Putting some deep thought into this...
A "Tactical Defeat" but Strategic Victory seems almost an oxymoron on modern non set-piece battlefields.
I'm trying to think of any that fit this, and I'm sure their may be a few but it is rare. On an ancient or middle ages battlefield I think it could be more common, as the tactical aim was generally to defeat the opponent (opponent being the army assembled immediately upon that particular battlefield), while the strategic goal might be different.
Goals upon the modern (20th century or so and later) battlefield are a bit different. And the Tactical goal of operation Pedestal was to get the convoy through to Malta. The strategic goal was to keep Malta alive and functioning. The tactical goal of pedestal was NOT to shoot down X amount of enemy aircraft, or to inflict more casualties than received. The Goal was to get the supplies through.
Failure or success of this goal would have to be determined by whether or not sufficient supplies made it through, though a caveat could be made as to whether or not the losses were acceptable.
Then I guess the question we have to ask, is would the Allied commanders, knowing the losses in advance, still send the task force on it's merry way, or would they abort? And another caveat would have to be that they could not abort and try another method of re-supply, it's Pedestal or nothing for Malta.
And I do indeed believe that the Allied commanders, having this choice would still commit to Operation Pedestal. As mentioned above, ships could be built to replace or damaged ships could be repaired, but prying an occupied Malta from Axis hands would be much tougher, and would have a profound impact on the war in Africa.