Denmark Strait - Run ?

[Patrick McWilliams]

"Have another look at that part of the Denmark Strait: heading west would take the Germans straight to Greenland, several hundred miles north east of its southern point! They were far too far north to escape easily into the Atlantic"

Quote: "No, the position where Bismarck encountered the British ships is well to the south of the Denmark strait, they were to the west of Reykjavik and already in the Atlantic. They had several hundred miles of open ocean to the west of them before the packice off Greenland would force them to turn south or south west. The Denmark strait is the narrows between Greenland and Iceland (almost 300 kms at it´s narrowest), the battle took place far to the south of that."

Sigh!!! Ok, I know you're in Iceland but check your geography again. The German ships could NOT head directly west without crashing into the coast of Greenland!

Check your geography! The battle took place off the south-west of Iceland, far south of the Denmark strait and there was, as I wrote above:"several hundred miles of open ocean to the west of them before the packice off Greenland would force them to turn south or south west"
If they would continue long enough on a westerly heading, they would eventually hit the pack ice off the Greenland coast but they had an area the size of the North sea to manouver in to the west of Iceland before that happened.

My last word on this totally fruitless discussion is: check your geography!! Eventually hit the pack ice. i.e. making it abundantly clear to the British that they were heading directly for Greenland and thereby substantially narrowing the area of chase. Have a nice day and over and out!

[dunmunro]

No, the position where Bismarck encountered the British ships is well to the south of the Denmark strait, they were to the west of Reykjavik and already in the Atlantic. They had several hundred miles of open ocean to the west of them before the packice off Greenland would force them to turn south or south west.
The Denmark strait is the narrows between Greenland and Iceland (almost 300 kms at it´s narrowest), the battle took place far to the south of that.

Yes, and if Bismarck could easily outrun the RN force, all Lutjens had to do was to head west at 30.5 knots when the RN BBs opened fire and in four hours the RN capital ships would be below the horizon, and Lutjens would be loose in the central North Atlantic within easy range of his supply ships and a threat to any convoy in that area. Yet Lutjens, oddly, chose to engage in a 2 on 1 against the two most powerful ships (Lutjens thought PoW was KGV) in the RN. Lutjens' actions were thus either foolhardy (and a maybe a consequence of simple cowardice by "freezing" at the sight of the Hood, as some have claimed) or simply an acknowledgement that he could not outrun his opponents, and thus, early in the morning with clear weather, his only option was to fight.

[Karl Heidenreich]

dunmuro:

Lutjens' actions were thus either foolhardy (and a maybe a consequence of simple cowardice by "freezing" at the sight of the Hood, as some have claimed) or simply an acknowledgement that he could not outrun his opponents, and thus, early in the morning with clear weather, his only option was to fight.

Lutjens froze, no doubt about it. That was why Lindemann over ride him. When Lutjens reacted the only thing he did was ordering to disengage PoW and run into the Atlantic and to the destruction of his superb ship and his heroic crew.

[dunmunro]

dunmuro:

Lutjens' actions were thus either foolhardy (and a maybe a consequence of simple cowardice by "freezing" at the sight of the Hood, as some have claimed) or simply an acknowledgement that he could not outrun his opponents, and thus, early in the morning with clear weather, his only option was to fight.

Lutjens froze, no doubt about it. That was why Lindemann over ride him. When Lutjens reacted the only thing he did was ordering to disengage PoW and run into the Atlantic and to the destruction of his superb ship and his heroic crew.

Of course I'm being sarcastic when I stated that Lutjens might have been a coward or a fool. He was a hardened combat commander with an outstanding war record in both wars. His actions only make sense if he could not outrun his opponents.

[Vic Dale]

I second Duncan's defense of Lutjens.

He was an outstanding admiral who has been wrongly maligned by people who are ignorant of the tactical situation and how it was unfolding. Even survivors seem to have little grasp of how difficult it was going be to avoid the British blockade once the alert was raised and then again how extremely difficult it would be to shake off his shadowers. Their accounts are loaded with pessimism about the whole concept of the operation and blame Lutjens for their plight on being caught and sunk. Well that goes with the territory.

The breakout was an act of war however you read it and Lutjens was under orders to conduct the breakthrough and that is just what he did despite his misgivings. If Lutjens had got the ship safely to France - which he nearly did - he would have been everyone's hero- the "scourge of the RN." And he very nearly made it despite the fact that the whole weight of the RN - including the Fleet Air Arm - which could reasonably be brought to bear were after him, together with Coastal Command and privateers flying Catalinas from the USA. All that focus on one single ship and still they nearly missed him. Lutjens' tactics must have been well up to the mark.

In the Denmark Strait Lutjens had a fifty-fifty chance of getting out without a scratch. As for boldness, pressing the Strait after Suffolk and Norfolk made contact, shows that he had weighed the odds and proceeded on the chance that heavy units might not be in place to intercept him at the other end, whereas they might well be ready for him later had he retreated. He took the courageous decision to attack the Strait, despite his orders permitting delay if he felt it necessary. The British Battle unit did intercept him and his squadron beat them off. However you weigh this, the German squadron under Lutjens' leadership scored the biggest single victory of all time for the German Navy.

Better judgment than that possessed by Lutjens has flowed from the pens of authors and from the cosy armchair. Condemnation and clap-trap has been heaped upon the head of this officer, but not significantly by senior officers on either side of the battle.

Vic Dale

[Karl Heidenreich]

Nelson was an outstanding Admiral.
Beatty and Hipper were outstanding admirals.
Nimitz and Spruance were outstanding admirals.

Lutjens destroyed his flagship, didn´t sunk a single ton of allied transports, froze at DS, disengaged PoW and got all his men killed. He was far from being an outstanding admiral. At his best he could have been Nagumo´s XO.

[RF]

Lutjens career record, with its track record of rapid promotions, suggest that he was a commander better than average - for the German Navy. He was one of the best they had. But not necessarily the better than average of other navies - say the RN or the US Navy. The German Navy had no long standing tradition or proud history that pertains to other maritime nations and their navies, the German Navy was far more insular and was born into a sense of inferiority in status and role to the German Army.
My view is that Lutjens was a capable officer, but not the best choice for Rheinubung. Outstanding - no.

[Vic Dale]

To RF.

Germany had a larger population than Britain and therefore a much larger pool for selection of personnel. With a seafaring history at least as old as that of Britain the German sailor was very much the equal of his British counter part.

With regard to a "fighting navy" with a lack of tradition, the KM had to absorb combat lessons from all sea battles and will not have been able to rest on the laurels won by Nelson and will not have developed the complacency which so diseased the higher ranks of the RN. Lessons were undoubtedly learned in the RN from years of combat with Dutch, Spanish and French men o' war, and study of the many battles which the RN engaged in shows that for every outstanding tactician there were a number of dumb bunnies who should have been shot.

The RN was a place of great prestige and despite moves to combat it, commissions could still be bought or sought through connection. The RN was largely staffed through privilege and the deficiencies of this manner of selection showed through all too often.

Germany was not a natural seafaring nation as most of her trade passed over land, so any Germans who did take to the sea possessed a devotion to it which probably exceeded that of the British. British trade via the sea would largely be done going south and east to the Americas, Africa and Asia, whereas the German sailor would also pass through the Baltic and toward the North. So German sailors were a particularly hard bunch. Many of the U-Boat commanders came from the Merchant Marine and some of their tales are harrowing.

The years following the First World war saw a reduction of the High Seas Fleet (HsF)to little short of zero and her seamen and officers had to find work on civilian ships, or give up the sea altogether. They often went far and wide sailing in all and any ships they could find, plying trade over the whole globe. The terrible economic conditions which impinged on Germany through the 20 and 30s caused great hardship, far worse even than that suffered by the people of Britain and France, so the German sailor would be a particularly "hard-bastard" and god help anyone who got in his way.

The practical obliteration of the HsF reduced the officer corps to a bare minimum and selection was ferocious. The mutinies in the HsF had caused the Fleet to abandon the privileges previously enjoyed by the Kaiser's officers was gone and the navy such as it was became a thoroughly professional body.

The rebuilding of the fleet drew in many experienced men of 20 years before and those who joined from school were selected as the best of the best and the officers who would lead then had to be good. There was determination to shake off the terrible stigma of Scapa Flow and the KM produced a band of officers and men who were second to none and despite having such a small navy and with so few U-Boats in 1939 the U-Boat arm was to grow and become a potentially world beating threat. For 2 years there was nothing to beat them.

The U-Boat arm was a constituent part of the fleet as a whole surface and not a separate arm as some think. So a Fleet Commander was going to be someone who had the technical and tactical skill to be able to direct surface, submarine and aerial activity.

I don't think there can be any doubt as to the aggressive thinking of the German captains and admirals, though shortage of ships imposed it's own limitations on what they could reasonably do. When on learning that war was inevitable someone said, " All we can do is show the world how to die." It was quite a realistic appraisal of the situation, but pessimism was not to penetrate the minds of the KM.

From day one the KM showed that it was prepared to fight and that the superior foe was not to be given an easy victory; the day the KM would die would and should be delayed for as long as possible and to that end caution had to be exercised in equal measure to boldness.

Admiral Marschall deserves criticism for the way he failed to grasp the overall situation in the Norwegian campaign, but no one can question his courage. It may be argued that he took a calculated risk in going after Glorious which paid off, but in reality he took too great a risk with Germany's prime naval assets. He went after both Glorious AND Ark Royal and given that the Ark was an entirely different kettle of fish to Glorious, if he had found her he would likely have come off very badly. As it was, Scharnhorst took a torpedo which put her out of action for a good while. Germany's naval heavy hitting power had been practically halved at a stroke.

In coming into gun-range of Glorious Marshall put his ships inside her 200 mile diameter continuous surveillance area. Had Glorious been the Ark or had she had the Ark in company, Marshall would probably had had both his ships stopped to eventually come under the guns of the Home Fleet.

Marschall's successor Lutjens possessed the right balance between boldness and caution. He took his ships into the Atlantic and demonstrated the ability to use the right weapons for the task, U-Boats against convoys escorted by battleships and directed onto target by the spotter-planes of his battleships and using his battleships on convoys which lacked battleship support. Under Lutjens as Fleet Commander, the minute resources of the KM would maximise the effectiveness of Germany's blockade against British trade.

In the Denmark Strait, the German Navy showed what it could do under fire and when out numbered two to one. Some may say that the hit which knocked out Hood was a fluke, but that fluke, required that the German navy should hit it's target. The two battles on the 24th and 27th of May showed the opposite poles of fortune to the German navy; in the one a single German battleship sank one British battleship and chased off another, in the other, two British battleships caught up with a crippled German battleship and in turn sank her. Lutjens face two sea fights and on both ocasions he was outnumbered two to one.

In shaking off the shadowing cruisers Lutjens showed that he knew a thing or two about tactics. That the ship was discovered on the morning of the 26th has nothing to do with any failing on Lutjens' part. The ship sailed under a standing air-patrol in the Biscay and from there she was under continual surveillance and successfully attacked form the air.

The thing which made it certain that Bismarck was heading for France, in the minds of the British during the 25th, was the fact that Group west and not Group North was addressing communications to the German ship. Apparently Bletchly Park picked up on this small detail and passed it on to the Admiralty.

Lastly, you cannot inherit a fighting tradition and nor can you acquire it through osmosis. You may hang the portrait of a past hero on the wall of the Admiralty's Anti-room, but the only service it can give is to "remind" the individual of what happened in the past. Technology has surpassed everything which Nelson knew as trade-craft, so with a basket of adapted tactics and new weapons the junior or senor officer can only hope to be as "successful" as Nelson or Benbow if they try to do what he did they will inevitably come unstuck. Nelson provided great inspiration to officers and men of the RN - he also endowed them with great complacency. More than one went into action thinking they would prevail simply because they were British and because they were associated with Nelson.

If a British officer can look at Nelson's Portrait, read his syrupy signal and be truly inspired, then a German officer can be equally inspired to think that he has a chance to excel against a possible Nelson. Each will bring his best effort to the battle ground.

Vic Dale

[Herr Nilsson]

Lutjens destroyed his flagship, didn´t sunk a single ton of allied transports, froze at DS, disengaged PoW and got all his men killed.

Nice game, I found at least 3 errors.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Let me re phrase before the lovers of verbal arragements or rethorics do their thing:

Lutjens:

1. Failed to pass through the Kattegat undiscovered
2. Failed to supply his flagship with fuel when the ocassion raised
3. Failed to order to fire upon an enemy that was already firing to his ships
4. Failed to continue the action in order to punish more heavily POW or destroy it
5. Failed to turn around to DS back again instead decided to "continue" his already aborted mission
6. Failed to take the appropiate decision to ensure the survival of his ship
7. Sent a message so long to Germany that it was like a Goethe poem

Finally got the great majority of it´s flagship crew killed.

Rheinubung resulted in 0 (zero) tons of allied supply shipping sunk.

Basically he doesn´t sound like De Ruyter, Nelson, Andrea Doria, Beatty, Hipper or Nimitz to me. Sounds more like... Abe? Kurita?

[tommy303]

As I see it,

point 1--It was hardly Luetjens fault that his ships were spotted by a Swedish cruiser and that Sweden bent the neutrality rules a bit and informed the British Naval Attache in Stockholm. Some writers have suggested that starting from Wilhelmshaven might have been better and thereby avoid the close waters of the Kattegat, but they forget that with full provisions, maximum fuel and munitions, that Bismarck could not negotiate the Kiel Canal. In any event the decision lay with the SKL and not Luetjens. To Luetjens credit, he felt the encounter with the Gotland had compromised the mission and exercised his authority to put into Bergen so he could consult with his superiors by land line and give them his appraisal of the situation.

point 2--refueling in Norway was not in the SKL's operational orders; in addition, Luetjens may have wanted to burn up some more fuel and improve thereby Bismarck's speed and seakeeping. He did recognize that Prinz Eugen was short ranged and so arranged for her to refuel while in Bergen, particularly since Group North informed him of a fast moving storm front which could be used to cover the breakout--this precluded any pause in the Arctic to refuel from tankers there.

point 3--while most popular histories and even the Baron suggest Luetjens delayed opening fire, we do not know for sure if it was Luetjens or Lindemann. Certainly, Luetjens hoisted the signal JD some moments before fire was opened, so it is possible that he gave Lindemann orders to fire when ready. If so, then Lindemann was the cause of the delay as he had tactical control of his own ship and would select when to open fire; this actually makes a great deal of sense since Lindemann was a gunnery expert and would know exactly at what ranges the most effective fire could be opened--this corresponded very closely with the range at which Bismarck indeed did open fire. Opening fire too soon would tend to waste ammunition, and Bismarck had a very limited supply of AP shell, so a delay until the range came down a bit more. We do not even know the context of Lindemann's famous remark or if he actually made such a remark.

point 4--It is true that Luetjens made the decision not to continue the action and pursue the retreating Prince of Wales. On the other hand, such a pursuit would have served little purpose except to exhaust her remaining stocks of AP shell. It was thought on Bismarck that she was more badly damaged than she really was.

point 5--one has to ask, why turn back. Luetjens orders were to break out into the Atlantic, and he had just done so. In light of the discovery that the British now had radar, turning back might mean forfeiting any future attempts at breaking out. There was also the problem that if he turned back, he would have less room to manouver and lose the enemy, and would be sailing back towards clearing weather and shorter periods of twilight. One also needs to remember that Group West approved his decision--if they had felt he was better off heading back to Norway, they would have ordered him to. If he could reach France, affect repairs, Bismarck would be better placed to resume her mission and not have to make the long perilous voyage back

point 6--I don't think there was any magic decision which could have ensured the safety of his ship. He had to base all his decisions on what he knew at the time, and to judge him, so must we.

Point 7---I will concede that about the long message, although we must presume that Luetjens, who was normally very concious of the need for radio silence, felt that the enemy was still in distant contact and knew where he was. Once Group West informed him the enemy seemed to have lost him, he reverted back to strict radio silence until eventually discovered once more.

[Karl Heidenreich]

1. He choose a daybreak. He could have done it by night. For God sake: it was war and everybody knows of spies.
2. Refueling wasn´t in his orders but the oportunity was there. Good commanders took advantage of the oportunities in front of them. Nelson didn´t have orders to do what he did at the Nile...
3. The baron´s book leave a lot unsaid but the basics are there. The way he refered to Lindemann shows a great respect, he clearly admired the man. Not can that be said of Lutjens. The issue is not if what the Baron said is true, is what he DIDN´T said in order not to denigrate, more, Lutjens´memory.
4. Nelson or Nimitz would have gone for the kill. That´s why they are inmortal.
5. His orders were to break into the Atlantic not because it was a nice ride. He had to sink ships. He cannot do so if half the RN was hunting him. His orders went down the toilet when he made contact with Hood and PoW. He had a greater duty for returning the ship to fight another day.
6. He overestimated the capability of his enemies to defeat him. Big mistake: he was defeated before the fighting started.
7. He should had taken all measures to ensure the survival of his ship. And that´s not hindsight, it´s common sense.

[Herr Nilsson]

@tommy303,

I could not have said this better myself in German language.

[RF]

To RF.

Germany had a larger population than Britain and therefore a much larger pool for selection of personnel. With a seafaring history at least as old as that of Britain the German sailor was very much the equal of his British counter part.

Germany was not a natural seafaring nation as most of her trade passed over land, so any Germans who did take to the sea possessed a devotion to it which probably exceeded that of the British. British trade via the sea would largely be done going south and east to the Americas, Africa and Asia, whereas the German sailor would also pass through the Baltic and toward the North. So German sailors were a particularly hard bunch. Many of the U-Boat commanders came from the Merchant Marine and some of their tales are harrowing.

Vic Dale

Vic, you raise some very interesting and cogent points in your post, part reproduced here, which set me thinking.

You focus on individuals as seamen, going beyond the traditional images of countries and their naval traditions, or in the case of Germany, its perceived lack of tradition, where my thoughts were and are heavily influenced by British naval writers.

Germany of course only came into being as a nation in 1871. Prussia had a navy - a coastal force that was blockaded by the Danish Navy in the war of 1864, which is often cited as an example of a lack of naval power and tradition. Only in 1899, in the eyes of many writers, did Germany emerge as a naval power, with the creation of the dreadnought based HSF.
But Germans, in English based literature, have never been seen as seafarers in the same way as the Spanish, Portuguese or the Dutch - or even the Americans, who were a naval power right from 1776. Germany, in the words of one author (who unfortunately I cannot recall, as Iread this so long ago) never had its John Paul Jones. Historically I think this is true - but again, as you alluded to in your post, you have Gunther Prien ''singing the King of England's beard'' in raiding Scapa Flow in 1939 and sinking HMS Royal Oak, just as Drake raided Cadiz in 1587.

I think what is key here is the poilitical leadership, and German leadership always seemed to concentrate on armies, to the detriment of seapower. To me that is exemplified by KM sailors being referred to as soldiers rather than sailors, the Navy being the Army at sea. I think the verdict of Barrie Pitt, in Richard Humble's book ''Hitler's High Seas Fleet'' is very apt - ''It might, but for Hitler's inflexible land-mindedness, have been otherewise. The young German navy had now a sound recognition for courage and seamanship and its ships were among the strongest, most powerful and most handsome in the world. A squadron of Bismarcks, protected by their own aircraft, might have swept the Northern seas.'' This was written under the heading ''Neglected Power'' which about says it all.

[wadinga]

Victor Ilych Ulyanov Dale,

If a British officer can look at Nelson's Portrait, read his syrupy signal and be truly inspired,

SYRUPY!!!!!

You have finally gone too far....

Your British citizenship is hereby revoked, please report to the nearest police station, surrender your passport, and from that place you will be transported with all despatch to the outermost limits of Her Majesties' Dominions and from thence ejected, never to return.

The Immortal Memory, and the most famous and wonderful Naval Signal ever sent shall remain sacrosanct and an inspiration to future generations.

Karl, you forgot to mention that with only two ships and one target, Lutjens managed to get his flagship in the line of fire of his other ship. That's D-minus at Admiralling. And as for that long-winded signal, well don't get me started.............

German U-Boat crews and small ship sailors were undoubtedly very experienced, but the big ships spent most of their time sitting around with their crews chipping, painting and polishing things, not getting sea-time.

By the way

When on learning that war was inevitable someone said, " All we can do is show the world how to die."

The someone was Admiral Raeder.

This is only matched by for lack of thought by

With a seafaring history at least as old as that of Britain the German sailor was very much the equal of his British counter part.

followed by

Germany was not a natural seafaring nation as most of her trade passed over land,

Dooh!

All the best

wadinga