Taranto Effect on Naval Warfare

[Byron Angel]

Two thoughts -

Re shipboard AAA, I think the problem was as much lack of good FC systems as it was lack of proper weapons.

Re the Taranto raid itself, IMO the principal factors behind its success were (a) surprise, and (b) the night-flying skills of the Fleet Air Arm pilots who made a nocturnal timing of the attack tactically feasible.

FWIW

B

[Dave Saxton]

I would welcome the informed view of poswters on this site as to my conviction that Taranto not only represents the best of the RN but also had an enormous effect on naval warfare.

I agree for the most part.

What puzzles me is that no major navy, not even the Japanese, didn't consider upgrading AA systems (quantity and quality) onboard battleships, even after Taranto, and not even after Midway...
Only in late 1942 - early 1943 did the USN and IJN started to upgrade their battleship AA systems...

The Tirpitz's AA was greatly improved over that of Bismarck by early 42. Indeed it was probably better than any Allied or Japanese battleship during that time frame. The channal dash participants also had improved AA compared to early 41 by early 42.

Re shipboard AAA, I think the problem was as much lack of good FC systems as it was lack of proper weapons.

I agree Byron. Even late war IJN shipboard AA wasn't as effective as it should have been given the quantity of weapons used. And it's pointed out by L. Brown and others; even late war USN flak control radar and flak directors were found wanting. But I think that AA artillery was never going to provide the effectiveness needed, or believed of providing in actually, and could never be a substitute for fighter air cover. The British found in testing post war, that ship board AA artillery, even with the best possible flak directing radars and high angle directors, was not good enough. Hence the development of the surface to air guided missile.

[alecsandros]

The Tirpitz's AA was greatly improved over that of Bismarck by early 42. Indeed it was probably better than any Allied or Japanese battleship during that time frame. The channal dash participants also had improved AA compared to early 41 by early 42.

There were improvements, but not enough, IMO, to counter the air attack threat. In fact, during the Loffoten raid, albeit 2 Albacores were shot down, showed that the AA volume of fire was not enough to deter even small waves of bombers. 2 torpedoes passed within 10meters of the ship, IIRC. So they were somewhat lucky.

That's why I mentioned the US battleships, which, by late 1942 had over 100-120 light/medium AA guns onboard each, growing to over 130-150 by late 1943...

North Carolina and South Dakota, proved much more formidable AA defenders against far larger waves of enemy bombers...

And Tirpitz only arrived at a decent number of AA guns in July 1944... (78 x 20mm + 16x37mm + 16x105mm)

[Dave Saxton]

In fact, during the Loffoten raid, albeit 2 Albacores were shot down, showed that the AA volume of fire was not enough to deter even small waves of bombers.

Your leaving out important details of this March 42 incident. The Tirpitz's heavy flak could not be used as the enemy bombers approached launch range because they were hidden in low lying heavy clouds. The aircraft approached and located the target using their airborne radar. They popped out of the clouds and dropped their torpedoes before the heavy, or light flak, could fire much at all.

North Carolina and South Dakota, proved much more formidable AA defenders against far larger waves of enemy bombers...

When and where? During the Solomons Islands operations they still had very weak light flak built around the useless 1.1s. At Santa Cruz in Oct 42 South Dakota was operating as part of an anti-aircraft formation that included not only the Enterprize but an AA cruiser San Juan, and a heavy cruiser, plus DDs. Operating alone or with one DD, I doubt it would have done very well.

You look at the AA equipment of a US BB in March 42 and its laughable.

But my point is, especially in light of the failure of Yamato and Musashi's late war failures with huge quanties of AA aboard, is that no matter how much flak volume, or by whom, it was still never enough. I my opinion, the entire notion that bomber waves could be deterred by a battleship's flak (any battleship), provided a high enough volume of fire, is a mistaken concept.

[alecsandros]

... The aircraft approached and located the target using their airborne radar. They popped out of the clouds and dropped their torpedoes before the heavy, or light flak, could fire much at all.

According to Leonce Peillard's "Sink the Tirpitz", the Albacores attacked from the north, against the wind, and from astern of the German BB. The adverse wind slowed them down. And "a few minutes" passed between their observation and the actual attack took place. The Germans counted 25 torpedo-planes, but they were only 12, carrying 2 torpedoes each.
The attack lasted 9 minutes. The same source mentions "48x20mm, 16x37mm and 16x105mm guns opening fire". The Germans reported 4 Albacores shot down, again doubling the real number...

When and where? During the Solomons Islands operations they still had very weak light flak built around the useless 1.1s. At Santa Cruz in Oct 42 South Dakota was operating as part of an anti-aircraft formation that included not only the Enterprize but an AA cruiser San Juan, and a heavy cruiser, plus DDs.

I don't know. At Santa Cruz, and Eastern Solomons, North Carolina and South Dakota yielded ~ 100 light and medium AA guns each, and the battle reports suggest they destroyed a good number of attackers. As I understand, all of the dive bombers (9 or 12) which directly attacked North Carolina were destroyed during their attack... South Dakota also was targeted several times by both torpedo bombers and dive bombers, but only 1 bomb hit, and at least 10, if not 14 enemy planes were destroyed.

But my point is, especially in light of the failure of Yamato and Musashi's late war failures with huge quanties of AA aboard, is that no matter how much flak volume, or by whom, it was still never enough.

I know. I always wondered about that.
My explanation would be that the entire AA defense of the Japanese navy was rather poor.
After all, Musashi was part of a huge battlefleet, at the time of her sinking. The fleet concentrated at least 1000 AA guns...
And yet ... the Musashi was lost, and only 18 of the ~250 incoming planes were shot down.

The 25mm medium flak was slow to train, and fire. And the fire control was lacking.... very much.

This isn't to say Iowa would survive the attack of 250 Japanese bombers; but I would expect it to behave much, much better than either Musashi or Yamato in the same circumstances.

Cheers,

[RF]

Overall, trying to blame everything on "oil" shows that you have swallowed the revisionist history fiasco which ignores poor leadership, poor inter-service co-operation, poor planning and procurement, useless preparations for war and a total inability to understand how to mount both an offensive and, more especially, defensive merchantile war.
.

Indeed. It highlights the complete stupitity of Mussolini declaring war in the first place.

And it is an indictment of the total incompetance of the Duce in letting Italy be so unprepared..

[Dave Saxton]

According to Leonce Peillard's "Sink the Tirpitz", the Albacores attacked from the north, against the wind, and from astern of the German BB. The adverse wind slowed them down. And "a few minutes" passed between their observation and the actual attack took place,

Its true that the aircraft were going into the wind so the rate of closure was very slow. However, Peillard is rather misleading by ignoring the cloud cover factor. A much better account based on Lucas' action report:

Lucus sighted TP at a range of 20 miles at 0842 hours. They had come in at altitude of only 500 feet to stay below the radar horizon until the sighting. Then Lucus lead the strike force up to 3500 feet altitude to continue the ramining 20 miles with cloud cover by using ASV radar to track the target. Tirpitz tracked the aircraft as well and tried to direct its own Arado to intercept one of the Albacores. Finally at 0917 (35 minutes later) the attack group reached a break in the clouds, with Lucas's own sub-flight finding themselves less than 1 mile from TP's starboard beam. Tirpitz did not open fire even then, but Friedrich Ihn did. Lucas decided to attack immediately before TP opened fire. The torpedoes were released at range of 1700 meters. The torpedoes were in the warter at 0918 hours. There remained three additional subflights yet to release their torpedoes. One sub flight continued to the north for a few minutes before turning to attack. Another sub flight crossed to the port of TP and launched their torpedoes, also at 0918 hours, in anticipation toTP turning to the west. KzS Topp timed his turn to comb the torpedo tracks perfectly and the TP retained enough speed so that other torpedoes passed well astern. Only now did the other sub flights release their torpedoes from the north at a range of 900 meters at 0925. Once again Topp demonstrated some slick ship handling and the Tirpitz avoided the other six torpedoes. TP was manovuering during the time after it finally opened fire and the enemy was already well within release range before it opened fire, so not much can be drawn as to TP's AA capabilities from that.

[Dave Saxton]

I don't know. At Santa Cruz, and Eastern Solomons, North Carolina and South Dakota yielded ~ 100 light and medium AA guns each,

NC received her first light flak upgrade in late 1942 while having its torpedo hit damage repaired. Only then was there an opprotunity to do so. This was the problem in 42, the BBs were so busy in early and mid 42 they didn't have time. The light flak was poor but they had the Mk4 radars to direct the heavy flak. Even Iowa in April 43 had only a token light flak (less than TP in 42) with no gun tubs on the bow, stern, or turrets.

As I understand, all of the dive bombers (9 or 12) which directly attacked North Carolina were destroyed during their attack... South Dakota also was targeted several times by both torpedo bombers and dive bombers, but only 1 bomb hit, and at least 10, if not 14 enemy planes were destroyed.

In each case they were operating as part of an intergated task group in a AA formation, and with a AA cruiser close by. It was not a case of the ships fending off these attacks essentially alone. Gatch's claims of SD shooting down dozens of enemy AC still rankles the crew members of the other ships that contributed to the AA defence to this day.

My explanation would be that the entire AA defense of the Japanese navy was rather poor.

I think we should study this issue some more. I'm hesitant to just jump on to such a conclusion. Another popular myth based on an unrealistic comparitive level as to USN ship board AA capability?

[Dave Saxton]

When the Yamato was sunk, and when the Musashi suffered the pivitol attack which doomed it, they were not operating within an intergrated task group in an anti-aircraft formation. In the Musashi's case, the Musashi's command made a tactical error. The formation turned right but Musashi turned left as CAG 20 approached. Musashi was thus seperated from the rest the formation and left on its own. Without the mutual help of the other ships its AA was not up to the task, and it suffered mightly.

[Djoser]

In each case they were operating as part of an intergated task group in a AA formation, and with a AA cruiser close by. It was not a case of the ships fending off these attacks essentially alone. Gatch's claims of SD shooting down dozens of enemy AC still rankles the crew members of the other ships that contributed to the AA defence to this day.

Gatch also claimed to have sunk half the Japanese Navy during the 2nd Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. We all know what really happened that night--he got his ass handed to him, and had to be bailed out by a ship commanded by a much better man, with a much better crew.

[Rick Rather]

...those 21 planes were actually separated into two waves, attacking an hour apart... By contrast, the Japanese had six carriers launching 355 planes, in two waves only slightly separated.

This is not correct.

The Japanese first wave launched at ~6:00am local and attacked at ~7:55am.
The Japanese second wave launched at ~7:15am local and attacked at ~8:50am.

Over Oahu, there was a brief lull between the departure of the first wave and the arrival of the second, but the onset of the two attack waves was ~1 hour apart.

[alecsandros]

Lucas decided to attack immediately before TP opened fire. The torpedoes were released at range of 1700 meters. The torpedoes were in the warter at 0918 hours. There remained three additional subflights yet to release their torpedoes. One sub flight continued to the north for a few minutes before turning to attack. Another sub flight crossed to the port of TP and launched their torpedoes, also at 0918 hours, in anticipation toTP turning to the west.

Hi Dave,
At what time did Tirpitz open fire with AA batteries , according to this account ? And how much time passed until the attack was over ?

[alecsandros]

NC received her first light flak upgrade in late 1942 while having its torpedo hit damage repaired. Only then was there an opprotunity to do so.

From Friedman's US Battleships, for North Carolina, I counted 6 quadruple 1.1", 40 x 20mm Oerlikon, 24 x 12,7mm, in Aug 1942. This gives a total of 88 light/medium guns, along with the 20x127mm. The 127mm guns at least were directed by the Mark1A computer...

In each case they were operating as part of an intergated task group in a AA formation, and with a AA cruiser close by. It was not a case of the ships fending off these attacks essentially alone. Gatch's claims of SD shooting down dozens of enemy AC still rankles the crew members of the other ships that contributed to the AA defence to this day.

I know, it's difficult to take the ships apart and say "this destroyed x number of planes, this destroyed y number of planes", especialy during such complex battles.
However, it can't be said either that NC and SD simply moved around, while "other ships" were forming the AA defense...
The reports that I've read at least show huge output of AA shells, significant damage done to the enemy, and very little damage suffered...

I think we should study this issue some more. I'm hesitant to just jump on to such a conclusion. Another popular myth based on an unrealistic comparitive level as to USN ship board AA capability?

I made a research on this a few years ago, with the main comparisons between the Bofors 40mm, Oerlikon 20mm and the Type96 25mm gun.

The 25mm had inferior rate of fire, reload time, effective range, and was more difficult to handle than either Allied AA gun mount, thus giving inferior protection.

some more info here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_96_25 ... ectiveness

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For a very rough statistic, we can calculate the output of the AA battery from Iowa and from Yamato.

Iowa:
80 x 40mm Bofors (120 rounds/minute, effective range 3000 meters)
49 x 20mm Oerlikon (300 rounds/minute, effective range 900meters)
TOTAL: 80 x 120 + 49 x 300 = 24300 rounds/minute

Yamato:
162 x 25mm (110 rounds/minute, effective range 1000 meters)
TOTAL: 162 x 110 = 17820 rounds/minute

From another source:

"The 25 mm Type 96 was widely used throughout the Japanese Navy with about 33,000 guns being produced. The Japanese considered this gun to be an excellent weapon, but it did not compare well to either the Bofors 40 mm or the Oerlikon 20 mm weapons used by the Allies. The magazines for the Type 96 held only 15 rounds, so frequent stoppages for change outs were required. By 1945, these weapons fired projectiles too light and too short ranged to effectively engage the heavier and faster US aircraft then in service. "

-----

Adding to that the problems experienced with the type 96 gun, it's smaller range, and the lack of comparable electronics on board Yamato and Iowa, we can see that the AA defense of the Japanese largest battleships was not at all on par with that of the largest US battleships...

[alecsandros]

When the Yamato was sunk, and when the Musashi suffered the pivitol attack which doomed it, they were not operating within an intergrated task group in an anti-aircraft formation. In the Musashi's case, the Musashi's command made a tactical error. The formation turned right but Musashi turned left as CAG 20 approached. Musashi was thus seperated from the rest the formation and left on its own. Without the mutual help of the other ships its AA was not up to the task, and it suffered mightly.

Yes,
But Yamato and Musashi had practically all of their AA system built around the type 96 - 25mm gun, with an effective range of 1000 meters or so - inside torpedo launch distance, and inside dive-bomber release height. Moreover, US planes of the era were fast and well armored, while the 25mm mounts were slow to train and reload.

With the 1000meters effective range, the other Japanese vessels couldn't do much anyway to cover Musashi...

[Dave Saxton]

With the 1000meters effective range, the other Japanese vessels couldn't do much anyway to cover Musashi...

I'm sure you understand that aircraft have to fly through several hot/kill zones to reach the primary target when several warships are arranged in an AA formation regardless of the effective range of their light AA. There's a big difference between fighting alone and fighting within a group.

Adding to that the problems experienced with the type 96 gun, it's smaller range, and the lack of comparable electronics on board Yamato and Iowa, we can see that the AA defense of the Japanese largest battleships was not at all on par with that of the largest US battleships...

Agreed.

for North Carolina, I counted 6 quadruple 1.1", 40 x 20mm Oerlikon, 24 x 12,7mm, in Aug 1942. This gives a total of 88 light/medium guns,

This isn't very good light flak for 1942. The 1.1 were almost useless, and the 20mm Oelikon wasn't that effective, nor very accurate. As for .50cal MGs... well... POW probably had equal or superior flak capability in Dec 41.

This also doesn't compare well at all to TP in 42. The 20mm Oerlikon in no way compares to the German 20mm weapons. The effective range of the German 20mm weapons was at least 2,750 meters and it could accurately be put on target. The Oerlikon suffered from the nature of its operation with the gunner strapped into the harness of the gun and his aim being jarred by the recoil of the weapon itself.

At what time did Tirpitz open fire with AA batteries , according to this account ? And how much time passed until the attack was over ?

No exact time is given.