Reading about the Bismarck's brief stay in Norway I came across the following:
21 May. At 0900 on 21 May the group put into Kors Fjord near Bergen according to plan. There they refueled during the day and kept out of sight of the enemy.
In Raeder's report to the Fuhrer at the Berghof
More valuable original content kindly provided by Mr Rico.
We all know Bismarck did not refuel in Norway, but it would appear even Raeder himself was misinformed, and this would have added to the consternation at SKL when Lutjens sent urgent messages about a critical fuel situation later in the operation. Some on this site over the years, have offered speculative estimates of Bismarck's fuel consumption and thus status during the operation, but with little knowledge of how weather and trim after damage might have affected the rate of consumption. Also the rate of loss after PoW's midship hit which sent fragments and caused leakage and perhaps contamination is unknown and must be added to problems caused by the bow hit. By the end, Lutjens was committed to a return to France at less than full speed when the Ark's Swordfish dealt the fatal blow. A few extra knots might have made all the difference.
Many have expressed an opinion that Lutjens made a serious mistake in not "topping up" the flagship as well, and speculative reasons have suggested insufficient available fuel, lack of time or even that the extra displacement caused by maybe a thousand tons extra fuel would have reduced maximum speed. It seems unlikely a port the size of Bergen could not have scraped up some more for such a VIP, PG was finished filling up by late afternoon and yet BS only collected her from Kalvanes Bay about 20:00 heading for the northern exit from the offshore islands. Several more hours wasted. Anyway how much speed reduction will a few cms extra draft cause? Raeder clearly thought Bismarck had fuelled too, which would have made her visit worthwhile. (I hope the German original confirms "they")
The Baron's description is of a surprisingly relaxed day at anchor, hosting interested visitors from German units ashore with not much apparent urgency about achieving surprise with the operation. Is there any indication that any critical systems, say radar, needed urgent spares which needed to be picked up and maybe tested before final departure? If Lutjens was wasting time waiting for favourable weather in the Denmark Straits, sitting in Grimstadfjord was directly "in sight" of thousands of "enemy" ie Norwegians, the Resistance reported her presence and as we know she was photographed by the RAF.
Any thoughts or additional information?
All the best
wadinga