OPERATION PEDESTAL

[Steve Crandell]

There are people who think the campaign up the Italian peninsula was a terrible waste of lives and material, considering the nature of the terrain and it's questionable strategic value. A lot of it is hindsight, of course.

[aurora]

There are people who think the campaign up the Italian peninsula was a terrible waste of lives and material, considering the nature of the terrain and it's questionable strategic value. A lot of it is hindsight, of course.

Steve-Operation Husky was the ongoing plan to seize Sicily; and and then on to Italy for the 600 Day War.The major effect of this took Italy out of the war -they capitulated in September 1943.Their navy was impounded and the Mediterranean was once more relatively safe-so we were committed to the the war against the Germans-we could not pull out otherwise we were back to square 1.This" what if"scenario- of what would have happened had we not invaded Italy-belongs to another part of the Forum.

[Steve Crandell]

For the record, I don't think invading Italy was a mistake; just the amount of effort put into breaking the Gustav line and beyond.

[aurora]

Steve-it was a hard gruelling war-Italy was split up the middle-US 5th Army took the left flank on the Mediterranean Sea side and British 8th Army took the right flank on the Adriatic Sea side.landings at Salerno and Anzio,many rivers to cross Senio,Sango and Rapido.The Gustav Line at Monte Casino,the Rome Line and the Gothic Line,the Argenta Gap and L Commacchio.The war was stalemated by the winters of 1943,44 and 44/45-nothing could move.

The campaign on the Italian mainland until the surrender of German forces in Italy in May 1945.It is estimated that between September 1943 and April 1945, some 60,000 Allied and 50,000 German soldiers died in Italy. Overall Allied casualties during the campaign totalled about 320,000 and the corresponding Axis figure (excluding those involved in the final surrender) was about 336,650.

No campaign in the Mediterranean and Middle East Theatre cost more than the Italian campaign in terms of lives lost and wounds suffered by infantry forces

[pgollin]

Steve- you can rest assured that Operation Torch was a must ,particularly for the British-it ended the war in North Africa,it took Malta out of the equation ................

Er ....... It was the Westerly thrust from Alamein which freed Malta "from yje equation".

[pgollin]

Steve-it was a hard gruelling war-Italy was split up the middle-US 5th Army took the left flank on the Mediterranean Sea side and British 8th Army took the right flank on the Adriatic Sea side.landings at Salerno and Anzio,many rivers to cross Senio,Sango and Rapido.The Gustav Line at Monte Casino,the Rome Line and the Gothic Line,the Argenta Gap and L Commacchio.The war was stalemated by the winters of 1943,44 and 44/45-nothing could move. .............

The big problem was that momentum was lost with the failure of the Anzio landings and with Clark's stupidity in taking Rome instead of following orders.

Whether with those two mistakes mended the Allies MIGHT have broken through the Gustav line more quickly is unknowable.

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[pgollin]

I have all of O'Hara's books and found them to be mostly reliable; .............

How do you explain some of his more way out claims (I gave the examples of Second Sirte and the merchant war in the med).

THESE are the same as the Italian revisionist, but do NOT conform with the normal interpretations by historians. Nothing wrong with revisionism, but it has to conform with the facts and make some sort of sense.

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[aurora]

ABC's comment that this was "the greatest action of the war"-which plainly it was not.
It was a complete failure !!

[aurora]

Posted by pgollin

"The big problem was that momentum was lost with the failure of the Anzio landings and with Clark's stupidity in taking Rome instead of following orders.

Whether with those two mistakes mended the Allies MIGHT have broken through the Gustav line more quickly is unknowable".

I have absolutely, without a vestige of equivocation;NO argument with the above,although I would have preferred "rectified" to "mended"but that is of little consequence

[pgollin]

ABC's comment that this was "the greatest action of the war"-which plainly it was not.
It was a complete failure !!

IF it had been a "complete failure" then Malta would have fallen - you must try to keep some grasp on reality.

.

[alecsandros]

ABC's comment that this was "the greatest action of the war"-which plainly it was not.
It was a complete failure !!

IF it had been a "complete failure" then Malta would have fallen - you must try to keep some grasp on reality.

.

No,

Pedestal was a failure, and a big one. It ensured some bare minimum supplies for the defenders, while leaving the island unable to mount operations of any sort.

Esentialy, Malta was kept out of the war by the Axis until early 1943.

Malta couldn't "fall" in the classical sense of the term , without some sort of Axis amfibious or airborne assault - both completely out of the question.

[dunmunro]

The Axis AFs continued to devote a huge number of sorties against Malta, but they gradually lost the air battle:

:The episode of Alam-el-Halfa over, Tedder could again focus his attention on the supply battle. During September his aircraft and Admiral Harwood's submarines sank nearly a third of the enemy cargoes attempting to reach Africa, besides causing many other vessels to turn back with their mission unaccomplished. In all this the renewed striking power of Malta told to such effect that Hitler soon ordered another ' blitz' against the obstinate island.' Because of the revival of Malta as an air base and the numerous sinkings in the Mediterranean', ran his directive of 14th September, 'supplies for the First Panzer Army have fallen far below normal requirements. Unless Malta is weakened or paralysed once more, this situation cannot be remedied'. At the end of the month Ciano was still more explicit: 'In all, we have little more than a million tons [of merchant shipping] left', he noted on 29th September, 'at this rate the African problem will automatically end in six months, since we shall have no more ships with which to supply Libya'.

The new, and, as it proved, final assault in Malta began on 10th October, 1942. That day the number of enemy raiders rose abruptly from the by then normal twenty or thirty to over 120. Six times the enemy appeared in strength--though each time, significantly enough, with few bombers and many fighters. Five times our aircraft intercepted these formations well north of the island; on the other occasion a formation composed entirely of fighters managed to cross the coast at great height but did no damage. From the day's fighting the enemy lost two aircraft, ourselves none; and, still more gratifying, not a single bomb fell on Malta.

Such was the beginning. The next day the enemy sent over, according to our estimates, 216 aircraft; the day after, 279; and from then on, up to and including 19th October, between 200 and 270 each day. In addition some ten to twenty aircraft carried out 'nuisance' raids at night. But from 20th October onwards the attacks fell away, until in the last week of the month the daily average was no more than 120 raiders, most of which got nowhere near the island. During these final operations the Germans found out once again that fighter sweeps are

--231--

no substitute for heavy bombardment. The defeat of the enemy, in fact, may be dated from 18th October, when Kesselring withdrew his Ju.88's from the battle. In the period of the most intensive fighting, from 10th to 19th October, we shot down forty-six German aircraft and probably at least an equal number of Italian, as against a loss of only thirty Spitfires; while in terms of aircrew the estimate was that fifteen of the enemy had failed to return to base for every one of ours. More important than any exact calculation of losses was the fact that damage to the island was slight, and that though some bombs fell on the airfields nearly every day they did not impede our operations. On only one night during the month did Malta's bombers fail to take off against enemy shipping. That was a night on which there was no enemy shipping to attack.

This, then, was all Kesselring could show for his final fling against Malta. For this the Axis had kept 600 aircraft in Sicily at a time when they desperately needed every one of these machines in Africa. In the end even the German pilots lost heart; and a final order from Goring at the end of October, that Malta must be destroyed within eight days, was as vain and wind-stuffed as the source from which it came. As Kesselring coldly pointed out in reply, experience had amply shown that only the occupation of the island could put it out of action. And by that time matters were so far gone in Africa that the enemy was quite unable to spare forces for an attempt on Malta. So passed to the grave that still-born conception which the Germans with Teutonic pomposity had termed Operation HERCULES, and the Italians, with a more prophetic insight into their own limitations, Operation 'C.3'. It was a project which, like the capture of Gibraltar, would have been simple compared with many that the Germans cheerfully and unnecessarily undertook, but which, had it been attempted with success, might well have spelled defeat to the allied cause.

* * *

In October our aircraft and submarines struck with still greater effect against the enemy convoys. Between them the two methods of attack, sharing the honours almost equally, sank some 50,000 tons of shipping on the North African routes. According to Admiral Weichold, forty-five per cent of the entire Italian tonnage despatched, and fifty-nine per cent of the German, failed to reach the other side. Of the German cargo of which Rommel was thus cheated, sixty-five per cent was fuel.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/U ... II-11.html

[alecsandros]

@ Duncan
Indeed, efforts were done to shut Malta down, but , as the article you quoted mentioned, "experience had amply shown that only the occupation of the island could put it out of action".

Considerable air forces were allocated also for the attacks against Pedestal. Some sources list as many as 800 German/Italian bombers and fighters allocated to the attacks. On Aug 12th, the Axis delivered 5 large air attacks with at least 400 bombers in total.

[pgollin]

No,

Pedestal was a failure, and a big one. It ensured some bare minimum supplies for the defenders, while leaving the island unable to mount operations of any sort.

Esentialy, Malta was kept out of the war by the Axis until early 1943.

Malta couldn't "fall" in the classical sense of the term , without some sort of Axis amfibious or airborne assault - both completely out of the question.

Pedestal ensured that Malta survived and continued to be a thorn in the Axis side - hence it was NOT a failure.

You are trying to redefine the word failure as ANYTHING other than total success - something that was seen as impossible by the planners for Pedestal. They realised that as long as they could not provide a full escort all the way to Malta that losses in the final section would be large.

The planners were realists - not armchair strategists.

.

[alecsandros]

No,

Pedestal was a failure, and a big one. It ensured some bare minimum supplies for the defenders, while leaving the island unable to mount operations of any sort.

Esentialy, Malta was kept out of the war by the Axis until early 1943.

Malta couldn't "fall" in the classical sense of the term , without some sort of Axis amfibious or airborne assault - both completely out of the question.

Pedestal ensured that Malta survived and continued to be a thorn in the Axis side - hence it was NOT a failure.

You are trying to redefine the word failure as ANYTHING other than total success - something that was seen as impossible by the planners for Pedestal. They realised that as long as they could not provide a full escort all the way to Malta that losses in the final section would be large.

The planners were realists - not armchair strategists.

.

My imrpession is that the large summer operations (Vigoruous, Harpoon, Pedestal) tried to keep Malta in the war - as a forward operation base. As it was, they delivered supplies for Malta to survive, but not for it to have any offensive meaning.

The escort was as large as possibly available at the time - and still suffered heavy losses. That doesn't take away from the daring and skill with with the Royal Navy defended the convoys.