Guadalcanal naval campaign

[Francis Marliere]

Why weren't the ground offensives supported by heavy naval gunfire ? Why didn't the Japanese navy, with overwhelming superiority, didn't at least try to stop the US reinforcements to Guadalcanal ?

Because there was no NGFS doctrine and training in the IJN. By the way, NGFS was possible if Henderson Field was neutralized, which was never done.

And why oh why did the Japanese naval commanders withdrew so hastily and so early after their battles ?

I guess, they withdrew quickly to avoid air attacks. And I guess they were right. Imagine : Mikawa does not leave after its victory at Savo, destroys the transports but looses 5 CA to air attacks the following day. He would be treated of fool and idiot because a couple of transports are not worth one third of Japan heavy cruisers ...

Case in point: the loss of Hiei. Had the Japanese force press on and bombarded Henderson field as it was supposed to, the damage done could have reduced the CAF fifghting strenght by quite a bit (the previous bombardment wiped out 60% of the planes). It would have helped the ground troops as well as retreating back with the damaged Hiei.

If Abe's force did win the 1st naval battle of Guadacanal (and I consider they had all the cards to win, being superior in optics, training, doctrine, gunnery and torpedoes), I guess that things could have gone very bad for the marines.

[alecsandros]

After Santa Cruz at least, the IJN had a force of 3 carriers already near Guadalcanal and 4 more light carrers ready for attacks in 1-2 weeks.
Between them, those carriers fielded over 200 warplanes, out of which over 100 were ready to strike.
Why fidn't they use their battleships and carriwrs then and there to level Henderson field ? therr were no more US carriers available and the airfield had some 80 operational planes - clearly not enough to resist a determined naval assault.

After Santa Cruz, the IJN did not have 3 carriers and 4 light ones fielding 200 planes. Shokaku and Zuiho were damaged and had to retire for repairs. Hiyo had engine troubles. Zuikaku was undamaged but had aboard 38 fighters, 10 dive-bombers, and 19 attack planes (http://www.combinedfleet.com/Zuikak.htm). Junyo is also undamaged but has very few planes left (as far as I know 22 kansen, 11 kanbaku and 4 kanko).

Francis

"out of which over 100 ready to strike". Your total is 104 :)
The total of 200 includes Hiyo's aircraft, reassigned to Zuikaku and Junyo, along with 4 escort carriers doing ... escort.

Gunfire support could have been done IF the IJN ships were supported by carriers, which was not done.

I meant the hasty withdrawal after 1st Guadalcanal and Santa Cruz, not the other engagements, were prudence was necessary...

[Francis Marliere]

However, Zuiho could have been used at East Solomons, and let's say they were unlucky with Hiyo at Santa Cruz :)

My opinion is while Japanese admirals had blind points, they were not utterly stupids. If Zuiho was not present at Easter Solomons, there is a reason. it's not because we ignore it that Yamamoto or his collegues are incompetents. We should rather blame our ignorance than the stupidity of naval officers, who, I think, knew their jobs.

I never thought about sending the escort carriers to battle the US Navy. But they could be used as air cover for the warships, and transports, as well as launching some pin-point raids over Henderson.

As I said, these ships had no air groups and could not perform the missions you are talking about. Sorry to cut "the grass under your feet" (French expression, do not know if it makes sense in English), but the idea to give them an air group makes little sense, for several reasons. First, I don't think they can operate bombers (I mean loaded bombers). Second, the planes and pilots affected to this carriers will be taken from somewhere else (Rabaul ?). Third their mission of training and aircraft transport is important. How will pilots be trained ? How will planes will safely reach forward areas ?

On the way the batteships and cruisers were used however, I can't find no excuse. The presence of US battleships was noted several times by Japanese submarines, one of them successfully torpedoing the USS North Carolina.

The presence of US battleships was reported by reconnaissance but was never, IMHO, sure. Aircrews tend to see battleships everywhere ... Anyway, the battleships were always far away, often screening the carriers, and never seen north of Guadalcanal. the probability of a day surface action against Japanese and US lines of battles was very, very low and was not the risks for the ships and the fuel burnt.

At the same time, the surface fleet failed to support the land operations, failed to provide air cover for the transports, and warships passing the slot, failed to intercept US supply ships, and failed to exploit their advantages after Santa Cruz and 1st Guadalcanal....

The surface fleet could not support the land operations (to the exception of short duration night bombardments at each Tokyo Express) unless Henderson Field was shut down. It was never and it's the reason of American defeat.

The failure to provide air cover for the transport is simple : when carriers where available they tangled with enemy carriers. Japanese warships did not have strong AA. They did their best to protect the transports they escorted but this was beyond their capacities. It has more to do with the weakness of Japanese AA than the use of cruisers and battleships in the Solomons.

With respects, I can't see how Japanese surface forces could have intercepted US supply ships by day (Tokyo Express could attack by night but US supply ships usually did not operate under darkness in this area). Cruisers operating by daylight 200 to 250 nm around Henderson Field were almost certain to be attacked by dive and torpedo bombers, and seriously damaged. A task force trying to intercept shipping south of Guadalcanal (before it went in the radius of Cacstus Air Force) would have an almost impossible task. She would probably be detected by Catalina or B-17, and attacked by carriers or US surface warships. The risks would be very important and the chances of success very low.

Best,

Francis

[alecsandros]

We should rather blame our ignorance than the stupidity of naval officers, who, I think, knew their jobs.

I read Zuiho was operational by Aug 12th. Japanese naval commanders made the most ridicoulous naval blunders of the entire war.

As I said, these ships had no air groups and could not perform the missions you are talking about.

It is possible, but I remember they performed convoy duties and anti-submarine patrols, thus implying some sort of air groups, albeit small (about 20 aircraft each). [and yes, they were slow, and lacked the capabilities of large fleet carriers. Just like the US and RN escort carriers did :) And , as shown at Samar, even the escort carriers could pack a punch...]

On the point regarding Henderson field, and the troubles it gave the Japanese ships:

again their need to lose badly shows through.
Henderson was a small airfield with 2 strips, capable of holding about 100 planes in total. In mid October, it only had about 60 operational planes. Rabaul on the other hand was 800km away (easily within bombing range) and could hold hundreds of warplanes. In late 1942, the air base there fielded more than 350 planes.

The Japanese carriers also fielded large numbers of units (in late Oct 1942, Zuikaku and Junyo, with some crews from the Hiyo, could bring over 130 planes to bear - twice the numbers of Hnderson).
However, Henderson was left un-attacked, or attacked only sporadicaly.

This of course meant trouble for the surface ships, but this was a "trouble" the Japanese made far to little effort to mend.

[Steve Crandell]

First I want to thank Francis for his patience and the wealth of information he has provided about this series of battles. You've summarized things wonderfully!

I don't think the Japanese were prepared for the fighting spirit and professionalism displayed by the US forces on Guadalcanal. Prior to this they had defeated US forces pretty handily in the Philippines. They also didn't realize how large the defending force was. I really think they expected to defeat the US forces pretty quickly and when they didn't they considered it a fluke and kept trying.

The USN really didn't want to commit the two fast battleships in those confined waters either. It was almost a desperation move, and it could have turned out very badly, but there wasn't much else left to do the job.

[Francis Marliere]

I read Zuiho was operational by Aug 12th. Japanese naval commanders made the most ridicoulous naval blunders of the entire war.

With respect, Alecsandros, you'd better be prudent. How can you be sure that Zuiho was totally operationnal and available ? There must be a good reason, that we ignore, that explains why he wasn't at Eastern solomons (ie the ship may be operationnal but has no air group, or no trained air group, etc.)

It is possible, but I remember they performed convoy duties and anti-submarine patrols, thus implying some sort of air groups, albeit small (about 20 aircraft each). [and yes, they were slow, and lacked the capabilities of large fleet carriers. Just like the US and RN escort carriers did :) And , as shown at Samar, even the escort carriers could pack a punch...]

As far as I know, it is not correct to compare US and Japanese "escort" carriers. Allied one were small but operationnal ones. Japanese were IMHO just aircraft transport that sometimes performed escorts with very small air groups. I don't think that loaded bombers could operate from them.

Henderson was a small airfield with 2 strips, capable of holding about 100 planes in total. In mid October, it only had about 60 operational planes. Rabaul on the other hand was 800km away (easily within bombing range) and could hold hundreds of warplanes. In late 1942, the air base there fielded more than 350 planes.

The Japanese carriers also fielded large numbers of units (in late Oct 1942, Zuikaku and Junyo, with some crews from the Hiyo, could bring over 130 planes to bear - twice the numbers of Hnderson).
However, Henderson was left un-attacked, or attacked only sporadicaly.

This of course meant trouble for the surface ships, but this was a "trouble" the Japanese made far to little effort to mend.

Once again, while I respect your opinion, I don't agree with you. Henderson Field was small in capacity (fuel, ammo and spares, etc.) but hudge in size. The base suffered dozens airstrikes and suffered only minor damages, because the planes and other stuff were dispersed on a wide area. The japanese lost far more planes while attacking Cactus than they destroyed on the air or on the ground. Henderson Field was not " left un-attacked, or attacked only sporadicaly", it was attacked more than necessary by inadequate force. The problem is that Type 1 Rikkos (Bettys) or carrier planes were ill-suited for such missions. They had neither payload nor accuracy to neutralize such a large air base.

You say that in late 1942, Rabaul (and I guess, Kavieng and Buin) had 350 planes. That mean, IMHO less than half are flyable ones. Half of them are Type 0 kansen, and half of these fighters are the "short wing' variant (A6M3) that can't reach Guadalcanal. A part of the bombers are Type 99 kanbaku that can't make the trip from Rabaul to Guadalcanal and return. Another part of the bombers are rikkos employed to reconnaissance (there were never enough flying boats for that). That means that an airstrike from could have at best 30 to 40 bombers with the same number of fighters. With coast watcher and radar, such a strike has great chances to get ambushed by at least 30 US fighters (F4F-4 USMC fighters plus some P-38 beginning in November). At high speed and high altitude, the Type 0kansen has no advantage whatsoever against the ennemy fighter and both sides take hits. Wildcat can take hits and survive while Zeroes cannot. When a Wildcat is damaged, the pilot can force land the plane and bail-out in a safe area ; a damaged Zero is a lost one. What I mean is that an air raid will cost the Japanese a lot of planes and pilots and very few US ones. And the results will be disappointing because Henderson Field is a hudge area "full of empty". Most of bombs will hit the jungle, and the very few that won't miss will destroy a lone plane or crater a strip, that will be repaired within a couple of hours.

I understand you think that the japanese carriers were strong enough to neutralize the American base in late 1942. Once again I don't agree. Zuikaku was sent back to Japan to build up another air group. that left only Junyo, with an air group of less than 50 planes. Attacking Henderson Field with such a weak force makes no sense. Fighter escort cannot be strong enough to prevent very high looses from US fighters and the small payload of naval attack planes gives no hope to make anay signifiant damage to the base. I suggest you have a look at Combined Fleet's Junyo TROM and see what happened when this carrier launched air strikes against Guadalcanal. The air group suffered heavy looses and achieved nothing.

The problem with your idea of an all-out attack of Henderson field by surface warships is that most of them did not have the fire power to knock out the air base. The only one that hade a real effect was the october one made by 2 Kongo class BB. When cruisers were tasked with that kind of mission, they destroyed a couple of planes on the ground but were caught and hit hard by Cactus the following day. A heavy cruiser against a couple of planes is not a good trade-off.

The Japanese did make mistakes but I'm afraid you're a bit excessive in your analysis. IMHO they did not lack fighting spirit but luck at the critical times. I don't criticize their use of carriers or surface fleet as a whole but wonder how and why admiral abe did loose the 1st battle of Guadalcanal. The reasons why vice-admiral Kondo did not take with him Kongo and Haruna for the 2nd battle of Guadalcanal remain unclear for me. They could have made the difference.

Best,

Francis

[alecsandros]

Hi Francis,
A serious air bombardment on the waters around Guadalcanal was performed from Rabaul in April 1943, during Opereation I-Go. It comprised about 150 planes, with 2/3 Zeros and the rest bombers. The numbers lost to all causes were small (4 or 5 planes), and the Zeros destroyed 3 US fighters (out of about 60 which intercepted the formation). Damage done was slight, mostly because the bombers were kept at arms length by the Wildcat squadrons.

By contrast, in Oct 1942, there were about 25 or 30 Wildcats stationed on Henderson, with no more than 20 operational at any given time. A serious bombardment THEN, coupled with the ground offensive and naval bombardment, could have made the difference, as the F4Fs were to few to manage a large scale assault.

Combining Rabaul-based attacks with carrier-based attacks (Zuikaku and Junyo) would make matters worse. Plus, the presence of the carriers in close proximity would offer the transport ships and surface ships a chance to do their job. As we know, following Santa Cruz, Zuikaku and Junyohad over 50 Zero fighters on board, twice the numbers of Wildcats on Henderson. That both carriers were withdrawn from the area and sent to refit is one of the many many dubious aspects of Japanese decision making at the time (Junyo was tasked with close protection of several transports in early Nov, but was not successfull, as her small flight deck and insufficient number of Zeros hampered effective protection). At this time, transports, cruisers and battleships were falling prey to the... 30-35 bombers operational at Henderson !

There was little to no cooperation between Japanese land, sea and air forces. The navy expected the Henderson to be taken by the ground troops, but offered exactly zero gunfire support, allthough it was known that heavy artillery had not been delivered to Hyakutake's troops. The Japanese air force also did little to help the ground offensive, allthough, at the very least, it could have provided escort fighters over the beaches (Zeros from Rabaul).

===
Abe not only lost 1st Guadalcanal, he also managed to lose Hiei. 2 days after that, Kirishima was sent alone (why?), in the same waters and with the same mission that a force twice as large couldn't accomplish. Of course, without air support, and without any sort of intel on the quality and disposition of US Navy forces. As you said, leaving Haruna and Kongo behind was a very questionable decision...

===
To sum up: I don't have anything to critic about Japanese Navy's courage in combat. What seems incredibly dubious were the decisions made immediately after the decisive battles, AND the dispositions and employment of the navy's assets throughout the campaign.

[alecsandros]

Doing further reseach on Zuiho, it seems she was fully operational by Aug 12th, and carried 24 planes (18 zeros, 6 kates). As of Aug 12th, she was a part of the 1st Carrier division, along with Zuikaku and Shokaku.
One of the possibilities would be that Zuiho was kept in reserve. Another one would be that he was just left in home waters, just as Haruna and Kongo were left behind when Kirishima was sent to 2nd Guadalcanal. A third option would be that the light carrier had to few aircraft to make a difference in a fleet engagement, and furthermore he was also rather slow (28kts during trials, but no more than 27kts in real operations in 1942. The Shokaku and Zuikaku on the other hand could top 32kts)

Serrious losses at Eastern Solomons probably forced the decision makers to throw in everything they had for Santa Cruz, including the small Zuiho...

[dunmunro]

Doing further reseach on Zuiho, it seems she was fully operational by Aug 12th, and carried 24 planes (18 zeros, 6 kates). As of Aug 12th, she was a part of the 1st Carrier division, along with Zuikaku and Shokaku.
One of the possibilities would be that Zuiho was kept in reserve. Another one would be that he was just left in home waters, just as Haruna and Kongo were left behind when Kirishima was sent to 2nd Guadalcanal. A third option would be that the light carrier had to few aircraft to make a difference in a fleet engagement, and furthermore he was also rather slow (28kts during trials, but no more than 27kts in real operations in 1942. The Shokaku and Zuikaku on the other hand could top 32kts)

Serrious losses at Eastern Solomons probably forced the decision makers to throw in everything they had for Santa Cruz, including the small Zuiho...

Where did you read that?

According to Combined Fleet:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/Zuiho.htm

July 1942: Assigned to Second Striking Force, Second Air Attack Force, 1st Air Fleet, CarDiv 5.

13 July 1942:
Arrive at Sasebo.

14 July 1942:
Assigned to 3rd Fleet, CarDiv 1.

20 July 1942:
Enter drydock at Sasebo.

12 August 1942:
Assigned to striking force, 3rd Fleet, CarDiv 2.

25 August 1942:
Depart Sasebo for Hashirajima.

28 August 1942:
Assigned to Support Force Striking Force (3rd Fleet, CarDiv 1). 1 September 1942:
Depart with main unit Support Force from Kure for Truk.

6 September 1942:
Arrive at Truk.

[alecsandros]

Which part ?
Zuiho appears to have been operational since Aug 12th, and I just hypothesized onto the possible reason for not deploying her at Eastern Solomons.

[Francis Marliere]

Zuiho appears to have been operational since Aug 12th, and I just hypothesized onto the possible reason for not deploying her at Eastern Solomons.

With respect, Alecsandros, you "just hypothesized" that. The site is great but does not tell the whole story and Zuiho may, or may not have been operationnal at the time. My guess is that we do not know enough to be sure and we'd better be prudent ... My point is untill we are sure that Zuiho was operationnal, it's imprudent and unfaire to speak of blunder.

Best,

Francis

[alecsandros]

... It would have been redundant nonetheless. The Japanese claimed a great victory at Eastern SOlomons, and promptly withdrew from the area, leaving their transports without air cover, and their ground troops without artillery cover. A most excellent decision, for the US forces :)

[Steve Crandell]

I've been reading "Neptune's Inferno", and it definitely leaves one with the impression that the Japanese weren't holding anything back. They had serious fuel shortages to deal with, as well as heavy losses of pilots.

[satamadeepharbor]

I found an excellent book on the Guadalcanal naval campaign titled called "Neptune's Inferno" by James Hornfischer, which goes into great detail about the failings and successes of both sides. It seems a quite compelling position, that given their operational limitations with a terribly exposed and difficult supply chain down the "Slot", the Japanese did what they could against a stubborn but haphazard ad hoc American defense of the island. The American side was extremely lucky to have benefited from the"fog of war" the Japanese had, i.e. doubts among upper echelon about the validity of the campaign, faulty intelligence, overconfidence, and lack of decisive tactical leadership at crucial moments. The same was true of the American side, but they had more safeguards, duplication and backup.

At times, especially early on in '42, such as at the 1st Battle of Savo Island, the Japanese came out as tactical geniuses, and the Americans scarcely knew what hit them, except that three cruisers were lost. In subsequent battles around Savo, the sheer bravery of the ignorant carried the Americans over the Japanese, as did the use of radar controlled fire by the USS Washington that resulted in the scuttling of the Kirishima(?) in Nov of '42. Not to say the Americans did not suffer serious losses, but they held, just barely, and the Japanese finally conceded that there might be better campaigns to fight at a future date.

Guadalcanal was the high water mark of the southern advance of Japanese expansion, the end of a continuous string of successes, and for that reason failure was so hard to admit to. They would have done batter to take their winnings home after the first two battles of Savo, but honor and hubris forced a longer stay to their detriment, as the Americans improved their tactical methods and brought superior numbers and instruments to bear.

[Dave Saxton]

Hello satamadeepharbor and welcome,

Good post. Allow me to elaborate a bit on your statement about Washington’s use of radar controlled gunnery. The un-initiated may assume that this was a new and unique development. The USN and had been employing radar directed gunnery throughout all of the Guadalcanal night battles up to that time with varying degrees of effectiveness and in some cases ineffectiveness. Nonetheless, the use by Washington in this case makes a nice example of how it was used and could have been used in the other cases as well.

When Washington originally opened fire some 45 minutes prior, to the east of Savo Island, it selected a large radar contact at 18,000 yards, taken to be a battleship, as the target for the main battery. Radar contacts at closer range, known to be cruisers were selected as targets for the secondary battery. With the firing of the second main battery salvo all the radar sets blinked off and on and ceased to register any targets for sometime there after. The Washington continued to fire using “generated ranges”. The targets could no been seen with optics either (the enemy cruisers were now hidden by smoke screens). No hits were scored. The radar contact at 18,000 yards as it turns out had to be nothing more than a phantom contact.

By the time it came to the combat with Kirishima to the west of Savo Island the radars had been restored to functionality. The Washington tracked one particular radar contact of interest on the SG but it was not known what it was until Kirishima revealed itself by switching on search lights and opening fire. Lee was concerned about the actual whereabouts of the South Dakota and also the Gwin which he had lost track of. He had therefore forbad Washington to open fire on any radar contacts prior to that time.

The importance of the SG, which was a surface search radar and not a firecontrol radar can not be overstated. SG utilized a PPI indicator which made it much easier to make sense of a complex array of radar contacts than was the case of radars using a-scope indicators. For example, the firecontrol radars on the Washington operated on 40cm wavelength and used A-scope indicators. A-scopes present only range data in an abstract form of a line trace with a pip (or several pips) in it, kind of like an electro cardiogram read out at the doctor’s office. It takes a skilled operator to determine what these represent. Bearing of the target was taken from the position of the director the radar antenna is mounted to. The plan position indicator on the other hand presents a map like display. On the SG’s PPI display, the resolution was 5* for bearing and 500 yards for range. This made it much, more handy to provide a situational awareness to the ships command than was the case with A-scope presentation alone.

Nonetheless, this great advantage, unique to the USN at that time, was almost thrown away in 1942 by the fact that the only PPI indicator for SG was in the SG radar office. Personal at the command positions could not view the PPI display directly, but still had to rely on the narrative given by the average 19 year old rating over the phone circuits. This had been a particularly vexing problem for Adm Callaghan two nights before (he actually had to receive the narrative from the talk between ships radio circuits because his own flag ship did not have an SG!) However, on Washington Adm Lee and Captain Davis had worked out and practiced specific communication procedures to help reduce such problems.


So the SG helped Lee make some sense of the complex tactical situation that night and be prepared to put the firecontrol radars on the right target at the right time in the case of Kirishima, once it was known that the radar contact of interest was indeed a Japanese battle cruiser.

The firecontrol radar on Washington had several limitations at that time. The range accuracy and bearing accuracy were excellent but the resolution for both range and bearing were poor. When lobe switching, that was necessary to obtain accurate bearing positioning of the director, the bearing resolution was 15*. The resolution for range was 400 yards. This meant that pips of multiple targets not more than 15* apart or more than 400 yards apart for range, would overlap on the range presentation or in the positioning of the director. As it was Washington’s radars were unable to spot the fall of shot relative to the targets.

The ability to range the target with radar was still crucial, however. Optics could not be relied upon at night because the USN did not use flash-less powder. The range accuracy of the 40cm sets was 0.1% of the range plus a tolerance of 40 yards. In the case of the shooting at Kirishima from only 8,400 yards the range accuracy for the firing solution would have been about 48 yards.