Why was USN cruiser shooting so poor?

[alecsandros]

From a previous post on page one:

The difference of the data allows for some variances. If I take the mean, which approximates the performance of HIPPER at Barent Sea (~2.5%), this is within the 2% to 3% range suggested for 1939 to 1942 (valid). The performance of 1.98% as of late 1944 at Suribao Strait comes from US cruisers at this engagement (one template). Roughly 26.26% worse hitting rate than HIPPER at Barent Sea and 60.6% worse than PE at DS 1941.

However, the Hipper's hit rate was between 8% and 11% at Barents Sea, not the 2.5% listed.

An extensive USN study of cruiser hit rates (both 6" and 8") from live fire shoots against towed targets at 16,000-20,000 yards (1941) predicted the USN cruiser to hit at a rate from 22%-33% at those ranges! A far cry indeed from 1% or less actually achieved. We should expect the USN combat shooting to be comparable to the German and British shooting, considering comparable technological advantages, but it was in reality many times worse.

... The total number of rounds fired by the German heavy cruisers against enemy warships in the entire war is probably equal to the number of roudns fired by USN cruisers during the final, 10-12 minutes phase of Battle of Surigao Strait . Or about 1000 rounds.
Hence, I don't think it's fair to compare the results, as the Germans had simply way less ammo consumption then their US counterparts.

Exeter's initial shots vs Graf Spee were the absolute exception of RN cruisers, and they appear in stark contrast in every other long-range gunnery attempt performed by the 8" RN cruisers (including Norfolk, Suffolk, Dorsetshire during teh Bismarck episode).

Again, the total ammo consumption factor comes to mind - RN cruisers expended probably tens of thousands of 8" rounds in the entire war, so some of them were statistically bound to hit something, sometime, in a particular time and space frame.

Other than that, we see Japanese and USN cruiser obtaining incredibly poor results at >20km range gunfire, and no example of either side having the edge in cruiser gunnery, except in remarkable tactical situations.

[aurora]

From a previous post on page one:

The difference of the data allows for some variances. If I take the mean, which approximates the performance of HIPPER at Barent Sea (~2.5%), this is within the 2% to 3% range suggested for 1939 to 1942 (valid). The performance of 1.98% as of late 1944 at Suribao Strait comes from US cruisers at this engagement (one template). Roughly 26.26% worse hitting rate than HIPPER at Barent Sea and 60.6% worse than PE at DS 1941.

However, the Hipper's hit rate was between 8% and 11% at Barents Sea, not the 2.5% listed.

An extensive USN study of cruiser hit rates (both 6" and 8") from live fire shoots against towed targets at 16,000-20,000 yards (1941) predicted the USN cruiser to hit at a rate from 22%-33% at those ranges! A far cry indeed from 1% or less actually achieved. We should expect the USN combat shooting to be comparable to the German and British shooting, considering comparable technological advantages, but it was in reality many times worse.

--indeed Dave-I don't whether you accepted my reasons for both CA's and CL's poor shooting in 1942/43 night engagements-I said that the Prewar CA's were too slow in reacting to a fast moving enemy; and that the CL's were using non flashless propellant all through 1942 into 43-which blinded the gunners; but more importantly lit up their battle line. to such an extent that a Long Lance would get them- before they had fully recovered-a sunken ship is OOB and cannot add to statistics.

[Steve Crandell]

Dave has apparently taken one performance by one British cruiser (Exeter) and used it to indicate all British cruisers for the entire war. He takes an unrealistic estimate by US authorities of what they thought US cruiser shooting was going to achieve, which was much better than anyone achieved, and because they didn't the thinks their shooting was terrible.

We know that the USN treaty cruisers which had all guns in the same slide had poor salvo dispersion early on, which was mostly corrected by not firing all guns in a turret together and then later by delay coils. They had older fire control systems than the newer ones and were slower to get fire control radar.

As far as I can tell from an initial summary, all USN CAs were heavily damaged or sunk in the battles in the South Pacific in 1942, so of course they were "withdrawn". I specifically looked up USS Portland, USS New Orleans, USS Pensacola, USS Salt Lake City, and USS San Francisco. The first three returned to the South Pacific as soon as their battle damage was repaired. The last two were part of the Aleutian Islands force in the North Pacific, where they participated in shore bombardment. I suppose you could call that a back water, but they had to send someone for that function. As far as I know they also sent light cruisers.

USN surface gunnery was the only tool available to stop the IJN from reinforcing their troops and shelling the Marines on Guadalcanal. USN torpedoes largely didn't work, so it was pretty much ALL done by surface gunnery and then aircraft picking off the damaged ships the next day. The IJN thought USN shooting was very good. Dave doesn't. Something damaged their ships, and it wasn't torpedoes.

[aurora]

"Dave has apparently taken one performance by one British cruiser (Exeter) and used it to indicate all British cruisers for the entire war. He takes an unrealistic estimate by US authorities of what they thought US cruiser shooting was going to achieve, which was much better than anyone achieved, and because they didn't the thinks their shooting was terrible".

Steve you are way of the mark-no way did Dave reflect the success of the Brit cruisers in the AGS engagement- to indicate that was par for the rest of RN cruisers.

How much better than anyone achieved???

"The IJN thought USN shooting was very good. Dave doesn't. Something damaged their ships, and it wasn't torpedoes"

I get the impression that you are being overly partisan-I don't recall Dave saying the IJN shooting was poor-it was good- because the USN's use of non flashless propellant lit up their battle line like a fairground and they took great advantage of that for 15 months or more-with guns AND the Long Lance

[Steve Crandell]

"Dave has apparently taken one performance by one British cruiser (Exeter) and used it to indicate all British cruisers for the entire war. He takes an unrealistic estimate by US authorities of what they thought US cruiser shooting was going to achieve, which was much better than anyone achieved, and because they didn't the thinks their shooting was terrible".

Steve you are way of the mark-no way did Dave reflect the success of the Brit cruisers in the AGS engagement- to indicate that was par for the rest of RN cruisers.

How much better than anyone achieved???

"The IJN thought USN shooting was very good. Dave doesn't. Something damaged their ships, and it wasn't torpedoes"

I get the impression that you are being overly partisan-I don't recall Dave saying the IJN shooting was poor-it was good- because the USN's use of non flashless propellant lit up their battle line like a fairground and they took great advantage of that for 15 months or more-with guns AND the Long Lance

Dave gives an example of good shooting by Exeter in a thread about poor USN shooting, which he started. Why would he do that other than to show that British shooting was better? Otherwise, why mention it at all.

You misinterpreted my statement about "much better" shooting. I said no one achieved the sort of shooting the USN predicted would be possible pre-war.

I agree that the lack of flashless powder adversely affected the USN in the South Pacific, but many if not most of the Long Lance torpedoes were fired before any gunnery at all.

Why is it partisan to imply that US shooting was better than terrible, and that the Japanese agreed?

Where did I say IJN shooting was bad?

[aurora]

"Dave gives an example of good shooting by Exeter in a thread about poor USN shooting, which he started. Why would he do that other than to show that British shooting was better? Otherwise, why mention it at all"

Oh dear-you are getting upset- about a member giving kudos to the Plate cruisers- why on earth should he not-it surely isn't anti American-this is just a talk shop- not an election debate.It is generally agreed that cruiser shooting left much to be desired by all the belligerent navies in the early war years-except perhaps the Japanese in 1942,in which they invariably had the edge in a night engagement.

You were being overly partisan chiding Dave- for telling it how it was- in the Plate battle.

Did not think that I accused you of saying "IJN shooting was bad"

[Steve Crandell]

I do get upset here at times. I am retired USN, and it appears that a lot of time here is spent by various members telling me how bad the USN was at pretty much everything. That was not my experience. If that is partisan, then I plead guilty.

[aurora]

Steve- I do hope this extract explains 1942; but as I now see where you are coming from-I'll say no more about that.

The Japanese realized that they could not overcome the quantity of U.S. battleships. Instead, they developed an attrition strategy in which they would use surprise and night fighting to reduce the number of U.S. battleships before crushing the American fleet in a decisive battle. The Japanese trained religiously, at night, and under very realistic conditions. Deaths in training were commonplace and were treated as the cost of doing business. While the Japanese trained realistically, the U.S. went from unrealistic night training before the war, to almost none from 1940 to 1941:

The U.S. Navy enjoyed no tradition of night battle and, unlike the British, did not extract the conclusion from World War One that a major navy must be prepared equally to fight by night and by day. Although the training schedules of U.S. warships included frequent night battle practice, artificialities and limited scale sapped their realism. Further, events in 1940 and 1941 seriously diluted even this expertise. Established crews became pools regularly raided for drafts to man new ships commissioned under the expansion program. Moreover, President Roosevelt's Atlantic "Neutrality Patrol" precluded much training.

These shortcomings provided the U.S. Navy with many painful lessons.

U.S. Navy doctrine viewed the big guns as superior to the torpedo. Under that philosophy, we placed much greater emphasis on the gun and stressed a strategy of engaging an enemy force within effective gunfire range, which was believed to exceed torpedo ranges.

The American emphasis on gunnery, rooted in inadequate, ineffective, and short-ranged torpedoes, was not mirrored in Imperial Japanese Navy equipment or tactics. While all Japanese cruisers (heavy and light) and destroyers were fitted with superb long-ranged torpedoes, no American heavy cruisers and only a few light cruisers were so equipped. The operational surprise achieved by the Japanese attack was enhanced by the surprising "failure" of their tactics to mirror our own.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep ... ck/#page15


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[Dave Saxton]

I'm not the only American that finds that USN cruiser shooting was exceptionally poor. So did Admiral Nimitz, and Admiral King, and Admiral Halsey.

[Dave Saxton]

--indeed Dave-I don't whether you accepted my reasons for both CA's and CL's poor shooting in 1942/43 night engagements-I said that the Prewar CA's were too slow in reacting to a fast moving enemy; and that the CL's were using non flashless propellant all through 1942 into 43-which blinded the gunners; but more importantly lit up their battle line. to such an extent that a Long Lance would get them- before they had fully recovered-a sunken ship is OOB and cannot add to statistics.

Yes, the night blindness caused by not having flashless powder was a serious issue noted by Rear Adm Scott and Rear Adm Lee. American warships were poorly equipped to fight at night having no specialized night optics. They were also poorly trained compared to other navies at night fighting, particularly the IJN.

However, they had radar and the Japanese didn't.This is what is so puzzling about the shooting performance and why the Hipper's shooting is a particularly valid comparison, being its shooting was also at night- utilizing radar. Indeed, from mid 1943 almost all USN cruisers had the outstanding Mk8 firecontrol radar, which was better than the German FuMO27 or the British Type 284M. Yet we don't do not see a marked improvement in the shooting with Mk8 either. Early British cruiser shooting in the Med was with out the aid of radar, and we do see a marked improvement as the British gradually equipped their cruisers with radar. American cruisers always had radar from mid 1942.

I think Byron was on to something when he posted this:

The target would immediately be engaged at a rapid rate of fire right from the start under radar FC, using a rocking ladder to resolve salvo MPI variations and any possible ranging errors.

It was the probably fighting doctrine. Shooting to hit with the first salvo and then going to a rocking latter at high ROF was identified in 1943 by Halsey as perhaps the primary problem. But the practice had become so ingrained into the USN by then that it continued though out the war right to the end and beyond, even infecting the battleship shooting doctrine and recommendations.

[Steve Crandell]

I'm not the only American that finds that USN cruiser shooting was exceptionally poor. So did Admiral Nimitz, and Admiral King, and Admiral Halsey.

Did they attempt to do anything about it? Why was it bad, and was it some endemic problem or was it individual ships? We know about some of the problems with the treaty cruisers and fixes that were applied. Wichita and Tuscaloosa seem to have done reasonably well against some French ships during Torch. Of course Tuscaloosa suffered from the endemic problem with having all of her triple mount guns in the same slide.

I just don't see why being American in itself would make our shooting bad, so I'm looking for some other reason. The Baltimore class were used post war for shore bombardment and received accolades for their effective gunfire in that regime, for what that is worth. If they were effectively useless I don't think they would have been employed in that regime post war.

Since you include all USN cruisers and the Atlanta class only had 5" guns, you seem to think there was something wrong with 5" gunnery as well, and possibly USN gunnery in general. I suppose that is possible, since USN crews were very inexperienced overall, at least in the early years of the war with the huge expansion of the armed forces which occurred. USN crews tended to have large percentages of inexperienced personnel as did every branch of the US military.

[Steve Crandell]

The target would immediately be engaged at a rapid rate of fire right from the start under radar FC, using a rocking ladder to resolve salvo MPI variations and any possible ranging errors.

It was the probably fighting doctrine. Shooting to hit with the first salvo and then going to a rocking latter at high ROF was identified in 1943 by Halsey as perhaps the primary problem. But the practice had become so ingrained into the USN by then that it continued though out the war right to the end and beyond, even infecting the battleship shooting doctrine and recommendations.

If you get first salvo straddles and continuous straddles after that, why would that be a problem?

[Dave Saxton]

If you get first salvo straddles and continuous straddles after that, why would that be a problem?

They obviously were not consistently getting first salvo straddles and continuous straddles. They only thought they were. This was pointed out by Halsey.

[Steve Crandell]

If you get first salvo straddles and continuous straddles after that, why would that be a problem?

They obviously were not consistently getting first salvo straddles and continuous straddles. They only thought they were. This was pointed out by Halsey.

I think Bill Jurens would disagree with you. He points out that West Virginia achieved 7 or 8 (I forget which) consecutive salvoes with full broadsides at Surigao strait and opines that it may have been the best battleship performance of the war. If you are looking at a Mark 8 display and you see splashes in front of the target and splashes behind the target and you can see visually that they are in line with the target, how can you be wrong about it being a straddle? What would you do differently? Also, I don't believe she was using rapid continuous fire ... she was firing about one salvo per minute.

[Dod Grile]

U.S. cruiser gunnery was generally atrocious prior to the war---even short & middle range shoots. I've seen figures on target exercises in which heavy cruisers firing at middle ranges--say, 5,000 to 7,000 yards--hit absolutely nothing out of maybe 50-100 shots. Others had hit percentages in the 2% to maybe 5% or 6% scale, IIRC. If I can dig up the actual numbers I'll post them, but they are all fairly unimpressive. (These were, of course, pre-radar shoots.)

It takes little mental effort to realize how much more difficult actual combat situations--especially night actions--were during the PacWar. (Japanese long-range cruiser gunnery was by no means exemplary either.)

I think it's important to recognize that these ships' main batteries were not really designed to engage small, high speed, evasive targets at any range. Certainly not the Treaty cruisers we employed, and which did so much hard fighting early in the war...

For those really interested: If I am not mistaken Record Group 313 in NARA II (College Park, MD) has a lot of our records for pre-war gunnery exercises.