How important was sinking in final battle?

[tnemelckram]

This might seem a little offbeat. I've been wondering about the considerations, consequences or reasons involved in leaving the Bismarck as a floating, useless hulk versus finishing the job by sinking her. Did it matter one way or another?

This assumes that:
a) The British battleships inflict the exact same bombardment damage on Bismarck;
b) The Germans don't open the seacocks for scuttling;
c) Dorsetshire doesn't fire her torpedoes;
d) Almost all British ships just depart for the same fuel, air attack and U Boat attack reasons.
e) A few destroyers are left behind to observe and rescue survivors. The option to sink her with their torpedoes is still open.

Here's some of the competing thoughts I've tossed around.

1. There were obvious prestige reasons to sink her, among them avenging the Hood.

2. On the other hand, it seems that Tovey was willing to cut bait on sinking her at some point because the risks outweighed the benefits.

3. The ship would still be useless to the Germans as a fighting unit.

4. Here's the important thing. The British might enjoy an intelligence bonanza if they wait a while for a practicable opportunity to board her to arise.

5. The existing fires would be an obvious danger to the boarding crew. It seems that most of the shelling damage was above decks and that was where most of the fires would be. Would they have tended to die down n a reasonable amount of time instead of spreading? What was fueling them that would enable them to spread.?

6. Limited boarding in areas away from the fires might be practicable and produce some interesting information.

7. With a fuel source and without the Germans flooding the magazines, the fires could spread to the magazines and detonate the whole ship, boarders and all. Perhaps interrogation of survivors could determine whether the magazines had been flooded. It would certainly be in the survivor's interest because it would enhance their chances of getting themselves off the ship.

8. Flipping 7 around, it seems that fires spreading to unflooded magazines would be the most likely way the ship would eventually sink without scuttling or torpedoes.

9. If the Germans could figure out a way to tow it to land, the hulk could be cut up and the steel re-used to produce other war material. Perhaps this is a good reason for the British to not play around and make sure she is sunk.

10. Following from 9, there is probably some advantage to depriving the Germans of the opportunity to inspect the hulk and learn lessons.

11. A small group of destroyers with this mission should be able to protect each other from U Boats. They would need enough fuel. In general, they are less attractive and satisfying targets for German revenge.

12. Assuming they could board, the British might not have the necessary experts on hand to do a proper inspection. Maybe this would make it not worth the trouble in the first place.

[RF]

This is a set of questions that are easy to ask after the war has ended and with the full benefit of hindsight.

Capturing the Bismarck was not a practical proposition. The British never considered it, the aim was to deal with the ship by sinking it.

Unless the Bismarck formally surrenders there is little chance of successfully boarding the ship, the risk to British crews would too to great for too little gain. It would not be an operation like seizing a U-boat, such as was done with U-110. The Bismarck was vastly bigger, far more difficult to find your way around and with the possibility of an armed resistence from a hostile crew. The British did not have enough men for a full scale invasion of Bismarck, they had to protect their own ships.

Not sinking the ship and just leaving it? Well, with hindsight it would have sunk anyway. But the British didn't know that. They quite rightly would not leave any chance of the ship being recovered and repaired by the Germans.

[lwd]

...
Not sinking the ship and just leaving it? Well, with hindsight it would have sunk anyway. But the British didn't know that. ....

They probably realized it was very likely but why take any risk? They had already been bitten by an extremely unlikely event risking another was just not in the cards.

[tnemelckram]

Hi RF! Thanks for your reply.

I always try to approach hypos using foresight only. Based on the factors in my OP, I agree that the British could not know looking forward whether she would sink on her own. Thus unless there is the chance to board and secure valuable intelligence from an inspection, I agree that you might as well sink her. I don't think is required foresight to consider boarding as a possibility, as it was a large part of past naval history and was known to offer intelligence opportunities.

Thus I think the thread should focus on whether with foresight boarding might be a realistic possibility. If so, then with foresight it would follow that you would have to wait some reasonable amount of time before sinking her to preserve the possibility and devote a reasonable amount of resources to it (a few DD'S). If that doesn't work out, sink her.

I agree that the risk to boarders would be great. I don't think resistance from Bismarck's crew was among them. You would only board after it was clear that the ship was being abandoned and under those circumstances the last thing on the Germans' mind would be leaving behind some ambush party to meet a rather unconventional boarding attempt. Plus you could determine get an idea of whether there was such a risk by interrogating the survivors that you recover as a subsidiary part of the operation.

As to getting lost on an unfamiliar ship, I think this was always a historical risk of boarding but this never prevented it because there were ways to address it. Information from interrogation or using an apparently sympathetic survivor as a guide might help.

I don't see why the boarding party would have to be so large that in and of itself that would kill the operation..

As set forth in the OP, I think the risk revolves around the fires and whether they were likely to spread as opposed to dieing down. The larger question is whether the risk to the boarders and remaining ships outweighs the potential intelligence gains.

[tnemelckram]

I think there is some discussion of this possibility in the British records but I can't remember where. I'll look for it but maybe someone else can find it sooner and post a reference.

Maybe Churchill raised the subject either before or after in his Memoirs. Knowing The Great Man's history and tendencies, it would not surprise me if he send Tovey some contradictory message about boarding soon after he sent the message to sink Bismarck at all costs even if it meant towing KGV home afterward!

Probably the biggest factor involved in rejecting a boarding was the strength of Churchill's first order.
At that point, it might have been wise for Tovey to turn off the wireless for a while.

[Bgile]

I would think that the action the Germans took to scuttle Bismarck would put paid to any possibility of boarding her. They would certainly have scuttled if it looked as though the British might board.

[Vic Dale]

Bismarck was relatively intact below the armour and no amount of gunfire was likely to sink her. Torpedoes too would have a hard time getting to the torpedo bulkhead which was designed to resist their blast and appears to have easily done so. If the ship could float at the time Tovey turned away she would most certainly continue to do so. The ship's own DC parties would gradually overcome fires and flooding, possibly even the inability to steer, given sufficient time. Her engines were still intact and they could drive her at reasonable speed, making it possible for salvage vessels to come alongside and correct the effects of whatever was left of the jammed rudders, and steer the ship at good speed toward friendly waters.

It would also be possible to concentrate and direct the resources of the Luftwaffe to provide an extended anti shipping screen around the ship, using JU88s and Heinkels plus the longer range Condors which could track and pinpoint targets, so that the JUs and HEs would not have to linger before delivering their attacks.

Although Bismarck was defeated in battle the ship was not completely destroyed and unless sunk or scuttled could have been retreived - in theory. Whether or not the German High Command could put their differences aside and concentrate their effort sufficiently is another matter, but if they did it would create a major problem for Tovey and might cost him precious ships in a possibly futile attempt to acheive what should have been completed earlier, when conditions were more favourable.

Although the C-in-C had to take his battle squadron away to refuel, he was still able to direct the remainder of the Fleet to concentrate and this included battleships and a battle cruiser, plus a couple of carriers and dozens more lighter vessels. Though they could not take Bismarck on in one to one combat, they could most certainly deal with her if she could not fire back. Under such an onslaught, Bismarck's command would be forced to surrender.

Tovey had to sink her that day, before the weather cleared and made long range anti-shipping strikes a possibility and had she not sunk that morning he would have concentrated the rest of his forces around her to finish her off later that day. Realising this the ship's command had to order the scuttling charges to be set, either now or later in order get as many men as possible safely off the ship. The sight of cruisers and destroyers circling, will have convinced Captain Lindemann of what needed to be done.

Although Tovey rightly made sure his Flagship did not have to be towed home and almost certainly attacked by U-boats, there can be no doubting his resolve to defeat and sink the pride of the German Fleet. The only thing which remains in question is Churchill's lack of grasp of the War at Sea.

Vic Dale

[lwd]

Bismarck was relatively intact below the armour and no amount of gunfire was likely to sink her.

That is hardly correct. Indeed there is relatively clear evidence that the amount of gunfire she had already received would have let to her going down most likely within a few hours. If the British BBs backed off the odds are her going down faster increase significantly. Even if she was relatively intact below her armor the fact that her armor was below water level and getting lower is not a good thing.

Torpedoes too would have a hard time getting to the torpedo bulkhead which was designed to resist their blast and appears to have easily done so.

It is one thing to escape with relatively minor damage from one or two torepedoes (especially arial ones). It's another to not take serious damage from repeated strikes especially from the larger ship launched torpedoes.

If the ship could float at the time Tovey turned away she would most certainly continue to do so.

For at least an hour or two.
Certainly after reading: http://www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_Bismarck_p2.htm one is not left with the impression that Bismark was at all sea worthy.

The ship's own DC parties would gradually overcome fires and flooding, possibly even the inability to steer, given sufficient time.

How many people were left from her DC parties? How are they going to overcome flooding and fires without power? How are they going to get the time to fix the steering when they couldn't when the ship and crew were in much better condition?

Her engines were still intact and they could drive her at reasonable speed,

Were they? and could they? There are reports that at least one BB caliber shell made it into her engineering spaces. Her funnels were in bad shape. Given that she was not going at a "reasonable speed" prior to the battle is there any reason to assume the wreck that she was could do so afterwards.

...It would also be possible to concentrate and direct the resources of the Luftwaffe to provide an extended anti shipping screen around the ship, using JU88s and Heinkels plus the longer range Condors which could track and pinpoint targets, so that the JUs and HEs would not have to linger before delivering their attacks.

How may Condors were available? How long would they last if the RN sent some carrier born fighters after them? How long on station would a JU88 have? and home much longer would it last than the Condors in this situation. Just how much damage do you think the LW would do operating at the end of its range?

Although Bismarck was defeated in battle the ship was not completely destroyed and unless sunk or scuttled could have been retreived - in theory.

Yep all that was needed was a big enough floating dry dock and the cooperation of the RN. Oh the dry dock better get there in the next hour or two.

[JtD]

The Luftwaffe at that time was incapable of defending S&G in Brest. I doubt they could have been of much use to the Bismarck.

It's also true that the majority of the Luftwaffe Kampfgeschwader were being relocated for deployment on the soon to be formed Eastern Front.

I think the Germans scuttled the ship because it was destroyed at that time, with hardly anything working and decks awash. It was going down.

[Vic Dale]

Before the FAA could fly off fighters they would have to be carrying effective ones and in sufficient numbers. The condors were avaliable in relatively large numbers, so a round the clock surveillance would have worked to keep tabs on British shipping around Bismarck. The JUs and HEs would have had 400 miles additional range after the flight out and back are taken into account, which translates into about 90 minutes stooging around over the fleet having been directed onto their targets by the condors. The Home Fleet could not survive close to Norway the year before and nothing about that had changed. The carriers would have to stay well out of the way, or become prime targets themselves. Their fighter strikes would then have to find the bombers and they would have to time their attacks so as to meet them. The carriers would also have to fly top-cover for themselves to prevent a surprise attack by a group of longrange Condors.

The area the Luftwaffe would be protecting would be very small, no greater than about 50 miles wide and any ship within that area would be a target, if they were not in that area, they would be no threat to Bismarck. To attack they would have to be in range.

There were very few hits which got through the armour and into machinery spaces. As Lt. Junack said as he went round the ship just before she sank, it was peaceful and well lit like a Sunday in harbour.

The ship if left as she was would have sunk, but DC parties could easily have kept her afloat. That is why they needed scuttling charges to get her to sink. If the ship had been in a sinking condition, nothing the British could have done would have brought her back even if they had boarded her, so the charges would ahve been superfluous anyway. That she sank so slowly after having her enginerooms opened to the sea, testifies to the fact that she was far from being in a sinking condition before the charges were blown.

The ship was disarmed not destroyed, investigation of the wreck tells us that.

How many men for the DC parties? Every man in the ship can become part of a DC party, because every single individual is trained in the tasks; fire fighting, pumping out flooded compartments, stopping holes with bedding, bungs and wedges, shoring up and other ways of keeping a ship afloat. Electricians would run emergency power cables and stokers would pump fuel and water ballast to compensate and lighten the bow or the stern and flood or void wing tanks to trim the ship port and starboard. When the ship went down, well over a thousand men went into the water and this says nothing of those hopelessly trapped or who gave up on the likelihood of being saved. The generators were still turning right until the engine rooms and machinery spaces flooded.

The ship was able to make 10 to 12 knots, which by any standard is reasonable and if able to steer that would see her in Brest within 30 hours.

In order to get torpedoes to work effectively they would have had to strip away the shell plate in order to get a direct strike on the torpedo bulkhead, but even then there is no saying they would perforate it. It is 2 inches think and made of ductile steel. How many successful strikes would that take? I believe three 21 inch torpedoes struck Bismarck and forensic investigation of the wreck says that the torpedo bulkhead is still intact.

There is no doubting that Tovey was going to make sure that Bismarck went to the bottom, but if he did not organise the remainder of the Home Fleet to destroy her, it could have given enough time for the German High Command to organise counter measures to put Tovey on the ropes.

It needs to be asked what might have happened if Bismarck had made it through the night and come under the planned air umbrella. There can be no doubting she would then have made it to Brest even if heavily damaged, because air cover would have made it impossible for the British Fleet to operate near her. Bismarck was just 3 hours steaming from that umbrella when she took the fatal torpedo, so if instead of the normal air cover for a returning surface raider, an extended and concerted effort had been organised - just 100 miles farther out - they could have made it hell for the British ships in that area.

Hesitation on Tovey's part could have given the Germans a chance to save the ship. Hesitation on Lindemann's part could have given the British a prestige advantage in actually boarding the hulk. As much use value as claiming Rockall, but something of a prestigious move nonetheless.

Vic Dale

[JtD]

If it was so easy for the Germans to attack British ships with land based bombers, why didn't the British do the same? After all, they had superior material for this kind of job. Instead, they sent dozens of ships. Silly Brits.

[tommy303]

If it was so easy for the Germans to attack British ships with land based bombers, why didn't the British do the same?

I suspect a lot had to do with the differing nature of aircraft employed by Coastal Command and the Luftwaffe. A large number of their available aircraft were recon flying boats (Sunderland and PBY for instance) with some bomb capability, and smaller twin engined level bombers such as the Hampden and Wellington. The emphisis had been on attacking enemy coastal shipping and ASW patrols around the British Isles and the Bay of Biscay. One of the main problems Coastal Command had was the difficulty in obtaining sufficient aircraft as Bomber and Fighter Commands had higher priorities. While the numbers and types of aircraft were adequate for ASW work, such larger aircraft with useful bomb loads against major surface warships were not, at least in 1939-41. There was a serious lack of long ranged torpedo carrying aircraft in Coastal Command, and level bombers were not ideal against warships at sea.

The Luftwaffe on the other hand was organized a bit differently--flying boats and long ranged float planes for patrols, with tactical bombers for attacking. There were some long range maritime bombers such as the Condor, but the real hitting power lay in the standard Luftwaffe twin engine bombers such as the He 111, Ju88 and Do217. The He111 was a level bomber, though in late 1941 He111 torpedo squadrons were organized, and had the same problems of hitting maneuvering ships at sea as Coastal Command's bombers, but both the Do217 and Ju88 had dive bomber capabilities and were thus more effective in attacking ships at sea.

[JtD]

With the Bristol Beaufort the British also had a torpedo bomber of significant range. There also were the heavy Short Stirling and Handley Page Halifax, part of the bomber command, but then the Luftwaffe was also occupied with other bombing campaigns. There also was the Beaufighter entering service with the Coastal Command.

Unless you count the Iron Duke, there still was no BB sunk by aircraft at sea and no BB sunk by bomb damage. So I don't see why and how the Germans could have provided any serious cover for the Bismarck against surface units. Otoh, it obvious why the British sent ships instead of planes.

[lwd]

Before the FAA could fly off fighters they would have to be carrying effective ones and in sufficient numbers.

It doesn't take much to be effective vs a Condor. I doubt even the Ju-88s would want to loiter around even if it's Gladiators attacking.

The condors were avaliable in relatively large numbers,

Your idea of large numbers must be different than mine. According to
http://www.pilotfriend.com/photo_albums ... Condor.htm

Moreover, because of high attrition, KG 40 never had full wing strength and seldom had more than 12 aircraft available...By 9 February 1941 1./KG 40's claim had reached 363,000 tonnes. By this time it had been joined by two further Staffeln, totalling a nominal 36 aircraft.

Sounds like no more than about 40 AC and that's if the Germans are lucky.

so a round the clock surveillance would have worked to keep tabs on British shipping around Bismarck.

How are they going to spot them at night?

The JUs and HEs would have had 400 miles additional range after the flight out and back are taken into account, which translates into about 90 minutes stooging around over the fleet having been directed onto their targets by the condors.

I'd like to see your numbers on this. The only range I'm finding for the Ju-88 is ~1700 miles. Looks to me like Bismarck was at least 600 miles from Brest but I suspect the 1700 miles is with no bomb load so I doubt they had 400 miles to spare. Just because a Condor spots a British ship by the way doesn't mean that the bombers sent out to find her will.

The Home Fleet could not survive close to Norway the year before and nothing about that had changed.

The home fleet survived pretty well near Norway. This involves longer runs for the German planes.

The carriers would have to stay well out of the way, or become prime targets themselves. Their fighter strikes would then have to find the bombers and they would have to time their attacks so as to meet them. The carriers would also have to fly top-cover for themselves to prevent a surprise attack by a group of longrange Condors.

Actually the prime target of the fighters would be the Condors and Ju-88s that you have orbiting Bismark. Not hard to find them. Condors would get butchered trying to attack warships.

The area the Luftwaffe would be protecting would be very small, no greater than about 50 miles wide and any ship within that area would be a target, if they were not in that area, they would be no threat to Bismarck. To attack they would have to be in range.

But they can't protect anything at night or even the last and first few hours of daylight.

There were very few hits which got through the armour and into machinery spaces.

It doesn't take many when the ships is already going down.

The ship if left as she was would have sunk, but DC parties could easily have kept her afloat.

I see nothing to indicate that.

T... That she sank so slowly after having her enginerooms opened to the sea, testifies to the fact that she was far from being in a sinking condition before the charges were blown.

or not. One theory I've seen was that the scuttling charges actually delayed the sinking by effectivly counter flooding her or at least lowering her center of gravity. Without them she may have rolled over faster.

The ship was disarmed not destroyed, investigation of the wreck tells us that.

Everything above the water level was a wreck and some of the stuff below.

How many men for the DC parties? Every man in the ship can become part of a DC party, because every single individual is trained in the tasks; ...

Were they? Are you sure that was the German practice?

Electricians would run emergency power cables and stokers would pump fuel and water ballast to compensate and lighten the bow or the stern and flood or void wing tanks to trim the ship port and starboard.

if they had the power and the cables and the direction and could make their way through the rubble.

The ship was able to make 10 to 12 knots, which by any standard is reasonable and if able to steer that would see her in Brest within 30 hours.

But it has to be 10 to 20 knots in the right direction. Did she even have anyone left who could navigate?

In order to get torpedoes to work effectively they would have had to strip away the shell plate in order to get a direct strike on the torpedo bulkhead, but even then there is no saying they would perforate it. It is 2 inches think and made of ductile steel. How many successful strikes would that take? I believe three 21 inch torpedoes struck Bismarck and forensic investigation of the wreck says that the torpedo bulkhead is still intact.

No all they have to do is let more water into the ship. Each successive hit does more shock damage and lets more water in. Part of the reason the torpedo bulkehead was intatct was that at least one and perhaps all 3 of the 21" torpedoes didn't hit it. She was already too low in the water.

[RF]

.

I always try to approach hypos using foresight only. Based on the factors in my OP, I agree that the British could not know looking forward whether she would sink on her own. Thus unless there is the chance to board and secure valuable intelligence from an inspection, I agree that you might as well sink her. I don't think is required foresight to consider boarding as a possibility, as it was a large part of past naval history and was known to offer intelligence opportunities.

Thus I think the thread should focus on whether with foresight boarding might be a realistic possibility.

Past naval tradition and past naval history - yes, indeed it was, but we are not back in the days of the likes of Francis Drake, Richard Grenville or John Paul Jones. We are not talking of a Spanish galleon or dismasted sailing ship, but of a floating steel fortress with the inner complexities of a city.

And intelligence finds - OK, but what exactly are you looking for and where do you expect to find it?

No possibility of armed resistance from the crew of the boarded ship? How do you know? Can you be sure?

And what safeguard do you have against a boarding party being caught inside a sinking ship and going down with it? Let alone explosions and fires?

To me a boarding operation might be feasible for a large force of Royal Marines, providing the ship stays afloat and there are no other major encumbrances. That means having such a force accompanying KGV and Rodney, just on the offchance of encountering a crippled enemy battleship....

And when you have captured the ship you have the logistics of recovering the intelligence. This sort of task was a major operation even for a hilfskreuzer in looting a merchant ship, it could and often did take days.... think what would be involved for a battleship....

I don't see boarding as a practical proposition.