can!” If two ships of that type met, the result of the fight would be a “toss up,”
was merely a transparent opportunistic attempt to divert monies to his favoured vessels which could handle both powerful enemy armoured cruisers and any unfortunate AMCs they encountered.

If a British AMC encountered a similar German liner the result might indeed be a toss-up, but that would not matter because in the tussle the German would almost certainly have her speed curtailed and be easily destroyed subsequently. There were plenty of British liners to expend in this way. The Carmania/Cap Trafalgar and Alcantara/Greif actions proved what anyone could have foretold, these armed merchantmen were soap-bubbles armed with hatpins, which could only ever win Pyrrhic victories against armed opposition. (Except as Q ships and an ocean greyhound cannot do disguise).

However the reality was that the battlefleets of Britain and Germany continued to grow and prosper but the geographical position of Germany and her lack of any developed overseas colonies with dockyards and logistical support where detached fleets could be based meant the antagonists would be constrained to the North Sea. The Hochsee Fleet would never sail the High Seas. Whilst the Austro Hungarian fleet remained a threat, the Goeben was on the loose and the Italians were undecided, a detached British battlecruiser fleet was maintained in the Mediterranean, but once the Adriatic was shut down, they were drawn back to the North Sea battlefleet scouting role. There they were intended to punch their way through enemy cruiser screens as Hood with the Invincibles did at Jutland, or screening the battlefleet from enemy scouts as Beatty did at the same time as he pushed Hipper round to the east, keeping Scheer unaware almost until Jellicoe's first salvoes landed.

There were casualties to be risked, and accepted, since the ruling triangle of armament vs protection vs speed still prevailed, and British designs favoured the first and last over the middle.

I believe Andrew Gordon's book to be a valuable source because in addition to factual and detailed description it explains the ideas and attitudes of the RN in that time and their influence on decision-making. It also highlights the cataclysmic impact between the attitudes of the "Fishpond" and more conservative elements. Nowhere is the disjunct between modern liberal thinking with encouragement and acceptance of initiative by subordinates and the attitudes of those far off times clearer than around p139. The stolid and unimaginative Evan-Thomas continues to steam towards inevitable doom at the hands of the entire HSF as Beatty races past in the opposite direction, because the flag signal ordering his turn has not been hauled down.



All the best

wadinga


The stolid and unimaginative Evan-Thomas continues to steam towards inevitable doom at the hands of the entire HSF as Beatty races past in the opposite direction, because the flag signal ordering his turn has not been hauled down



They say that foaming in the Mediterranean off Lebanon on the afternoon of May 31st 1916 was Tyron spinning in the watery depths!
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2471
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by wadinga »

Hi HMSVF,

Are you sure it wasn't Alec Guinness in Kind Hearts and Coronets?

Don't you have an opinion on the battlecruiser's origin: super-cruiser or liner chaser wrangle? :cool:

Further research in Friedman's British Cruisers of the Victorian Era shows the big cruisers from Powerful and Terrible on had long stroke vertical triple expansion engines which still fitted below the protective deck.

When DNC White produced the Cressy 1897-98 armoured cruiser design to act as a fast wing of the battlefleet, Friedman says
White had invented the battlecruiser. In effect he had reached the same conclusion the Germans did about a decade later, that a fast ship with battleship protection but somewhat lighter guns would be well worthwhile.
That is Pre-Dreadnought battleship armour, but with a speed advantage over the Pre-Dreadnought fleet. Subsequent classes upped the power and armament incrementally, leading inexorably to the step-change which was the Invincibles, which needed a speed advantage over Dreadnought for the same reasons.

All the best
wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
HMSVF
Senior Member
Posts: 347
Joined: Sun Jun 17, 2018 10:15 am

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by HMSVF »

Hi Wadinga,

I think there development was part of a rationalisation of RN numbers and focus. Fisher had already called the RN a “ a misers hoard of old junk” with ships “too old to fight,too slow to run away” (or similar). I think that he (rightly) saw Germany as the biggest threat. We had a treaty with Japan and it was highly unlikely that there would be war with the USA.

However he couldn’t ignore the empires needs. Rather than have a multitude of cruisers of differing sizes and strengths he goes for a dreadnought armoured cruiser. Fast,long legged,more than a match for an armoured cruiser or a pair of them. They also had the utility that they could be brought back to home waters in strength if need be. By having smaller numbers of dreadnought armoured cruisers he frees up crew,makes logistics easier (no multiple calibre sizes between 6 and 9.2 inches). If he decided to pair them up then you could have a homogeneous squadron of ships capable of similar speeds.

The problem was that it only worked if others didn’t follow suit.
Luckily apart from Goeben the HSF kept theirs at home. Spee with say Von der Tann and say Moltke would have been a nightmare scenario for the short time that they were able to operate (before they ran out of coal or munitions).

The Falklands action showed the dreadnought armoured cruiser in the role it was meant to take - a hare amongst tortoises. Could Stoddart have done it with say HMS Defence/Minotaur/Shannon?
Yes,but it would have been a close run thing.


Eventually the whole concept turns into a prototype fast battleship with bigger guns,better boilers and increased armour (except Renown and Repulse - which Fisher pushed for).
Hood was probably the proper prototype but I believe that she initially was to have 9 inch sloped armour...

Perhaps the biggest problem was calling them battlecruisers? Too similar to ‘battleship’,leaving them at risk of being used as proper ‘ships of the line’ as opposed to vessels that could smash the scouting forces of an enemy or sink a rogue armoured cruiser in a distant sea.

Just my musings!

(Apologies for grammar etc - typed on phone!)
Byron Angel
Senior Member
Posts: 1655
Joined: Sun Mar 06, 2011 1:06 am

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by Byron Angel »

Been ill.

The logic underlying the "dreadnought armoured cruiser" as a solution to the German high-speed transatlantic raid threat was that the government was spending stupendous amounts in subsidy payments to the commercial owners of the huge new British transatlantic liners in order to have use of them in case of war; one of their important tasks would have been to deal with the a/m German raider threat. The DAC alternative was a less expensive and far more flexible tool for the job. And it was Fisher's premier obligation to the government to get the unsustainable naval budged under control by any means necessary.

It is not an coincidence that the Chief of the Naval Intelligence Division (the very Admiralty entity that had been sounding the alarm with respect to the German liner threat) sat on the very design committee that developed the Invincible. Smirking dismissive rhetoric that blithely dismisses the case as a matter of comical inconsequentiality really does disappoint me.

Nicholas Lambert (who has IMO done some good work) is a faithful academic understudy within the Sumida personality cult that operates at the University of Maryland. Interested parties might wish to examine some of Sumida's interesting outlooks on certain points (see, for example - "A Matter of Timing" by Sumida in JMH). Read also Sumida's JMH review and further exchanges with John Brooks in connection with his 2005 book "Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland - The Question of Fire Control". Sumida's latest project is to discredit the work of Arthur Marder, who apparently ... just did not get the big picture when he wrote his seminally important series "From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow".

I'm going to leave this little chat to the resident experts here. Enjoy yourselves.

Byron
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2471
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by wadinga »

Hi HMSVF,

Perceptive observations as usual. :ok:

I sometimes think these high-level academic types generate strange arguments for their own amusement and status enhancement. Germany "not a maritime threat" for one school (apparently Sumida et al) or they are, but with "Paper Tiger" ersatz warships that only battlecruisers can catch(Prof Seligmann).

According to Archibald Hurd's WWI study on Britain's Merchant Navy athttp://naval-history.net/WW1Book-MN1a-M ... d.htm#II

Where he lists all the merchant ships Germany could have armed, both at home and overseas, and the preparations for so doing, only a tiny fraction were so utilised, the vast majority sitting around for years, either in internment or idle in German ports. He makes clear, as do several others that it was unassuming, undistinguished, easily-disguised, slow, but most importantly, economical with fuel (coal) vessels which made the best raiders.

Keble Chatterton in his 1931 book The Sea Raiders describes the breakout of the four funnel flyer Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse from Germany after receiving a somewhat limited armament, despite outfitting in Bremerhaven, and exhausting her coal stocks after only 12 days and hiding inshore off Spanish Sahara awaiting colliers. En route she took 48 shots to sink the captured trawler Tubal Cain and a further 53 to sink the 7,000 ton Kaipara but her gunners got no more practice against the 3,000 ton Nyanga, sunk with dynamite charge. A couple of other ships were let go on account of passengers, before HMS Highflyer, a very ordinary old cruiser, previously demoted to training ship, attacked the partially refuelled raider. German accounts allege the ship was scuttled because she couldn't get away, and Highflyer claimed she sank her enemy. There was never a need to create battlecruisers to chase "Paper Tigers".

There was surely no question Germany was a major threat to British worldwide commerce, and this was identified before the turn of the century, but it seems factions in the German hierarchy were unsure which way to direct their efforts. The Tirpitz school were keen on a battlefleet to go toe-to-toe with the RN, whilst another school including Admiral Karl Galster thought more along "Jeune Ecole" lines with minor vessels to harass the British close to home and previously-deployed cruisers as commerce raiders to cripple British economic life with attacks overseas. Galster highlighted the geographical difficulty with the British Isles blocking routes out to the World's oceans from the Fatherland and the lack of German overseas bases with sophisticated facilities.

Tirpitz was the winner, got his battlefleet, but could never match British building rates, the army feeling it was the German Senior Service and demanding resources, and he made the usual German compensation of building fewer, better ships.

The nearest thing the Germans had to a base for overseas fleet operations was Tsingtao and the Japanese came in quickly to lay their hands on that. Von Spee was homeless and even organised German ex-pats in South America couldn't keep his fleet supplied. I believe there was a plan for German battlecruisers to break out of the UK blockade to try and help him in, if he made it to the N Atlantic, but the chance never happened. Goeben had the Ottoman Empire as an unassailable base, made a nuisance of herself on occasion, but was too badly outnumbered in both the Black Sea and Mediterranean to do much.

You are definitely right that Fisher as a force of innovation didn't bother too much about the enemy's reaction or probably whether they would build better ships. As I quoted him, the enemy response was just a lever to get even more of what he wanted. With a head start anyway, and the "We Want Eight" attitude, he expected to overwhelm the enemy with numbers.

Fast battleships would in time replace the battlecruiser, and the shade of Fisher would undoubtedly enjoy the fast Iowa vs slow Yamato arguments which rage around here. :lol:

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2471
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by wadinga »

Hi Byron,

Genuinely sorry to hear you have been unwell and that my observations may have caused any additional distress. However I just don't believe Prof Seligmann's thesis as stated.

To put "stupendous" into context, from the Cunard site:
"British prestige was at stake. The British Government provided Cunard with an annual subsidy of £150,000 plus a low interest loan of £2.5 million (equivalent to £271 million in 2019),[12] to pay for the construction of the two superliners, the Blue Riband winners Lusitania and Mauretania, capable of 26.0 knots
and the costing of conversion of Invincible's turrets from unreliable electric operation:
They proved to be a failure despite two lengthy refits in 1909 and 1911 and were converted to hydraulic power during her refit in early 1914 at a cost of £151,200.
One equipment fix was the same price as the annual subsidy. Boats are just holes in the water you pour money into.

Hope you feel better soon. All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
Steve Crandell
Senior Member
Posts: 954
Joined: Wed Feb 05, 2014 7:05 pm

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by Steve Crandell »

Ironically one of the most successful German raiders was SMS Seaadler, which was a three masted sailing ship.
HMSVF
Senior Member
Posts: 347
Joined: Sun Jun 17, 2018 10:15 am

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by HMSVF »

Byron Angel wrote: Tue Feb 02, 2021 7:59 pm Been ill.

The logic underlying the "dreadnought armoured cruiser" as a solution to the German high-speed transatlantic raid threat was that the government was spending stupendous amounts in subsidy payments to the commercial owners of the huge new British transatlantic liners in order to have use of them in case of war; one of their important tasks would have been to deal with the a/m German raider threat. The DAC alternative was a less expensive and far more flexible tool for the job. And it was Fisher's premier obligation to the government to get the unsustainable naval budged under control by any means necessary.

It is not an coincidence that the Chief of the Naval Intelligence Division (the very Admiralty entity that had been sounding the alarm with respect to the German liner threat) sat on the very design committee that developed the Invincible. Smirking dismissive rhetoric that blithely dismisses the case as a matter of comical inconsequentiality really does disappoint me.

Nicholas Lambert (who has IMO done some good work) is a faithful academic understudy within the Sumida personality cult that operates at the University of Maryland. Interested parties might wish to examine some of Sumida's interesting outlooks on certain points (see, for example - "A Matter of Timing" by Sumida in JMH). Read also Sumida's JMH review and further exchanges with John Brooks in connection with his 2005 book "Dreadnought Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland - The Question of Fire Control". Sumida's latest project is to discredit the work of Arthur Marder, who apparently ... just did not get the big picture when he wrote his seminally important series "From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow".

I'm going to leave this little chat to the resident experts here. Enjoy yourselves.

Byron
I'm going to leave this little chat to the resident experts here. Enjoy yourselves

Hope you feel better soon Byron. I'm certainly not an 'expert'! Just have an interest and spent probably too much time (and money!) reading :lol:
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2471
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by wadinga »

Hi All,

According to Anthony Preston's Battleships of WWI Invincible cost £1.6 million so not loaning any money to Cunard wouldn't buy many of them. Additionally the motive for the government loan might be to keep shipyards busy and capability in place, not just to get potential use of these merchant ships, which might get requisitioned anyway in time of war.

As an "Eco-raider" using the wind, Seeadler didn't need coal stocks, but I was in error earlier on when I incorrectly said she beat Kronprinz Wilhelm on tonnage. Oops :oops: Many of her captures were sailing ships.
Over the next 225 days, she captured 15 ships in the Atlantic and Pacific and led the British and US Navies on a merry chase
.
Sixteen ships, totaling 30,099 tons, were captured by Seeadler between 21 December 1916 and 8 September 1917.
Wikipedia

I am no bannerman swearing fealty to House Sumida, House Lambert or House Seligmann and have no interest in their academic Game of Thrones and any "smirking dismissive rhetoric" is only my poor effort to add a little levity in the current all-pervading gloom. "Soap bubbles with hat pins" was intended to compare the defensive weakness of merchant cruisers with even that of the much-maligned battlecruisers. One of the most successful raiders, Moewe, was forced back to harbour by the damage inflicted by the heroic fight of the out-gunned merchant ship Otaki with her single 4.7" gun, before she sank, her captain going down with his ship.

As a Merchant officer, her Captain Archibald Bisset-Smith could not receive the VC at that time. In 1919 he was posthumously commissioned as a temporary lieutenant in the Royal Naval Reserve, which entitled him to receive the VC posthumously.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
Byron Angel
Senior Member
Posts: 1655
Joined: Sun Mar 06, 2011 1:06 am

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by Byron Angel »

A brief of the details of the Cunard subsidy program of 1902, passed under the Balfour government can be found by searching "British government subsidies to Cunard Line 1902 (The paper is freely D/L from JStor).

In short - The British government loaned Cunard approximately two million pounds sterling for the construction of two high speed transatlantic liners of the highest speed (Mauretania; Lusitania) specifically required within the agreement to be able to outpace the latest German liner designs. The loan was repayable in twenty annual payments at 2.75 pct per annum. Construction time was approximately two years. As soon the ships entered service, the British government was obliged to pay Cunard an outright annual subsidy of one hundred fifty thousand pounds per annum through the twenty year validity period of the agreement. Over the period of the entire twenty year subsidy program, the British government effectively loaned Cunard two million pounds sterling at 2.75pct per annum interest over twenty years, while also paying Cunard an outright amount in subsidy of close to three million pounds sterling.

The British government did not lend money to Cunard for construction of these two ships; it effectively bought and paid for two of the fastest most modern high-speed transatlantic liners afloat on behalf of Cunard. This is what was meant by fiscally unsustainable subsidy programs to counter the latest fast German liners on the transatlantic sea lanes.

ONCE AGAIN, these were decisions undertaken by the British government based upon its perception of the trade threat in the period 1902-1905; it had absolutely nothing to do with what ultimately came to pass ten years later in 1914.

Just read the history honestly

B
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2471
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by wadinga »

Hi Byron,

Glad you are feeling better and clearly so feisty.

From the World War One site wwionline.org/articles/complex-case-rms-lusitania/
The Lusitania and her sister ship the Mauretania were built to dominate the luxury transatlantic passenger trade. At the end of the 19th century, the iconic Cunard Steamship Line was losing business to an American conglomerate, headlined by the White Star Line and owned by financier JP Morgan, and the Germans. To maintain its hegemony, Cunard needed to build newer, faster, and more luxurious ships, but lacked the funds. Emphasizing the British Empire’s competitive disadvantage, Cunard appealed to the government for a loan. Parliament responded with £ 2.6 million to construct the two largest and fastest ships on the seas. Until the loan was repaid, the Admiralty owned a percentage of the ships, and Cunard would turn them over to the Navy for use in the event of hostilities. Cunard also had to remain in British hands. No foreign investor could ever own a share of the great steamship line.
And from Wikipedia:
American millionaire businessman J. P. Morgan had decided to invest in transatlantic shipping by creating a new company, International Mercantile Marine (IMM), and, in 1901, purchased the British freight shipper Frederick Leyland & Co. and a controlling interest in the British passenger White Star Line and folded them into IMM. In 1902, IMM, NDL and HAPAG entered into a "Community of Interest" to fix prices and divide among them the transatlantic trade. The partners also acquired a 51% stake in the Dutch Holland America Line. IMM made offers to purchase Cunard which, along with the French CGT, was now its principal rival.[16]
So there is at least a suggestion this was purely a prestige/political/business decision, based on subsidising Cunard against its American/German cartel rival and protecting it from take-over. The British government only "bought" these ships at the end of the 20 year loan period, when they would be pretty worthless.

I think I can spot "honest" history when I see it. Let's not fall out over this, it's just a bit of fun.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
Byron Angel
Senior Member
Posts: 1655
Joined: Sun Mar 06, 2011 1:06 am

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by Byron Angel »

Read the entire JSTor article referenced, Sean, and do the math for yourself - it was a “loan” in name only: two million pounds loaned and three million pounds in direct subsidy was an unprecedented deal implemented at a time when the naval budget was approaching a crisis level. I hardly imagine this sort of spending was undertaken to support the honor of the British merchant ensign on the Atlantic trade lanes.

And then one must ask ... why bother? The Naval Defence Act of 1898 had put into motion a massive cruiser construction program - more than fifty large ocean-going cruisers built between 1899 and 1905 ... and the navy faced ZERO credible raiding cruiser threat from any foreseeable enemy.

Yet, in 1904/1905 the Committee on Designs was convened and produced the radical new Invincible. Why? Bacon (who officially participated in the deliberations as a Representative of the Admiralty) clearly provided the answer ... to deal with the high speed transatlantic raider threat that the fifty new reciprocating-engine armored cruisers were perceived as unable to resolve. Corbettand Marder both confirm the point.

It is a matter of utter amazement to me that this clear and unambiguously presented case is being tossed off as a matter on inconsequence.

You are entitled to your opinion, Sean. This is my last post on the Subject. I am not interested in circular exercises in clever repartee to pass idle time.

Byron
HMSVF
Senior Member
Posts: 347
Joined: Sun Jun 17, 2018 10:15 am

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by HMSVF »

Byron Angel wrote: Fri Feb 05, 2021 1:43 pm Read the entire JSTor article referenced, Sean, and do the math for yourself - it was a “loan” in name only: two million pounds loaned and three million pounds in direct subsidy was an unprecedented deal implemented at a time when the naval budget was approaching a crisis level. I hardly imagine this sort of spending was undertaken to support the honor of the British merchant ensign on the Atlantic trade lanes.

And then one must ask ... why bother? The Naval Defence Act of 1898 had put into motion a massive cruiser construction program - more than fifty large ocean-going cruisers built between 1899 and 1905 ... and the navy faced ZERO credible raiding cruiser threat from any foreseeable enemy.

Yet, in 1904/1905 the Committee on Designs was convened and produced the radical new Invincible. Why? Bacon (who officially participated in the deliberations as a Representative of the Admiralty) clearly provided the answer ... to deal with the high speed transatlantic raider threat that the fifty new reciprocating-engine armored cruisers were perceived as unable to resolve. Corbettand Marder both confirm the point.

It is a matter of utter amazement to me that this clear and unambiguously presented case is being tossed off as a matter on inconsequence.

You are entitled to your opinion, Sean. This is my last post on the Subject. I am not interested in circular exercises in clever repartee to pass idle time.

Byron

Isn't possible your both right?

My impression on the Mauritania and Lusitania was they were designed in such a way to be converted in auxiliary armed cruisers (reinforced decks in certain areas to enable gun mountings to be fitted etc).in times of war. Now there must be a reason for that, if it was purely to catch bog standard merchantmen then you don't need a 26 knot vessel to do it.

In regards to Fisher,as I said before I think he saw savings in crew, logistics and therefore money in producing a big fat super cruiser that could kill anything it could outgun and outrun, whilst showing the flag at the same time. When he came to power the RN had many cruisers of varying quality and age and usefulness.An awful lot were old crocks, knackered and slow. I think that he supposed that he could repeat the "dreadnought" trick by rationalisation. Get rid of the junk and have a core of vessels that could mop up any likely threat. The most likely threat was Germany and Germany did have a Far East squadron of armoured cruisers and light cruisers. If just say things went pear shaped with Itay,Turkey,Russia,Austria for example he (Fisher) would still have ships that could ruin most of those navies day and outrun the vessels that were a tough nut to crack,falling back to join a battleship squadron.


I don't think it's an either or debate tbh

Just my 2 penneth.


Best wishes HMSVF
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2471
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: Books on British Battlecruisers?

Post by wadinga »

Hi HMSVF,

Hitting two birds with one stone is always an attractive prospect for bean counters and Fisher cleverly pushed his Battlecruiser programme forward with "and another thing, we can get these liners with them as well", which transmogrifies in Bacon's eulogistic biography of the great man into the very origin of the battlecruiser concept. This was written at a time when the memories of the battlecruiser class were dominated by the "points lost" at Jutland which made the action a British "defeat" for those whose evaluation was as facile as merely counting up tonnage lost. Not to mention Fisher's newly-built "White Elephants" the Navy was saddled with after WWI which counted towards Washington Treaty tonnage, and could not be discarded. Representing the first battlecruisers as merchant ship hunters helped deflect blame away from Bacon's mentor and sponsor's memory, and was accepted without demure by some, although Dewar said it was "absurd" soon after it was written.

V Tarrant in Battlecruiser Invincible, writing in 1986 of the ships's last few moments on p 106 says:
And so it was that a ship designed to hunt down armed merchant cruisers and marauding cruisers much weaker than herself, now found herself as leading ship of the battlefleet and about to become engaged with vastly superior battlecruisers and the powerful battleships leading the van of the German fleet.
Ships "designed to hunt down armed merchant cruisers" did not need 12" guns or 6" armour. As Dewar observed far cheaper, and thus numerous vessels could have done this function. Numbers meant covering more international locations than a few, expensive battlecruisers could possibly do.

At the risk of further exasperating Byron I am somewhat confused by
The Naval Defence Act of 1898 had put into motion a massive cruiser construction program - more than fifty large ocean-going cruisers built between 1899 and 1905 ... and the navy faced ZERO credible raiding cruiser threat from any foreseeable enemy.
There was a British Naval Defence Act in 1889 which did expand the cruiser fleet (along with Pre-Dreadnoughts) greatly
Nine first-class cruisers of the Edgar class, twenty-nine second-class cruisers of the Apollo and Astraea classes and four third-class cruisers of the Pearl class were provided
This was an attempt to maintain the "two-power" standard, largely against France and Russia. Most of these ships were obsolete and qualified for Fisher's "discard" pile, as you described. At the same time a Government financing deal was struck:

www.whitestarhistory.com/teutonic
In the later part of the 1880’s, White Star Line struck a deal with the British Government to help fund the construction of two new ships. The deal was that the Government would help to fund them in return for in time of war the ships being available to be and designed to be easily converted into armed merchant cruisers. The first of these ships completed was RMS Teutonic, followed by a sister ship RMS Majestic.
Both ships held the Blue Riband at various times.

and

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RMS_Campania
RMS Campania was a British ocean liner owned by the Cunard Steamship Line Shipping Company, built by Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company of Govan, Scotland, and launched on Thursday, 8 September 1892.
Identical in dimensions and specifications to her sister ship RMS Lucania, Campania was the largest and fastest passenger liner afloat when she entered service in 1893. She crossed the Atlantic in less than six days, and on her second voyage in 1893, she won the prestigious Blue Riband, previously held by the Inman Liner SS City of Paris. The following year, Lucania won the Blue Riband and kept the title until 1898 - Campania being the marginally slower of the two sisters.
Campania and Lucania were partly financed by the Admiralty. The deal was that Cunard would receive money from the Government in return for constructing vessels to admiralty specifications and also on condition that the vessels go on the naval reserve list to serve as armed merchant cruisers when required by the government. The contracts were awarded to the Fairfield Shipbuilding and Engineering Company, which at the time was one of Britain’s biggest producers of warships.
Both ships held the Blue Riband at various times.

So there was a long tradition of the British Government subsidising British companies' new liners, decades before Mauretania and Lusitania at the start of the 20th century. But by then J P Morgan was busy buying up British liner companies, had proposed take over of Cunard and the government felt they must be saved from foreign control with money and new competitive ships.

The debate and vote to grant the loan and subsidy to Cunard was described in Hansard as occurring in the early hours (4-5 am) of 2nd August 1904, after an acrimonious debate in which members pointed out it made no commercial or even military sense and were appalled it was being forced through with a rushed debate at such an unearthly hour.

ERNEST PRETYMAN Secretary of the Admiralty
What the Admiralty were getting in return for this agreement were ships of a speed which would enable them to command the Atlantic. There were in existence at this moment four steamers of considerably greater speed than any steamer owned in this country. Bearing in mind recent events, the position of the food supplies of the country, and the fact that there were four steamers on the Atlantic which we could not catch, he thought it would be worth a large sum to obtain vessels which would secure to them
MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL Are there no warships that could catch these steamers?
Mr PRETYMAN said the range of a warship was measured in a totally different way to that of a merchant ship. Atlantic liners were constructed on very different lines to warships. The new Cunarders would be able, if necessary, to command the Atlantic. They would be able to catch any ship which could be placed on the Atlantic to injure their trade and stop their food supplies.
So the Secretary dodged answering Winston's question, (Prof Seligmann has made up his own reasons why 23 knot warships couldn't catch 23 knot liners), and the Government pushed through the deal, whether there was any real value in the ships as AMCs or not. Fisher and other Navy men were appalled, they wanted any money available spent on proper warships, not liners.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
Post Reply