HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

From the birth of the Dreadnought to the period immediately after the end of World War I.
User avatar
marcelo_malara
Senior Member
Posts: 1845
Joined: Sun Oct 02, 2005 11:14 pm
Location: buenos aires

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by marcelo_malara »

Hi Wadinga. Your post seems correct, because the port proper is as far to the W of the entrance as your deduced position is to the E of it, so for the intention of commanding the entrance both position would be the same, with the E position having the advantage of more range to the sea. The scale on the right of the posted chart are minutes of latitude, which equals to nautic miles, so your position would be not many miles away from the town but just two.

Regards
Byron Angel
Senior Member
Posts: 1651
Joined: Sun Mar 06, 2011 1:06 am

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by Byron Angel »

paul.mercer wrote: Wed Jul 21, 2021 8:18 am Gentlemen,
Just a thought, if Canopus had been able to raise enough steam get out, how would she have fared against the German squadron?
I doubt that CANOPUS would have succeeded in getting into action at all. Apart from raising steam, it would have been necessary to pump out the compartments of her double-bottom which had been filled to settle her down on the bottom. Beyond that, according to Captain Grant's account, her best speed at the time was 12-13kts sustained and 14-15 kts in short bursts. With von Spee's ships fleeing at 20-22 kts, she never would have been able to get into range before the day's business had been concluded by INVINCIBLE and INFLEXIBLE.

If CANOPUS, by some circumstance, had managed to get into action, her 12-inch main battery spoke pretty much the same language as those of the battle-cruisers, just much more slowly; her 6-inch secondary battery would certainly have been lethal to any light cruisers she might be so fortunate as to overtake.

Byron
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2467
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by wadinga »

Hello Marcelo and Byron,

Two drawings (one by noted naval artist Wyllie) on the Canopus wikipedia page shows Canopus firing to port suggesting she was moored with ship's head roughly south. Note the secure multiple anchor chains and topmasts sent down to minimise her profile.

Another artist's impression exists on the web but shows topmasts raised with battle ensigns at both and firing to starboard over land, apparently under way. I think this is more like guesswork.

Naval history net gives us her log for 8th Dec 1914
Port Stanley
Lat -51.69, Long -57.85
04.30am: Patrol boat returned.
06.20am: Naval yard party left.
07.30am: Unknown warships sighted to Southward.
08.30am: Action. Cruisers verified as German squadron.
09.19am: Opened fire fore & Aft 12” turrets on “Gneisenau & Nürnberg”.
09.30am: Ceased fire. Enemy retreated.
10.00am: Fleet put to sea.
10.00am: Ammunition expended 12” Pointed common & full charges 5 in number.
Noon: Water distilled 19 tons, water expended 15 tons, water remaining 102 tons, fuel expended for all purposes 31 tons, fuel remaining 1179.8 tons.
01.10pm: Dockyard party returned.
02.30pm: Hands at Action stations.
05.30pm: 2 seamen, 1 stoker & 1 Marine joined from hospital.
06.30pm: W/T. signal “Scharnhorst & Gneisenau” sunk.
08.30pm: Patrol boat left.
09.30pm: Night defence stations.
It seems no one had owned up to practice ammunition being fired. :cool:

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
User avatar
marcelo_malara
Senior Member
Posts: 1845
Joined: Sun Oct 02, 2005 11:14 pm
Location: buenos aires

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by marcelo_malara »

So, they were not two full broadsides?
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2467
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by wadinga »

Hi Marcelo,

Maybe they fired 7 shots with one failure and decided not to account for the mix-up in inventory between Common Pointed and practice shells. This is just the day log and the "practice ammo" story probably emerged later. Much later, since someone might be in "hot water" over it. Richard Hough's The Great War at Sea mentions the story in connection with papers left by Captain R F Phillimore, commander of HMS Inflexible, which picked up Gneisenau survivors, including Commander Pochhammer, who was given excellent hospitality in his captor's ship, including wining and dining with the ship's officers. He may be the source of the story of a non-exploding hit on the funnel, and only when it was followed up would the practice ammunition deception come to light.

There is an account by a midshipman from HMS Carnarvon of the considerable efforts made and risks taken to pick up these German survivors. The ship's whaler was smashed against the side and rescuers and potentially rescued alike were thrown into the freezing sea. Luckily most were recovered.

You could try contacting Canopus' Gunnery Officer Lieutenant-Commander Philip Hordern. if you are really troubled by this discrepancy, he could probably resolve it, but you will need an Ouija board since he has been dead since 1950.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
Byron Angel
Senior Member
Posts: 1651
Joined: Sun Mar 06, 2011 1:06 am

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by Byron Angel »

Hi Marcelo,
Of the sources I have read regarding Canopus, most mention two 2-shot salvoes (I am assuming turret salvoes) for 4 rounds in toto; one or two sources mention five rounds discharged, but fail to elaborate as to details.

B
Byron Angel
Senior Member
Posts: 1651
Joined: Sun Mar 06, 2011 1:06 am

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by Byron Angel »

Interesting sidelight to "Canopus" - I was always under the impression that the preparations for Canopus to defend Port Stanley sprang from the mind of Captain Grant. But it seems that he was carrying out explicit Admiralty orders. Following signal text excerpted from relevant Naval Staff Monograph-

From Admiralty
November 9th
Sent 3:10 a.m.

To I.O., Monte Video,

Following orders to “Canopus” and “Glasgow” : –
Canopus” to remain in Stanley Harbour. Moor your ship so that the guns command the entrance. Extemporise mines outside the entrance. Be prepared for bombardment from outside the harbor; send down your topmasts. Stimulate the Governor to organize all local forces and make determined defence. Arrange observation stations on shore to enable you to direct fire upon ships outside. Land guns or use boats’ torpedoes to sink blocking ship before she reaches the narrows. No objection to your grounding ship to obtain a good berth. Send “Glasgow” on to River Plate should she be able to get sufficient start of enemy to avoid capture. If not, moor her inside “Canopus”. Repair your defects and await orders.


The rabbit hole is always deeper than you think.

Byron
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2467
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by wadinga »

Hello Byron,

This signal is exactly as recalled by Grant in his memoir I linked to earlier on. Admiralty orders but surely not Admiralty language.

"Stimulate the Governor". "Make determined defence" "Extemporise mines" These are the ringing phrases of the man who "mobilised the English Language" against its enemies. The indelible watermark of First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Spencer Churchill, not what an aide might suggest to First Sea Lord Jacky Fisher. "We cannot envisage" and "even if it means towing KG V" are him inserting his words (even the daftest) into Pound's instructions in the Bismarck Chase a quarter of a century later, and here, he and Fisher, having bullied the unfortunate Cradock to oblivion with his inferior force, seek to make amends by micromanaging from afar the very limited defence remaining for the Falklands. Grant complains he is expected to send daily reports to London despite many thousands of miles distance and the vagaries of 1914 telecommunications.

However, having instructed Grant to laager the wagons, not shoot till he sees the whites of their eyes and to tell the womenfolk they should choose death before dishonour, one cannot fault them in their next move, sending the cavalry to the rescue, post-haste! Unfortunately Sturdee is so unflappable and measured and unhurried, it needs Luce of the Glasgow to get him to "get a move on" and he only just arrives in time. Even then there is a scare for WSC when it appears from initial reports Von Spee has caught Sturdee coaling. But Canopus' hit puts the wind up the enemy, as do a few glimpsed masts and funnels, and hunters are instantly transformed into prey.

Much as I admire the "Great Monster" for his overall leadership of the country in WW II, it often seems when one goes down the rabbit hole, in search of the pesky varmint, the rabbit turns out to have a cigar and a brandy, rather than a pocket watch and white gloves.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
User avatar
marcelo_malara
Senior Member
Posts: 1845
Joined: Sun Oct 02, 2005 11:14 pm
Location: buenos aires

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by marcelo_malara »

Very good data guys, thanks! Remains the question of how the gun´s fire was controlled, I presumed that a future position of the target was selected, the time of arrival of the target to that position computed, and at that time of arrival less the time of flight of the shells the guns were fired. It is remarkably to have hit the ship, no doubt that the projectile ricocheting in the water contributed to this, I imagine that the projectile must have flown quiet low creating a danger zone greater than same descending projectile would.
Byron Angel
Senior Member
Posts: 1651
Joined: Sun Mar 06, 2011 1:06 am

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by Byron Angel »

marcelo_malara wrote: Fri Jul 23, 2021 2:35 am Very good data guys, thanks! Remains the question of how the gun´s fire was controlled, I presumed that a future position of the target was selected, the time of arrival of the target to that position computed, and at that time of arrival less the time of flight of the shells the guns were fired. It is remarkably to have hit the ship, no doubt that the projectile ricocheting in the water contributed to this, I imagine that the projectile must have flown quiet low creating a danger zone greater than same descending projectile would.
Hi Marcelo,
My understanding is that, although the guns of Canopus could fire over the intervening spit of land with application of a slight elevation, the intervening terrain was nevertheless too high for the gunlayers in the turrets (no director control) to themselves see their targets. Fire control, such as it was, was therefore the responsibility of the spotting station established atop nearby Sapper Hill and in contact with Canopus by telephone.

I have NO idea at what range Canopus really opened fire; various sources cite ranges of 11,000 yds, 11,500 yds, 14,500 yds, even 15,000 meters (impossible IMO). I have opted to work with 11,000 yds and the assumption that the guns were not worn out.

The following ballistic data comes from His Majesty's Ballistic Tables 1918 -

12-in 35 calibre B.L. Mk VIII
Projectile: Common Piercing, Mk IV (2crh)
Initial velocity = 2350 f/s
Elevation = 9deg 20min
Range - 11,000 yds
Angle of Descent = 14deg 28min
Time of Flight = 20.38 sec
Remaining Velocity = 1217 f/s

Danger Space for 30ft target = 35yds
50pct Zone @ 11,000 yds = Length 66.2yds / Breadth 6.7yds / Height 48.6ft


The spotting station on Sapper Hill presumably had tracked the approach of Gneisenau and Nurnberg while they closed toward Port Stanley, converted their estimate range and range rate, target speed and target inclination to values relevant to the position of Canopus, and then transmitted those values to gunnery control aboard Canopus. I'm assuming that target bearing was converted on the basis of some mutually accessible reference azimuth like true (or perhaps magnetic) North or South. The gunners would add a deflection estimate and compute projected gun range on view of estimate target speed and inclination ..... and then opened fire at a selected estimated range. Given the fairly tight "50pct zone", my "back of the napkin" guess is that the range would have to have been correct to within +/- 35 yards to have a 50/50 chance of hitting with one round. It is no surprise to me that there were no hits (leaving aside the miraculous ricochet which is said to have dinged Gneisenau's funnel.

FWIW.

B
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2467
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by wadinga »

Hi All,

Just finished reading an excellent, but slim book, The Battle of the Falklands 1914 by Graham Pascoe. He is a professional translator of German and appears to have done excellent local research on the Falklands.

He says Canopus was moored, not as I guessed, in the extreme east of Port Stanley bay, which is known as the Canache and dries out, but in Whalebone Cove a little further north, in a location now occupied by a wreck, the "Lady Liz". She could still fire over the land, firing over the port bow, and over the starboard quarter, covering the narrow ingress from Port William to Port Stanley.

He clarifies that the Sapper Hill observation point was SW of Stanley town and its elevation of 450ft gave it the earliest view of the enemy, and the volunteer member of the local defence force, a Dane called Christian Andreasen, phoned through his sighting report direct to Canopus which was number 14 in the specially-laid telephone network. Captain Grant had the warning radioed to Invincible, but there was no acknowledgement. Eventually Glasgow attracted the flagship's attention by firing a gun and flashed a searchlight message through the haze of coaling dust surrounding Sturdee's vessel.

Spotters were despatched from Canopus to her telephone-equipped observation station located nearby on a 72ft elevation hill, now called Canopus Hill, just south of the airport, and Grant and other officers went up into the Spotting Top from where they got a view of the enemy. Midshipman Robert Dickson quoted in Pascoe says
They thought they'd got such a soft job on and slowed down to make their shooting certain. As they did we let rip with the fore turret at 16,000 yds. Our first salvo was a long way short. It must have been a surprise to them. Then they altered course about five points to starboard for ten minutes or so and then resumed their original course, keeping in line ahead. As they turned the first time we fired our second salvo. One shell from our fore turret burst just over the Gneisenau covering her decks with splinters. Our after turret right gun fell about 400 yds short and 200 left , richochetted and struck her amidships between the third and fourth funnels, and a cloud of steam rushed up.
Pascoe quotes a report by Grant which does not claim the hit personally but says Pembroke Point lighthouse, the detached battery at Lake Point and an examination ship in the harbour all said they saw this hit. He also says these shots were fired at maximum elevation (navweaps says this is 13.5 degrees for these mounts). Conceivably the ship might have been heeled somewhat to give extra range

Pascoe, who has read both Pochammer's and Raeder's accounts in original German says they make no mention of the hit. Wishful thinking by the British, or unwillingness to acknowledge it by the Germans? He records that Pochammer says there was no realisation their pursuers were battlecruisers until after 10.00 when two ships began to outdistance the other vessels chasing him. It would seem "possible" tripod masts did not scare away Von Spee initially , but organized resistance by whatever ships were in harbour, as he was hoping for an unopposed raid. He had no ammunition reserves for a fight, and thought he could escape with speed from whatever ships, like the Kent, the British had scraped together.

He did not know until too late that battlecruisers, designed from the outset to overwhelm armoured cruisers like his, were in chase, and he was doomed. The posy of flowers he was offered in Valparaiso would never lie on his grave.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
User avatar
marcelo_malara
Senior Member
Posts: 1845
Joined: Sun Oct 02, 2005 11:14 pm
Location: buenos aires

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by marcelo_malara »

Thanks! This is a partial Argentine nautical chart of the area. I thing Canopus was moored near the 69 label on the East of the bay (marking a depth of 6.9 m), as you said the small bay to the South seems too shallow. To the East of this you can see the small elevation mentioned. Sapper Hill is not labeled, but should be the height marked 137 m.


Image
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2467
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by wadinga »

Hi Marcelo,

Those locations look spot-on to me, thanks for showing the chart!

Pascoe reproduces a watercolour paining by Lieut-Commander Rudolf Verner who was gunnery officer in Inflexible, moored in Port William ,about where the 11m sounding is. In the painting, which shows his view from the fore-top, he depicts Gneisenau and Nurnberg with two shorts falling near them and smoke on the horizon from Von Spee's other ships. The wireless station masts, which the German ships were preparing to bombard, were on the coast immediately north of where the word Hookers is on the chart. Verner had his turrets manned but says he could not fire from where he was.

Verner also says how relieved he was the leading German vessels did not come round the Pembroke headland and attack the battlecruisers whilst they were still raising steam. It is often speculated that if the Germans had done this they might have inflicted some serious damage, but they were under observation all the time, and on emerging would surely have been subject to a storm of short range fire. Pascoe suggests they should have attacked this way, but he is surely applying hindsight, saying, because it was so early on a clear-weather day they could not hope to escape by simply running away. However as he himself points out Captain Maerker only reported "Two large ships" even though some believed they could see tripod masts. There was no positive identification of battlecruisers, which had the speed and armament to "gobble up" the armoured cruisers, until the chase was already well underway. Two large ships might have been Canopus and another slow pre-dreadnought or armoured cruisers with no more speed than Von Spee. No intelligence had reached Von Spee that high speed battlecruisers had been sent south after him, despite them being spotted several times during their long voyage.

Dickson's account (reinforced by Verner) makes it clear the Germans could be seen from the spotting tops of British ships, so I find it difficult to see what the observation station actually added to the gunnery solution. Probably the only rangefinder available was mounted on top of Canopus' bridge, (much lower than the spotting top) so there is no guarantee the Germans could be seen from there. A target bearing off the bow could surely be measured in the spotting top but the range is more difficult. As an outside possibility, perhaps the carefully surveyed distance between the two observation points (on ship and shore) allowed it to be used as a very long baseline using phoned-in simultaneous bearing compared to that measured in the ship. The baseline orientation would mean this became less effective as the targets moved north.

Canopus' gunnery was probably helped by the ship not rolling or yawing at all, and the Germans slowing down to make their attack on the Wireless Station.

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
User avatar
marcelo_malara
Senior Member
Posts: 1845
Joined: Sun Oct 02, 2005 11:14 pm
Location: buenos aires

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by marcelo_malara »

Well, I find it strange that the German ships were seen from the tops. Look at this topographic map from 1982´s war. There are intervening 50 m heights in most directions from the alleged Canopu´s anchorage to the sea.

With hindsight, the author is right, the only option available to the Germans was to enter harbor and fight the RN at close range. The sunset time at that latitude and date (almost summer) is about 8 pm, with civilian and nautical twilight at 9 pm and 10 pm respectively, difficult to run away from a higher speed foe.

Image
User avatar
wadinga
Senior Member
Posts: 2467
Joined: Sat Mar 12, 2005 3:49 pm
Location: Tonbridge England

Re: HMS Canopus at Port Stanley

Post by wadinga »

Hi Marcelo,

Well, you can't really argue with eye witnesses. Both Dickson in Whalebone Cove and Verner in Yorke Bay could see them. To be honest I can't read the contours in your photo, even blown up. The high ground which is Canopus Hill (22m) to the south of Stanley airport, which itself is at only 23m above MSL, at would block some view to the east, but to the south east the ground is very low lying.

If you can see this you tube video "Falkland Islands - Stanley Airport FIGAS Landing" you can how see low lying the ground to the SE of Whalebone Cove is. If the Germans had got far enough north to be due east of Canopus in Whalebone Cove, then the observation hut would indeed have had to handle "blind fire" control for the ship.

As has been observed, Captain Maerker in Gneisenau and even Von Spee who gave the order to retreat had not the slightest inkling there were battlecruisers in the harbour, nor any understanding their enemy might be hampered in engaging immediately. With the greatest respect I see little point in saying what they should have done, if they were in possession of information they didn't have. If you don't think you can be caught, it doesn't matter how good the visibility or when twilight is, you have the whole South Atlantic to disappear in.

The only reasonable speculation is that Von Spee was wrong in taking a chance on the Falklands being undefended, which he acknowledged in his signal to Maerker "You were right". He thought gaining the coal stocks from the Falklands or even destroying them was a useful war target of opportunity, to be picked up on the way home. Whether he could have got his squadron home to Wilhelmshaven through RN blockade is complete speculation. Even then they would have been in prison with the rest of the "High Seas Fleet".

All the best

wadinga
"There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today!"
Post Reply