Force Z

[alecsandros]

... What should be added would be that Prince of Wales, Repulse and their escorts were not sent to protect Allied interests on their own. They were sent in order to strenghten a rather large fleet already present in the area (later reformed into ABDACOM Allied force, with some 10 cruisers and 20 destroyers).

[paulcadogan]

.. What should be added would be that Prince of Wales, Repulse and their escorts were not sent to protect Allied interests on their own. They were sent in order to strenghten a rather large fleet already present in the area (later reformed into ABDACOM Allied force, with some 10 cruisers and 20 destroyers).

Exactly... I can't recall where I read this, but there was a great deal of negotiation in this regard and the participation of the US Asiatic Fleet was supposedly contingent upon the inclusion of major British warships such as the Prince of Wales. No one knew when or how war would come to the region and Pearl Harbor certainly changed things dramatically, at least for the Americans obviously, and Force Z ended up facing the Japanese in a less than adequate state of preparation - no carrier, no cruisers and only 4 destroyers.

[tameraire01]

It was indomitable that was supposed to be with them but as it is mentioned above she was damaged. Phillips was a fool to think that a single BB and BC along with four destroyers could stop them.

[pgollin]

.

NO !

Indomitable was NEVER intended to be there in December, she was due out later.

[aurora]

Tom Thumb (Philips) was fixated on the belief that that the battleship could and would see off an air attack; but I feel sure he was thinking about high level bombing and not dive bombing or even torpedo strikes- which is what did happen; and they were sitting ducks-he just would not listen to any subordinate who told him otherwise

aorora

[alecsandros]

Tom Thumb (Philips) was fixated on the belief that that the battleship could and would see off an air attack; but I feel sure he was thinking about high level bombing and not dive bombing or even torpedo strikes- which is what did happen; and they were sitting ducks-he just would not listen to any subordinate who told him otherwise

aorora

... Indeed.
He may have hoped that the AA air defense of Prince of Wales and Repulse would be enough to stop an air attack. At the time, PRince of Wales carried what must have been the largest AA battery of any capital ship in comission. [16 x 133mm , 56 x 40mm 2-pdr, 1x20mm Oerlikon].

[Francis Marliere]

As far as I remember things, nobody at the time knew about the extraordinary long range of Japanese "rikkos" (Type 97 and Type 1 bombers). Admiral Philipps did expect air attacks, but high altitude level bombing ones, which proved in the Mediterranean absolutely useless. It was a very bad surprise for the British when they saw the first planes attacking with torpedoes.
The second bad surprise was that Japanese pilots were more inclined than their Italian and German counterparts to attack at close range. Japanese torpedo planes usually got more hits but in return suffered, in average, more looses from antiaircraft fire.

[alecsandros]

As far as I remember things, nobody at the time knew about the extraordinary long range of Japanese "rikkos" (Type 97 and Type 1 bombers). Admiral Philipps did expect air attacks, but high altitude level bombing ones, which proved in the Mediterranean absolutely useless. It was a very bad surprise for the British when they saw the first planes attacking with torpedoes.
The second bad surprise was that Japanese pilots were more inclined than their Italian and German counterparts to attack at close range. Japanese torpedo planes usually got more hits but in return suffered, in average, more looses from antiaircraft fire.

... Perhaps, but Force Z was actualy pretty lucky to escape detection for as long as it did. On Dec 9, Prince of Wales and company were much more closely to the airbases of French Indochina then they were on Dec 10, and easy within striking range of all existing torpedo bombers.

Though many have criticised Phillips for not requesting air cover, in reality the matter was debated before Force Z set sail, and it was discovered that the RAF and RAAF resources existing in Singapore were simply not adequate to cover force Z over her entire journey, unless it addopted a very defensive course, along the Malaysian shore line. The 1 squadron of Brewster Buffalos which was tasked with defending the fleet was hopelessly antique, and had 13 operational fighters on Dec 10. Against the ~ 90 bomber attack, these antique fighters with poor armament had little hope of success. Moreover, their range was insufficient to cover Force Z over the entire journey.
A distress call was sent by Repulse at 11:00 on Dec 10, and the Buffallos scrambbled and took off almost immediately. However, they needed 100 minutes to get to the ships, and by that time, both Repulse and Prince of Wales were sinking.
They circled around a bit, and then returned to base in Singapore , 350km away.

[dunmunro]

As far as I remember things, nobody at the time knew about the extraordinary long range of Japanese "rikkos" (Type 97 and Type 1 bombers). Admiral Philipps did expect air attacks, but high altitude level bombing ones, which proved in the Mediterranean absolutely useless. It was a very bad surprise for the British when they saw the first planes attacking with torpedoes.
The second bad surprise was that Japanese pilots were more inclined than their Italian and German counterparts to attack at close range. Japanese torpedo planes usually got more hits but in return suffered, in average, more looses from antiaircraft fire.

... Perhaps, but Force Z was actualy pretty lucky to escape detection for as long as it did. On Dec 9, Prince of Wales and company were much more closely to the airbases of French Indochina then they were on Dec 10, and easy within striking range of all existing torpedo bombers.

Though many have criticised Phillips for not requesting air cover, in reality the matter was debated before Force Z set sail, and it was discovered that the RAF and RAAF resources existing in Singapore were simply not adequate to cover force Z over her entire journey, unless it addopted a very defensive course, along the Malaysian shore line. The 1 squadron of Brewster Buffalos which was tasked with defending the fleet was hopelessly antique, and had 13 operational fighters on Dec 10. Against the ~ 90 bomber attack, these antique fighters with poor armament had little hope of success. Moreover, their range was insufficient to cover Force Z over the entire journey.
A distress call was sent by Repulse at 11:00 on Dec 10, and the Buffallos scrambbled and took off almost immediately. However, they needed 100 minutes to get to the ships, and by that time, both Repulse and Prince of Wales were sinking.
They circled around a bit, and then returned to base in Singapore , 350km away.

453 squadron took off at 12:20 and arrived over Force Z almost exactly 60 mins later, which was then about 290km from Singapore. The Buffalo was adequately armed to deal with unescorted IJN bombers.

[dunmunro]

Tom Thumb (Philips) was fixated on the belief that that the battleship could and would see off an air attack; but I feel sure he was thinking about high level bombing and not dive bombing or even torpedo strikes- which is what did happen; and they were sitting ducks-he just would not listen to any subordinate who told him otherwise

aorora

... Indeed.
He may have hoped that the AA air defense of Prince of Wales and Repulse would be enough to stop an air attack. At the time, PRince of Wales carried what must have been the largest AA battery of any capital ship in comission. [16 x 133mm , 56 x 40mm 2-pdr, 1x20mm Oerlikon].

Indeed, PoW had performed very well in the AA role during Operation Halberd.

[alecsandros]

453 squadron took off at 12:20 and arrived over Force Z almost exactly 60 mins later, which was then about 290km from Singapore. The Buffalo was adequately armed to deal with unescorted IJN bombers.

... According to Singapore: Britain's greatest defeat, the distress call was issued at 11:00 by Repulse, and the squadron was completely off the ground by 11:20.
They arived over the fleet at 13:00, circled around and withdrew.

According to most maps I know, the positions of the sunken ships is ~ 200 nm from SIngapore (360km)

The Buffalo F2A3 carried 4 x 12.7 mgs, and had a top speed of 450km/h at sea level, and a rate of climb of 690m/minute.

Against 90 bombers, 12 antique fighers had no hope, and they could not arive there in time anyway.

[alecsandros]

Indeed, PoW had performed very well in the AA role during Operation Halberd.

... The performance during the last battle was not bad either: 3 bombers destroyed during the attack, 1 crashed landed, 29 damaged to various degrees, and that allthough Prince of WAles AA battery was crippled by the first torpedo hit.

[dunmunro]

453 squadron took off at 12:20 and arrived over Force Z almost exactly 60 mins later, which was then about 290km from Singapore. The Buffalo was adequately armed to deal with unescorted IJN bombers.

... According to Singapore: Britain's greatest defeat, the distress call was issued at 11:00 by Repulse, and the squadron was completely off the ground by 11:20.
They arived over the fleet at 13:00, circled around and withdrew.

According to most maps I know, the positions of the sunken ships is ~ 200 nm from SIngapore (360km)

The Buffalo F2A3 carried 4 x 12.7 mgs, and had a top speed of 450km/h at sea level, and a rate of climb of 690m/minute.

Against 90 bombers, 12 antique fighers had no hope, and they could not arive there in time anyway.

Here's the map from the official RN history:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/R ... S-14-5.jpg
and if you look up the coordinates of the sinkings and use Google Earth, you will get a slightly lessor distance.

11:58 Repulse signals that Force Z is under air attack
12:20 453 RAAF squadron TO
13:20 453 Squadron arrives.
13:23 PoW sinks. (Battleship by Middlebrook and Mahoney, p.249)

M&M show that if Force Z requested aircover when the first IJN recon aircraft began to shadow that 453 squadron would have arrived about 10 min before the first TB attack (the attack that crippled PoW).

In Feb 1942, F4F-3s from Lexington downed 15 of 17 attacking IJN twin engined bombers, including 5 kills by one pilot, and the F4Fs had much the same armament as the RAAF Buffalos.

[alecsandros]

453 squadron took off at 12:20 and arrived over Force Z almost exactly 60 mins later, which was then about 290km from Singapore. The Buffalo was adequately armed to deal with unescorted IJN bombers.

... According to Singapore: Britain's greatest defeat, the distress call was issued at 11:00 by Repulse, and the squadron was completely off the ground by 11:20.
They arived over the fleet at 13:00, circled around and withdrew.

According to most maps I know, the positions of the sunken ships is ~ 200 nm from SIngapore (360km)

The Buffalo F2A3 carried 4 x 12.7 mgs, and had a top speed of 450km/h at sea level, and a rate of climb of 690m/minute.

Against 90 bombers, 12 antique fighers had no hope, and they could not arive there in time anyway.

Here's the map from the official RN history:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/R ... S-14-5.jpg
and if you look up the coordinates of the sinkings and use Google Earth, you will get a slightly lessor distance.

11:58 Repulse signals that Force Z is under air attack
12:20 453 RAAF squadron TO
13:20 453 Squadron arrives.
13:23 PoW sinks. (Battleship by Middlebrook and Mahoney, p.249)

M&M show that if Force Z requested aircover when the first IJN recon aircraft began to shadow that 453 squadron would have arrived about 10 min before the first TB attack (the attack that crippled PoW).

In Feb 1942, F4F-3s from Lexington downed 15 of 17 attacking IJN twin engined bombers, including 5 kills by one pilot, and the F4Fs had much the same armament as the RAAF Buffalos.

... Warren's "Britain's Greatest Defeat: Singapore 1942" has different figures on the timing of events.

Nonetheless, the 9 torpedo bobmers that crippled the Prince of Wales could have been driven off by the 12 Buffallos, but what of the remaining 40 torpedo bobmers ?

Agreed the Buffalos were similarly armed to the Wildcat, but had comparatively worse performance (speed, climb, range).

... The range and time of response of the Buffallos at the point of crisis did not insure protection of the fleet (and they could not have known how far and how quickly a large torpedo attack would appear, so as to launch the Buffallos 1 hour in advance)

[KevinD]

Given the 'theme' of this thread I wonder if anyone here has yet read the recently published (a few months ago in UK) book Scapegoat. The Death of Prince of Wales and Repulse by Martin Stephens?