2 questions regarding Bismarck

[RF]

Very interesting, Thommy

So it was a stream of incorrect information that lead to some questionable decisions...

Questionable maybe, but not necessarily wrong.

Going to France, in my view, was a logical thing to do. The Atlantic breakthrough had been achieved, and with Germanys' biggest naval victory to date in both world wars... one aspect of the film ''Sink the Bismarck'' that was accurate was the comment drawn out by both Sheppard (Kenneth More) and Lutjens (Karel Stepanack) that to return to Germany after sinking Hood could be seen as a defeat, and muddy what should be seen as the celebration of a major victory. Also going to France mean't that Bismarck would join the twins - and achieve the objective of Rheinubung in creating a formidable battle force.

[RF]

My impression is he (they) chose boldness over safeness... The trip to France was twice as long as the trip to Norway...

But still safer. Bismarck would have made it but for a fluke hit......

[alecsandros]

So it was a stream of incorrect information that lead to some questionable decisions...

[/quote]
Well, it's difficult to separate the knowledge we have with hindsight from the knowledge Lutjens had at the time. Indeed, it would have looked bad to turn away just after sinking the enemy flagship. However, it would probably have been the better thing to do. The lucky torpedo hit came when Bismarck was about 1200km from Brest, doing maybe 22-24kts. So, even if a hit wouldn't have been obtained on the 26th, there was plenty of time on the 27th... And even on the 28th... Not to mention the probable torpedo attack of Vian's destroyers... And then attacks from land-based bombers and torpedo-bombers... The problem was the ship was under constant surveillance from May 26th onwards...

The 2 problems I see, indeed not necessarily wrong, but at least curious, are: opening fire on Hood VERY late and choosing a 2-times longer route with a damaged ship on reduced range, heading for a much higher concentration of ships (than it would face on a hipothetical journey to Norway)

As Thommy pointed out in detail, those may have been the best decisions given the information available to the German officers, but they were far from optimal in the grand scheme of things...

[frontkampfer]

alecsandros wrote:My impression is he (they) chose boldness over safeness... The trip to France was twice as long as the trip to Norway...

But still safer. Bismarck would have made it but for a fluke hit......

RF,

I agree! Lutjens took a a gamble and it almost paid off. IMHO, Brest was the right choice and would have certainly got the attention of the RN & RAF with three major enemy warships on the southern flank if nothing else. Hindsight is 20/20, luck is what it is, luck.

[t-geronimo]

... but they were far from optimal in the grand scheme of things...

From which point of view?
From today?

[alecsandros]

From which point of view?
From today?

Yes... Had Lujens had known of the concentration of RN ships on the way to Brest, he probably woudl have gone to Norway.

The crippling torpedo hit would have come sooner or later. Ark Royal had at least one full day to launch further torpedo strikes. AND, even if the torpedo wouldn't have hit the rudder, it would have caused further damage and force the ship to slow down even more, probably ~ 15kts (because it allready received 2x14" shells and 2 aerial torpedoes beforehand, because of which the economical speed was 20kts). Not to mention the accumulation of DDs, CLs and CAs, which were doing 32kts+, and which might deliver further torpedoes...

[t-geronimo]

I think he was aware of the fact that the Royal Navy would bring almost everything to sea they had to hunt his ship down.

On the other hand he was aware of the fact that british cruisers now had radar and that this was possibly the last possibility to make a breakthrough throug denmark strait or south of Iceland "undetected" (in fact of course he was detected).

[Antonio Bonomi]

Hello everybody,

you are raising good points Thorsten ( T-Geronimo ) .....

Here some food for more thougths :

1) Operation Rheinubung was needed by Kriegsmarine warships to demonstrate to Adolf Hitler that they were fighting as well as Donitz U-Boots. Adm Lutjens was not going to call it back and abort the operation unless absolutely necessary. He wanted to help his tutor Adm Erich Raeder that was on a very critical personal situation versus Hitler because of warships inefficiency compared to U-Boots according to Hitler.

2) Operation orders were NOT to engage battle against warships unless needed to sink convoy merchant ships. When VADM Holland warships opened fire Adm Lutjens informed SKL in Berlin about the fact he was engaged by battleships ( it is clearly written on PG battle map ) and waited for a feed back that never came back to him. Once it was clear he had asked permission ( having respected the orders he had on his hands ) and not having received response on a reasonable time .... he knew the situation needed a quick decision to be made, ... than everybody saw the flags JOT-DORA on Bismarck mast ... because Adm Lutjens did release the order to open fire when ready to both warships, ... and Prinz Eugen fired first, ... so Lindemann and Schneider were slower on reacting than Brinkmann and Jasper on PG.

Bye Antonio

[ede144]

I think he was aware of the fact that the Royal Navy would bring almost everything to sea they had to hunt his ship down.

On the other hand he was aware of the fact that british cruisers now had radar and that this was possibly the last possibility to make a breakthrough throug denmark strait or south of Iceland "undetected" (in fact of course he was detected).

My impression from reading the Baron was, Lütjens wanted to get lost in the Atlantik. The course back to Norway was much more predictible.

regards
ede

[RF]

Logically ''getting lost in the Atlantic '' was the thing to do - provided the pursuers were shaken off. But Bismarck was damaged and needed repairs. Lutjens did lose his pursurers without realising it and then gave away his course by a long radio message.....

Had he simply lost his pursuers and stopped where he was - and wait a few days for the RN ships to run low on fuel and rest his own crew - then he could have done what Brinckmann did, get to Brest unmolested.

[RF]

My impression from reading the Baron was, Lütjens wanted to get lost in the Atlantik. The course back to Norway was much more predictible.

When Krancke attacked convoy HX 84 the RN reacted on the expectation that Scheer would head back towards Norway, or as a more remote altenative, head for France. Krancke of course was only starting his foray, not finishing it..... so his move towards the central Atlantic was the one move the British weren't expecting. There was nothing to oppose Krancke as he found more merchantman to capture/sink and be resupplied by Nordmark.

Disappearing into the wide ocean made the KM ships safer than they were in home waters - because they were invisible.

[Rick Rather]

If I had the misfortune to be Raeder for a day, then the moment I heard about the Hood sinking I would have sent the following message to Lutjens:

DISREGARD "DECOY" ORDERS. OBJECTIVE OF RHEINUBUNG IS TO SINK ENEMY BC AND RETURN TO NORWAY.

Say it's what I meant to do all along, and try for a propaganda win.

[phil gollin]

............ Say it's what I meant to do all along, and try for a propaganda win.

Interesting point, how did the German propaganda machine deal with the ups and down of the "episode" ?

In one sense the British had an easier task, defeat then victory is a stirring story to tell. Does anyone know any details ?

.

[RF]

it's what I meant to do all along, and try for a propaganda win.

Its a propaganda win - but it doesn't do anything to imperil Britains' lifeline and that would be the consideration for Raeder, especially in his dealings with a Fuhrer whose attention is shortly to be focussed on Russia.

No, I go along with Marschall - the Fleet Commander on the spot should make the decision.

[tommy303]

but it doesn't do anything to imperil Britains' lifeline and that would be the consideration for Raeder

And that is the main point of the matter. Sending Bismarck back to Norway and presumably on back to the Baltic for repairs does nothing but give a propaganda victory. The whole reason for sending Bismarck and Prinz Eugen out, even after it was evident the twins in Brest would not be able to join the sortie, was to keep pressure on the British and make them disperse their resources. Luetjens saw this as too high a risk plan for the potential rewards it might bring and argued in favor of waiting for the twins to be repaired and ready; Raeder though was not, and after a long discussion with the Flottenchef, persuaded Luetjens to proceed with the operation.