Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack ?

Historical what if discussions, hypothetical operations, battleship vs. battleship engagements, design your own warship, etc.
boredatwork
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by boredatwork »

alecsandros wrote:I'll try to change the perspective a bit: were is a carrier most suitable, and were is a battleship ?
I'd argue that a carrier is always preferable provided 1. the weather is good enough for launching aircraft, 2. the mission is to be performed during the day, and 3. the enemy positions are known, with little to no probability of surprise attacks. (I know about some carrier missions performed during the night, but those were rare exceptions, with great risks taken...)
But when are all of those conditions respected ? Probably only when the capital ships (CVs, BBs) are part of a large task-force, which can hold it's own against, say, a night surface attack, and that has a good number of recon aircraft (for observing incoming enemy units).
I've never argued against the notion that under some tactical circumstances a Battleship is more suitable than a carrier. There is no question that in any surface engagement, day or night the latter is at a great disadvantage.


My argument is such superiority is irrelavent if the conditions under which it occurs never happen because the carrier is so superior operationally she can dictate the tactical circumstances under which the battle is fought so that they will always be in her favour.

All the engagements you post as examples of a BB's superiority under certain conditions IMO I could counter by pointing out that such an engagement need never have happened at all had more carriers been present in place of one side's BBs.

As such I don't think your Samar example really supports your position - In the entire war it's one of only two examples where an undamaged carrier found itself under surface fire. In BOTH cases it was only gross error on the part of the carriers that allowed it to happen.

Second it wasn't Yamato's capabilities that caused her to abandon the attack - there was already a recipe for disaster. It was Kurita after having his Flagship torpedoed underneath him and losing the largest BB in the world he lost his nerve and decided to withdraw. IMO he would likely have done regardless of which BB he was commanding from.

Thirdly - you cite it as evidence that carriers are at a disadvantage without good recon, to need to know where the enemy is to be effective - the problem is that applies equally to battleships if not more so given the limited range of their weapons. The US had SIX fast battleships at Leyte so why didn't they stop Yamato at Samar? Because they were uselessly running north with the carriers too. At least the Carriers sank Musashi and some Japanese CVs - what did Iowa and New Jersey accomplish? **ANY** weapon system is more effective if you know where your enemy is so you can employ it most efficiently.

All those pre-necessary conditions made keeping a carrier at sea very very costly... That's probably why, after WW2 we don't see a proliferation of the carrier except in the US Navy. All other major navies retained heavily armored ships...
???

Yes carriers were costly but generally delivered performance related to that cost. Guns are far more expensive than rocks and yet no nation today maintains divisions of Rock Throwing Infantry.

Given how badly the other world economies were postwar, the differing priorities, and the spectre of nuclear warfare rendering control of the sea irrelavent in an all out conflict anyways it's not surprising the US was the only nation able to afford carriers in quantity - however having said that I don't see evidence that the desire to retain heavily armored ships was greater than the desire to obtain carriers - The British continued building carriers, The Australians, Canadians, French, and Dutch all acquired carriers. Eventually the Soviets, Brazilians, Argentinans, Italians, Indians and Spanish all joined the carrier club. Conversely most gun armed ship larger than light cruisers were quickly relagated to training or reduced to reserve.

alecsandros wrote:P.S.: imagine KGV and Rodney replaced by Victorious and Ark Royal during Bismarck's final battle. Could they score any hits on that weather ... ? How long would the battle last ... ? Or South Dakota and Washington replaced by Enterprise and Saratoga during 2nd battle for Guadalcanal. Would they be able to attack the Japanese ships during the night... at such a close range... ? Would Kirishima be sunk in 3 minutes ...? Would Enterprise survive the damage done to South Dakota ... ?
Assuming both carriers have their full load of planes and reasonably trained aircrew I don't see why they couldn't score additional hits on a slowly moving unmaneuverable battleship and reduce her to a wreck regardless of whether or not they can sink her.

As for Guadalcanal - again tactical versus operational - if the second battle happened exactly as it did except for the substitutions the odds of the carriers sinking Kirishima are much less than the BBs. But IF the US had built 2 additional carriers in place of the SD and Washington and they had arrived in theatre at approximately the same time odds are the US does alot better at Santa Cruz and after the battle together the 3-4 carriers supported by henderson field have the strength to challenge Japanese surface forces in daylight much further up the solomons - and the naval battles of Guadalcanal may wind up never being fought.
alecsandros
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by alecsandros »

@ Mike
You don't want to focus, for some reason, on the real problems a TF may face. Samar is a very good example. Poor recon means death for a carrier, while a BB at least will have a chance to fight to the death. Imagine Taffy 3 replaced by "Task-Force Hell", comprised of 4DDs, 3DEs AND Iowa, Missouri, New Jersey, Wisconsin. Don't you think they would have faired better than the 6 CVEs... ?

You're insisting that the carrier could allways dictate the operational conditions. I beg to differ. What operations could a carrier perform during the 6-months arctic night ? What good is a carrier during a 2-weeks Baltic or Atlantic storm ? How can the carrier dictate at the operational level when performing in an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, such as the Med, Baltic, China Sea, etc, where large numbers of enemy aircraft can swarm without warning, or with little prior warning, and decimate the air corps... ?

I would tend to accept that the carrier can, in the right circumstances, and in the right numbers, tip the operational scales, and later strategic scales of teh war towards the owner (that's exactly what the war in the Pacific demonstrated). But you must take into consideration that rarely was war a one-side track, and unexpected circumstances tended to appear, while the mistakes that you mention concerning the loss of HMS Glorious and USS Gambier Bay tend to appear quite frequently in reality.
ALso, the quality and quantity of the enemy's naval and air forces, along with the quality of his commanders, would severely influence the results of a carrier-based task force.

Think, for example, from teh Japanese perspective. They were the first to adopt carrier doctrine. They invested in it very much: time, people, money, raw materials, etc. Of course this left fewer resources for the ground forces, air forces, and rest of the navy (such as the submarine arm, which was severely handicaped in comparison to the other major powers by mid-war).
They gambled their future on the carrier... They used it at Pearl Harbor, Java Sea, Indian Ocean, with nice results. Than *the enemy* started getting better.. and better.. They started losing more than they were destroying (Coral Sea). And Midway, Guadalcanal and Philipinne Sea were nails in the Imperial Navy's coffin: they completely lost the initiative, and were forced on the defensive, because they relied so much on their carriers. BUT, because the *enemy* became so strong, they were beaten at their own game.

Maybe they would have been better off building 200 long-range submarines instead of 10 fleet carriers ...? Some decent medium tanks ...? I don't know.

And no, I'm not saying they should have built BBs... I was just making a point that the carrier was a fragile ship in the 40s and relying to win the war with fragile ships may be a mistake.

And remember it's one thing to fight a war in tropical/ecuatorial waters, with long sunny days, good weather and vast stretches of water (were enemy fleets can not hide), and another thing to fight a war in the northern hemisphere, with shorter days (many times very short), many islands, and many times bad weather, which woudl severely hinder carrier operations. [but that doesn't hinder at all, or hinders only a bit ground-based aircraft operations, as the airfield does not need to head into the wind for launch, nor does it roll and pitch under the heavy storm waves]

====

P.S.: returning to Bismarck's final battle, I would be very surprised if an aerial torpedo from a Swordfish would manage to function properly in that sea condition. Thus, it would be more a battle between a crippled Bismarck and 2 heavy cruisers + a few destroyers, buzzign around her for hours before running low on fuel and returning to base covered in shame.
boredatwork
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by boredatwork »

alecsandros wrote:@ Mike
You don't want to focus, for some reason, on the real problems a TF may face. Samar is a very good example. Poor recon means death for a carrier, while a BB at least will have a chance to fight to the death. Imagine Taffy 3 replaced by "Task-Force Hell", comprised of 4DDs, 3DEs AND Iowa, Missouri, New Jersey, Wisconsin. Don't you think they would have faired better than the 6 CVEs... ?

I respectfully suggest that it's you not focussing on the fact you're posing a tactical example that ignores operational realities.

There's no question that 4-6 BBs would have tactically faired much better at Samar than 6 CVEs. But you're missing the point: Those 4-6 BBs weren't at Samar to fight to the death.

For your hypothetical scenario to work (assuming we use the 6 BBs actually present in place of Missouri and Wisconsin) it would have required different operational decisions than what had happened historically. IF you change those operational decisions to ensure the battleships were actually at the battlefield at the right time to engage, you're simulataneously changing the decisions which took the fleet carriers out of the fight and let Samar happen at all.

TF77.4's mission was to provide air support to the ground forces until airfields could be established ashore, not engage the Japanese Navy. It was Halsey's TF38 who had the mission of defending the invasion from the later. As such there was no reason for Fast Battleships to be assigned anywhere else but to Halsey's force. So the ONLY way you would have fast battleships at Samar is IF Halsey orders them there.

For him to leave TF34 at San Bernadino would require 1 of 2 OPERATIONAL DECISIONS to be different - either 1) conduct the recon that would have confirmed Kurita was still a threat and take steps to counter it OR 2) play it safe and leave a force to guard the straight on the assumption he might still be a threat.

In the event Halsey made a major blunder and overruled the objections of his subordinates (and mislead his superiors) and did neither - there was no recon of the San Bernadino Straight that would have easily confirmed Independence's earlier report that Kurita had doubled back because Halsey believed Kurita a spent force and ignored any suggestion to the contrary. And Kincaid had no reason to believe Halsey wasn't properly doing his job and so cocentrated on his. And Halsey wasn't cautious but took his entire 4 group task force north, carriers, BBs and all, again leaving Kinkaid with the impression he was still doing his job. If Halsey didn't decide to leave the BBs then the BBs wouldn't have been there.

If Halsey had listened to Mitscher or Lee and either conducted proper recon or at least played it safe and left some force behind then yes the BBs could have been there to protect Taffy 3 from the Japanese surface forces - however IF we make those operational changes then there is no reason why he couldn't have left 1 of his 4 carrier task groups behind which would have been conducting actual recon and discovered Kurita's return long before Kurita got within gun range, warned TF77.4 to get out of the way, and sent Yamato to join her sister.
You're insisting that the carrier could allways dictate the operational conditions. I beg to differ.
No I'm not insisting a carrier could always dictate the operational conditions - I'm saying that relative to the surface forces you reference in your post I quoted a carrier will always be able to dictate whether or not she engages.
I would tend to accept that the carrier can, in the right circumstances, and in the right numbers, tip the operational scales, and later strategic scales of teh war towards the owner (that's exactly what the war in the Pacific demonstrated).
ALso, the quality and quantity of the enemy's naval and air forces, along with the quality of his commanders, would severely influence the results of a carrier-based task force.
You keep making these statements as if they applied to carriers solely.

Obviously it's dependant upon the right circumstances and the right numbers - but would Britain have defeated the U-boats if she didn't have escorts "in the right numbers" employed in the "right circumstances" (convoy). Would Germany have conquered France if she didn't have tanks "in the right numbers" and "right circumstances?" (PzDivs) Would the T-34 have been able to win the war if the USSR hadn't built them "in the right numbers" and used them in "the right circumstances" (OMGs).

Likewise how would the results of a BB task force not be influenced by the quality of the commanders and the quality and quantity of the enemy's forces?

Hence my point - not that carriers were "super invincible win the war by themselves weapon systems" - but rather if you didn't have the "right numbers" you would be better off building more carriers to get the "right numbers" and find commanders smart enough to use them in the "right circumstances" rather than diluting effort on inferior weapons.
But you must take into consideration that rarely was war a one-side track, and unexpected circumstances tended to appear, while the mistakes that you mention concerning the loss of HMS Glorious and USS Gambier Bay tend to appear quite frequently in reality.
The mistakes that led to the loss of Glorious and Gambier Bay WERE reality. 2 incidents in the entire war. I'll be generous and throw in Hornet and Chitose - 4 incidents. The notion that the battleships were performing a valuable service defending the carriers from night surface attack is fiction. The first two incidents weren't random bad luck - they were blunders because had even basic recon been attempted neither would have happened. In the second two BBs could have protected the crippled carriers - but then additional carriers might have been more effective at preventing the damage in the first place.

Likewise blunders and mistakes are not the sole property of carriers and surface forces have their fair share (SD at Guadalcanal, Zara and Fiume at Matapan, Beatty's BCs at Dogger bank, Hood and PoW at DS, Scharnhorst at North Cape, etc)
Think, for example, from teh Japanese perspective...

They gambled their future on the carrier... They used it at Pearl Harbor, Java Sea, Indian Ocean, with nice results. Than *the enemy*

started getting better.. and better..

...BUT, because the *enemy* became so strong, they were beaten at their own game.

And no, I'm not saying they should have built BBs... I was just making a point that the carrier was a fragile ship in the 40s and relying to win the war with fragile ships may be a mistake.
I'll give you the benefit of the doubt that you didn't think this argument through - because by that logic you could say that Germany lost the war because she relied on the Panzer, which she used in Poland, France, Barbarossa with nice results. The the enemy started getting better... and better... :wink:

Japan didn't lose the war because she backed the carrier - she lost the war because the premise upon which her strategy was based - waiting for the American people to get tired of the war - was off by a few years. When the quick victory didn't happen and she was caught up in a war of attrition with a vastly superior industrial power her fate was innevitable regardless of what weapon system she used.
[but that doesn't hinder at all, or hinders only a bit ground-based aircraft operations, as the airfield does not need to head into the wind for launch, nor does it roll and pitch under the heavy storm waves]
My case is that a carrier is superior to gun based naval forces for *most* missions - the fact that land based aircraft have many advantages (but also some disadvantages) over carrier aviation does not invalidate that - as land base aircraft share many of the benefits over gun based surface ships. I'm still waiting to hear what battleships could hope to accomplish in the mediteranean under an air threat too severe for the carriers to survive. Ultimate AA BB Iowa afterall had to refuel in Brazil after dropping off FDR in Mer El Kebir for the Teheran conference because the Mediteranean was too dangerous for her. :wink:
P.S.: returning to Bismarck's final battle, I would be very surprised if an aerial torpedo from a Swordfish would manage to function properly in that sea condition. Thus, it would be more a battle between a crippled Bismarck and 2 heavy cruisers + a few destroyers, buzzign around her for hours before running low on fuel and returning to base covered in shame.
I'm sure a bomb works just fine - reduce her upper deck to flaming ruins, ensure no tugs from France make it to the scene and what choice does Bismarck have other than to scuttle or float helplessly until the RN refuels and re-arms and tries again?
alecsandros
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by alecsandros »

Dear Mike,
Operational blunders only become manifest on the tactical level - until you start losing men and units you don't realise the mistake!

Regardless, the fact is that without serious escort (preferably including BBs) the carriers were easily sunk, because war is full of unexpected events.

Yes, unexpected events can happen to BBs also (SD at Guadalcanal for example). The point was that a BB has the possibility of fighting the enemy even in a surprise attack, and because of the build the men on board had a better chance of surviving the battle... (Again: would Enterprise survive the damage suffered by SD, provided another Samar-like blunder happens, and the US carriers get in a night gun battle with TF Kirishima ?)

So, unless the carrier TF has good recon, and good escort, and the weather is good enough for launch, and the engagement is to be done during the day, the main ships are very fragile units...

===

I don't understand the point about IOwa refueling in Brazil. Wasn't she bound for the Panama canal, to go in the Pacific ? And if so, why would it go in the Med to refuel, just to turn then back past Gibraltar ? (I may be mistaken, if so - sorry)

===

Bismarck's final battle: what bombs ? The Swordfish carried torpedoes...

===

Japan's focus on carriers. No, it's not the same as Germany focusing on panzers. Germany focused on U-boats, war planes, panzers, R&D, rocket artillery, gun artillery... They pretty much hedged their bets by working on a number of weapon systems. Japan on the other hand ONLY focused on carriers, leaving the rest of the war force prepared to fight the First World War. (Maybe the long-lance could also be counted as a good product of Japanese innovation. But anything else ... ? Something similar to Fritz-X, ME-262, V-2, Schnorchel-U-Boat... ?).
And, because these days you are nit-picking, you may say "how can we know if a realocation of war resources in Japan would have led to better war results?" and/or "how can we know that without distributing so many resources to the carrier arm the reallocation would have actualy led to better innovation in the other armed forces?". Of course we can't know. But the fact is they gambled on a single card - and they lost. They only had the initiative in the Pacific for 6 months, which should be a big embarassment for such a large navy. After that, allthough they had a 2:1 and sometimes 3:1 overall carrier superiority they started losing badly...
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by alecsandros »

boredatwork wrote: I'm still waiting to hear what battleships could hope to accomplish in the mediteranean under an air threat too severe for the carriers to survive.
It's not just about the air threat. It's about the possible reaction to a multitude of threats. The Regia Maria had some serious surface forces, which could intervene in a matter of hours over a convoy bound for Malta, for example, because their bases were quite close to the point of conflict. What happens if recon doesn't work ? Or if it's night ? Or if the weather is so bad that warplanes have very few chances of taking off, attacking and landing ?

In such a case, a battleship is clearly superior, as it can perform during any kind of weather, and, with good radar, perform well even during the night, at long range.

The idea about the air threat is that convoy escort usualy lasts some days. The entire complement of a carrier can be lost in a day, if the enemy bombers are escorted by a large number of advanced fighters, after which the ship is a useless floating platform. The battleships could continue to offer formidable AA defense for themselves and the rest of the TF/convoy, presuming they were technologicaly up-to-date... I repeat myself: the examples we have with advanced AA BBs, after 1942, show that it is extremely hard for even large waves of bombers to score hits on them, and a good number of incoming enemy aircraft can be shot down/damaged. (South Dakota - east solomons, North Carolina - santa cruz, Tirpitz - Albacore 1942 engagement, Iowa class - against kamikazes 1944-1945)
Thorsten Wahl
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by Thorsten Wahl »

Some tought from my side.

Carriers were able to perform usually a comparatively massed first strike and this first strike could be more concentrated on key targets at longer distances. The outcome of modern warfare strongly depends on first recognized - maneuver - first shot - first hit.

But they were less efficent in terms of carrying large amounts of ammunition against a enemy and sustain prolonged continous delivery of ordnance to the enemy, as carrier TF a strongly based on advanced logistics and plenty of fuel.
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boredatwork
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by boredatwork »

alecsandros wrote:Dear Mike,
Operational blunders only become manifest on the tactical level - until you start losing men and units you don't realise the mistake!
[/i].
Operational Blunders are independant of the tactical level - if for example you make a mistake that allows an inferior opponent to slip away without being engaged you don't lose any men but still have made a blunder.

But regardless you're still missing the point:

***It's completely irrelavent that the Iowa and her sisters could have performed much better at Samar than the escort carriers if the battleships WOULDN'T EVEN BE PRESENT at the battle DUE TO THE EXACT SAME BLUNDER that resulted in the escort carriers being surprised in the first place.***

Halsey and his battlefleet were decoyed north (operational) - IF Halsey's battlefleet is in the north, given that the US only has a finite number of fast BB it's an axiom that they can't be simultaneously guarding San Bernadino. If Halsey hadn't been decoyed then there COULD have been BBs at Samar but then there would also be carriers conducting reconnaisance that would have spotted Kurita's return long before he got within gun range and Samar, such that it might have been fought, would have been a repeat of Sibuyan.
Regardless, the fact is that without serious escort (preferably including BBs) the carriers were easily sunk, because war is full of unexpected events
You keep using "unexpected events" as justification for inclusion of BBs in a carrier task force - just to remind you WW2 has already happened - there are no more "unexpected events" - just the events that **actually happened.** If history was full of "Hipper stumbled onto Force H but HMS Renown drove her off before she could threaten Ark Royal" or "the Kongos made a night attack against TF38 but were soundly defeated by the Iowas" or "Warspite thrawted the cruiser/destroyer force sent after Illustrious in the wake of Taranto" then yes you could claim big gun armed surface defenses were a necessary component of a carrier force. But there were only TWO such cases during the entire war. Why go to the expense of providing Battleships for such a statistically remote possibility when for approximately the same cost you could provide an additional carrier which will make a much greater contribution to the war effort?
(Again: would Enterprise survive the damage suffered by SD, provided another Samar-like blunder happens, and the US carriers get in a night gun battle with TF Kirishima ?)
How would a US fleet carrier be involved in a Samar like blunder? Samar only happened because the escort carriers in question were told to ignore the naval battle - other forces would keep them safe. When did a US fleet carrier ignore the naval battle or rely entirely on other forces to keep it safe? In the entire war the only such ship to even remotely come under surface fire was USS Hornet and that was only because airstrikes had left her immobilised. BTW SD was present at the battle and was ordered away rather than staying around to defend the carrier.
I don't understand the point about IOwa refueling in Brazil. Wasn't she bound for the Panama canal, to go in the Pacific ? And if so, why would it go in the Med to refuel, just to turn then back past Gibraltar ? (I may be mistaken, if so - sorry)
Iowa was to drop off FDR in the Med and wait there to carry him back to the US later. However due to the German air threat her refueling in North Africa was abandoned and she instead steamed out of the Med, accross the Atlantic to Brazil to refuel, before crossing the Atlantic yet again not to enter the Med but go to the much safer port at Freetown forcing the President and his party to take a French destroyer from Tunis to meet up with her.
Bismarck's final battle: what bombs ? The Swordfish carried torpedoes...
And Ark Royal still had bombs in her Magazines?

Japan's focus on carriers. No, it's not the same as Germany focusing on panzers. Germany focused on U-boats, war planes, panzers, R&D, rocket artillery, gun artillery... They pretty much hedged their bets by working on a number of weapon systems. Japan on the other hand ONLY focused on carriers, leaving the rest of the war force prepared to fight the First World War. (Maybe the long-lance could also be counted as a good product of Japanese innovation. But anything else ... ? Something similar to Fritz-X, ME-262, V-2, Schnorchel-U-Boat... ?).
And, because these days you are nit-picking, you may say "how can we know if a realocation of war resources in Japan would have led to better war results?" and/or "how can we know that without distributing so many resources to the carrier arm the reallocation would have actualy led to better innovation in the other armed forces?". Of course we can't know. But the fact is they gambled on a single card - and they lost. They only had the initiative in the Pacific for 6 months, which should be a big embarassment for such a large navy. After that, allthough they had a 2:1 and sometimes 3:1 overall carrier superiority they started losing badly...
Nit picking?

What did YOU title this thread? And yet YOU make such statements as: "Japan on the other hand ONLY focused on carriers" and "But the fact is they gambled on a single card".

What the hell were the Yamatos?

"how can we know that without distributing so many resources to the carrier arm the reallocation would have actualy led to better innovation in the other armed forces?"

What resources??? She has virtually none. That's the point. She expended effort on a wide variety of weapons - war planes, destroyers, torpedoes, submarines, mini-subs, special shells, super battleships, landing craft, guided weapons, etc - and she was reasonably innovative. Many of her late war aircraft for example were equivalent or even superior to the Hellcats that were dominating her skies. Her problem was she didn't have remotely the resources to produce enough weapons to equip any of her forces. For example total Ki100 production was less than 100 which was less than the average weekly production of the F6F alone - in the face of such numbers individual quality is irrelavent.

BTW where was the Soviet equivalent of the Fritz X, Me-262, V-2, Schnorchel (a dutch invention btw), etc? And yet the Soviets came out on top.
They only had the initiative in the Pacific for 6 months, which should be a big embarassment for such a large navy. After that, allthough they had a 2:1 and sometimes 3:1 overall carrier superiority they started losing badly...
Given that the EXPERT on the Japanese Navy, Yamamoto, only predicted they would be able to retain the initiative for 6 months in the face of American industrial superiority I think they did as well as could be expected.

It's not just about the air threat. It's about the possible reaction to a multitude of threats. The Regia Maria had some serious surface forces, which could intervene in a matter of hours over a convoy bound for Malta, for example, because their bases were quite close to the point of conflict. What happens if recon doesn't work ? Or if it's night ? Or if the weather is so bad that warplanes have very few chances of taking off, attacking and landing ?
Then the convoy's light forces hold them off with smoke screens and the threat of Torpedo damage, as they successfully did on virtually every occasion when heavy ships were employed against them.
The idea about the air threat is that convoy escort usualy lasts some days. The entire complement of a carrier can be lost in a day, if the enemy bombers are escorted by a large number of advanced fighters, after which the ship is a useless floating platform. The battleships could continue to offer formidable AA defense for themselves and the rest of the TF/convoy, presuming they were technologicaly up-to-date... I repeat myself: the examples we have with advanced AA BBs, after 1942, show that it is extremely hard for even large waves of bombers to score hits on them, and a good number of incoming enemy aircraft can be shot down/damaged. (South Dakota - east solomons, North Carolina - santa cruz, Tirpitz - Albacore 1942 engagement, Iowa class - against kamikazes 1944-1945)
"useless floating platform"

You do realize that an Essex carried nearly as much AA as a battleship?

And that BB AA ammo is not infinite?

And I repeat myself - your examples are questionable 1) What battleship with "advanced AA" was attacked post 1942 by competant pilots flying advanced aircraft? 2) During how many of those attacks was the battleship herself the target with the possibility to be damaged by failure 3) Only the battles off of Guadalcanal could be considered a reasonable test of contemporary Battleship vs. contemporary carrier aircraft, albeit fragile Japanese ones and the "achievement" of the battleships is open to doubt as the carrier's own AA claims many of the A/C for which the battleship took credit.




Again the argument isn't that a carrier can operate without escort or that AA fire isn't of value - it's that neither of these roles in hindsight required the big gun or heavy armor hence there was nothing to justify a battleship over smaller, much less expensive ships which had to be present anyways to defend the BB from the same.
alecsandros
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by alecsandros »

Hi Mike,

First of all, don't get so angry, it's just the internet :)

Second of all, I'm thinking about the "hypothetical" pros and cons of a carrier vs a BB, and not relieving World War 2. In the real war, we know what happend. Of course carriers were instrumental in the defeat of Japan, much more than the BBs were.

So, my questions and arguments appear in the hypothetical level... To help me understand better the strenghts and weaknessess of the 2 types of ships...

That's why I mention "the unexpected events"... and make a case of Japan redistributing it's "resources" (meaning time, people, money, metals, etc) from carrier building to submarine building, for instance...

That being said, I'll jump to a few Q&A's:
===
"And Ark Royal still had bombs in her Magazines?"

AFAIK, they were 227kg HE bombs, which could be fitted under the fuzelage and wings of Swordfishes for ground attack. I don't know of any case in which the Sworfishes or the Albacores fitted bombs for attacking naval targets, allthough it coudl have been possible... I don't know ?

"What the hell were the Yamatos?"

The 2 Yamatos were the ONLY battleships built by Japan in the 30s-40s. In the same time, they built at least 11 fleet carriers (2xHiyo, 1xTaiho, 2xShokaku, 3xUnryu class, 1xShinano, 2xSoryu), totalling over 350.000t. A good numer of escort carriers, floatplanes carriers, and unfinished fleet carriers should be added to that, to have an idea about the importance of the carriers in their total resource consumption.

I do not share your view over the Japanese being remotely "innovative" in a pragmatic sense during the war (type 91 diving shells were a screw-up, the Okha kamikaze bomber was built with German rocket technology, etc), but we're going highly OT, so I won't comment about it anymore. Nor do I share your view over the "non-inovative russians" that "still won the war". They won the war in large part thanks to Allied shipping, delivered through the Arctic convoys adn Persian coridor...

And anyway,s this was not what I meant, but that a particular country - Japan - focused a great deal of resources into ONE weapon, and it FAILED, allthough it had clear supperiority against the USN for allmost 2 YEARS. So betting on the carrier does not GUARANTEE a successfull campaign...

"Then the convoy's light forces hold them off with smoke screens and the threat of Torpedo damage, as they successfully did on virtually every occasion when heavy ships were employed against them."

Again, I know what happend in the Med campaign. But I'm fantasizing, to see the importance of the carrier in a more general sense...
The Regia Maria acted with excessive caution, allthough it had the upper hand several times. But all the time they hesitated, and withdrawn, giving time to carrier and land-based bombers and torpedo=bombers to intervene and sometimes cripple heavy ships.
BUT, had the RM been commanded better, I do not see what a carrier could have done better than a battleship, particularly in rough seas/night/poor visibility, especialy if the Italians brought 2 Littorios to the battle. The "light ships" that you bring into the argument would have been swept off (IF the Italian TF would have acted vigorously...) and the convoy exposed and sunk.

"You do realize that an Essex carried nearly as much AA as a battleship? "

It's not (just) about the numbers... It's also about arcs of fire... and the geometry (placement) of the AA guns on the ship... And about survivability of the AA gunners to air attack... North Carolina and South Dakota were both strafed and bombed several times at Santa Cruz/E. Solomons, yet they retained their AA capabilities pretty much intact. On the other hand, a strafed/bombed carrier quickly loses it's ability to defend itself... (I hope I'm not being to general - pretty much every time bombs hit carriers, things went bad)
And this is a critical aspect: survivability in hostile environment. If, say, 30 dive bombers are to attack a carrier, and 3 manage to hit it, chances are high the ship would be out of the battle, if not even sunk. But if the same 30 bobmers attack a battleship and 3 hit it, chances are the ship would still be in fighting condition... The carrier has an advantage ONLY if the CAP is strong enough, relative to the attacking force, so as to take out a sufficient number of enemies before they pose a real threat to the ship...

I would also count the attack of the Albacores against Tirpitz of Loffoten in 1942. They were fairly modern planes (for that year)... And made a brave attack...

There is one other interesting battle, but I don't have enough details: it appears IJN Hyuga received powerfull AA artillery late in the war (including rocket artillery), and that it held off "dozens" of dive-bombers during battle of Leyte, only suffering one or 2 bomb hits... And destroyign at least 5 USN planes... Perhaps you have more info ?

And, of course, you should take into consideration the kamikaze attacks, and especialy their effects, over USN carriers versus USN battleships... Bunker Hill and Franklin were nearly sunk by SINGLE kamikazes. The rare events in which battleships were hit were far less dramatic, and the ship continued it's mission.

"...hence there was nothing to justify a battleship over smaller, much less expensive ships which had to be present anyways to defend the BB from the same."

Hmm... you're thinking about cruisers and destroyers ? In an ideal world, you'd probably be right...
But again, mistakes appear, scouting doesn't work all the time as it should (remember the seaplane from Tone that played a critical part in the loss of 4 IJN fleet carriers at Midway ?), and your CA+DD+CV task force can come under fire from BB guns... ANd then what can you do ? Sure, if the enemy is autistic, and/or doesn't have combat experience, a strong attack with torpedoes can drive him off. But if the enemy IS competent, and fires HIS OWN torpedoes before, or keeps your smaller ships at arms length using HIS cruisers and DDs (see Valiant + DDs against 8 GErman DDs in Norway), your TF will soon crumble...

===

I also think the CV was a more competent strategic vector (and is still is), but to make it realy worthwhile, you need stronger escort (than a battleship needs), near-perfect recon, and excellent logistics, all of which amount to a staggering total cost, which can rarely be supported by a navy...
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by alecsandros »

One more thing: the great results obtained by carriers were obtained against poorly trained and coordinated enemies, with insufficient AA, planes, or preparation...
Take the Swordfishes over Taranto and launch them agaisnt Brest, with Gneisenau and Scharnhorst at anchor, and see what happens...

A good test for a carrier (or multiple carrier task-force) would come against a prepared, and at least numericaly and technologically on par enemy...

And I'd give 4 examples: Coral Sea, Santa Cruz, Eastern Solomons, Midway.
These are, AFAIK, the only carrier - naval battles in which the numbers and technology were comparable.
And what happened ?
In the first 3, all the carriers involved were either sunk, damaged, or suffered so high aircraft losses that they needed to be withdrawn, all the ships involved leaving the battle without a clear victor. At Midway, a critical chain of events led to the loss of 4 IJN carriers and 270+ planes, in exchange of 1 USN carrier and 160+ planes.

So carriers-based battles tend to be zero-sum games, provided comparable numbers and technology... Interestingly enough, in all 4 engagements except Coral Sea, the Japanese commanders pressed on with their surface-ships to engage the enemy in a gun battle. Their plans didn't materialize because the US ships left the scene... In the case of Midway, Yamamoto contemplated the decision of combining all the ships of the operation (4 remaining light carriers - Ryujo, Junyo, Zuiho, Chiyoda, 7 battleships, etc) into one giant fist, but as allways during the war when Japanese admirals needed to take strong decisions, he hesitated, and decided to withdraw his vast armada to the harbors, allthough having an overwhelming superiority.
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by boredatwork »

alecsandros wrote:Hi Mike,

First of all, don't get so angry, it's just the internet :)
I didn't have milk for my cereal this morning so of course I'm cranky. :wink:
Second of all, I'm thinking about the "hypothetical" pros and cons of a carrier vs a BB, and not relieving World War 2. In the real war, we know what happend. Of course carriers were instrumental in the defeat of Japan, much more than the BBs were.

So, my questions and arguments appear in the hypothetical level... To help me understand better the strenghts and weaknessess of the 2 types of ships...
Would it fall under irony that you're now using hypothetical arguments after the number of times you've criticised me for doing so :D

Evaluating strengths and weaknesses has to be combined with an analysis of the likehood of the ships being placed in conditions where their hypothetical strengths translate into an actual advantage - your oft repeated argument of a carrier's vulnerability to surface gunfire for example - no question a carrier would be at a dissadvantage under such conditions - but if such conditions NEVER happen which despite not being an ideal world, despite all the carriers and surface ships, despite all the bad weather, despite all the nights, despite all the idiotic commanders, despite all the poor recon, despite all the Tone Seaplanes, despite Murphy, you can only produce 2 examples in the entire war where it happened is it really as much of a weakness as you claim?

Likewise there's no question a BB is less vulnerable to damage than a carrier - but compare what the carriers accomplished in the last year of the war while suffering under Kamikazes with what the undamaged fast BBs accomplished with their big guns and there's no comparison which made by far the more valuable contribution.
And I'd give 4 examples: Coral Sea, Santa Cruz, Eastern Solomons, Midway.
These are, AFAIK, the only carrier - naval battles in which the numbers and technology were comparable.
And what happened ?
In the first 3, all the carriers involved were either sunk, damaged, or suffered so high aircraft losses that they needed to be withdrawn, all the ships involved leaving the battle without a clear victor. At Midway, a critical chain of events led to the loss of 4 IJN carriers and 270+ planes, in exchange of 1 USN carrier and 160+ planes.

So carriers-based battles tend to be zero-sum games, provided comparable numbers and technology...
Again you have a habit of presenting knowledgeable arguments to support your point - without them actually supporting your point!

Yes when carrier based battles with equal numbers and technology were fought they tend to result in draws or minor tactical victories,

BUT

What would happen if I pitted 4 Iowas against 4 Iowas? Or 50 Spitfires against 50 Spitfires? Or 100 Tiger tanks against 100 Tiger tanks? Or 300 Spartans against 300 Spartans? Or 10 Tyrannosaurus Rex against 10 T Rex? Etc. :D

Barring bad luck or bad tactics on the part of one side or the other how exactly is any combat between comparable numbers and comparable technology not going to be inconclusive? In which case ultimate victory tends to fall upon the side with the greater industrial potential able to replace it's losses rather than who has a superiority in obsolete weaponry.


but we're going highly OT

So betting on the carrier does not GUARANTEE a successfull campaign...
I never claimed it did - I'm merely stating I disagree with your position that Japan bet on the carrier to the degree you claim, or that her technological choices remotely were responsible for her loss of the war instead of the strategic blunder in becoming involved in a war against a vastly superior industrial base that had the means and sufficient will to win the long war of attrition.
The 2 Yamatos were the ONLY battleships built by Japan in the 30s-40s. In the same time, they built at least 11 fleet carriers (2xHiyo, 1xTaiho, 2xShokaku, 3xUnryu class, 1xShinano, 2xSoryu), totalling over 350.000t. A good numer of escort carriers, floatplanes carriers, and unfinished fleet carriers should be added to that, to have an idea about the importance of the carriers in their total resource consumption.
Again to nit pick but if you count unfinished carriers then you have to count Shinano and No111 towards BBs. And they weren't just any battleships but ships nearly twice as large as their generational allied equivalents - KGV/Richelieu/NC. Of the carriers listed - the Hiyos and Shinano were conversions and thus took fewer resources than ships built from scratch and the Unryus were only ordered after Midway when the war was already lost. I don't see how Japan's effort was skewed compared to the navies that actually won the war - In the same period:

The US built 10 battleships + 2 unfinished compared to ~33 fleet carriers+2 unfinished, 11 light fleet conversions, and ~100 escort carriers.

The Royal navy built 6 BBs compared to 9 fleets carriers + 2 unfinished, 20 light fleet carriers + 1 unfinished, and ?? escort carriers.

Looking further, considering only US numbers: 10 BBs to 2, 33 fleet carriers to 11, ~70 cruisers to 12, ~400+ Destroyers to ~70, 300 Escorts to 40 I think it's reasonably evident why Japan lost the war had little to do with focusing on one weapon at the expense of others since only in submarines did she come remotely close to American totals.
One more thing: the great results obtained by carriers were obtained against poorly trained and coordinated enemies, with insufficient AA, planes, or preparation...
Take the Swordfishes over Taranto and launch them agaisnt Brest, with Gneisenau and Scharnhorst at anchor, and see what happens...
IMO this is a much more valid argument then trying to claim Japan lost the war because she focussed on the carrier. You could point to the raids on Tirpitz, with her own dedicated fighter cover, difficult harbour, additional AA, smoke machines - She wasn't an easy target but the carriers still managed to cripple her for a few months. Further strikes were foiled by the defenses and bad weather but then what could Tirpitz really accomplish anyways had she moved beyond the safety of her achorage?



I should be doing real work this weekend so I'll conclude my argument by stating although I love battleships and would gladly be able to justify their utility - IMO the reality is if I had to fight a war from 1942 onwards I would always take an additional carrier over a battleship unless I had such a superiority in aircraft that I had air supremacy - at which point I would take a few BBs purely to support amphibious landings - but if there are old BBs available for such a task then I'll take those first to leave ship building resources free to build me more carriers.
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by alecsandros »

boredatwork wrote:

Would it fall under irony that you're now using hypothetical arguments after the number of times you've criticised me for doing so :D
Absolutely :lol: I don't have other examples to resort to, so I'm stuck in the hystorical frame :)

Evaluating strengths and weaknesses has to be combined with an analysis of the likehood of the ships being placed in conditions where their hypothetical strengths translate into an actual advantage
But what would happen if Italy would build 1 carrier, and France another, with them operational in, say, 1940. Would they help win or lose the war in the Med more than a truly modern battleship would ? [a question regrding the marginal utility of carrier vs battleship :D ]

It is interesting to see how many battleships and carriers were used by the Royal Navy (and briefly USN) in the Mediteranean campaign. In my opinion, the number of BB missions was larger than that of carrier missions, and every time carriers were sent, they would be covered by BBs (and vice-versa - the BBs covered by carriers :D ). During Battle fo Calabria for instance, HMS Eagle played no part in the naval battle, while the battleships slugged it out.

Why don't we see a massive carrier armada during the invasion of Sicily ? Or at Salerno ? Or at Anzio ? Carriers would have been excellent in assuring fast responses to German armored counterattacks over the beach heads... But they were nowhere to be found. Probably the risk of overwhelming air attack was to great...
[What's even more interesting is that RN fleet carriers were not doing anything at the time...]
What would happen if I pitted 4 Iowas against 4 Iowas? Or 50 Spitfires against 50 Spitfires? Or 100 Tiger tanks against 100 Tiger tanks? Or 300 Spartans against 300 Spartans? Or 10 Tyrannosaurus Rex against 10 T Rex? Etc. :D
:D
What I found curious is that in the few battleship vs battleship or even heavy cruiser vs heavy cruiser engagements, the outcome did not correspond to the expectations at all. So, for some higher reason, the old-school naval battles tend to have one clear winner, and one clear loser, despite initial similarity of numbers, technology, and even positioning.

[Bismarck+Pz Eugen vs Hood+PoW... Graf Spee vs Exter+Ajax+Achilles... battle of Savo Island, Tassafaronga... etc]

I never claimed it did - I'm merely stating I disagree with your position that Japan bet on the carrier to the degree you claim, or that her technological choices remotely were responsible for her loss of the war instead of the strategic blunder in becoming involved in a war against a vastly superior industrial base that had the means and sufficient will to win the long war of attrition.
What I meant was that it's not enough to have fleet carriers and good trained aviators. The Imperial Navy had clear superiority in numbers even after Midway, yet it wasn't capable of obtaining even a single clear victory over the USN, after the initial 6 "golden months". And it wasn't about US industrial strength - not in 1942 at least - because the numbers of available US carriers, BBs, CAs, etc, are known for the time, and they were far below those of the IJN.

[qoute] Further strikes were foiled by the defenses and bad weather but then what could Tirpitz really accomplish anyways had she moved beyond the safety of her achorage?[/quote]
Good question. I would expect a more combat-ready crew, and better performance of the ligth-AA guns (20 and 37mm). Given the number of the attackers though (130 ?), and the lack of escorts for Tirpitz, it probably would have been very bad for her...
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by alecsandros »

More about the attacks on Tirpitz - thanks to Wiki:

Operations Planet, Brawn, Tiger Claw, Mascot, and Goodwood

"A series of carrier strikes were planned over the next three months, but bad weather forced their cancellation. A repeat of Operation Tungsten, codenamed Operation Planet, was scheduled for 24 April. Operation Brawn, which was to have been carried out by 27 bombers and 36 fighters from Victorious and Furious, was to have taken place on 15 May, and Operation Tiger Claw was intended for 28 May. Victorious and Furious were joined by Indefatigable for Operation Mascot, which was to have been carried out on 17 July by 62 bombers and 30 fighters. The weather finally broke in late August, which saw the Goodwood series of attacks. Operations Goodwood I and II were launched on 22 August; a carrier force consisting of the fleet carriers Furious, Indefatigable and Formidable and the escort carriers Nabob and Trumpeter launched a total of 38 bombers and 43 escort fighters between the two raids. The attacks failed to inflict any damage on Tirpitz,[50] and three of the attacking aircraft were shot down.[55] Goodwood III followed on 24 August, composed of aircraft from the fleet carriers only. Forty-eight bombers and 29 fighters attacked the ship and scored two hits which caused minor damage.[50] One, a 1600-pound bomb, penetrated the upper and lower armour decks and came to rest in the No. 4 switchboard room. Its fuze had been damaged and the bomb did not detonate. The second, a 500-pound (230 kg) bomb, exploded but caused only superficial damage. Six planes were shot down in the attack.[56][57] Goodwood IV followed on the 29th, with 34 bombers and 25 fighters from Formidable and Indefatigable. Heavy fog prevented any hits from being scored.[50] One Firefly and a Corsair were shot down by Tirpitz's gunners. The battleship expended 54 rounds from her main guns, 161 from the 15 cm guns and up to 20 percent of her light antiaircraft ammunition.[58]"
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by boredatwork »

alecsandros wrote:Why don't we see a massive carrier armada during the invasion of Sicily ? Or at Salerno ? Or at Anzio ? Carriers would have been excellent in assuring fast responses to German armored counterattacks over the beach heads... But they were nowhere to be found.
Yes, nowhere to be found - unless we look at the 2 fleet carriers and 5 escort carriers protecting the fleet from the constant raids by german aircraft. >_>


What I found curious is that in the few battleship vs battleship or even heavy cruiser vs heavy cruiser engagements, the outcome did not correspond to the expectations at all. So, for some higher reason, the old-school naval battles tend to have one clear winner, and one clear loser, despite initial similarity of numbers, technology, and even positioning.
Jutland had a clear winner? Dogger Bank had a clear winner? River Plate had a clear winner? 1st Guadalcanal had a clear winner? Twins against Renown had a clear winner? 1st Narvik had a clear winner? Kommodorski Islands had a clear winner?

Savo and Tassafaronga were won by Japanese Torpedoes and night combat training, both of which were FAR superior to the US at the time.
What I meant was that it's not enough to have fleet carriers and good trained aviators. The Imperial Navy had clear superiority in numbers even after Midway, yet it wasn't capable of obtaining even a single clear victory over the USN, after the initial 6 "golden months". And it wasn't about US industrial strength - not in 1942 at least - because the numbers of available US carriers, BBs, CAs, etc, are known for the time, and they were far below those of the IJN.
Again I don't see how such statements are unique to carriers - any numerical advantage can be thrown away if you don't concentrate your forces and allow a numerically inferior force to defeat you piecemeal. US industrial strength was relavent because she was repairing and replenishing her carriers and their airwings at a much quicker pace than the Japanese. For example Yorktown being available for Midway when Shokaku and Zuikaku were out of action for damage and loss of pilots.

Most importanly you overlook 2 major advantages the US had: 1) Radar - though far from perfect much increased the efficiency of the CAP compared to the visual direction the Japanese relied upon and 2) Magic - the ability to read Japanese codes and concentrate your forces at the right place, at the right time (Midway) was a massive advantage.
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by alecsandros »

boredatwork wrote: Yes, nowhere to be found - unless we look at the 2 fleet carriers and 5 escort carriers protecting the fleet from the constant raids by german aircraft. >_>
And what did they do during the landings and proceedings ? Ah.. nothing.. I wonder why's that ?

Jutland had a clear winner? Dogger Bank had a clear winner? River Plate had a clear winner? 1st Guadalcanal had a clear winner? Twins against Renown had a clear winner? 1st Narvik had a clear winner? Kommodorski Islands had a clear winner?

Savo and Tassafaronga were won by Japanese Torpedoes and night combat training, both of which were FAR superior to the US at the time.
I said the outcome corresponded much less to the expectations. And, provided similarity in numbers/strength, yes, it's always ONE CLEAR WINNER (allthough it's very hard to find balanced engagements - maybe Savo Island, Cape Esperance ?). At Jutland the Royal Navy had clear superiority in numbers, and most people would expect a victory, BUT it lost more ships and more men than the Germans had. The actual battle of River Plate had - at least in the day of the actual fighting - one clear winner - Graf Spee. 1st Guadalcanal wasn't balanced at all. I would have expected obliteration of the USN forces; though that didn't happen. Savo and Tassafaronga were fought at short ranges, in which US torpedoes could easily deal deadly blows to the Japanese, so your argument doesn't stand. 2nd Guadalcanal pitched 2 US BBs and 4 DDs against 1 BC, 6 CAs/CLs and 9 DDs, at very short range (7-12 km), inside which the torpedoes should have been devastating. They weren't, and the Japanese lost badly.

Again I don't see how such statements are unique to carriers - any numerical advantage can be thrown away if you don't concentrate your forces and allow a numerically inferior force to defeat you piecemeal.
Yes, I'm glad we agree.
What is different in a carrier task force is that the essential elements - the carriers - were fragile and easily destroyed. Thus a large investment - of tiem, money, man-hours, raw materials - could be lost quite rapidly...

US industrial strength was relavent because she was repairing and replenishing her carriers and their airwings at a much quicker pace than the Japanese. For example Yorktown being available for Midway when Shokaku and Zuikaku were out of action for damage and loss of pilots.
Argghh, this will never end :D
My impression is that carrier ratios from Dec 1941 to Jul 1943 clearly favored the Japanese trhoughout. Even considering operational carriers (for example Shokaku and Zuikaku weren't operational during and after Midway), and total available aircraft, they still had the upper hand.
Remember the USN only used 6 carriers until mid-1943: Yorktown (sunk Jun 1942), Enterprise (repairs Aug-Oct 1942, repairs/retraining Dec 1942-Jan 1943), Saratoga (repairs/retraining jan 1942 - Jun 1942, then Aug-Nov 1942), Lexington (sunk May 1942), Hornet (sunk Oct 1942), Wasp (European escort duties until May 1942. sunk in Sep 1942).

In Jul 1942 (coming after a particularly bad month for IJN carrier arm), for example, the Japanese could field: Shokaku, Zuikaku, Junyo, Hiyo, Ryuho, Zuiho, Unyo, Taiyo totalling over 350 war planes. The first 6 could reach fleet speed (25-28kts) and could field ~ 300 warplanes. (about the same nr of aircraft Enterprise+Saratoga+HOrnet +Wasp had at the time).
(an excellent link here http://www.ww2pacific.com/japcv.html)

With the loss of Wasp in Sept, Hornet in Oct, and severe damage suffered by Enterprise and Saratoga, by Nov the IJN had clear-cut superiority, if not supremacy in a potential carrier battle. Shokaku, Zuikaku, Ryuho, Junyo, Hiyo alone could field 250 warplanes, against which only Enterprise was available (and starting with Dec Saratoga also - that's probably why HMS Victorious was sent in the Pacific...)
Most importanly you overlook 2 major advantages the US had: 1) Radar - though far from perfect much increased the efficiency of the CAP compared to the visual direction the Japanese relied upon
I didn't observe that quality before 1944 ? US CAP may have had good results during many air battles, but so had the Japanese CAP, when the opposing forces were similar.
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Re: Would Yamato with advanced AA gunnery survive air attack

Post by boredatwork »

/shrug

I'll concede defeat because it's evident that will be the only way this debate will end and I need to get on with real work.

Congrats on your internet forum debate victory by attrition! :wink:
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