HMS TRACKER with Capt.Walker's 2nd SUPPORT GROUP
October
Returned to Clyde.
2nd SG Deployed with HM Sloops STARLING, KITE for defence of outward Convoy ONB207.
25th Transferred to provide anti-submarine cover for inward Convoy HX262.
(Note: Known assembly of SIEGFRIED and KORNER U-Boat Groups
were being used to
make attacks on Convoys ON207, ON208, HX262, HX263, HX264, SC145 and
ONS21)
28th Deployed with HX262 and launched air patrols during refuelling of escorts.
29th Transferred to provide anti-submarine cover for passage of inward Convoys ON209 and
HX263.
November Deployment with 2nd Escort Group in continuation.
1st Experienced severe weather which limited flying operations after damage to several
aircraft.
Transferred to south to operate in better weather conditions.
5th Aircraft launched to investigate area found by intercepted U-Boat radio transmissions.
See SEEK AND STRIKE by W Hackmann.
6th Under attack by U262 which was detected by HMS KITE and sunk by ships of 2nd Support Group.
U842 was later sighted by ship’s aircraft and later sunk by ships of Support Group
For details see U-BOATS DESTROYED by P Kemp and HITLER’S U-BOAT WAR
by C Blair.)
7th Provided anti-submarine air cover for passage of inward Convoy HX268.
8th Under torpedo attack by U648 with Acoustic GNAT torpedoes which missed.
Support Group ships anti-submarine search was unsuccessful.
Took passage to Argentia, Newfoundland to refuel
Delayed by heavy weather
11th Further delay by fog off Newfoundland.
12th Under repair to Machinery defects at Argentia.
23rd Sailed from Argentia to Norfolk Va.
28th Under machinery repair at Norfolk.
December
5th Sailed from Norfolk to resume anti-submarine operations.
15th Provided anti-submarine air cover in support of passage of inward Convoy HX270.
28th Disembarked 8165 Squadron aircraft and personnel.
1 9 4 4
January
5th Embarked 846 Squadron AVENGER aircraft and personnel.
Deployed to work-up Squadron for operational service,
15th Under defect repair in Clyde shipyard.
February
13th On completion sailed with sister ship HMS BITER to provide anti-submarine defence
in conjunction with 2nd Support Group.
Launched air patrol to carry out patrols in defence of outward joint Convoy
OS68/KMS43 and outward ONS29.
The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
Quo Fata Vocant-Whither the Fates call
Jim
Jim
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
HMS AMEER
Once HMS Ameer arrived in Britain, she was allocated to the British Eastern Fleet, sailing as escort in May 1944 to convoy KMF-31 to the Mediterranean, while en route to Trincomalee, Ceylon. There, she joined her sister ships HMS Battler, HMS Begum, and HMS Shah
In early 1945, Ameer joined Force 61 as cover for "Operation Lightning", the amphibious assault by 3 Commando Brigade (two Royal Marine units and one Army unit) on Akyab, Burma. In the event, Japanese forces had evacuated that key area 48 hours earlier, making a heavy bombardment unnecessary.
Ameer's next operation was Operation Matador to capture Ramree Island, where her aircraft spotted fall of shot for HMS Queen Elizabeth, on 21 January 1945. The bombardment was to reduce Japanese artillery batteries in advance of landings by the 71st and 4th Brigades. A few days later, Ameer covered landings on nearby Cheduba Island by the Royal Marines (Operation Sankey) that were, once again, unopposed; indeed, the whole island was unoccupied.
On 22 February 1945, Ameer sailed from Trincomalee, in Force 62 with HMS Empress, the light cruiser HMS Kenya, six destroyers and six frigates. The objective was to perform Operation Stacey, the first of three photo-reconnaissance missions designed to cover the Hastings Harbor and Phuket Island areas of the Kra Isthmus. The reconnaissance was done successfully without enemy interference on 26 to 28 February. The following day, however, the task force was located and attacked. Hellcat fighters from Ameer and Empress successfully fought off the attack.
In June, 1945, Force 63, including Ameer and her sister ships HMS Khedive, and HMS Stalker, left Trincomalee for Operation Balsam, the third and last series of photo-reconnaissance missions over Malaya. On 20 June, at the end of the scheduled operation, the task force pilots executed offensive sweeps. Ameer’s Hellcats joined those from 808 Squadron and Supermarine Seafires from 809 Squadron and attacked Japanese air bases at Lhoksemawe, Medan, and Bindjai, strafing installations and aircraft. Antiaircraft fire shot down one Hellcat.
Ameer's last two operations were supporting mine-sweeping activity off potential landing sites. The first, with escort carrier HMS Emperor, light cruiser HMS Nigeria and destroyers HMS Roebuck, HMS Eskimo, and HMS Vigilant, provided air cover and bombardment off the Nicobar Islands over 9 and 10 July. The second, Operation Livery, starting on 24 July, cleared the approaches to Phuket Island, off the Kra Isthmus. HMS Nelson was part of the covering force. On 25 July, Task Force 63 came under bomber and kamikaze attack and the minesweeper HMS Vestal was hit.
Japan surrendered three weeks later.
Once HMS Ameer arrived in Britain, she was allocated to the British Eastern Fleet, sailing as escort in May 1944 to convoy KMF-31 to the Mediterranean, while en route to Trincomalee, Ceylon. There, she joined her sister ships HMS Battler, HMS Begum, and HMS Shah
In early 1945, Ameer joined Force 61 as cover for "Operation Lightning", the amphibious assault by 3 Commando Brigade (two Royal Marine units and one Army unit) on Akyab, Burma. In the event, Japanese forces had evacuated that key area 48 hours earlier, making a heavy bombardment unnecessary.
Ameer's next operation was Operation Matador to capture Ramree Island, where her aircraft spotted fall of shot for HMS Queen Elizabeth, on 21 January 1945. The bombardment was to reduce Japanese artillery batteries in advance of landings by the 71st and 4th Brigades. A few days later, Ameer covered landings on nearby Cheduba Island by the Royal Marines (Operation Sankey) that were, once again, unopposed; indeed, the whole island was unoccupied.
On 22 February 1945, Ameer sailed from Trincomalee, in Force 62 with HMS Empress, the light cruiser HMS Kenya, six destroyers and six frigates. The objective was to perform Operation Stacey, the first of three photo-reconnaissance missions designed to cover the Hastings Harbor and Phuket Island areas of the Kra Isthmus. The reconnaissance was done successfully without enemy interference on 26 to 28 February. The following day, however, the task force was located and attacked. Hellcat fighters from Ameer and Empress successfully fought off the attack.
In June, 1945, Force 63, including Ameer and her sister ships HMS Khedive, and HMS Stalker, left Trincomalee for Operation Balsam, the third and last series of photo-reconnaissance missions over Malaya. On 20 June, at the end of the scheduled operation, the task force pilots executed offensive sweeps. Ameer’s Hellcats joined those from 808 Squadron and Supermarine Seafires from 809 Squadron and attacked Japanese air bases at Lhoksemawe, Medan, and Bindjai, strafing installations and aircraft. Antiaircraft fire shot down one Hellcat.
Ameer's last two operations were supporting mine-sweeping activity off potential landing sites. The first, with escort carrier HMS Emperor, light cruiser HMS Nigeria and destroyers HMS Roebuck, HMS Eskimo, and HMS Vigilant, provided air cover and bombardment off the Nicobar Islands over 9 and 10 July. The second, Operation Livery, starting on 24 July, cleared the approaches to Phuket Island, off the Kra Isthmus. HMS Nelson was part of the covering force. On 25 July, Task Force 63 came under bomber and kamikaze attack and the minesweeper HMS Vestal was hit.
Japan surrendered three weeks later.
Quo Fata Vocant-Whither the Fates call
Jim
Jim
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
You can review the number of MAC ships and their introduction into the ASW effort at the following site...
http://navypedia.org/ships/uk/brit_cv_mac_ships.htm
The RN Escort Carriers can be explored at
http://navypedia.org/ships/uk/uk_carriers.htm
According to Friedman between mid 1943 & Jan 1944 110 Convoys sailed the North Atlantic and only 5 convoys were attacked during that period. By that time 39 CVE had been added to the RN ASW effort although 3 were lost and another sent back to USA. In the mean time the 14 MAC were added to the fleet increasing # the convoys that could be escorted by 40%.
By the beginning of 1944 every convoy must have had CVE/MAC in escort.
http://navypedia.org/ships/uk/brit_cv_mac_ships.htm
The RN Escort Carriers can be explored at
http://navypedia.org/ships/uk/uk_carriers.htm
According to Friedman between mid 1943 & Jan 1944 110 Convoys sailed the North Atlantic and only 5 convoys were attacked during that period. By that time 39 CVE had been added to the RN ASW effort although 3 were lost and another sent back to USA. In the mean time the 14 MAC were added to the fleet increasing # the convoys that could be escorted by 40%.
By the beginning of 1944 every convoy must have had CVE/MAC in escort.
"Eine mal is kein mal"
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
Thank you for your interest and input Paul (incl. the links) I must say the reintroduction of 14 MAC to augment the ASW capability did intrigue me;however "Needs must when the Devil drives" I shall certainly research that piece of information.
Quo Fata Vocant-Whither the Fates call
Jim
Jim
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
In the Pacific theater, escort carriers lacked the speed to sail with fast carrier attack groups, so were often tasked to escort the landing ships and troop carriers during the island-hopping campaign. In this role they provided air cover for the troopships and flew the first wave of attacks on beach fortifications in amphibious landing operations.
On occasion, they even escorted the large carriers, serving as emergency airstrips and providing fighter cover for their larger sisters while these were busy readying or refueling their own planes. They also transported aircraft and spare parts from the U.S. to remote island airstrips.
Battle off Samar
Perhaps the finest moment for these escort carriers was the Battle off Samar in the Philippines on 25 October 1944. Adm. William Halsey, Jr. was successfully lured into taking his powerful 3rd Fleet after a decoy fleet. This left aircraft from 16 small and slow escort carriers in three task groups armed primarily to bomb ground forces; along with their protective screen of destroyers and slower destroyer escorts, with "Taffy 3" bearing the brunt of the fight.
They were utterly mismatched against a massive Japanese main task force of four battleships, including the giant Yamato, eight cruisers, and 11 destroyers. Yet, with the assistance of aggressive and sacrificial attacks on the part of screening ships, the American escort carriers not only fended off but turned back the attackers.
On occasion, they even escorted the large carriers, serving as emergency airstrips and providing fighter cover for their larger sisters while these were busy readying or refueling their own planes. They also transported aircraft and spare parts from the U.S. to remote island airstrips.
Battle off Samar
Perhaps the finest moment for these escort carriers was the Battle off Samar in the Philippines on 25 October 1944. Adm. William Halsey, Jr. was successfully lured into taking his powerful 3rd Fleet after a decoy fleet. This left aircraft from 16 small and slow escort carriers in three task groups armed primarily to bomb ground forces; along with their protective screen of destroyers and slower destroyer escorts, with "Taffy 3" bearing the brunt of the fight.
They were utterly mismatched against a massive Japanese main task force of four battleships, including the giant Yamato, eight cruisers, and 11 destroyers. Yet, with the assistance of aggressive and sacrificial attacks on the part of screening ships, the American escort carriers not only fended off but turned back the attackers.
Quo Fata Vocant-Whither the Fates call
Jim
Jim
-
Steve Crandell
- Senior Member
- Posts: 954
- Joined: Wed Feb 05, 2014 7:05 pm
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
My father-in-law served on a CVE as a radio operator and lower tail gunnery on a TBM. He wasn't at Samar, though.
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
Snap!! My old man was a PO gunner on a Atlantic run corvette 1940-43; then a torpedoman with 4 Mobile Torpedo Maintenance Unit at Trincomalee for the rest of the war-did the full six years being RNR. Serviced Ameer's Avenger torps,along with other CVE's aircraft weaponry.
Quo Fata Vocant-Whither the Fates call
Jim
Jim
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
POSTSCIPT
Escort carriers played an enormous role in WWII. In the second battle of the Atlantic, the CVE's (combustible, vulnerable, and expendable to their crews) played a significant role in turning the tide against the U-Boat threat. In the initial days of the war, the wolfpacks settled into a "gap" between American and British air cover to ply their deadly craft.
With the advent of the CVE's, there was no "gap" in the air coverage. Bogue, Card and Core were especially successful in this role; as did Tracker.Audacity and other RN CVE's working with Support Groups,.In the Pacific, they added the roles of beachead support, and aircraft ferry for their larger brothers.
Escort carriers played an enormous role in WWII. In the second battle of the Atlantic, the CVE's (combustible, vulnerable, and expendable to their crews) played a significant role in turning the tide against the U-Boat threat. In the initial days of the war, the wolfpacks settled into a "gap" between American and British air cover to ply their deadly craft.
With the advent of the CVE's, there was no "gap" in the air coverage. Bogue, Card and Core were especially successful in this role; as did Tracker.Audacity and other RN CVE's working with Support Groups,.In the Pacific, they added the roles of beachead support, and aircraft ferry for their larger brothers.
Quo Fata Vocant-Whither the Fates call
Jim
Jim
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
.
No.
Escort carriers did NOT play "a significant role in turning the tide against the U-Boat threat". That "tide" was turned in May 1943 by the combination of improved radar, weapons and tactics in the North Atlantic and the availability of VLR Liberators to close Atlantic Gap.
What the Escort Carriers did was consolidate the change and defeat any attempt by the U-Boat force to regain the initiative (in conjunction with many more escorts and improved technology).
.
No.
Escort carriers did NOT play "a significant role in turning the tide against the U-Boat threat". That "tide" was turned in May 1943 by the combination of improved radar, weapons and tactics in the North Atlantic and the availability of VLR Liberators to close Atlantic Gap.
What the Escort Carriers did was consolidate the change and defeat any attempt by the U-Boat force to regain the initiative (in conjunction with many more escorts and improved technology).
.
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
OK- but why so pedantic-is it because you wish to irritate-if so you are wasting your time and energy on me.You Know as well as I do that any effort that helped defeat the Uboat can legitimately be termed a significant role in defeating the Uboat-the CVE certainly helped turn the second tide of the boats.Come now be reasonable and give up this heckling over pinpricks-you cannot be "helping" yourself.pgollin wrote:.
No.
Escort carriers did NOT play "a significant role in turning the tide against the U-Boat threat". That "tide" was turned in May 1943 by the combination of improved radar, weapons and tactics in the North Atlantic and the availability of VLR Liberators to close Atlantic Gap.
What the Escort Carriers did was consolidate the change and defeat any attempt by the U-Boat force to regain the initiative (in conjunction with many more escorts and improved technology).
.
Quo Fata Vocant-Whither the Fates call
Jim
Jim
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
.
It is NOT pedantry, it is fact.
The tide turned in May when the U-Boats were withdrawn from the North Atlantic.
YES, Escort Carriers helped stop them from returning - BUT THAT IS DIFFERENT.
Try learning and repeating the facts.
.
It is NOT pedantry, it is fact.
The tide turned in May when the U-Boats were withdrawn from the North Atlantic.
YES, Escort Carriers helped stop them from returning - BUT THAT IS DIFFERENT.
Try learning and repeating the facts.
.
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
Mr Gollin-I find your rudeness- to a very senior citizen- quite unacceptable and distasteful; but I can tell you- I am not going to going to bow to your incessant tirades and will not answer further rude interjections
Quo Fata Vocant-Whither the Fates call
Jim
Jim
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
From my readings the code breaking allowed the allies to steer Convoys away from threatening Wolf Packs and instead steer these hunter killer ASW groups with CVE and newly equipped DD into the paths of the Wolf Packs. It would seem that one part was just as important as the next.
"Eine mal is kein mal"
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
Best kept of all Allied secrets- was the breaking of enemy codes including some of the German Naval Enigma codes (information gathered this way was dubbed Ultra) at Bletchley Park in England. This enabled the tracking of U-boat packs to allow convoy re-routings; whenever the Germans changed their codes (and when they added a fourth rotor to the Enigma machines in 1943), convoy losses rose significantly. By towards the end of the war, the Allies were regularly breaking and reading German naval codes.
To prevent the Germans from guessing that Enigma had been cracked, the British planted a false story about a special infrared camera being used to locate U-boats. The British were subsequently delighted to learn that the Germans responded by developing a special paint for submarines that exactly duplicated the optical properties of seawater.
To prevent the Germans from guessing that Enigma had been cracked, the British planted a false story about a special infrared camera being used to locate U-boats. The British were subsequently delighted to learn that the Germans responded by developing a special paint for submarines that exactly duplicated the optical properties of seawater.
Quo Fata Vocant-Whither the Fates call
Jim
Jim
Re: The CVE in WW2-was it a real asset??
aurora wrote: Best kept of all Allied secrets- was the breaking of enemy codes including some of the German Naval Enigma codes (information gathered this way was dubbed Ultra) at Bletchley Park in England. This enabled the tracking of U-boat packs to allow convoy re-routings; whenever the Germans changed their codes (and when they added a fourth rotor to the Enigma machines in 1943), convoy losses rose significantly. By towards the end of the war, the Allies were regularly breaking and reading German naval codes.
To prevent the Germans from guessing that Enigma had been cracked, the British planted a false story about a special infrared camera being used to locate U-boats. The British were subsequently delighted to learn that the Germans responded by developing a special paint for submarines that exactly duplicated the optical properties of seawater.
Oh dear ........
Try reading up on "the Tracking Room", microwave radar, etc .......
.