Hello everybody,
@ Wadinga,
while on the Denmark Strait all is clear now, ... from the war propaganda guidelines given by Churchill to the Admiralty on 1939 ... until the creation and modifications of the reports to save a Captain leaving too early a battlefield ... and the creation of " The Plot " in order to save a superficial RearAdm declaring something he should have never declared and signed ...
... and remember that I am still looking for who Pinchin really was ... as I suspect he was not the Norfolk navigating officer signing that incorrect chart for the second board ... but an " useful " help ... used on purpose ... to avoid the negative propaganda on summer 1941 ... and enable the recognitions after ... which saw him decorated too.... with Kelburn ... another very interesting presence on Norfolk that day ...
.... moving on this thread subject, ... here there is still a long way to go in order to realize what happened.
Your 1, 2 and 3 target apparently have been identified on board the Warspite being a Colleoni class light cruiser leading and 2 Zara class heavy cruisers following in line, ... than 2 destroyers, ... total 5 enemy ships ... but we know they were 6 ships ... but in the darkness I see no problems to accept this identification errors.
This should have determined at first the target selection and assignment, ... and we will found it out hopefully.
Logic would dictate that Warspite, as you wrote, should have being opening against the Alfieri, so the third on the line in reality.
Valiant should have opened to Fiume, the second one in line, as it seems to have occurred.
Barham should have opened against the Zara, the first enemy warship, as it seems to have occurred.
But Adm Cunningham declared Warspite opened on Fiume with 5 hits he saw on the enemy out of her first 6 shells fired ...
Alfieri was not targeted at the beginning, and Officer eyewitnesses surviving declared they saw ahead on them the Fiume and the Zara under fire before being targeted themselves.
Alle 22.30 la Warspite aprì il fuoco per prima, da 3500 metri di distanza. Subito la seguirono la Valiant e la Barham: ventiquattro cannoni da 381 mm riversarono un diluvio di proiettili sui due incrociatori della I Divisione, mentre i proiettori del cacciatorpediniere Greyhound e delle corazzate illuminavano lo Zara, il Fiume e l’Alfieri.
Lo Zara ed il Fiume, colti completamente alla sprovvista, non ebbero nemmeno il tempo di abbozzare una reazione: entrambi gli incrociatori furono ridotti, in capo a tre minuti, a due relitti galleggianti, devastati dall’uragano di fuoco che si era abbattuto su di loro.
Alle 22.35 (o 22.33) la Barham aprì il fuoco per ultima, ed il suo comandante, capitano di vascello Cooke, ordinò di aprire il fuoco contro un cacciatorpediniere che era appena apparso nel fascio del proiettore del Greyhound, a prora sinistra della corazzata: era l’Alfieri, che divenne il bersaglio delle prime due salve da 381 della corazzata.
translated :
At 22.30 the Warspite opened fire first, from 3500 meters away. Immediately followed by the Valiant and the Barham: twenty-four 381 mm guns poured a deluge of bullets on the two cruisers of the First Division, while the destroyers Greyhound projectors as well as the battleships ones lit the Zara, the Fiume and the Alfieri.
The Zara and Fiume, caught completely off guard, did not even have the time to draft a response: both cruisers were reduced, after three minutes, to burning wrecks from the hurricane of fire they received.
At 22:35 (or 22:33) the Barham opened fire being the last one, and its commander, Captain Cooke, ordered to open fire on a destroyer that had just appeared in the beam projector of the destroyer Greyhound, left at the prow of the battleships: it was the Alfieri, who became the target of the first two 381 mm salvoes of the battleship.
Something clearly does not match here ...
Lieutenant Sansonetti confirms from the Alfieri :
Era passato poco dall’avvistamento dei due presunti Very rossi a sinistra, quando da bordo del cacciatorpediniere si assistette all’improvvisa apertura del fuoco contro Zara e Fiume, con tiro illuminante e battente da parte delle corazzate britanniche. Il sottotenente di vascello Vito Sansonetti, sull’Alfieri, aveva appena aperto la porta della plancia quando vide attraverso il vetro un enorme incendio svilupparsi sulla poppa del Fiume (soprattutto a dritta), poche centinaia di metri a proravia dell’Alfieri, e poi sentì improvvisamente delle esplosioni e corse fuori, mentre schegge infuocate di ogni dimensione si levavano nel cielo. Non trascorsero che pochi istanti, che l’Alfieri divenne a sua volta un bersaglio, contro cui fu fatto fuoco non solo con i pezzi secondari da 152 delle corazzate (il cui effetto fu poco inefficace, in quanto la Warspite, per un problema al sistema d’illuminazione automatico EBI, aprì il fuoco in ritardo, solo alle 22.31, da una distanza di 2290 metri – ritenuta eccessiva –, tirando la prima salva a vuoto e colpendo uno dei cacciatorpediniere con la seconda, mentre la terza e la quarta mancarono l’Havock), ma anche con quelli da 381 della Barham: la prima salva da 381 della Barham, sparata da soli 2800 metri di distanza, mise un colpo a segno sotto la plancia della nave di Toscano, ed il direttore del tiro della Barham, osservando i risultati della prima salva sull’Alfieri, disse “È stato il migliore tiro notturno che abbia mai fatto”. Il comandante della Barham si trovò d’accordo. Poi la corazzata spostò il suo tiro sullo Zara.
translated :
It had been a little by the sighting of two alleged Very red on the left, from aboard the destroyer when we witnessed the sudden opening of fire against Zara and Fiume, with fire lighting and swing by the British battleships. The lieutenant Vito Sansonetti, on board the Alfieri, had just opened the door of the bridge when he saw through the window a huge fire developed on the stern of the Fiume (mostly straight), a few hundred meters at the bow of Alfieri, and then felt sudden explosions and ran outside, while fiery shards of all sizes rose in the sky. Not passed that a few moments, that the Alfieri in turn became a target against which the fire was done not only with the pieces from the secondary 152 mm of the battleships (the effect of which was little ineffective, since the Warspite, for a problem to the system Automatic lighting EBI, opened fire late, only to 22:31, from a distance of 2,290 meters - considered excessive - pulling the first salvo in vacuum and hitting one of the destroyers with the second and the third and fourth missed the RN destroyer Havock), but also with those from 381 mm of the Barham: the first salvo of 381 mm of Barham, fired from just 2,800 meters away, put a hit under the bridge of the Capt. Toscano ship ( Alfieri ) , and the Director of the shot of Barham, observing the results of the first salvo on the Alfieri said " It was the best night shooting I've ever done." The commander of Barham found himself in agreement. Then the battleship moved his shot on the Zara.
We seem to have a correct understanding and match only about the Valiant opening fire on the Fiume.
But to who Warspite opened fire ?
To who Barham opened fire ?
Which one were the initial target assignment and the relative orders issued, ... which orders have been issued after ( like the : " shift target one ship left ", ... and why ?
This is what we need to realize now.
It will be interesting to read the Official RN battleship war diaries and the official accounts both sides ... and also George Stitt and Mazzantini books ... and one day hopefully ... like for the HMS Glorious and the Denmark Strait, ... we will realize what really happened ... and mostly : why ??? ...
Sorry, my fault I forgot the propaganda guidelines :
Good news was made to seem better; bad news was toned down, delayed or sometimes suppressed.
We know very well why. We just need to reconstruct the real facts ... like for Denmark Strait ...
Bye Antonio