German rangefinders WWI

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garder
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German rangefinders WWI

Post by garder »

Hi

I have been doing some research on german naval artillery and fire control from 1906-1918. Since this is a subject with very little english littearture, I hope you would like to discuss some dissimilarities I have found with me, concerning german rangefinders, there size (base-length) and numbers on board ships.

Firstly Paul Schmalenbach in Die Geschichte der deutschen Schiffsartillerie says on page 71-72 that: Die 28-cm-Türme konnten Geräte (rangefinders) von 6 m Basis... aufnehmen The Nassau and Helgoland class both had 28 cm guns. But in Von der Nassau zur Köning-klasse G Koop and K. P. Schmolke states that the Nassau/Helgoland class had rangefinders with 3 m-base (page. 25 and 56). If one looks at the photografic evidense it is clar that the rangefinders dosen´t have a 6 m base but much closer to a 3 m base. Also it appears that the SMS Ostfriesland during the war recieved larger rangerfinders in here gun turrets. Se the pictures belowe:

http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/19 ... nder1.jpg/

http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/38 ... der2a.jpg/

So is Paul Schmalenbach wrong, or is there something I have misunderstood.

I can´t find any sources confirming the size of the rangefinders onboard the dreadnoughts. Can anyone help me, or share there thoughts?
Byron Angel
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Re: German rangefinders WWI

Post by Byron Angel »

I believe the explanation is that the IGN progressively retro-fitted larger base-length rangefinders to its capital ships after Jutland.


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delcyros
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Re: German rangefinders WWI

Post by delcyros »

Sure that SCHMALENBACH is really mentioning ww1 28cm turrets and not those of the later Panzerschiffe? I aske specifically, because his work is sometimes not that clearly cut between pre-ww1, ww1 and post ww1 in questions of fire controll.

Turret RF of 28cm turrets in ww1 were typically 3m devices (possible exceptions are the battlecruisers), the GCT devices were 3m for these ships until after Jutland the fore and aft sets were generally replaced by 4m devices, including those on the foretops.

Additional 1.5m or 2m baselength rangefinders appear in some photos in crowns nests on ships which were not refitted either with the tubular conning tower or a heavy tripod after Jutland. Coupled with the Control position, with which many of the same ships had been fitted, those units could have had the facilities and capability to direct the main armament in conditions such as had occurred at Jutland late in the day. There is some speculation that those units with the full FC suite mounted aloft most certainly could have or not.
garder
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Re: German rangefinders WWI

Post by garder »

Thanks for answering Buron Angel.

I agree that at least the Helgoland class the recieved larger rangefinders during the war. But from the photos I would say that even the new ones wouldn´t have a base-length of more than 4 m.

Do you know of any sources that list which ships recieved longer rangefinders and when? A bit of a long shot I know :D

In general I think very difficult to establish what length of rangefinders were carried onboard individual ships. For instance in Von der Nassau zur Köning-klasse p. 120 it states that the Köning class carried 1 8-m-base rangefinder, 5 5-m-base and 2 3-m.base rangefinders. But no 8 m rangefinder is visible in any pictures and I don´t think the turret rangefinders have a 5-m base (see picture below). What is more in Reports on Interned German Vessels: Gunnery Materials, ADM 186/243 at the british National Archives, it states that during inspektion after the war no conning tower or observation post had rangefinders with base-lenghts longer than 3 meters.


http://imageshack.us/photo/my-images/18 ... urret.jpg/

I think that the information in Von der Nassau zur Köning-klasse can not be trusted, and that the answer to my qustion is to studie all the periode pictures of ships and gun turrets that I can get my hand onto.

I have another qustion regarding rangefinders. In Geschichte der deutschen Schiffsartillerie page 72 it says: das die Messbasis (rangefinder base) auf der Turmdecke aufgestellt wurde i.e. the rangerfinder-base was on top of the turret. But in Reports on Interned German Vessels: Gunnery Materials it says that this tube on top of the roof was a tube that: accomedates an adjuster beam of light that passed from one eyepiece, through the rangefinder to one periscobe end. Then through the tube above the roof and down to the other eyepiece. This was used to adjust the rangefinder, which was done very often, sometimes between every range-reading.

Can someone who is familiar with stereoscobic rangefinders tell me if this procedure makes any sense? If this is true it shows me that you can´t trust everything you read in Deutschen Schiffsartillere even though it is considered a very importent work on german WWI naval artilleri (Also the only one that coveres this topic in any detail, I haven´t read Friedmanns new book)
garder
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Re: German rangefinders WWI

Post by garder »

Hi Delcyros

Thanks for your answer. I had not thought of that. I am danish and my german could be better so it is possible that I have misunderstod something.
Turret RF of 28cm turrets in ww1 were typically 3m devices (possible exceptions are the battlecruisers), the GCT devices were 3m for these ships until after Jutland the fore and aft sets were generally replaced by 4m devices, including those on the foretops.
I would love it if you had any sort of reference for that. That is exactly what I am looking for. As I wrote in the post above this one, in Reports on Interned German Vessels: Gunnery Materials, ADM 186/243 it states that no conningtower or observation post rangefinder exceeded 3 meters. So I would really like to compare the sources. I have a feeling that Reports on Interned German Vessels isn´t always accurate.
Byron Angel
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Re: German rangefinders WWI

Post by Byron Angel »

garder wrote: Do you know of any sources that list which ships recieved longer rangefinders and when? A bit of a long shot I know :D
..... CB1516 - "Reports on Interned German Vessels - Gunnery Information, February 1919" mentions evidence of BAYERN carrying turret rangefinders of an estimated 25-30 ft (8m?) in baselength installed well forward in the turrets, very close behind the turret face plates. IIRC, there is also mention of evidence of the installation of an estimated 8m rangefinder aboard KOENIG. One of the problems with these British inspection reports, however, is that almost all the really sensitive ans interesting FC equipment of the German ships had been removed before they went into internment.

A logical <<<guesstimate>>> is that the 12in and 15in ships probably received rangefinder upgrades after Jutland, but there is a lot more research that needs to be done on this subject.

garder wrote: In general I think very difficult to establish what length of rangefinders were carried onboard individual ships. For instance in Von der Nassau zur Köning-klasse p. 120 it states that the Köning class carried 1 8-m-base rangefinder, 5 5-m-base and 2 3-m.base rangefinders. But no 8 m rangefinder is visible in any pictures and I don´t think the turret rangefinders have a 5-m base (see picture below). What is more in Reports on Interned German Vessels: Gunnery Materials, ADM 186/243 at the british National Archives, it states that during inspektion after the war no conning tower or observation post had rangefinders with base-lenghts longer than 3 meters.
..... A friend of mine sent me some time ago some research details on German post-Jutland rangefinder outfits, but I have to track it down in my somewhat disorganized files.


garder wrote: I have another qustion regarding rangefinders. In Geschichte der deutschen Schiffsartillerie page 72 it says: das die Messbasis (rangefinder base) auf der Turmdecke aufgestellt wurde i.e. the rangerfinder-base was on top of the turret. But in Reports on Interned German Vessels: Gunnery Materials it says that this tube on top of the roof was a tube that: accomedates an adjuster beam of light that passed from one eyepiece, through the rangefinder to one periscobe end. Then through the tube above the roof and down to the other eyepiece. This was used to adjust the rangefinder, which was done very often, sometimes between every range-reading.

Can someone who is familiar with stereoscobic rangefinders tell me if this procedure makes any sense? If this is true it shows me that you can´t trust everything you read in Deutschen Schiffsartillere even though it is considered a very importent work on german WWI naval artilleri (Also the only one that coveres this topic in any detail, I haven´t read Friedmanns new book)
..... Yes, this makes some sense, insofar as I understand the operation of the Zeiss stereoscopic rangefinder system. AS with any fine measuring instrument, it was necessary from time to time to calibrate/adjust the rangefinder in order to assure performance with proper accuracy.

BTW, IMHO don't put too much hope into finding much of value regarding WW1 German fire control systems in either of Freidman's recent books ("Naval Firepower" and "Naval Weapons of WW1"). I find him rather thin on the topic and rather suspect him of a certain degree of teutophobia as well.


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Herr Nilsson
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Re: German rangefinders WWI

Post by Herr Nilsson »

Goodall mentions a 26.9 ft rangefinder in Bayern's turrets.
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Marc

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Thorsten Wahl
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Re: German rangefinders WWI

Post by Thorsten Wahl »

ADM 186/259 Progress in Gunnery 1922/1923
mentions a
25-6 ft - 7.8m Zeiss stereoskopic rangefinder from Hindenburg

http://www.admirals.org.uk/records/adm/ ... 86-259.pdf
Meine Herren, es kann ein siebenjähriger, es kann ein dreißigjähriger Krieg werden – und wehe dem, der zuerst die Lunte in das Pulverfaß schleudert!
garder
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Re: German rangefinders WWI

Post by garder »

Thanks Nillson and Wahl, very helpful references.

Generally I think it is less complicated to establish the number and type of rangefinders on the later ships (Bayern class, Hindenburg) than the earlier classes, because they didn´t change so much doing the war.

In the coming week I will order some good sources for pictures of the varius german dreadnought classes from the local libary. Hopefully the can answer some qustions.
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Tool1958
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Re: German rangefinders WWI

Post by Tool1958 »

Dear All,

I would like to take up this older topic again and hope that all participants are
doing well. Regarding this topic, there may have been updates, but also new
questions in more then 10 years.

For me, the question also arose as to when and which ships of the Imperial
Navy were equipped, and retrofitted with which rangefinders / basic devices.
It is known that the Battle of Jutland from the second half of 1916 onward
led to hectic re planning and retrofitting in many navies.

I am aware of the various discussions about increasing the size of some German
Battleships- and Cruisers from 3 meters to 4 or 5 meter base units/rangefinders.

But what really surprised me, however, was that in the last quarter of 1916, for
example, the small cruiser "SMS "Breslau" / Midilli was demonstrably equipped
with a 6-m basic rangefinder. After all, this cruiser did not belong to the German
High Seas Fleet, but was `only´ active in a distant theater of war!
Small Cruiser with 6-m-Rangefinder 06-1917.png
Small Cruiser with 6-m-Rangefinder 06-1917.png (247.89 KiB) Viewed 25608 times
Original Source:
"The Ottoman Steam Navy 1828-1923", Edited & Translated by James Cooper, page 53
https://archive.org/details/learnislamp ... 3/mode/2up


The entries in the KTB (war diary) of the "SMS "Breslau" / Midilli prove not only the
installation of a 4-m-Base device above the armored command post on the bridge,
a 3-m-Base device on the aft hut, but also a 6-m-Basic device on the aft, former
gun platform.

The decision for this modification was already made in July 1916 (!) by admiralty
of the Mediterranean-Division. From the ordering, production and transport of the
Rangefinders and further 15-cm Krupp S.K. L/45 guns, then another few months
passed, and delivery by train did not arrive in Istanbul until the end of December
1916. Due to further renovation work on the propulsion machinery, the operational
readiness was delayed until to the 30. April 1917.

Maybe there are current additions?

Regards Holger
Byron Angel
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Re: German rangefinders WWI

Post by Byron Angel »

Hello, Holger.

Byron Angel here.

Thank you for the archive.org access to the "Ottoman Steam Navy" volume. I do have the hard copy, but this digital version is very convenient. I have discovered a lot of interesting reference works on archive.org, but never thought something such as this would be available as an "unencumbered" download.

I do have <<<some>>> data on post-Jutland range-finder upgrades in the HSF, but this will be a busy day for me. I will do my best to post tonight/tomorrow.

Byron
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Tool1958
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Re: German rangefinders WWI

Post by Tool1958 »

Byron Angel wrote: Wed Nov 15, 2023 1:49 pm Hello, Holger.
Byron Angel here.
Thank you for the archive.org access to the "Ottoman Steam Navy" volume. I do have the hard copy, but this digital version is very convenient. I have discovered a lot of interesting reference works on archive.org, but never thought something such as this would be available as an "unencumbered" download.
I do have <<<some>>> data on post-Jutland range-finder upgrades in the HSF, but this will be a busy day for me. I will do my best to post tonight/tomorrow.
Byron
Hello Byron,

Confirmed; - archive.org offered a lot of very intersting documentations.

But sometimes it is a very time-consuming search if, for example, 10 or 20
files with each 500 pages ot more, have to be read.

Also many thanks for your offer. "Schmalenbach; - Geschichte der deutschen Schiffsartillerie", is known.

Also for sample: "DREADNOUGT Gunnery and the Battle of Jutland `The Question of Fire Control´", John BROOKS
https://www.routledge.com/Dreadnought-G ... 0415407885

But yes; - I am very interested about sources, what happened after Jutland 1916.

Regards Holger
Byron Angel
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Re: German rangefinders WWI

Post by Byron Angel »

Hi Holger,
I sent you a PM yesterday about some archive.org resources which you may find interesting.

Re John Brooks, his doctoral thesis can be found on the British Library EThOS website as a free searchable PDF download.

Re post-Jutland rangefinder developments on the British side, the battle had demonstrated the inadequacy of the 9-ft Barr & Stroud FQ2 at current fighting ranges and post-battle comments in the Grand Fleet Gunnery and Torpedo Orders review document showed widespread support for fitting at least one of the new Barr & Stroud FT24 15-ft rangefinders aboard each of the battleships in the Grand Fleet battle-
line. The FT-24, fitted aboard the new QE class battleships, had demonstrated good results at Jutland up to 18-19k yards, whereas the FQ-2 was shown (once again) to be inadequate beyond 12-13k yards.

Re post-Jutland German range finding, I promise to pass along what I have on the fitting of longer base-length devices as soon as I find it in my files. Still looking.

Byron
Byron Angel
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Re: German rangefinders WWI

Post by Byron Angel »

Hi Holger,
You are a lucky man! It took me a good amount of time to find the document (provided by an old researcher friend more than 20 years ago).


The Imperial German Navy after Jutland

Much is known of the Royal Navy's reactions to the unpalatable results of the Battle of Jutland. Indeed, not only is the Battle itself still the subject of extensive historical inquiry, but so too is the extensive work done to prepare the Grand Fleet for another such encounter.
It is undoubtedly true that the Grand Fleet was much more battle-worthy in 1918 than it had been in 1916. And the improvements were nothing short of a quantum leap in virtually every phase of tactical and materiel applications. So extensive were the improvements that some have hypothesized that the Grand Fleet of 1918 would have been able to make short work of the High Seas Fleet.

This is a twofold presumption. First, that given the halt in heavy unit construction coupled with the transfer of experienced personnel to the U-Boat arm, Fleet strength would remain fundamentally at the 1916 level, but with less competent ratings manning the various units. Second, that the IGN learned virtually nothing from the experience of Jutland, and therefore remained technically at the 1916 level. The former is certainly valid. The latter, however, is essentially incorrect.

Unfortunately, while we know much of the Great Battle, and we know much of what the IGN did subsequently, establishing a cause and effect relationship between the two is basically a matter of conjecture, no matter how logical.
____________

When the High Seas Fleet returned to port on June 1, 1916, the German nation erupted in jubilation. Newspapers carried banner headlines such as 'Great Sea Victory over the English' and 'German Sea Victory between Skagerrak and Horns Reef.' The Kaiser proclaimed that 'The spell of Trafalgar has been broken!" School children were given a holiday. The Austro-Hungarian Naval Attaché reported that "the German Fleet is filled with enthusiasm and elated with victory. Everybody, down to the last seaman, believes in the strength of the Fleet and looks forward to further encounters with confidence."

But Scheer, Hipper, and the other Admirals knew better. They knew that their strategy of reducing the might of the Grand Fleet by overwhelming detached portions of it was the only means by which the Fleet could hope to break the blockade that was starting to strangle the German economy. But Scheer had neither the desire nor the intention of confronting the main strength of the Royal Navy again. When the strategy failed to deliver worthwhile results on August 16, Scheer abandoned it summarily, and advocated unrestricted submarine warfare. But that is beyond the scope of this paper.

The Naval High Command was aware of the potential range advantage the RN enjoyed with the 13.5-inch guns that could elevate to 20-degrees. But it was not until the Battle of the Dogger Bank demonstrated how decisive such long-range fire could be that they determined to take counter measures.

With the exception of those five ships armed with the 28cm SKL/45 gun, which already could elevate their main guns to 20-deg., the rest of the dreadnoughts were limited to 13.5-deg. While the IGN envisioned battle at 10,000 to 15,000 meters, they had not foreseen the practical use of even longer ranges. So they authorized an increase in the elevation of the main and secondary guns, probably as the ships rotated into dockyard hands for periodic refit.

Due no doubt to space limitations, the layout of the ball race and revolving structure, and possibly the dimensions of the gunports, only 2.5-deg. could be added, making the new maximum elevation 16-deg. However, it appears that only Seydlitz had the work done prior to Jutland. This is interesting in light of the fact that the secondary 15cm guns of all the dreadnoughts had their elevation increased to 19-deg. in 1915! So the opportunity to have done the work existed, but was not utilized.

But Jutland provided the impetus needed. While the shooting of the 1st and 2nd BCS may not have been impressive, that of the 5th BS most certainly was. In both range and accuracy, they demonstrated the dangerous potential of long range gunnery. Rene Greger makes a special point of noting how rapidly after the Great Battle the HSF dreadnoughts were modified. Hindenburg and Bayern were completed with 16-deg., the latter being increased to 20-deg. later, and Baden was completed with 20-deg. Turrets in the Mackensen class battlecruisers were altered to 20-deg. from the designed 16-deg., and all new designs incorporated 20-deg. as the standard. By the end of 1916, the IGN had eliminated the range advantage the RN had enjoyed since the beginning of the war.

Perhaps the simplest lesson the IGN learned from Jutland was that the torpedo nets mounted on all of the dreadnoughts were actually a hazard. Hits from enemy shells had damaged the netting and support structures, which allowed sections of the net to enter the water along the ship's side. It was shear luck that none of the ships had had their screws fouled by the damaged nets, which would have had disastrous consequences. Plus, the German participants in the Battle no doubt noticed that the RN had already removed their torpedo nets. Within a few months time, the IGN had followed suit.

The Battle had also demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the 8.8cm anti-torpedo boat armament against the larger British destroyers. Having no director-pointer control, moderately poor locations, only a moderate range, and a relatively light shell, they lacked the ability to hit and the stopping power when they did obtain a hit. At Jutland, the 15cm secondary guns proved effective in the anti-destroyer role. In general terms, below is a brief description of the disposition of the 8.8cm guns:

Nassau class: originally fitted with sixteen 8.8cm SKL/45. In 1915, this was altered to fourteen 8.8cm SKL/45 and two 8.8cm Flak/45. After Jutland, two 8.8cm Flak/45.
Helgoland class: originally fitted with fourteen 8.8cm SKL/45. In late 1914, this was altered to twelve 8.8cm SKL/45 and two 8.8cm Flak/45. After Jutland, two 8.8cm Flak/45.
Kaiser class: originally fitted with twelve 8.8cm SKL/45. In 1914, this was altered to eight 8.8cm SKL/45 and four 8.8cm Flak/45. After Jutland, only the four Flak/45 were carried.
Konig class: originally fitted with six 8.8cm SKL/45 and four 8.8cm Flak/45. After Jutland, only the four Flak/45 were carried.
Von der Tann: originally fitted with sixteen 8.8cm SKL/45. In 1915, this was altered to twelve 8.8cm SKL/45 and two 8.8cm Flak/45. After Jutland, only the two Flak/45 were carried.
Moltke: originally carried twelve 8.8cm SKL/45. In 1915, this was altered to eight 8.8cm SKL/45 and four 8.8cm Flak/45. After Jutland, only the four Flak/45 were carried.
Seydlitz: as Moltke.
Derfflinger: originally mounted four 8.8cm SKL/45 and four 8.8cm Flak/45. After Jutland, the four 8.8cm SKL/45 were removed, and it was planned to replace them with an additional four 8.8cm Flak/45. But only four were fitted.
Hindenburg: Eight 8.8cm Flak/45 was planned, but only four actually fitted.
Bayern and Baden: originally only four 8.8cm Flak/45 actually fitted. By the end of the War, the planned eight guns were mounted.
It should be noted that the IGN not only completely abandoned the light anti-torpedo boat gun, but also mounted more anti-aircraft guns (on their newer and larger ships) than any other combatant during the Great War. And the weight saved, small though it was, could be allocated to other uses.

Perhaps the most obvious changes made to some of the IGN dreadnoughts were the fore masts. It would be an error to attribute those additions solely to Jutland. After all, Blucher had been fitted with a tripod mast complete with range-finder position in 1913, for service as the Fleet Gunnery Training ship. It is therefore obvious which direction Dr. Raps and the fire control development project were intending. Further, the battleship Kronprinz was completed with a heavy tubular mast carrying an identical range-finder position.

Jutland, however, provided the impetus to both extend and enhance the tops. Several reports from the HSF noted approximately the same as the Derfflinger's experience. Quoting from Campbell, "In the Derfflinger the spotter's glasses in the fore-top were linked to the Director by 'follow-the-pointer' gear, but the spotter could not transmit in this way to the Director. In the latter part of the battle [the second engagement of the battle lines], the British hulls could be made out from the top when only gun-flashes were visible from the GCT, but by then communications with the fore-top had been cut by splinters."

Throughout most of the HSF, the spotting arrangements had been improved in 1914, so it was not merely a question of protecting the communications facilities with the tops. In the case of Derfflinger cited above, even could the spotters have communicated with the Director via follow-the-pointer gear, they could not have provided range and deflection data needed for a valid fire control solution. The solution was not merely to duplicate the range-finder positions a la Blucher and Kronprinz, but to provide the position with Director-Pointer gear.

Therefore, while Derfflinger was under repair following the Battle, she shipped a tripod foremast. Bayern and Baden were both completed with tripods. Initially, they only included the range-finder position, but in 1917-18, the Director was fitted. Hindenburg completed with the full fire control suite. In 1917, the Konig, Markgraf, and Grosser Kurfurst shipped a heavy tubular mast with the full fire control suite (Richtungsweiser), and Kronprinz fitted with the fire control gear. Kaiser and Friedrich der Grosse were so fitted in 1918. These and the spotting position had splinter proof protection.

The spotting arrangements on the foremasts of most of the rest of the dreadnoughts were also altered following Jutland. The Nassaus, some of the Helgolands, the remaining three Kaisers, Von der Tann, Moltke, and Seydlitz were all fitted with a new, enlarged crow's nest mounted on the front of the mast. In addition, the three Kaisers, Moltke and Seydlitz were fitted with a second, lower position, which may have been sufficient for a simple bearing instrument. British Intelligence referred to these as "Control Positions", so given the location, timing, and circumstances, some form of gunnery control seems logical. However, the structure was of limited size, and was substantially smaller than the bona fide FC positions mentioned above.

But the most interesting alterations to the HSF were potentially equally important, though much less visible, than the changes to the tops. The standard range-finder through Jutland had been the Zeiss 3-meter stereoscopic instrument, which could give good results in the 15 ¬ 16,000 meter range. There is some evidence that the Konigs and the Derfflingers carried 4-meter instruments. However, after the Great Battle, all of the sets mounted in the fore- and aft- GCTs were changed. In most cases, the 3-meter instruments were replaced by 4-meter equipment. It appears that the Kaisers, Konigs, Derfflinger and Hindenburg, and Bayern and Baden were fitted with 5-meter equipment. This includes the range-finder mounted in the position in the fore-tops. These were quite sufficient to give good results at the new battle ranges made possible by the increased gun elevations. Peter Padfield states that "shooting to the correct range forms perhaps 90% of the art of naval gunnery" so the longer instruments would surely have had a positive effect on the IGN's long range accuracy.

Further, the designs for the Sachsen, Wurttemberg, Mackensens, and the so-called Ersatz Yorcks were altered to mount an 8-meter instrument on the fore GCT, and the new designs, L20ea and GK4542 for example, would have carried 8-meter equipment throughout.
Indeed, some sources state that Bayern and Baden carried the 8-meter instrument in 1918, but this cannot be confirmed. But there is photographic evidence that Von der Tann carried one on her after GCT at that time.

Of considerable interest, from the examination of photographs, there appears to have been small 1.5- or 2-meter range-finders mounted on the new crow's nests of those dreadnoughts that were not fitted with tubular or tripod masts. Coupled with the Control position, with which many of the same ships had been fitted, those units could have had the facilities and capability to direct the main armament in conditions such as had occurred at Jutland late in the day. Those units with the full FC suite mounted aloft most certainly could have.

The Battle had also revealed a number of FC equipment shortcomings that demanded corrective action. Campbell notes that the earlier pattern telescopes fitted to the Director-Pointer "were far from meeting requirements," though given some of the gunnery performances, it seems to have been sufficiently functional. Likewise, the older pattern Range Clocks proved of limited value, and some Gunnery Officers made corrections based on readings from the range-finders, or more appropriately corrected based on the changes from the averaged range provided by the mittlungs apparat. Communications from various positions, such as range-finders and spotting tops, needed to be enhanced. Of particular interest was the request for a simple gyro device that tract the target through rapid or radical changes in own ship's course.

It is likely that all but the last were remedied with all dispatch. The last, however, was no doubt one of the gyro projects Dr. Raps could not address in wartime. Raps and the Siemens & Halske engineers had experimented with gyroscopic devices for FC, but had been forced to discontinue the work when war broke out.

However, Julius von Petravic had developed a gyroscopic device that kept the guns on target through the roll of the ship; in essence, mechanically assisted continuous aim via a gyro-sight system. This was known as the Abfeuerungs Gerat in IGN service. Though it had already been adopted by the K u K Marine, it was only under field test at the time of Jutland. Indeed, Lutzow had a unit mounted in each of three of her four turrets, but they had immediately failed from the shock of her own guns firing. By 1918, however, the equipment was in use throughout the HSF.

One final change in the HSF was tactical rather than technical. An interesting incident during the Battle may very well have been the impetus for a re-organization of the HSF.

Friedrich Ruge has mentioned that at about 1826 or so, Admiral Scheer, noting the events at the 'Windy Corner' entertained the idea of an attack from two directions. Hipper and the 1st SG, supported by the 3rd Squadron, would deal with the British forces to the east, while he would take Friedrich der Grosse and the 1st and 2nd Squadrons to the north-west. Had he done so, it surely would have meant the destruction of Warspite and Warrior at the very least. With the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, such a move would also have placed half of the HSF behind the Grand Fleet battle line, which had deployed toward the east, though Scheer could hardly have known that.

According to Ruge, this promising plan was briefly discussed with Scheer's staff, and then abandoned in the face of communications difficulties. Such an explanation, however, does not seem more than superficially satisfactory. First because, as Keith Yates points out, individual initiative was highly regarded and expected in the IGN. This meant that, with minimal instructions, Scheer could count on Hipper and Behncke to fight their squadrons without him holding their hands, as it were. And second, wireless communications within the HSF had been effective for the entire battle. Scheer could have briefly and quickly informed his subordinates of his intentions.

A more likely explanation has to do the very nature of the 'line of battle' in the context of large fleets. Almost by definition, it lacks flexibility. In that, it more resembles the ancient Greek Phalanx as opposed to the articulation of a Roman Legion. So while Scheer was no doubt willing to play Nelson, and attempt unorthodox tactics, his staff was likely aghast at the thought.

After Jutland, the HSF was re-organized along tactically more flexible lines. Instead of the orthodox Battle Squadron of eight ships in two divisions, the old divisions became squadrons. In other words, the Nassaus made up the 1st Squadron and the Helgolands the 2nd (the pre-dreadnoughts having been de-mobilized), with the Fleet Flagship, Baden, attached. The 3rd Squadron was Bayern and the four Konigs, while the five Kaisers comprised the 4th Squadron. The 1st Scouting Group, comprised of the five battle-cruisers, in essence would serve as a fifth squadron or fast wing of the fleet. Thus, squadrons, with their attached screening units, could be handled as proto task groups, applying tactical pressure where needed without regard to the battle line type formation.

This organization was used in late 1917 during Operation Albion, in the Baltic against the Russians, which was no doubt a field test. The Fleet that sortied in April 1918 was a much more flexible and formidable weapon then it had been at Jutland, both technically and tactically.
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The author later adds...
In my recent mini-article[above], I mentioned only the RFs that were visible, and as a general rule, mounted higher than the turret instruments. I was also under the impression that the turret instruments were the same 3-meter 'standard'. Turns out this was not the case. Schmalenbach notes that the instruments in the 28cm [sic. and 30.5cm] turrets were 6-meters, while those for the 38cm [sic. and 35cm?] were 8.2-meters.
My guess is that the 42cm designs must have been planned for 10-meter instruments. I've often felt that the Third Reich offered little in technological improvement.

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Last Updated: 16 October, 2000.
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Tool1958
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Re: German rangefinders WWI

Post by Tool1958 »

Byron Angel wrote: Thu Nov 16, 2023 2:00 pm Hi Holger,
I sent you a PM yesterday about some archive.org resources which you may find interesting.

Re John Brooks, his doctoral thesis can be found on the British Library EThOS website as a free searchable PDF download.

Re post-Jutland rangefinder developments on the British side, the battle had demonstrated the inadequacy of the 9-ft Barr & Stroud FQ2 at current fighting ranges and post-battle comments in the Grand Fleet Gunnery and Torpedo Orders review document showed widespread support for fitting at least one of the new Barr & Stroud FT24 15-ft rangefinders aboard each of the battleships in the Grand Fleet battle-
line. The FT-24, fitted aboard the new QE class battleships, had demonstrated good results at Jutland up to 18-19k yards, whereas the FQ-2 was shown (once again) to be inadequate beyond 12-13k yards.

Re post-Jutland German range finding, I promise to pass along what I have on the fitting of longer base-length devices as soon as I find it in my files. Still looking.

Byron
Hello Byron,

Thank you also for your PM with the information there. I will definitely follow up on your tips and references.
If I find something I will share it here, of course.

(I love the AHF-Slogan: "Information not shared is lost"!)

It is surprising that so little attention has been paid to this military-technical issue, even from the German side.

Regards Holger
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