The Hit in Bismarck's bow

[Vic Dale]

Having recently made a close study of the hit in Bismarck's bow, using very accurate detailed drawings, I have come to the conclusion that the shell which flooded the bow sections during the Battle of Denmark Strait, came in at about 30 degrees off the port bow.

The exit hole can be seen in the wreck photos and there the shell can be seen to have come out just on the forward upper part of the false bow wave painted on the starboard side. Very close inspection shows that there is a damaged scuttle (porthole) just above the exit hole and that the shell has caused some damage to the fitting, if it has not knocked it out of the ship altogether. The scuttle btw appears to be No. 6 of the lower row. The exit hole itself looks to be elongated - longer than it is high and with petalling on the forward edge and perhaps the lower edge. The after part of the exit hole appears to be depressed into the ship, though this is not clear. This might conform to the pattern of a shell passing through the ship's plate at a shallow angle, though the photo is far from distinct and my assement may not be the last word.

The entry hole is supposed to be shown in another photo, but does not conform to the normal trajectory, being on the boot topping (waterline) and therefore below the exit hole on the other side.

In his book; Battleship Bismarck - A Survivors Story, Mullenheim Rechberg says, on page116 (paperback copy) that the shell damaged bulkheads, between compartments XX and XXI and compartments XXI and XXII. This means that two main transverse bulkheads were damaged, one at either end of compartment XXI - fore and aft. This was on the armoured deck two decks below the fo'csle.

Compartment XXI is quite narrow longitudinally and in order for the shell to strike so as to pierce both the forward and after bulkheads it has to have come in at a maximum of 30 degrees from the bow. The location of the exit hole corresponds to a position just abaft the after bulkhead of compartment XXI - at the forward end of compartment XX.

Considerations;
1. It might be thought likely that some of the damage caused to the bulkheads was of a secondary nature and that not all of it was attributable to the shell itself.

2. Clearly the shell has passed through the after bulkhead as the exit hole is in the next compartment abaft compartment XXI, so secondary damage would be additional to penetration.

3. There is no mention of secondary damage to the decks above or below the path of the shell in compartment XXI, so it is unlikely that secondary damage would be done to the forward bulkhead if the shell had simply passed across the ship. It is unlikely therefore that the damage caused to the forward bulkhead was due to anything other than the shell passing through it as the primary cause and again, secondary damage would be in addition to shell penetration.

4. It might be thought that the shell was deflected in some way to alter it's path, but my understanding is that if anything, a shell passing through plating would be biased in it's trajectory toward the normal (90degrees) of the plate it had just passed through. In any case deflection would only shorten or lengthen the longitudinal path of the shell and it would still have to have passed through both forward and after bulkheads of compartment XXI, in order for it to pass out through the side of compartment XX.

Conclusion;
At the present time is does not appear that primary damage to the fore and after bulkheads is attributable to anything other than the shell passing through and for that to happen, the shell must have come in at a maximum of 30 degrees from the bow.

Vic Dale

[Herr Nilsson]

In his book; Battleship Bismarck - A Survivors Story, Mullenheim Rechberg says, on page116 (paperback copy) that the shell damaged bulkheads, between compartments XX and XXI and compartments XXI and XXII. This means that two main transverse bulkheads were damaged, one at either end of compartment XXI - fore and aft. This was on the armoured deck two decks below the fo'csle.

Vic,

I think the PG KTB is much more reliable than the Baron's book. According to the KTB only XX and XXI were damaged.

"May 24th
0950 hours-
Semaphore signal from Bismarck:
Commander to commander. For your information only. I have received two heavy strikes. One in compartement XIII-XIV. Hence, loss of generator 4, boiler room portside is taking on water, but can be contained. Second hit in compartement XX-XXI in forward ship section. Penetration portside, exit starboard above the armoured deck. Third strike through a boat without consequence. Otherwise I am fine. 5 light casualties."

[Vic Dale]

Hello Marc

I considered that, but the damage to the forward Bulkhead of the compartment indicates a strike very close to it. It is possible that the shell struck the framing and was deflected aft, but I don't think the deflection of a 14 or 15 inch projectile on encountering mild, ductile steel would be that great, and nor should there be any large splinters dislodged on passing through unless a piece of framing was thrown against the bulkhead and perforated it.

To damage both bulkheads the point of impact would have to be very close to the forward bulkhead and my initial imprssion is that it would not add much more than 5 degrees to the angle through the ship. I have actually drawn the flightpath through the joints between bulkheads and through the ship's sides for my schematic presentation.

There is also the elongated exit hole to consider. Comparing impacts on PoW, heavy shells do not seem to have deflected greatly on passing through thin plating, so the elongationnhas to represent to a major degree the path of the shell.

Vic Dale

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao all,

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/forum/phpBB3/ ... 1085#p1085

Bye Antonio

[Vic Dale]

Antonio appears to have loocated the "holy grail" for us; namely evidence from somewhere that Bismarck was steering 220 degrees.

I personally have scoured documents everywhere for such evidence and failed to find it, having had to fall back on the plotted target track from PoW, which shows a much sharper inclination towards incoming fire and which until now made perfect sense.

Antonio is to be congratulated.

Vic Dale

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao all,

@ Vic,

Prinz Eugen was sailing on course 220 degrees from 05.55 until 06.03 and 45 seconds, referencing her KTB and mostly her own battle track map.

You would agree this is indisputable evidence.

Now what we have from German and British sources : Bismarck sailing in line of battle following Prinz Eugen during that particular time frame.

German written evidences : ViceAdm Schmundt report; Adm Raeder briefing to A. Hitler on June 6, 1941; Op. Rheinubung various documents on NARA archives; F.O. Busch book on 1943.

German visual evidences: photo Nh 69722 at 05.55 and after PG film start at 06.03 and BS relative positions delta; Ltnt Schmitz-Westerholt paint showing Bismarck at 06.00 in relation to PG and British squadron.

British written evidences: Sunderland document reporting Bismarck sailing in line of battle following Prinz Eugen.

British visual evidences: Norfolk map at 06.00 attached to Hood board of inquiry showing Bismarck still in line of battle and behind Prinz Eugen on course 220 degrees.

It happened that PoW crew wrongly estimated Bismarck course, as they went from 241 degrees ( from 05.35 until 05.53 on map CBH 17750 plan 4) down to 212 degrees on the PoW gunnery plot with a mix of different BS course measurements as you can see on the attached plot.

The reality is that Bismarck was sailing following Prinz Eugen wake on starboard side, and we do know precisely now the Prinz Eugen course thanking her own battle track and it was 220 degrees.

Consequently and elementary Bismarck course best estimate is 220 degree course on PG starboard side from 05.55 until 06.03 and the famous BS turn to starboard showed soon after it happened by the PG film.

There is no other possible way that Bismarck was were NH 69722 shows her to be at 05.55 and after she is were PG film shows her to be at 06.03 and 30 seconds, only same course and sailing faster than PG for more than 8 minutes gaining some distance.

Schmitz-Westerholt paint shows this precisely, and F.O. Busch told us as well were Bismarck was sailing, on PG starboard side while following the German heavy cruiser in line of battle on course 220 degrees.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/forum/phpBB3/ ... 1089#p1089

Bye Antonio

[Karl Heidenreich]

It seems to me that Antoniop´s references and particular evidence in this issue are more than enough. If someone has studied this particular event (DS) has been Antonio and his findings are widely accepted by both, the Hood and Bismarck webpages and forums. I have read, again and again, his DS article and posts and find no flaw in them: they are correct in every aspect.

[Vic Dale]

Sadly, Antonio has presented nothing new and the eveidence he bases himself upon seems to undermine his assertion.

NH69722 does not show Bismarck following directly in PG's wake, but standing off to port of it and heading at an inclination of about 10 degrees to port, which equates to a heading of 210 degrees.

I personally do not value this photo as it does not have the correct cloud characteristics as seen in other phtos taken within minutes of the time it is supposed to represent plus it has about ten other defects, which we all know about by now.

However even is we base ourselves on this photo and we consider the target bearing in PoW at 0555 which was 322 deg. corrected for angle of lead by 1.68 degrees (ref. Winklareth 2002) Bismarck bore close to 334 degrees from PoW. From this we can determine a rough target bearing in Bismarck whilst heading 210 degrees. Given that at 22,100 yards Hood and PoW separated by 800 yards were 1.5 degrees apart, when viewed from Bismarck, fire from both British ships would have come in at a mean bearing of about 60 degrees from Bismarck's bow, against the 70+ degrees your drawing shows.

It is impossible for PoW to have tracked the target accurately enough for the purposes of gunnery and to be able to straddle and perhaps hit, if the target's inclination and course had not been accurately plotted. We can see that this was done properly on PoW's Salvo Plot which you have kindly supplied and it was also done in the shadowing ships, which confirm the conclusion.

If you take a look at Norfolk's plot (see below) you can plainly see (inside the red circle) that the shadowing ship has Bismarck much closer to the British squadron than PG, I make it about 10% which at 0558 at 18,500 yards and as is shown on the plot, would be about 2000 yards to port of PG's track at 0558. If the ships were as they appear in NH69722 (Bismarck slightly to port and diverging from PG's track by just 10 degrees at 0555, Bismarck would still be about 600 yards to port of PG's track, by 0558 and by 1000 yards by 0600. It should be remembered that Norfolk had type 279 gunnery radar which would have given accurate ranges at that time.

Clearly something has happened between establishing the initial heading for Bismarck at 212 degrees on PoW's Gunnery Plot and that would be a further alteration to port made by Lindemann probably to incline his ship's armour belt to incoming fire, so as to maximise it's resistance to penetration.

In that event, if the hit in the bow occurred at around 0558 it would have come in at about 42 degrees.

The reference in the Baron's book did get me exited, making me think I had underestimated Bismarck's inclination at the time the shell came through, as the reference spoke of damage to the forward bulkhead of compartment XXI, which I thought may have been due to penetration, in which event, an adjustment to my own chart would be necessary. At the same time this view opened up the possibility of pin-pointing the time of the hit. However it appears that all is well, that there is no "new" evidence about Bismack's track and as a result I stand by my chart.

Vic Dale

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao Vic and all,

just connecting the 3 plotted point of Bismarck between 05.41,... 05.53 .... and 06.00 on the Norfolk plot proposed by Vic, you will obtain the Bismarck course as reported by Norfolk radar.

Of course since my battle map was done using those available evidences, .. it is perfecly in line,.. and the plotted course of Bismarck by Norfolk was 220 degrees .

Again Vic, only PoW failed to correctly plot the Bismarck, .. as Mc Mullen wrote clearly on his letter.

So you are using a wrong reference using only PoW gunnery plot, ... while everything else is in line with my work and the reality.

Somebody did all those analysis well before you did it lately, .. some years ago.

Now you can add this to the list of available references showed above.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/forum/phpBB3/ ... 1091#p1091


Bye Antonio

[Vic Dale]

To Antonio.

Mc Mullen said only that he did not get accurate ranges prior to opening fire. That does not and cannot mean that PoW did not get accurate ranges. Had she not got good ranges from spotting and other observation even though radar would not serve on this occassion, she could not have hit the target or even managed a straddled, except by extreme good fortune. Of course PoW got ranges and her gunnery table did a good job predicting the target. Her fire was effective for the first 14 salvoes.

That Mc Mullen did not get accurate ranges for the first salvo simply meant that he could not tell if his first shot would fall over, in which case it might not have been seen. Happily it did fall over and it was seen, though probably because it was off line. The next salvo fell over but was seen to fall in line. All further salvoes fell good for line and at salvo 6, Mc Mullen made a straddle. That would not have been possible if the enemy ship's heading and speed was not known.

Further shot was fired at steadily decreasing ranges and the fact that no more than three straddles were registered owes more to the fact that only three guns fired on a number of salvoes when five were required.

Naval Gunnery is a very intricate science and it requires the input of a great deal of very precise information and even then it does not always go where you might hope. If PoW's FC had not been on top line she would never have registerd a hit on Bismarck. That her results were praised in the battle's aftermath says a lot and it is certain that her gunnery results can be relied upon.

Mc Mullen never wrote anything criticising PoW's gunnery plot, he simply said he did not get good ranges before opening fire. As the battle progressed and the A-Arcs opened the after turret wth it's massive range finder will have come into the picture and that will have given very good ranges to the TS.

Nor is there any criticism anywhere of PoW's target track. So good is it that Admiral Schoffield used it in his Booklet; the Loss of the Bismarck.

You have yet to address the question of how it was that the range closed at the rate it did, if Bismarck had not turned toward the enemy. From a range of 21,150 at 0556, down to 16,300 by 0600, equals 4850 yards - in just 4 minutes!! That is 1212.5 yards every minute, when PoW could only cover 950 yards in a minute if she was heading directly for the target, which we know she wasn't.

PoW was inclined to the enemy, so that her target was 50 degrees from the bow. This means that she would only move closer to her target at a rate of about 750 yards per minute, Bismarck herself would have to contribute her own share of 2000 yards to the rate of range closure, which works out at 500 yards per minute. Hence a turn toward the enemy as battle commenced, somewhere in the region of 30 degrees to port of the track of PG's heading of 220 degrees.

Vic Dale

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao Vic and all,

I do not have to address anything more here, those arguments had been way too long discussed already, especially NH 69722.

The closing range between Bismarck and PoW is well depicted on several PoW official battle maps, showing clearly PoW movements as well.

You wanted to know which course Bismarck was sailing and which angle the PoW hit coming from bearing 330 degrees hit the Bismarck bow.

Now the answer is in front of you : Bismarck was sailing on course 220 degrees and the PoW hit came from 70 degrees, as PoW sailing on course 280 degres was firing at bearing 330 degrees toward the Bismarck.

The drawing is there for you as well as all the evidences demostrating Bismarck course in line of battle following the Prinz Eugen on course 220 degrees as reported on many official documents.

Up to you to believe it or not, from my side this is it.

Bye Antonio

[Bgile]

That would not have been possible if the enemy ship's heading and speed was not known.

I believe enemy course and speed could be less than precise and still achieve a few straddles over 14 attempts.

Further shot was fired at steadily decreasing ranges and the fact that no more than three straddles were registered owes more to the fact that only three guns fired on a number of salvoes when five were required.

It's actually possible to achieve straddles with less than five guns. Two are sufficient.

Nor is there any criticism anywhere of PoW's target track. So good is it that Admiral Schoffield used it in his Booklet; the Loss of the Bismarck.

What else did he have to go on?

You have yet to address the question of how it was that the range closed at the rate it did, if Bismarck had not turned toward the enemy. From a range of 21,150 at 0556, down to 16,300 by 0600, equals 4850 yards - in just 4 minutes!! That is 1212.5 yards every minute, when PoW could only cover 950 yards in a minute if she was heading directly for the target, which we know she wasn't.

Or, the time/range were recorded improperly. I would especially suspect the exact times. It would be easy to do that in the excitement of battle.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao all,

here in now you can evaluate Norfolk plots/map accuracy versus PoW one and determine easily who was right and precise ( Norfolk ) and who was out of track since the beginning and only progressively became more accurate as ranges closed in ( PoW ).

Than you have the Norfolk map at 06.00 giving the exact confirmation to my Bismarck course determination ( 270 - 50 = 220 degrees ) and the PoW incoming hit angle ( 280 + 50 = 330 degrees ) showed on my drawing for the Bismarck bow hit.

No need to invent anything, it was already there available, so for me was an easy exercise to make it, .... it was well supported already.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/forum/phpBB3/ ... 1093#p1093

You can make now your own considerations on the reliability of PoW battle map estimation of the enemy precise course ( the Bismarck ) ............

Bye Antonio

[Vic Dale]

Ciao all,

here in now you can evaluate Norfolk plots/map accuracy versus PoW one and determine easily who was right and precise ( Norfolk ) and who was out of track since the beginning and only progressively became more accurate as ranges closed in ( PoW ).

Than you have the Norfolk map at 06.00 giving the exact confirmation to my Bismarck course determination ( 270 - 50 = 220 degrees ) and the PoW incoming hit angle ( 280 + 50 = 330 degrees ) showed on my drawing for the Bismarck bow hit.

No need to invent anything, it was already there available, so for me was an easy exercise to make it, .... it was well supported already.

http://www.hmshood.org.uk/forum/phpBB3/ ... 1093#p1093

You can make now your own considerations on the reliability of PoW battle map estimation of the enemy precise course ( the Bismarck ) ............

Bye Antonio

The words "not drawn to scale" answer your point here. This is a schematic, not a track chart and simply indicates rough distances and with equally rough bearings.

Suffolk's radar was not giving good results that morning, as at 15 miles she was out beyond the normal limits of surface surveillance of her 284 set. Norfolk was much closer at 11 miles, but her 279 radar was not capable of working accurately on surface targets over 8 miles away. So radar would not have been used directly on Bismarck to much effect. What it would have been used for is accurately pinpointing Suffolk and Norfolk in relation to each other, so they could compare shadowing results obtained by optical sightings. In effect their radar would act as a long-base rangefinder, using the accurately gauged distance between the cruisers, whilst the bearing of the shadowed ships obtained from each cruiser could be compared against the long base and the range found that way.

The effects of mirage on Suffolk's observers has been well documented and this effect could throw out a whole series of observations from that vessel.

In effect, PoW was operating alone, she did not even get any range data from Hood yet her fire was effective after just five salvoes. She fired two salvoes to obtain target bearing and four more to get the range and finally to obtain a straddle and from there she laid accurate and telling fire on Bismarck. The high precison of her gunnery predictors made it possible to plot Bismarck's headings and bearings from PoW, and from that a plot was drawn. There were no quibbles from the Admiralty who knew a thing or two about gunnery and navigation and how the two went together.

You may recall reading Admiral Schmundt's comments about PG's enemy track chart, which he said fell very far short of what was required and told PG's officers to take the report back and re-plot using the gunnery data. If PG's officers had done what Lt Cdr Rowell did subsequent to the battle using his ship's gunnery data, they could have drawn an equally good track chart.

As I have said many times, what I am showing is not new. It was all done very accurately during the spring and summer of 1941, by the two opposing sides. What I have contributed is simply combining the British and German charts, something which could not done at the time because the documents were held in secrecy and separate from each other. Ten very clear and precise observations made by both sides and taken in conjunction with PoW's Salvo Plot enabled me to draw this chart.

The track from Hood can be derived accurately from PoW's own track, which is correct up until the hit on the compass platform - the signalmen's and wheelhouse logs give accurate times for squadron turns and no one has suggested any deviation from it until 0600. PG's track chart is an official document too and again no one suggests deviation from what is shown.

Taking the range at which PG opened fire on Hood, against the target bearings in PoW and with due regard to the 3000m separation between PG and Bismarck at open fire, I was after many months of trial and error and having used a whole ream of paper, able to positon PG's and PoW's track charts at distances and bearings which made sense of all of the sighting reports, between 0550 and 0600. From there it was a relatively simple matter to plot Bismarck's headings according to what was shown on the Salvo Plot.

Only by drawing Bismarck's track showing a heading which put her on a convergence course with the enemy separated by an angle of about 80 to 90 degrees, does the battle make any sense. We have both sides inclining their side armour to incoming fire to maximise it's effectiveness and closing the enemy to a decisive battle range. The rate of range closure as shown on the salvo plot is also supported.

Vic Dale

[dunmunro]

Minor point; PoW's 'X' turret should read 'Y' turret!