Denmark Strait: Half salvos vs full salvos

[TTTT]

A bit confused here.

Bismarck fired 93 rounds at Denmark Strait, which would be 12 full salvos (with 3 misfirings) - 6 against Hood and 6 against PoW.

She hit Hood first with her 3rd half salvo. Did she continue firing half salvos or full salvos after the hit?

Hood blew up after the 5th salvo, which I assume means either the 5th full salvo or the last half salvo of the 5th?

Again, after she hit Pow with the very first (half?) salvo, did she continue with half salvos?

Were half salvos standard tactic for German capital ships both in WW1 and WW2, even after going into "quick mode"?

I understand that Von Der Tann at Jutland hit Indefatigable with 3 out of 4 rounds from a half salvo, then blew her up with 2 hits from the next half salvo?

[Byron Angel]

A bit confused here.

Bismarck fired 93 rounds at Denmark Strait, which would be 12 full salvos (with 3 misfirings) - 6 against Hood and 6 against PoW.
She hit Hood first with her 3rd half salvo. Did she continue firing half salvos or full salvos after the hit?
Hood blew up after the 5th salvo, which I assume means either the 5th full salvo or the last half salvo of the 5th?

Again, after she hit PoW with the very first (half?) salvo, did she continue with half salvos?

Were half salvos standard tactic for German capital ships both in WW1 and WW2, even after going into "quick mode"?

I understand that Von Der Tann at Jutland hit Indefatigable with 3 out of 4 rounds from a half salvo, then blew her up with 2 hits from the next half salvo?

For clarity, I consider the simultaneous discharge of all main battery guns upon a single target as a "Broadside"; I define the simultaneous fire of one gun per each turret or (see below) all the guns of half the turrets as a "Salvo".

My understanding is that BISMARCK employed salvo fire throughout the Denmark Strait action, alternating between salvoes consisting of all four guns of turrets A & B followed by the four guns of turrets C & D, etc. The ranging method employed by Bismarck was, I believe, the customary "Gabelgruppe" ["Forking Group"] method of three salvo groups -
> Salvo 1 would be fired at estimated target range MINUS a pre-selected distance.
> Assuming Salvo 1 fell short as expected, Salvo 2 would be fired at estimated target range PLUS the same pre-selected distance.
> Assuming Salvo 2 fell over as expected, Salvo 3 would immediately be fired at the estimated target range.
> If salvo 3 straddled the target, rapid fire would be immediately commenced; if Salvo 3 fell short, rapid fire might be commenced with an up 100 or 200 meter range correction; if Salvo were spotted over, the range would be dropped slightly
> If Salvo 1 were to fall over instead of short as intended, target range estimate would be corrected and the Gabelgruppe re-commenced afresh on the basis of the new range estimate; likewise if Salvo 3 were to fall short instead of over as expected.
> A pre-selected plus/minus interval of 400 meters was by no means unknown; given a salvo spread of perhaps 150 meters, it would take little time to straddle.

At least, that is my interpretation of the methodology.

Footnote - Paul Schmalenbach (gunnery officer of Prinz Eugen @ Denmark Strait) mentions in his book "Die Geschichte der Deutschen Schiffsartillerie" another gunnery methodology referred to as "Schnell-einschiessung" (Quick-ranging). I am guessing that this refers to a more rapid method of executing the Gabelgruppe ..... (but I might be incorrect).

The phrase "Gut. Schnell, wirkung" means Rapid Fire - i.e., the firing solution has been established (range, range rate, deflection rate); fire as rapidly as possible without waiting for spotting corrections to be applied. Turret crews could not keep this rate up for more than a very few minutes.

- - -

Bismarck continued to engage PoW for a period of time as she sought to reverse course and turn away under smoke. In the course of doing so, PoW had suffered a mechanical breakdown in her after turret that effectively left her a defenseless target.

- - -

Salvo-fire (as opposed to broadside fire) was absolutely the standard German gunnery method in WW1. The reminiscences of the gunnery officers of the German battle-cruisers at Jutland make this plain. There is mention of a single broadside attempted by one of the battle-cruisers, with the gunnery officer commenting that it was not possible to effectively spot the fall of shot and was consequently discontinued.

- - -

Re the Von der Tann versus Indefatigable engagement, no one really knows with certainty how many hits were involved in her sinking. my best guess is three - the first hit aft, followed by two hits forward. I have a copy of Mahrholz's (gunnery officer of Von der Tann at Jutland) account of the engagement, if you are interested. The next nearest observer was a bridge officer aboard New Zealand; his account can be found in "The Fighting at Jutland" (a very good first-person resource).


Byron

[Byron Angel]

For anyone interesed in a free PDF D/L of "The Fighting at Jutland" ...

Go here -
https://archive.org/details/fightingatj ... at+Jutland


Byron

[TTTT]

Thanks, it makes sense.

I looked at the film of Bismarck firing against Hood (taken from Prinz Eugen) over at YouTube, and it is pretty clear that she's firing Anton and Bruno first, shortly followed by Cesar and Dora, although the intervals seems to vary.

So, if follow your terminology (one salvo = 4 guns), Hood was sunk by Bismarck's 10th salvo? And that she fired 1-2 salvos against Hood also after that before she turned against PoW? Or have I this all wrong, that Bismarck fired just 6 (4-gun) salvos against Hood and 18 against PoW?

Yes, I have seen various accounts about how many hits Indefatigable took. And please post Mahrholz's account of the engagement. Thanks for the link, I'll take a look at it.

[Byron Angel]

Here is the excerpt from the Jutland account of Gunnery Officer Paschen of LUTZOW re AB + CD salvos and broadsides -

Our rangefinders gave us good ranges commencing at 240 hm. and it seemed an eternity, actually it was twenty minutes, before we had reached our range of 190 hm. Even then we had to wait for the “ Seydlitz ” till the range was further reduced. Five points—57° is the enemy’s bearing. Estimated speed 26 knots, course 110°. This made the rate of closing 4 hm. a minute. At a range of 167 hm. by our calculations the first turret salvo from “A” and “‘B” turrets was fired at 4.48 p.m. “ Liitzow”’ throughout the action fired alternate salvoes from her fore.and after turrets, a system I cannot praise too highly. Both guns work as one, load simultaneously and are laid by one man. When loaded there is quiet in the turret. Gunlayers take turns at laying when necessary. The muzzle smoke is concentrated at one end of the ship ; one of the controls at least can observe even under the most unfavourable conditions. Once only I fired a full salvo from all turrets, the result did not encourage me to repeat it, the salvo fell short or mostly short and covered the whole target in an enormous column of water.


Byron

[TTTT]

Ver interesting! Seem like they couldn't praise the 4+4 system enough. Do you know the practise in other navies?

[marcelo_malara]

The problem of firing a full salvo is that you have to wait the reloading time (at least 30 seconds) to fire again, whereas with a half salvo you can make corrections and firing immediately. Nor to mention the waste of 4 shells if you didn´t have the range yet.

Regards

[hans zurbriggen]

Hello Mr. Angel,
thanks for your correct description of German fire practice. However, please don't forget usual initial 'Vollsalve' fired as a broadside (8 guns) aimed at correcting bearing (and possibly warm-up guns) more than range.
It is mentioned (as well as 'Gabelgruppe') in P. Jasper gunnery report from Prinz Eugen (that fired initially 2 of them, due to impossibility to spot first Vollsalve fall of shots).

Regarding the 5th salvo, I think it was actually 9th salvo as counted by Germans (any discharge of guns, not considering number of shells) : 1 Vollsalve (8 guns) + 3 Gabelgruppe salvoes (4 guns) + other 5 salvoes (4 guns), with last 5 (half)salvoes that also fairly match Rowell's (PoW navigating officer, as witness at Hood loss 2nd Board of Inquiry) description of Bismarck firing.

I agree with Mr. Malara and you regarding advantages firing half salvoes (easier spotting, quicker corrections and less waste of ammunitions).


Hello, Mr. TTT,
AFAIK, British firing method was similar, excluding Vollsalve: each salvo was half total guns. However, in case of British ships, a salvo was not by turrets, it was by guns, with even and odd guns of all 'bearing' turrets firing alternatively. Broadsides were only used (in both navies) in quite special situations (e.g. at night when at point blank distances).

hans

[Byron Angel]

Thanks, it makes sense.

I looked at the film of Bismarck firing against Hood (taken from Prinz Eugen) over at YouTube, and it is pretty clear that she's firing Anton and Bruno first, shortly followed by Cesar and Dora, although the intervals seems to vary.

So, if follow your terminology (one salvo = 4 guns), Hood was sunk by Bismarck's 10th salvo? And that she fired 1-2 salvos against Hood also after that before she turned against PoW? Or have I this all wrong, that Bismarck fired just 6 (4-gun) salvos against Hood and 18 against PoW?

Yes, I have seen various accounts about how many hits Indefatigable took. And please post Mahrholz's account of the engagement. Thanks for the link, I'll take a look at it.

Hi AT,
Here is the [more or less] translated excerpt of Mahrholz’s account of Von der Tann’s engagement with Indefatigable at Jutland -

“After my relief, I went to my cabin to rest a bit after my watch. I took a book in hand, yet hardly had I begun to read when the signal “Clear for Action” sounded throughout the ship. I was on the bridge in a bound. Our cabins lay forward in Von der Tann, not far from the bridge. The first “Klarmeldungen” of the “Gefechtstellen” were already coming into the artillery control position. I made a short voice check on the telephones connecting myself with the range clock, “Peilscheibe”, assistant observer, and third artillery officer in the aft artillery control position, and tested the fall of shot timer. Then I had time to make inquiries as to what was happening, but I did not find out much. The light cruisers had reported an encounter with the enemy. For the moment, only light forces had been observed, but after previous experiences they sought security behind the battle cruisers. With full power, the battle cruisers ran toward the reported position and soon our light forces could be seen on the horizon in battle with a yet invisible enemy. One could distinctly see the flashes of the salvos and splashes of the enemy shells. Soon the picture further clarified itself. Besides the cruisers engaged ahead, six smoke clouds came into view in the southwest. The apparent smoke clouds neared and were soon identified from the spotting top as battle cruisers.

Now it become serious, no longer a question of chasing light cruisers, but a do or die encounter of equal opponents. It dawned upon some that this was the commencement of a battle, but no one supposed that the entire English fleet was in the vicinity. This time it was quite different from earlier occasions. Our entire fleet stood only fifty sea miles astern of us and that gave a great feeling of strength and confidence. Each man on board wholeheartedly desired an encounter with the enemy. Many eager eyes gazed through their high-powered binoculars and telescopes to make out details. Soon the ships were also recognized from below as battle cruisers bearing down in two columns upon the German ships. While we still steered a northwest course, the English admiral formed his line on a southerly course, by so doing revealing an intention to cut off our battle cruisers from our rear support. Admiral Hipper followed this action, which gave him the best opportunity to draw the enemy force toward our main body in the south. Now both opponents were running abreast on diverging courses. Soon an additional squadron was sighted in the further distance, which later proved to be 5th Battle Squadron. With four ships of the Queen Elizabeth class, at that time the most formidable warships in the world, with an armament of 38cm caliber. It also made the English superiority more than double. But all the same there was no man on board who did not burn with desire to close with the enemy.

There was an enormous stress upon all feelings, which ached for release, and this pressure was only increased through the delay in the order to open fire. Long ago had I taken my post at the director-scope and directed my battery and ranging instruments upon the enemy; through the 15x magnification of my optics, I could clearly make out the enemy ships. “Fire to be distributed from the left” was called by the signals petty officer through the view slit and I slowly counted the line of opponents through my telescope. According to the rules, our ship, as the end ship in line, was to engage two opponents, since we would be pitted against the fifth and sixth enemy ships; but the medium artillery could not yet reach due to the great range, so I actually had to split my main battery, two turrets forward and two turrets aft. But that meant only two shots in each salvo and that did not appeal to me. So I decided to keep my battery together and first attend to one opponent and then the other. A wild decisiveness clutched at me to turn this decision into actuality. But now there was time and leisure to look upon the enemy through the telescope. Like unnatural monsters, the ships thrust through the water. I could clearly make out each action on the ships – the signal hoists and after that the rotation of the heavy turrets and the elevation of the gun barrels, which presented us with a view such as one had been accustomed to from many battle exercises, only then harmless twinkles had flashed from the muzzles.

The rangefinders continually metered ranges into the fire control apparatus and when I queried the rangefinder officer, he informed me beamingly that the measurements were excellent, the instruments correlating within 100 meters. So much the better for ranging in, I thought, but I still planned on an 8 hm fork to allow for the influence of the day over such an enormous distance. The range clock was set and connected to the gun-sight telegraph. With complete calm the “Seitenverschiebung” (deflection?) was calculated and corresponding orders were given to the guns so that fire could be opened at a moment’s notice. One really had the feeling as with an important gunnery exercise – a long steady preparation without useless twisting and turning, which promoted good calculations and estimates. A long series of comparative measurements had to produce a good initial range. No haste or delay in the transmission of orders or at the guns created a good feeling in the heart of the gunner. The loading of the guns had long ago been ordered. In the turrets the gun crews had rammed home into the breeches the projectiles, upon which all sorts not very friendly greetings for the English had been chalked. 162 hm had just been calculated, when, like a deliverance -”F.D., Open Fire” sounded and in the same second the first salvo cracked out against the enemy. Simultaneously, one saw gun flashes from the guns on the opposing side and the rolling yellow-brown smoke clouds rise above the ships. When our first salvo was out, I focused my entire energy in my eyes so that no movement of the enemy, no impact (fall of shot) of my battery might escape my attention. The center of the one-sixteenth graduated scale lay precisely beneath the middle stack of the battle cruiser “Indefatigable”, whose name I admittedly did not know at the time; we were only able to recognize the class. I concentrated, as I had become accustomed by gunnery exercises, my chief interest in the forward part of the opponent, for at the bow any speed change is best detected and at the bridge any course change is best detected. Under certain circumstances the target may maneuver between the splashes of laterally missing projectiles, thereby making possible an observation of the fall of shot as “over”; this is why the bow of the opponent should be kept under especially sharp observation by the gunnery officer.

Simultaneously with the “quacking” of the fall of shot clock, four enormous fountains spurted up over there. The deflection was correct, with the impacts falling “over” acceptable in line with the after superstructure. “8 Down, 4 more Left, one Salvo” was my initial correction. During the flight of the salvo, I compared the range-finder measurement to that of the fire control predictor and found that they agreed precisely. With the validation of the measurement, I now awaited the fork and four tall water columns sprang up, for a moment obliterating from view the entire middle part of the target. All four were clearly discernable on the surface of the water and also short within an acceptable limit. “4 Up, one Salvo” and again, after the time of flight period, a salvo struck near the opponent – two impacts short, one long, the fourth unable to be seen and presumably a hit, for the “Listenfuhrer” confirmed to me that four shots had fallen in the salvo. Because the AP shells exploded in the interior of the opponent and the effect of a hit was only visible if its destructive effect expanded from the interior to the exterior of the target, I was wary about declaring a hit and held myself rigorously to the observational standard. But the young lieutenant in the spotting top felt it was a hit. “Straddle, Gut Schnell” was the order after the splashes. Now we shot salvoes at short intervals, often with more than one salvo in the air simultaneously.

The enemy was firing back at a slower rate, and we could clearly identify their muzzle flashes. Whoever was not occupied at that moment was able to track their fall of shot by the clock. But the enemy’s shooting was poor due to his slow rate of fire. Possibly he was hamperedby lower visibility – in these hazy conditions our light paint paid off.

Byron Note – It is also possible that the rapid and accurate fire of Von der Tann during this period was interfering with Indefatigable’s spotting. Another possibility, circumstantially suggested by the gunnery logs of the surviving BCF battle-cruisers, is that Indefatigable was ranging by double-salvoes, which might have created an impression of a slow rate of fire.

According to the observations of our light cruisers, the enemy’s shots were all significantly over, such that at times the vessels behind us were endangered. Any confusion between our hits and the enemy’s muzzle flashes could be ruled out since the latter was accompanied by yellowish/brownish smoke. In contrast, our hits were characterized by a bright glow only in the event that our armor-piercing shells failed to penetrate before exploding.

By now, the shooting of Von der Tann was very effective, and from time to time the enemy was completely hidden behind the splashes. “Indefatigable” seemed to cease fire and tried to get out of the firing line (line of fire?) by zig-zagging, but our good optics could detect any of its movements immediately. When the enemy veered off, I increased the range by 1 hm (100 meters) and decreased accordingly when he veered in. I moved the “Schieber” [?] slightly, in accordance with the direction of the bow’s moves. During the flight of the salvo the new “calibration” (calculation?) for the “Anzeiger” was ordered, and immediately received the “Gang” [?] and “Schieber” for the new location of the enemy. At most times, the Schieber coincided with the “freihandig abgegriffen” [free-hand estimate?] value. Since the position constantly changed [Standortanderung?] we did not drag on the “Gang”[?]. The artillery communication officer worked splendidly, the “Aufsatztelegraph”[?] had the correct new [E.U.] after each turn of the enemy. There was no way out. Our battery stayed on the target and the quick succession of salvos was barely interrupted. I became impatient and ordered a personal command which I had developed during exercises, and which was not written in any gunnery instruction: “Faster!”. This implied that the man at the “E Watch” [/] should strive for the maximum possible firing rate without awaiting the gun signal for readiness, and the salvoes went out in an incredible rush.

The deadly blow struck the enemy 14 minutes after opening fire. I looked through the “Richtungsweisersehrohr” [fire director periscope?] and was the arrival of a salvo, followed by a gigantic explosion in the aft turret. A bright sheet of flame shot out of the turret roof and expanded along the entire aft section. Debris whirled through the air, possibly fragments of the turret’s roof. The next salvo hit the ship forward and finished it off. A monstrous black cloud rose into the air to twice the height of the topmast and masked the enemy completely – apparently we have hit an oil tank.

Byron Note – An odd reaction. But Mahrholz was the first German to witness such a catastrophic event during the war.

We shot another salvo into the cloud, but most likely it missed since our opponent has already slopped below the waves. The observing officer assured me that the enemy has been sunk, but I still was skeptical since I knew how easily one can be mistaken at these distances, and how tempting it is to visualize one’s wish. Only after the smoke was gone was I too convinced of the sinking and reported accordingly to the captain. News of our enemy’s defeat spread quickly below decks and I heard many “Hoorays” in the headphones.


Byron

[Byron Angel]

Ver interesting! Seem like they couldn't praise the 4+4 system enough. Do you know the practise in other navies?

Hi AT,
I am most familiar with the WW1 period. I'm also confining my comments to capital ships (battleships and battlecruisers for the sake of simplicity. The Royal Navy and the German Navy both employed salvo fire. The underlying logic was that the more salvos you could fire at a moving target within a given period of of time, the more data you could accumulate to correct your aim; think of it in terms of "sampling rate". It having been determined that salvos of at least four shots were best for the purpose of accurately spotting fall of shot, dreadnoughts were designed to carry at least eight guns. Salvos could be fired at twice the rate of broadsides, were easier to spot, were more economical of ammunition, and did not tire the gun crews so much.

Salvos were initially employed in connection with "Bracketing Fire": i.e., shoot a salvo, observe fall of shot relative to target, alter range in uniform steps (say 800 yds) until the target is crossed, then halve the range step (now 400 yds) and reverse direction until the target is again crossed, "rinsing and repeating until a straddle is achieved. To speed the process, the German Navy established the "Gabelgruppe" (Forking Group) method, as described in my earlier post. The Royal Navy prior to Jutland had left gunnery method up to the discretion of individual gunnery officers (ref: "The Sea Heritage" by Frederic Dreyer). After Jutland, the Grand Fleet ended the individual discretion approach and, in Dec 1916, introduced a mandatory gunnery method - "The 1916 Spotting Rules" - to be adopted throughout the Grand Fleet. The drafting of these new rules was guided by Ernle Chatfield (Beatty's Flag Captain at Jutland and a gunnery specialist) and featured as their foundation stone the use of the "double-salvo" - whereby two salvos would be fired in rapid succession with a range interval of perhaps 200-400 yards between them and then spotted as a group. This system proved very successful and remained in use into WW2.

On the other hand, the US Navy of the WW1 era favored fire by broadside. This commitment was carried out to the degree that US main battery turret design (see the US 14-inch gun battleships of the WW1 era) were such that all guns of the turret had to be elevated and depressed in unison; it was not possible to elevate the guns of the turret independently. The underlying logic (in so far as I can grasp it) was that hitting at long ranges was best accomplished by firing very large patterns (10-12 shots in a pattern of perhaps 800-1000 yds length). The overall rate of fire was slow compared to fire by salvo, but range-estimation errors became less of an issue. This gunnery method persisted into the 20s, but was beset by pattern dispersion problems due to design flaws of the a/m 14-inch turrets.


Hope this helps.

Byron

[TTTT]

Thanks, everybody! A lot of very interesting and new info for me.

[Thorsten Wahl]

Double post

[Thorsten Wahl]

@Byron
“Schieber” [?] Deflection adjustment considering the future position of the target, and some other deflection corrections(drift, wind...)

“Gang” [?] Deflection change

-----------------------
enemy was completely hidden behind the splashes. “Indefatigable” seemed to cease fire and tried to get out of the firing line (line of fire?)"

Firing line is a wrong translation of the wording "Strichschiessen". Meaning is different.

Von der Tann performed the firing procedure during fire for effect (Wirkungsschiessen) called "Strichschiessen". That means if looked from above the impact splashes form a dense line, the target cannot move through without beeing hit.
If the target tries to break out of the line of impacts a "Aufsatz" correction put the next series of impacts on the "good side" of the future target movement.
"Good side" if the target turn toward the firing ship is short.
If target turns away the "good side" is long.

During "Strichschiessen" corrections for elevation (Aufsatz) should be minimal to prevent a gap in the line of impacts.

Strichschiessen as the preferred firing procedure during Wirkungsschiessen requires very fast salvo intervals to prevent gaps in the line of impacts the opponent may slip through.

[Byron Angel]

@Byron
“Schieber” [?] Deflection adjustment considering the future position of the target, and some other deflection corrections(drift, wind...)

“Gang” [?] Deflection change

-----------------------
enemy was completely hidden behind the splashes. “Indefatigable” seemed to cease fire and tried to get out of the firing line (line of fire?)"

Firing line is a wrong translation of the wording "Strichschiessen". Meaning is different.

Von der Tann performed the firing procedure during fire for effect (Wirkungsschiessen) called "Strichschiessen". That means if looked from above the impact splashes form a dense line, the target cannot move through without beeing hit.
If the target tries to break out of the line of impacts a "Aufsatz" correction put the next series of impacts on the "good side" of the future target movement.
"Good side" if the target turn toward the firing ship is short.
If target turns away the "good side" is long.

During "Strichschiessen" corrections for elevation (Aufsatz) should be minimal to prevent a gap in the line of impacts.

Strichschiessen as the preferred firing procedure during Wirkungsschiessen requires very fast salvo intervals to prevent gaps in the line of impacts the opponent may slip through.

Hi Thorsten,
I am most grateful to you for these translations and explanatory clarifications of such technical German gunnery terms as these. IMO, even after more than a century, a full and complete appreciation for WW1 German Fire Control technology among English-speaking historians seems truly lacking ..... and grasp of German gunnery and spotting methodology seems to me to be even worse.

Gentlemen like you and Hans and "Delcyros" are like life preservers in a sea of darkness when it comes such issues.

Byron