Guadalcanal naval campaign

[alecsandros]

As my mind slowly drifted back to the heavy battles around the Guadalcanal islands, I couldn't help wondering what were the Japanese thinking ? Did they realy wanted so much to lose Guadalcanal ?

Why didn't they use MORE of their navy forces to make an impression ?
Why wasn't Henderson field wiped out with continous bombardment from the battleships and ALL Japanese carriers ?
Why were Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz fought with only half of the available carriers ?
Why were Kongo/Haruna and Hiei/Kirishima sent without heavy battleships support (Yamato/Musashi, Nagato/Mutsu) ?

[RF]

Considering the fiasco at Midway and a growing realisation they were overstretched it isn't surprising that the Japanese held back their offensive efforts at Guadalcanal. For the Japanese there was very little point because Japanese victory there wouldn't bring the Japanese any major benefits, except perhaps slow down the American advance westwards across the Pacific.

Midway at least offered the Japanese the chance of a major victory and further domination of the Central Pacific. Guadalcanal offered attrition for very little return.

[alecsandros]

... Perhaps , but they lost huge amounts of ships there.
2 battleships, 2 carriers (3 more badly damaged and out of operations for 6 months or more), 250+ carrier aircraft and 400 veteran air crew members, not to mention a large number of cruisers and destroyers.

A serious commitment at the time of Eastern Solomons, or even Santa Cruz, would have wiped out easily the 2 US CVs and 2 BBs, along with Henderson field.

As it was though, the Guadalcanal became a black hole for IJN warships. A black hole were they slowly dissapeared, one by one.

[Francis Marliere]

As my mind slowly drifted back to the heavy battles around the Guadalcanal islands, I couldn't help wondering what were the Japanese thinking ? Did they realy wanted so much to lose Guadalcanal ?

Why didn't they use MORE of their navy forces to make an impression ?
Why wasn't Henderson field wiped out with continous bombardment from the battleships and ALL Japanese carriers ?
Why were Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz fought with only half of the available carriers ?
Why were Kongo/Haruna and Hiei/Kirishima sent without heavy battleships support (Yamato/Musashi, Nagato/Mutsu) ?

Hello Alecsandros,

I also have a strong interest on Guadalcanal. As far as I understand things, the Japanese Navy made a strong effort for retaking the island.

They did use a lot of forces. All the carriers and most the cruisers and destroyers did operate in the Solomons. Only the battleships of Kitai 1 were kept in reserve.

Henderson Field was not " wiped out with continous bombardment from the battleships and ALL Japanese carriers" for several reasons. When there were carriers available, they had to deal with ennmy carriers ; that led to the carrier battles of Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. After the battles, the carriers were either damaged or had very few aircrafts left. As for battleships, I can see some reasons - good or bad - why they were not often used in "Iron Bottom Sound" :
- Doctrine : 1st Fleet was kept in reserve for the "decisive battle" which was the backbone of Japanese doctrine. I would add that battleships were designed to sink ennemy battleships, not to shoot at an airfield. It was a very difficult mental revolution to send Kongo class battleships shelling Guadalcanal (and these ships were seen and used more as cruiser than true battleships ; there was IMHO no way that a "true" battleship could be sent for this kind of mission).
- Danger : as I said battleships were kept in reserve for the decisive battle. The japanese Navy did not want to waste them in a hazardous mission (see what happened to Hiei and Kirishima).
- Speed : most of the battleships were not fast enough to make the kind of mission (they had to be out of reach of US bombers at nightfall and reach Guadalcanal before sunrise)
- Geography : the waters around Guadalcanal were poorly chartered and dangerous. It was not a place for big ships.
- Oil : the Japanese navy was very short on oil : the strategic stocks were getting low afetr Midway and bringing the oil to frontline was a big problem. The Japanese had to make choices since they could not oil all their ships.
- Ammunitions : the incendiary shells that were so effective during the first bombardement were on very short supply. The japanese did not have enough ammunition to make more bombardments than they did.

As far as I know 3 carriers (Junyo, Hiyo, Zuiho) missed the first battle for some reasons : Junyo was in repairs and Hiyo - just commissioned - was training (I don't know for Zuiho). Hiyo missed Santa Cruz because of engine troubles. The other carriers (Hosho, Taiyo, etc.) were not front line carriers and served as training ships, aircraft transports or escort carrier. You shoud have a look at http://www.combinedfleet.com/cvlist.htm if you want more details.

Best,

Francis

[alecsandros]

When there were carriers available, they had to deal with ennmy carriers ; that led to the carrier battles of Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. After the battles, the carriers were either damaged or had very few aircrafts left. As for battleships, I can see some reasons - good or bad - why they were not often used in "Iron Bottom Sound" [....]

Hi Francis,
good to see you around :)

The point was the Japanese had considerably more naval forces available during all major Guadalcanal naval battles (meaning Aug - Nov 1942: Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, 1 Guadalcanal, 2nd Guadalcanal). And the ones that were used were used badly.

At the time of Eastern Solomons, they pushed with Shokaku, Zuikaku and Ryujo (which was sunk). They kept unused Zuiho (which was available since Aug 12th following minor repairs. she carried ~ 25 warplanes), and the escort carriers Hosho, Taiyo and Unyo (~ totaling 60 warplanes). It's true the escort carriers were not first-line units, but they could conduct operations, and 60 planes was a big advantage in mid-to-late 1942 (Hornet carried about 60 operational planes during the battle of Santa Cruz; Henderson Field had about ~ 80 operational planes at the time of the Kongo/Haruna bombardment).

Imediately after Santa Cruz, they withdrew their (victorious) battlefleet, without wiping out Henderson Field.

Imediately after 1st Guadalcanal, they withdrew their (victoriuous) battlefleet, without profiting from the devastation done to the US fleet.

2nd Guadalcanal was extremely dubious. Kirishima sent without aid, allthough several submarines reports mentioned US battleships in the area.
Kirishima was sent without air support (where were the carriers ?!), and without heavy support (allthough the waters around Japan were full of battleships!)

===

All in all, why wasn't a large fleet assembled to take on Guadalcanal ? Something similar to the Midway operation ?
Instead they sent small fleets which were battered or destroyed by equal or stronger USN forces, despite the fact the Japan had a tremendous surface ship superiority throughout 1942.

[Dave Saxton]

The Japanese lost the war trying to re-take Guadalcanal. It cost them too much in terms of men and materials. They should have just walked away rather than continue to poor so much men and a material into the bottomless pit Guadalcanal had become. One factor that caused them to keep trying was that they needed to destroy the USN carriers and capital ships, or establish such a strong strategic position in the area that they could force a negotiated peace on favorable terms-which was their long term strategy. Some of the political leadership, and the IJA wanted Guadalcanal at least symbolically.

For Yamamoto and the IJN the American commitment offered a chance to bring the USN to battle and hopefully defeat it. The problem was Henderson Field, which put the IJN in an inferior tactical and strategic position. They could not expose their warships to the threat of air attack by day, and they had to start out 300 miles out to approach the area each night. Henderson Field also played key roles in the frustration of not being able to defeat the USN in carrier battles.

Yamamoto kept waiting for the army to take Henderson Field so he could advance a more agressive strategy, but they kept failing to take it. Placing big guns on the island itself to place the air field under continuous artillery fire was not practical due in large part to the terrain. Therefore the navy took up the task of bombarding the airfield at night. Bombarding the airfield to nuetralize American airpower at least for awhile was the goal of the IJN operations during November. Stopping the bombardments was the goal of the USN during this period and this was how the Naval Battles of Guadalcanal I & II materialized.

[Dave Saxton]

2nd Guadalcanal was extremely dubious. Kirishima sent without aid, allthough several submarines reports mentioned US battleships in the area.
Kirishima was sent without air support (where were the carriers ?!), and without heavy support (allthough the waters around Japan were full of battleships!)

===

All in all, why wasn't a large fleet assembled to take on Guadalcanal ? Something similar to the Midway operation ?
Instead they sent small fleets which were battered or destroyed by equal or stronger USN forces, despite the fact the Japan had a tremendous surface ship superiority throughout 1942.

One word: fuel

[alecsandros]

Dave, this brings us back to the initial questions above.
After Santa Cruz at least, the IJN had a force of 3 carriers already near Guadalcanal and 4 more light carrers ready for attacks in 1-2 weeks.
Between them, those carriers fielded over 200 warplanes, out of which over 100 were ready to strike.
Why fidn't they use their battleships and carriwrs then and there to level Henderson field ? therr were no more US carriers available and the airfield had some 80 operational planes - clearly not enough to resist a determined naval assault.

[Dave Saxton]

But they need to take over the airfield with boots on the ground for it to have a lasting effect. Merely taking out the airfield with airpower and naval artillery only has a temporary effect.

The IJN can not risk a prolonged presence if the airfield remains in even partial operation, and they can not keep carriers on station for days on end burning fuel they don't have. The IJN was more concerned to bring the USN to battle than in maintaning a continual strong presence in the area. The USN can simply withdraw and return after the IJN leaves, while the Seebees rebuild the airfield. Even the tremendous bombardment by Kongo and Haruna in Oct failed to knock the airfield out of operation. The army kept promising to take the airfield but they did not succeed. I don't think the IJN had the resources to invade and hold the island themselves.

[alecsandros]

Well they did bring the USN to bttle and forced her to withdraw eith serious damage. However, zero follow up on attacking the airfield.
Apparently they had enough fuel to send dozens of warships at a time, but not enough to give some air support to those ships... and that allthough tje entire carrier force of the USN had been taken out !
it seems that they tried their best to lose. even after some victories they still refused to administer any sort of crippling blow. ( tje one time henderson field was attacked from the air was during eastern solomons bu a formation of about 12 planes. Why not a massed attack with 150 bombers and tjen a few good days and nights of battlesjip bombardnt ?)

[Dave Saxton]

Your assuming that a follow up would deliver a crippling or decisive blow, but that's not the case. The Americans could absorb any kind of air or naval follow up bombardment the IJN could deliver. The risks out weighed the potential benifits.

It really boiled down to who could prevail on the ground; the Marines and the South Dakota National Guard troops, or the Japanese troops already on the island. The Americans won that fight over and over again.

[Francis Marliere]

The point was the Japanese had considerably more naval forces available during all major Guadalcanal naval battles (meaning Aug - Nov 1942: Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz, 1 Guadalcanal, 2nd Guadalcanal). And the ones that were used were used badly.

At the time of Eastern Solomons, they pushed with Shokaku, Zuikaku and Ryujo (which was sunk). They kept unused Zuiho (which was available since Aug 12th following minor repairs. she carried ~ 25 warplanes), and the escort carriers Hosho, Taiyo and Unyo (~ totaling 60 warplanes). It's true the escort carriers were not first-line units, but they could conduct operations, and 60 planes was a big advantage in mid-to-late 1942 (Hornet carried about 60 operational planes during the battle of Santa Cruz; Henderson Field had about ~ 80 operational planes at the time of the Kongo/Haruna bombardment).

Imediately after Santa Cruz, they withdrew their (victorious) battlefleet, without wiping out Henderson Field.

Imediately after 1st Guadalcanal, they withdrew their (victoriuous) battlefleet, without profiting from the devastation done to the US fleet.

2nd Guadalcanal was extremely dubious. Kirishima sent without aid, allthough several submarines reports mentioned US battleships in the area.
Kirishima was sent without air support (where were the carriers ?!), and without heavy support (allthough the waters around Japan were full of battleships!)

===

All in all, why wasn't a large fleet assembled to take on Guadalcanal ? Something similar to the Midway operation ?
Instead they sent small fleets which were battered or destroyed by equal or stronger USN forces, despite the fact the Japan had a tremendous surface ship superiority throughout 1942.

Alecsandros,

I realize that we don't agree on the capacities of Japanese "escort" carriers (Hosho, Taiyo, Unyo). As far as I know, the Japanese Navy did not consider these ships as front line units. Hosho was relegated to training status after Midway. Taiyo and Unyo were aircraft transports and did not have a dedicated air group. Bear in mind that Japan was desperatly short on attack naval planes untill very late in 1942. The production of Type 97 kanko (Nakajima B5N2) and Type 99 kanbaku (Aichi D3A2) was halted late 1941 in order to introduce new models. Unfortunately for the Japanese, these new models were not ready yet for mass production and the production of "Kates" and "Val" was restarted, but desperatly slowly.

The lack of planes, however, is not the only reason why these ships were used as transports. They lack speed, range, deck lenght, armor and armament to, operate as fleet units. Japanese "light" carriers such as Ryujo and Zuiho (and even Junyo with less limitations), due to their short flight deck and slow speed, had troubles launching torpedo planes. As far as I know, no more than 3-6 planes could be launched in a same deck spot, in perfect conditions. In light of these limitations, I have severe doubts that "escort" carriers, with even shorter flight deck and slower speed, could launch some bombers.

While I agree that the Japanese navy never operated in the Solomons a force as powerfull as the armada involved in the Midway operation, I don't think that the forces committed in the battles of Eastern Solomons, Santa Cruz or Guadalcanal were, as you said, "small fleets which were battered or destroyed by equal or stronger USN forces". I lack the time to check the oob, but I'm pretty sure that the Japanese commanders had all the carriers available plus a fair number of cruisers and destroyers. As far as I see things, the ships that did not participate at this battles were either on duty elsewhere or in repair / refit / maintenance. The only ships that were at Midway and not at Guadalcanal are the 1st fleet's battleships. And their absence makes sense.

As the adage says, logistic wins battle. And Japanese were notoriously poor on logistic. There was very little oil reserve at Truk, or no at all. Keeping the base supplied was a nightmare that mobilized a large number of tankers,of which Japan was very short. In short, the main naval base in the South Pacific could support only a limited number of ships. Often, ships leaving for the Solomons had to take fuel from the bunkers of ships who remained at Truk (such as the Yamato). Anyway, availability of fuel at Truk was only a part of the problem : fueling at sea was also problematic. Oilers were fews,and that limited the number of ships that could operate in the southern Solomons. My guess is that supplying battleships in the area of Guadalcanal was beyond the logistical capacities of Japanese fleet train.

Moreover, the Japanese strategy makers had to keep an eye on their oil reserves. They were getting low and every barrel had to be used carefully. At Midway, Japan could throw all in the balance because the expected victory was to put an end to the war, hence to the oil shortage. At Guadalcanal the hopes of a short war had vanished. The battles were not expected to end the war but to retake Guadalcanal. The war was to be long and oil was getting more and more precious.

At Midway, the Japanese navy suffered a terrible defeat despite the hudge advantage in battleships and cruisers. This armada burnt a lot of fuel and achieve nothing. There was no reason to repeat this mistake in the Solomons. In the Solomons, the surface warships had two main roles : by day, they screened carriers and transports against air (and submarines) attacks ; by night, they fought each others with guns and torpedoes. The Japanese battleships consummed oil at a prodigious rate, were ill suited for both roles.

Japanese doctrine and poor AA firepower prevented their use as escort for carrier task forces or convoys. And it made no sense to send them in the narrow and uncharted waters of Iron Bottom Sound where their big size and slow speed would be strong handicaps in a fight against ennemy light forces. Anyway, the Japanese admirals were in late 1942 still attached to their doctrine which said that battleships were designed to sink ennemy battleships. And there were no ennemy battleship around Guadalcanal, except on the night of 14th-15th November (which was a surprise for the Japs). Battlewagons could neither be usefull as the Kondo class was against Henderson Field, as I said on my previous post : they were too slow and the incendiary shells were in short supply.

In final analysis, my opinion is the Japanese defeat does not lay in shortage of naval forces : cruisers and destroyers were in strong numbers, and battleships (to the exception of the Kongo class) had no real role here. The real problem is, as you said, that sometimes this forces "were used badly". The margin of victory for the Americans was very thin at Guadalcanal, especially after the events of October. They were lucky that the Japanese did not push their advantage after the battle of Santa Cruz and performed so badly during the two naval battles of Guadalcanal. IMHO, the Japanese navy had all the cards to win these two battles : in light of Savo and Tassafaronga, Washington and South Dakota were very lucky not to torpedoed.

Best,

Francis

[alecsandros]

Your assuming that a follow up would deliver a crippling or decisive blow, but that's not the case. The Americans could absorb any kind of air or naval follow up bombardment the IJN could deliver. The risks out weighed the potential benifits.

It really boiled down to who could prevail on the ground; the Marines and the South Dakota National Guard troops, or the Japanese troops already on the island. The Americans won that fight over and over again.

That's true,
yet it had a lot to do with the way the Japanese Navy was employed there.

Why weren't the ground offensives supported by heavy naval gunfire ? Why didn't the Japanese navy, with overwhelming superiority, didn't at least try to stop the US reinforcements to Guadalcanal ?

And why oh why did the Japanese naval commanders withdrew so hastily and so early after their battles ?

Case in point: the loss of Hiei. Had the Japanese force press on and bombarded Henderson field as it was supposed to, the damage done could have reduced the CAF fifghting strenght by quite a bit (the previous bombardment wiped out 60% of the planes). It would have helped the ground troops as well as retreating back with the damaged Hiei.

[alecsandros]

In final analysis, my opinion is the Japanese defeat does not lay in shortage of naval forces : cruisers and destroyers were in strong numbers, and battleships (to the exception of the Kongo class) had no real role here. The real problem is, as you said, that sometimes this forces "were used badly". The margin of victory for the Americans was very thin at Guadalcanal, especially after the events of October. They were lucky that the Japanese did not push their advantage after the battle of Santa Cruz and performed so badly during the two naval battles of Guadalcanal. IMHO, the Japanese navy had all the cards to win these two battles : in light of Savo and Tassafaronga, Washington and South Dakota were very lucky not to torpedoed.

Best,

Francis

Hi Francis,
I agree with your points on the carriers. However, Zuiho could have been used at East Solomons, and let's say they were unlucky with Hiyo at Santa Cruz :)

[I never thought about sending the escort carriers to battle the US Navy. But they could be used as air cover for the warships, and transports, as well as launching some pin-point raids over Henderson. ]

On the way the batteships and cruisers were used however, I can't find no excuse. The presence of US battleships was noted several times by Japanese submarines, one of them successfully torpedoing the USS North Carolina.
At the same time, the surface fleet failed to support the land operations, failed to provide air cover for the transports, and warships passing the slot, failed to intercept US supply ships, and failed to exploit their advantages after Santa Cruz and 1st Guadalcanal....

Cheers,

[Francis Marliere]

After Santa Cruz at least, the IJN had a force of 3 carriers already near Guadalcanal and 4 more light carrers ready for attacks in 1-2 weeks.
Between them, those carriers fielded over 200 warplanes, out of which over 100 were ready to strike.
Why fidn't they use their battleships and carriwrs then and there to level Henderson field ? therr were no more US carriers available and the airfield had some 80 operational planes - clearly not enough to resist a determined naval assault.

After Santa Cruz, the IJN did not have 3 carriers and 4 light ones fielding 200 planes. Shokaku and Zuiho were damaged and had to retire for repairs. Hiyo had engine troubles. Zuikaku was undamaged but had aboard 38 fighters, 10 dive-bombers, and 19 attack planes (http://www.combinedfleet.com/Zuikak.htm). Junyo is also undamaged but has very few planes left (as far as I know 22 kansen, 11 kanbaku and 4 kanko).

Hence a carrier attack on Henderson Field after the battle has very little chance to make signifiant damages (too few planes with a small payload) and will be coatsly in planes. It is also dangerous for the carriers that may be attacked by the dive and torpedo bombers of Cactus Air Force. In final analysis, it's a the best way to turn a Japanese victory in defeat ...

A battleship bombardment is a better idea but still poses problems. First, Japanese admirals saw this kind of mission very dangerous for valuable units (the fate of Hiei and Kirishima proves they were right) and were reluctant to remake it unless there is a good reason, which there was not. Shelling Henderson Field would close the air base for a short time and is useless if the army is not ready to attack just after. And the army was not.

Then, I am not sure that the battleships could bombard Henderson Field. Their fuel situation is unknown and they may not have enough oil to make a high speed run to Iron Bottom Sound, retire at high speed, then return to base. I am neither sure that they have the good ammunitions. Since the battleships operated ahead of the carriers, they probably had APC shells, which were useless against a land target.

The weeks after the battle, circustamces don't change so much. Ammo availability may be a problem because incendiary shells were in very short supply. And any bombardment mission is not worth the risks if not followed by a land attack. A land attack is impossible after the defeat of late october, unless some strong reinforcements arrive at Guadalcanal. And it take times to gather the troops and the shipping, to make up a plan between army and navy, etc ... The next opportunity for an attack is mid november, as historical events ...

Best,

Francis