The sinking of the Konigsberg

From the Washington Naval Treaty to the end of the Second World War.
User avatar
paulcadogan
Senior Member
Posts: 1148
Joined: Sun Jul 16, 2006 4:03 am
Location: Kingston, Jamaica

The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by paulcadogan »

Came across this web page with details and photos from the air attack that sank the Konigsberg in Bergen Harbour in April 1940. Thought I'd share it for those who haven't seen it or are unaware of the details.

http://freespace.virgin.net/john.dell/s ... gsberg.htm
Qui invidet minor est - He who envies is the lesser man
Keith Enge
Member
Posts: 138
Joined: Sat Jan 01, 2011 1:36 am

Re: The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by Keith Enge »

The FAA would probably have been better off if this attack had failed. Because it succeeded, the FAA got the impression that it was acceptable to send an inadequate number of unescorted planes to attack warships. As it turned out, this attack was unique. In virtually all similar attacks by FAA planes, horrendous losses resulted for negligible results. If this attack had failed, maybe those subsequent attacks wouldn't have occurred and those lives have been spared rather than wasted. It also would probably have increased the priority of developing a long ranged escort fighter (which neither the FAA nor RAF ever produced).
User avatar
RF
Senior Member
Posts: 7760
Joined: Wed Sep 20, 2006 1:15 pm
Location: Wolverhampton, ENGLAND

Re: The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by RF »

The consequence of this line of thinking could be that prior to large forces of bombers and fighters being available to the FAA that no attacks at all would happen until late 1941 at the earliest. That would include no attack on Taranto and no Swordfish attack on Bismarck, both operations getting decisive results with small obsolete forces with little loss.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
Keith Enge
Member
Posts: 138
Joined: Sat Jan 01, 2011 1:36 am

Re: The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by Keith Enge »

RF - Neither Taranto nor Bismarck would have been effected; neither required fighter escorts. Taranto was at night and Bismarck was far at sea. The changed policy would have prevented disasters like the daytime Kirkenes/Petsamo and Scarpanto raids. Kirkenes cost HMS Victorious much of her airgroup with little compensating result. The raid on the Scarpanto airfield cost HMS Formidable nine months of repair. The attack on the airfield was too small to suppress it; its retaliation attack badly damaged Formidable and Nubian.
User avatar
RF
Senior Member
Posts: 7760
Joined: Wed Sep 20, 2006 1:15 pm
Location: Wolverhampton, ENGLAND

Re: The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by RF »

Keith Enge wrote:RF - Neither Taranto nor Bismarck would have been effected; neither required fighter escorts. Taranto was at night and Bismarck was far at sea.
With respect this is said with hindsight. Bismarck was known to carry aircraft and the Italians had fighter aircraft that can operate at night.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
User avatar
RNfanDan
Supporter
Posts: 424
Joined: Mon Apr 24, 2006 4:06 pm
Location: USA

Re: The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by RNfanDan »

I don't think hindsight has much to do with these examples, in any way.

Bismarck was indeed, beyond the range of air cover for much of its Atlantic sortie, while "...known to carry aircraft..." hardly affects the issue---Arados were not effective and too few in number to matter, against even obsolescent Swordfish. Not once, was the matter of Arado floatplanes a factor in deciding to withhold attacks from two carrier airgroups. This wasn't because of a few dive-bombers' success at Norway.

As regards Taranto, this sort of exercise (attacking an enemy fleet in harbor) was planned many years before WWII even loomed on the horizon, with RN Fleet exercises including precisely this this sort of mission, using real aircraft from Eagle, Glorious and Courageous, years ahead of Taranto. It was, in other words, simply not pertinent to the dispatching of a few land-based Skuas against the fjords.

In fact, it seems far more likely that it was a case of "try anything to catch up" by the British at Norway, who were caught completely off-guard against the German invasion and reacted in a very disorganized and ill-managed way, in nearly all respects.

Your point with Kirkenes is well taken of course, but there were also numerous attacks made against Tirpitz in the months and years to come, powerful carrier raids which kept the ship out of service for much of her sedentary existence.
Image
dunmunro
Senior Member
Posts: 4394
Joined: Sat Oct 22, 2005 1:25 am
Location: Langley BC Canada

Re: The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by dunmunro »

Keith Enge wrote:RF - Neither Taranto nor Bismarck would have been effected; neither required fighter escorts. Taranto was at night and Bismarck was far at sea. The changed policy would have prevented disasters like the daytime Kirkenes/Petsamo and Scarpanto raids. Kirkenes cost HMS Victorious much of her airgroup with little compensating result. The raid on the Scarpanto airfield cost HMS Formidable nine months of repair. The attack on the airfield was too small to suppress it; its retaliation attack badly damaged Formidable and Nubian.
There's a thread on this board exploring the Kirkenes and Petsamo raid:

viewtopic.php?f=9&t=3488

The attack on Kirkenes had a fighter escort but it got separated from the strike group. The Scarpanto raid was made with the full realization that it was unlikely to be successful, but the RN was fully committed to defending Crete and the Scarpanto raid was part of that commitment, despite the fact that the FAA did not have enough resources in the theatre to give Formidable a full complement of aircraft and she only embarked 15 Albacores/Swordfish and 12 Fulmars and not all were fully serviceable. . Additionally, the strike that crippled Formidable, was in fact, a chance encounter with a Luftwaffe, recon in force, JU-87 strike group that was not related to any retaliatory strike against the Scarpanto raid, but Formidable's few remaining Fulmars were still being refueled and rearmed after having engaged in about 20 combat sorties earlier in the day while flying CAP, and could not mount a successful defence.

Victorious sent 6 Fulmars along with the Swordfish strike that scored the first hit on Bismarck.
User avatar
paulcadogan
Senior Member
Posts: 1148
Joined: Sun Jul 16, 2006 4:03 am
Location: Kingston, Jamaica

Re: The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by paulcadogan »

Forgive me if this has been covered before, but doesn't all this also highlight the British problem - at least in the early part of the war - of the under-stocking of their aircraft carriers with aircraft?

Why was Ark Royal only able to muster 15 Swordfish to attack Bismarck when her theoretical capacity was 60 aircraft? Why was Victorious sent to sea with only 9 Swordfish and 5 Fulmars in her hangars when her capacity was 36? If the aircraft were not available...why weren't they? What's the point of building a weapon and not producing what it needs to function effectively? Imagine sending a battleship out to meet the enemy with its magazines and shell rooms only half full!

What might have happened if Ark Royal had another wave of 15 coming in to attack Bismarck immediately after the crippling steering compartment hit?

A lot of questions, but I feel British carriers could have had more of an impact had they been fully equipped.
Qui invidet minor est - He who envies is the lesser man
User avatar
RNfanDan
Supporter
Posts: 424
Joined: Mon Apr 24, 2006 4:06 pm
Location: USA

Re: The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by RNfanDan »

Paul,

You iterated a very important point. In fact, the issue of sufficient aircraft numbers aboard was a problem that seems to have persisted (with the exception of "ferrying" missions to Malta of non-FAA planes) all the way up to the aforementioned Tirpitz raids. Even as late as the creation of the BPF under Admiral Bruce Fraser's command --including carriers inherited from Cunningham's former Eastern Fleet at Ceylon-- the number and types of aircraft carried seem far greater than what may be perceived as "ordinary" complements.

This implies that the FAA may still have suffered from the long-standing administrative and/or political underminings that had crippled it throughout most of its existence. I think this is in no small part, due to the lack of good design and manufacturing infrastructure. Even when the Barracuda began to arrive in numbers, its underpowered engine and tendency to fall from the skies made it almost wholly unsuited for Fleet use. I note that the great majority of "performance" aircraft shipped aboard RN carriers were of US design, such as the Wildcat/Martlet and Avenger; although these were usually modified from US specs.

In summary, I think the arrival of war, so soon after the Inskip Award of 1937, left the FAA with almost nothing from which to implement its needs in terms of design, production, and even administrative aspects.

Dan
Image
dunmunro
Senior Member
Posts: 4394
Joined: Sat Oct 22, 2005 1:25 am
Location: Langley BC Canada

Re: The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by dunmunro »

paulcadogan wrote:Forgive me if this has been covered before, but doesn't all this also highlight the British problem - at least in the early part of the war - of the under-stocking of their aircraft carriers with aircraft?

Why was Ark Royal only able to muster 15 Swordfish to attack Bismarck when her theoretical capacity was 60 aircraft? Why was Victorious sent to sea with only 9 Swordfish and 5 Fulmars in her hangars when her capacity was 36? If the aircraft were not available...why weren't they? What's the point of building a weapon and not producing what it needs to function effectively? Imagine sending a battleship out to meet the enemy with its magazines and shell rooms only half full!

What might have happened if Ark Royal had another wave of 15 coming in to attack Bismarck immediately after the crippling steering compartment hit?

A lot of questions, but I feel British carriers could have had more of an impact had they been fully equipped.
Victorious was still working up (she had intended to work up while sailing with a convoy routed around the Cape) and her hanger was partially filled with crated Hurricanes destined for Egypt. Her 9 Swordfish were really intended for ASW protection while enroute. There wasn't time to offload the crated aircraft and embark the Squadron of Albacores.

Ark Royal always maintained more aircraft in the air for CAP and recon than were dispatched against Bismarck, but strike numbers were probably limited due to the weather. Ark Royal had 54 aircraft on board.

The RN had pressed for much higher production numbers for FAA aircraft, and, for example, they wanted 90 Albacores a month...but the BofB threw a big wrench into these plans and FAA aircraft production priority and aircrew training (the FAA even transferred pilots to Fighter Command) was reduced and FAA engine development plans were put on the back burner. The Griffon engine was RN sponsored and was intended to power the Barracuda and Firefly which were intended for 1942 service introduction; the Griffon was suspended and then taken over by the RAF, and the Barracuda II had to use an uprated Merlin while the Firefly was given Griffon engines of lesser power than RAF Spitfires, and both aircraft were nearly two years late into service. The impact of the BofB on the FAA is seldom considered, but it was hard for the RN/FAA to argue for higher priority than the RAF with the German Army and Luftwaffe based just across the channel...
dunmunro
Senior Member
Posts: 4394
Joined: Sat Oct 22, 2005 1:25 am
Location: Langley BC Canada

Re: The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by dunmunro »

RNfanDan wrote:Paul,



This implies that the FAA may still have suffered from the long-standing administrative and/or political underminings that had crippled it throughout most of its existence. I think this is in no small part, due to the lack of good design and manufacturing infrastructure. Even when the Barracuda began to arrive in numbers, its underpowered engine and tendency to fall from the skies made it almost wholly unsuited for Fleet use. I note that the great majority of "performance" aircraft shipped aboard RN carriers were of US design, such as the Wildcat/Martlet and Avenger; although these were usually modified from US specs.
The Barracuda II was not underpowered, in a relative sense, although it would have been better off with the Griffon engine. The Barracuda had some development and production problems, but they pale in comparison to the problems encountered with the USN's Curtis Helldiver. The only real problem with the Barracuda was that it was two years late, while the effect of lendlease was to further reduce FAA production and development priorities, leading to greater dependence on US aircraft types - again it is hard to argue for scarce development and production resources when "free" aircraft are being offered from the USA.
User avatar
Ersatz Yorck
Member
Posts: 141
Joined: Thu Sep 15, 2011 2:56 pm

Re: The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by Ersatz Yorck »

Good discussion on the FAA!
Gopher
Member
Posts: 40
Joined: Wed Oct 19, 2011 12:06 am

Re: The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by Gopher »

Have to echo what Dunmuro is stating. Naval Historians post WWII have been some of the poorest imaginable. The USN laid down one carrier down between 1937 and 1941 a repeat of a 1934 design, the Royal Navy laid down 7 between 1937-1939 including one specifically designed as an aircraft maintenance ship. When writers tell us the fleet air arm was neglected they fail to mention the aircraft that equiped the US and Japanese carriers in 1939. The A5M and F3F-1 would hardly be an improvement than anything the FAA had. The USN had 2 years of peace and only in December 1941 was the Wildcat and coming on board carriers which would have made US carrier no less vunerable to the Luftwaffe. The IJN could not develop a successor to the Zero in decent time. Ancillary to this the Royal Navy converted 4 cruisers to AA cruisers and laid down 11 AA cruisers before the outbreak of war, taken in conjunction with the capital ship modernization, someone somewhere thought air was going to be an important factor even if some Admirals did not. In 1940 Britain required Spitfires and Hurricanes off course the FAA was going to suffer from being a poor relation.
User avatar
RF
Senior Member
Posts: 7760
Joined: Wed Sep 20, 2006 1:15 pm
Location: Wolverhampton, ENGLAND

Re: The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by RF »

Gopher wrote:. Naval Historians post WWII have been some of the poorest imaginable.
Notwithstanding the rest of the post I think this is a rather harsh and sweeping assertion.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
lwd
Senior Member
Posts: 3822
Joined: Sat Jun 17, 2006 2:15 am
Location: Southfield, USA

Re: The sinking of the Konigsberg

Post by lwd »

Gopher wrote:.... The USN laid down one carrier down between 1937 and 1941 a repeat of a 1934 design, the Royal Navy laid down 7 between 1937-1939 including one specifically designed as an aircraft maintenance ship. ....
Under the treaties enforce at the time the US didn't have any more tonage left to commit to aircraft carriers. The RN did. Not sure this line is relevant to the topic at hand however.
Post Reply