So we have Jasper acquiring Hood as a target, firing several salvos, then firing one last salvo, whose aftermath he does not observe because he has been ordered to switch targets to PoW. However Jasper tells us that he then fires two salvos at PoW and that by 0559 he is on target, so by definition the last salvo 20.3cm fired against Hood was fired at 0557-0558.Jasper:
About 0445 hours [0545 GMT] I was awakened by an "Alarm". The 2nd Artillery Officer
[Kapitänleutnant Paul Schmalenbach] was present in the foretop, the battle station watch-leader
of the portside watch of the battle station watch. A quick transfer [of command] and a panoramic
view around the horizon revealed three targets to port, two of which were approaching rapidly.
Off the starboard stern stood a fourth target, apparently, the surveillance cruiser from the
previous night. We were advancing at the front of the battle-line, with Bismarck behind us.
Since no special instructions for division of fire were ordered by the flagship, [underlined and
comment in margin by Brinkmann] and both ships were rapidly approaching from port and at
that instant opened fire while under full steam, I chose to cut to the proper course [myself]. This
was toward the foremost ship in the hostile battle-line, which, according to the usual rules of
engagement for distribution of targets, appeared to be the point ship in our line of fire. [Illegible
remark by Brinkmann in margin].
I did not recognize the opponents as battleships, and until the conclusion [of the battle] I
considered them as being cruisers (under consideration, according to my memory or experience
"Exeter", "Birmingham", or "Fiji" Class).1) Accordingly, I decided to use high explosive basefuzed
shells. I persisted in using this type of projectile during the [entire] course of the battle,
since their impacts differentiated them very well from other hits. The impacts stood out clearly
as high white water columns amid innumerable clouds of explosive smoke that obviously came
from the intermediate artillery of the Bismarck
The bearing range-finding station reported 2 contacts off the right bow bearing 20º [2 Dez.] at 25
knots, distance 210 hectometers [21,000 meters]. I received "permission to fire" from the bridge
at 0455 hours and immediately commenced firing a full salvo at 202 hectometers [20,200
meters]. The full [8-gun] salvo was fired using nose fuzed rounds which were stored behind the
gun barrels as ready-to-use ammunition. The observable impacts [shell splashes] could not be
ascribed with certainty as belonging to our own [shells] because of [key punch] perforation
failures in the firing calculator [and thus no range correction report could be made]. Therefore, I
repeated [firing] a full salvo, which turned out to be observable and formed a straddle ladder of
which I could only observe two brief impacts from the lower limiting [rounds of the] salvo, while
the higher and middle [rounds] had to be called questionably too far. The distant impacts were
not visible, since they were concealed by the target. By contrast, [after firing] the bracketing
group an extraordinarily bright fire flash appeared on the enemy ship's aft section at the level of
the aft mast. The fire developed on the portside of the opponent, since the superstructures
stood out as sharp silhouettes. Immediately thereafter I received the order from the ship's
command to "Change target to the left" toward the second opponent [the Prince of Wales],
whereby the fire of "Bismarck" and "Prinz Eugen" now crossed. I was unable to observe
"Bismarck's" decisive salvo because I was no longer in a position to do so. I ordered the
targeting officer [target designator] to acquire the second target and thus lost the first [target]
from the [range finder's] visual field of action. Consequently, I did not perceive the detonation of the first target [Hood]
As was the case earlier, I commenced the second firing with a full salvo followed by a ranging
group [straddle ladder] which zeroed me in as of 0559. Firing for effect was then initiated. The
distance at that time was 160 -170 hectometers [16,000-17,000 meters]. During the completion
of ranging fire’s effectiveness, I observed two well-placed simultaneous portside strikes which
again were fired by the secondary artillery of the "Bismarck". At around the 8th salvo, the
opponent turned at first hard toward (us).
(Approximately 0601 hours). Immediately thereafter, I saw the long bow section of a sinking
ship traversing behind the opponent, pointing about 45° skyward and extending far above the
masts of the target. The opponent apparently tried to avoid the wreckage of the leading ship
[Vordermann = man in front]. During this phase of the battle indications of a small fire were
recognizable on the enemy ship, but it was considerably weaker than [was the case] onboard
the first opponent . During this time I observed a covering salvo from Bismarck's heavy artillery,
who had changed target. Immediately thereafter, the opponent turned hard onto a reciprocal
course. He gave off black smoke and apparently tried to use this to escape from view. In my
opinion, this smoke was artificial black fog and did not emanate from a real conflagration.
Schmalenbach
My initial observation from there was that the leading ship [Hood] opened fire on the Prinz
Eugen with a salvo from its forward turret group. It could be clearly recognized that both forward
turrets were aimed at us. Also, the ship had turned somewhat to port, and now I recognized two
very closely spaced stacks standing side-by-side. The ship's aft section was hard to distinguish,
as was the aft mast, and thus I was not certain of its type. I definitively identified the lead ship as
"Hood" only after I saw the sinking ship's bow section, with its especially distinctive stem, which
was briefly visible [before it sank]. "Hood" had fired 4 or 5 salvos by the time Bismarck and we
anwered her fire. Until then, I did not observe [shell splashes from] the shots being fired against
us except for 2 impacts [that landed] forward of the portside (approximately 100 meters in front
of the stem and about 50 meters laterally from the amidships line of the near side). Shortly after
the impacts of a salvo from Bismarck (I cannot explain it in any other way because of the rapid
sequence of impacts on the opponent to the right as well as the change in the color and height
of the impacts), a salvo from Prinz Eugen was delivered, which, according to my observations
through large binoculars, caused a conflagration in the vicinity of the aft mast.
Before further hits were made, the source of fire rapidly spread to an estimated length of 15 meters.
Oberleutnant zuz See Tilleßen, who stood next to me, spontaneously uttered the same opinion. A few
seconds (3-5) transpired between the salvo's impact and the absolutely instantaneous initiation
of the described conflagration. I deem it as very probable, nearly certain, that the above
mentioned salvo was from Prinz Eugen [and that it] caused the conflagration. A few seconds
later, a salvo from Bismarck hit the ship aft, and that resulted in an explosion of massive
consequence.
The explosion cloud hovered with yellowish-white luminescence above the [Hood's] aft turret
group. Several chunks of small and large size debris swirled about. A particularly noticeable
flaming component was propelled abaft, where it lay for some time [while] burning and fuming
strong black smoke. Probably, fuel was ignited on the water's surface. Within the detonation
cloud itself one could see exploding ammunition that blew sky-high and in all directions like
white stars. I believe that the [Hood's] forward turret fired one last salvo after the actual
explosion. With certainty, I observed that Hood fired only against Prinz Eugen, because this
could have been readily recog nized, based on the minimal battle distance, if the turrets had
been pointed more aft toward Bismarck. Hood sank very rapidly and stern first, with the bow
section rising so high (from the water) that the (entire) distinctive stem could be seen. The
forward turrets, and also the bridge and stacks, were still standing, as far as one could
recognize them through the intermittent smoke. The ship sank on nearly a southerly course. I
did not make further observations of the Hood because a change of target order was given for
the engagement of the heavy flak. (According to testimony from other officers, the "Hood" raised
herself and pointed 40° upward ). It seemed to me that she had a list to port. I estimate that
"Hood" expended about 10 salvos.
Now Schmalenbach picks up the story because he was able to see the fall of PEs last salvo and that a few seconds after it fell Hood was hit by the fatal 38cm salvo was Bismarck. Therefore both Jasper and Schmalenbach's statements converge on the fatal hit arriving at 0558, or sooner.
Jasper's first view of the sinking Hood is at 0601 when PoW passes the wreck and so brings Hood again into his narrow field of view, and she already has her bow well in the air and is within a few seconds of disappearing. Clearly the fatal hit arrived several minutes prior to his 0601 observation, and that is supported by Schmalenbach's estimate that Hood fired 10 salvos before her fatal hit.
Dr Cadogan's well reasoned paper also supports this conclusion:
http://hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrai ... adogan.pdf