Quite so, Sean. Trials are customarily run in as good weather and smooth sea state as can be arranged; they are not customarily undertaken to judge sea-keeping qualities.
Byron
Quite so, Sean. Trials are customarily run in as good weather and smooth sea state as can be arranged; they are not customarily undertaken to judge sea-keeping qualities.
In wartime trials are run as opportunity permits, regardless of weather. KGV's trials were run in Force 4 wind and seastate 2. Howe in wind 4 sea 32.Byron Angel wrote: ↑Thu Apr 02, 2020 9:54 pmQuite so, Sean. Trials are customarily run in as good weather and smooth sea state as can be arranged; they are not customarily undertaken to judge sea-keeping qualities.
Byron
The problem is that stating that the KGV class were 'wet ships', if in fact they were the least wet ships, is highly misleading. Again, we know that S&G were miserably wet ships that suffered repeated damage due to their low freeboard and poor bow design. We know that Bismarck had her forward RF removed because it was useless at sea. The Littorio class were very wet forward and suffered badly during adverse weather, and we have adverse reports from all the USN fast BB classes. Only Vanguard stands out from the rest, and comparing a treaty limited design to one built free of limits is hardly useful. OTOH, the KGV class were tasked with undertaking combat missions and engagements in adverse weather and did so successfully.Byron Angel wrote: ↑Fri Apr 03, 2020 12:14 am I find it simultaneously fascinating and dismaying that this discussion has somehow morphed into a competition between the KGV design versus American battleships. I do not recall Dr. Brown mentioning anything whatsoever in that respect.
Prince of Wales' DCT 15-ft rangefinder was quite unlikely to have delivered any useful ranging data at 30,000+ yards, except perhaps in absolutely perfect visibility conditions (which did not prevail; the fact that PoW was trying her luck at 30,000 yards is no proof that the DCT range-finder was delivering useful ranges; if fact the gunnery commentary shows that PoW was hunting both deflection and range and needed 1600 yards (IIRC) in range corrections to even cross the target.
The lower mounting of the long base-length turret range-finders had no effect whatsoever upon their utility; to suggest so is to imply incompetence on the part of designers mounting 40-ft range-finders in a location where they would be incapable of ranging even to 20,000 yards. The fact of the matter is that the turret range-finders were, as was customary for the RN at that time, of the coincidence type; such range-finders relied upon taking cuts of vertical elements of the target such as masts and superstructure elements which typically rose up to 100 ft or more above the waterline.
Moving along to "wetness", I found Pengelly's account of KGV's December 1940 trials which Dunmunro has quoted ("British Battleships 1919-1945, Burt; page 388). It is useful to read the paragraph immediately preceding Pengelly's account, to wit -
"The ships had a flush deck hull and a very slight sheer forward, this having been curtailed to an undesirable extent to meet an Admiralty requirement (in force prior to 1941) that all turret be able to fire at 30 depression over their entire safety arcs. The sheer forward was inadequate, however, and was aggravated by a reduction of about three feet in the original design freeboard due to the addition of extra weights during construction. This caused the ships to be wet at high speed and inclined to bury in head seas, the class suffering appreciably from this defect. During the action with Bismarck in May 1941, "A" and "B" turret range-finders in Prince of Wales were blanked by heavy spray coming in over the low forecastle and, as the main armament radar was not functioning, the fighting efficiency of the guns was seriously impaired."
Based upon Burt's data for the class as completed, draft ranged from 28ft 6in to 33ft 7.5in. If we assume that the deepest draft figure corresponds to the greatest Deep Load tonnage cited (42,630 tons), we obtain an immersion value of 105.5 tons per inch. Let's round that off to an even 100 tons per inch immersion. By mid/late1944, the KGVs had added ~4,000 tons to their Standard Displacement. At 100 tons per inch immersion, this would have reduced freeboard by an additional 3+ feet.
Freeboard as designed was supposed to be 30 ft forward. 3 feet of freeboard was lost as a result of extra weight added during construction, and a further 3 feet lost after their 1944 re-fits. By late 1944, the KGVs could not have had more than 24 ft of freeboard forward. This is why they were considered "wet" ships in service.
Others may wish to look into the question of where the waterline ultimately ended up relative to the depth of the main belt. I'm not going there.
Byron
(My emphasis and underlining)Y Turret was "wooded" as "A " arcs were not open. A rough sea and strong wind on the starboard bow together with our high speed resulted in a continuous stream of spray and water over A and B Turrets, and in spite of their window washing gear neither obtained any ranges before opening fire.
Both radar sets had been switched off to maintain Radar Silence and were switched on at the order "enemy in sight".
The main gunnery set due to its technical limitation was unable to pass ranges until the range was reduced to 24,000 yards.
As far as I can remember the range on opening fire was about 26, 000 yards.
No range was obtained before opening fire from the air warning radar set; I think (but am not certain} due to baving been switched-off and slowness in becoming operational after being switched-on again.
That left the 15 foot 14 inch Director Control Tower Duplex Range finders which were high up and clear of spray but the range was every extreme for such small range finders.
"Hood and "Prince of Wales" fired in their own time sectors, each controlling their own gunfire.
This procedure although independant, laid down that gun ranges be interchanged between ships before opening fire but we received no gun ranges from Hood and I was unable to pass any to her, so I expect she suffered the same trouble, being also a "wet" ship with her main optical range finders low down on the back of the Turrets.
We actually opened fire with a gull range obtained from one range from the 15 foot Director Control Tower Duplex range finders "meaned" with my estimated range. This latter was done, if you remember, with "Block Sketch Cards" where the height of the enemy's upper deck is observed relative to the horizon.
Once the range was down to about 20,000 yards the T. S. had a good Range Plot including radar ranges from the 14 inch Director Tower set and continual optical range finder ranges, certainly from "B" Turret.
It is of interest that having the "windward berth" was even in comparatively modern days an advantage where spray was concerned.
I also remember noticing the large range finders "high-up" in Bismarck (as they were in all large German ships}.
The procedure at that time was for the "Spotting Officer" (Lt. Cdr . Skipwith, R.N. ) (on my right} to give the routine orders, "enemy in sight" etc., "bearing and description"; for the "Rate Officer" Lieut. Buxton RNVR (on my left), to give Enemy's Inclination and speed while the G.O. in the middle, communicated with the Captain, kept an overall view and then, being in direct touch with the T.S. Officer (Mr. Murphy) discussed the range plot and arising therefrom the open fire range.
Thus on this occasion I remember almost "imploring" Mr. Murphy for ranges and his reply "No Ranges".
I can also remember asking the W/T operator (by my left foot) for ranges from Hood, also negative. Then Mr. Murphy's report of one range from D. C. T. and my "estimation by card"; then Hood opening fire and we following as per drill in our "time sector" on a mean of two ranges. (One from a 15 foot range finder and one estimated).
Nobody had yet opened fire so there were no shell splashes.Y Turret was "wooded" as "A " arcs were not open. A rough sea and strong wind on the starboard bow together with our high speed resulted in a continuous stream of spray and water over A and B Turrets, and in spite of their window washing gear neither obtained any ranges before opening fire.
It's only about relative wetness, really. Besides there is no competition, everybody knows all US Navy vessels, regardless of freeboard, are "dry" ships.I find it simultaneously fascinating and dismaying that this discussion has somehow morphed into a competition between the KGV design versus American battleships.
Nelson had a nominal 45k hp versus 110k on KGV. KGV had thicker deck and belt armour and her armour belt had ~twice the height of Nelson's belt.paul.mercer wrote: ↑Sat Apr 04, 2020 9:16 am Gentlemen,
I'm going to try your patience once again!
Going back to the original question of updating the KG's. In an earlier post which seems to have got lost in the debate about the seaworthiness of the KG class, I asked why that it was possible to build the 'Nelsons' with 3 x 16" turrets and still keep within the 'Treaty' limits, but not possible to mount 3 x 14" turrets on a KG, when according to an earlier post the triple 16" were in fact around 150 tons heavier than a Quad 14"?
I'm sorry if this has been covered elseware before, if so I must have missed it.
As an aside, I also asked if the KG's had been built with 12 x!4" (and all working properly!) would they have been a match for most of the ships of other countries, except perhaps the Iowas and Yamatos?
We have established, I believe beyond reasonable doubt, that building the KG Vs in that manner would not have been possible. Because they weren't. They could have been hypothetically built with 12 by 18" guns as fitted in Furious which would have made them arguably superior to a Yamato, but that is an idea so far removed from practicality and reality it belongs in the hypothetical forum."Nelsol" and "Rodol" as they were dismissively nicknamed (because they looked like tankers from a distance) had high freeboard throughout including the bow. They achieved Treaty compliance by having, frankly, inadequate power plants, taking up minimal space requiring a smaller area of weighty armour and providing insufficient thrust to achieve speeds where bow burying and spray would be much of a problem. Since the engineering spaces were squeezed in aft, the weighty turrets at 1600 tons each were not really very far forwards.
paul.mercer wrote: ↑Sat Apr 04, 2020 9:16 am Gentlemen,
I'm going to try your patience once again!
Going back to the original question of updating the KG's. In an earlier post which seems to have got lost in the debate about the seaworthiness of the KG class, I asked why that it was possible to build the 'Nelsons' with 3 x 16" turrets and still keep within the 'Treaty' limits, but not possible to mount 3 x 14" turrets on a KG, when according to an earlier post the triple 16" were in fact around 150 tons heavier than a Quad 14"?
I'm sorry if this has been covered elseware before, if so I must have missed it.
As an aside, I also asked if the KG's had been built with 12 x!4" (and all working properly!) would they have been a match for most of the ships of other countries, except perhaps the Iowas and Yamatos?
They didn't need 12- 14" guns to match up with contemporary battleships. They matched up good enough more or less as built. This includes the Iowas.paul.mercer wrote: ↑Sat Apr 04, 2020 9:16 am
As an aside, I also asked if the KG's had been built with 12 x!4" (and all working properly!) would they have been a match for most of the ships of other countries, except perhaps the Iowas and Yamatos?
If the KGV's were built to a ~45k ton limit the UK might not have ordered 5 of them and they would have taken longer to build and so PoW would probably not have been ready in time.BobDonnald wrote: ↑Sun Apr 05, 2020 7:57 am None of the 35,000 ton treaty battleships were worth building in view of the international arms race in the late 1930s. The Japanese were expected to build 16 inch/46,000 ton ships to complement the Nagato class. The Italians already built 15 inch/40,000 ton ships. Then the Bismarck 15 inch/44,000 ton ships clearly sized to rival the Hood. How good did the on the spot commanders rate them? Seems Adm Tovey slowed to wait on the Rodney to assure the outcome. What happens at Samar if Halsey leaves the 4 35,000 tonnes to face Yamato and company? Washington was the flagship and so faces Yamato alone. Poor old Adm Lee gets to go down with her instead of a heart attack in 1945.
Nothing less than a 45,000 ton North Carolina or a 45,000 ton KGV should have been contemplated. The gun escalation clause was already there and the tonnage went to 45,000 in a year's time. I guess democratic governments can't make those types of decisions in real time.
Groan!
RS