FAA aircraft comparative performance

[dunmunro]

I haven't seen much to indicate that the USN used drop tanks at this point in the war. Likewise if the fighters were sent as escorts they didn't tend to carry bombs. Especially if you think you'll encounter enemy fighters bombs are rather a waste as you'll need to jetison them anyway and have burned up more fuel getting to that point.

If one thinks of the Fulmar as a high performance SBD with a reduced bomb load, then one gets a better idea of how it was originally intended to be used. If the Fulmar meets no opposition then it can carry out its DB function and could then actually pull any CAP away from the Albacore DBs/TBs trailing behind.

[Bgile]

I haven't seen much to indicate that the USN used drop tanks at this point in the war. Likewise if the fighters were sent as escorts they didn't tend to carry bombs. Especially if you think you'll encounter enemy fighters bombs are rather a waste as you'll need to jetison them anyway and have burned up more fuel getting to that point.

If one thinks of the Fulmar as a high performance SBD with a reduced bomb load, then one gets a better idea of how it was originally intended to be used. If the Fulmar meets no opposition then it can carry out its DB function and could then actually pull any CAP away from the Albacore DBs/TBs trailing behind.

You make it sound like the "high performance SBD" Fulmar is a better DB than the SBD. Obviously one would want their DB to be as high performance as possible in it's assigned role. The Fulmar has dive brakes? What angle of dive is it capable of? Sounds like it is great at everything. Can it carry torpedoes?

[dunmunro]

You make it sound like the "high performance SBD" Fulmar is a better DB than the SBD. Obviously one would want their DB to be as high performance as possible in it's assigned role. The Fulmar has dive brakes? What angle of dive is it capable of? Sounds like it is great at everything. Can it carry torpedoes?

Obviously, a "high performance SBD" with but with a reduced bomb load is already less effective as a DB, but I have also pointed out that the Fulmar, like the Albacore, did not have a bomb crutch so it could not bomb vertically when carrying an centreline bomb load. The point to all this is that the Fulmar was a multimode aircraft that had more capability than is commonly realized. The fact that the FAA was unable to utilize all the capabilities designed into the aircraft says more about the FAAs constant attrition than lack of capable aircraft. The Fulmar had very large flaps that could be deployed in combat, and like the Fairey Battle and Albacore these probably doubled as dive brakes.

This quote is a nice summation:

The Fulmar was a very much needed piece of FAA equipment when the second world war broke out. Although inferior in speed and climb performance, its firepower, sturdiness, endurance and reconnaissance capabilities made up for it as far as naval requirements were concerned. Its invaluable work was proved by nearly 1/3 of Royal Navy [air to air] victories during the war, representing a considerable success.

Fairey Fulmar 4+ Publications, p3.

[Keith Enge]

I don't think that I would have wanted British carrier planes at Midway. Just a couple of months earlier, many of those same planes were handled rather easily by those same Japanese carriers in the Indian Ocean raid. Also, if the British carrier fighters were so good, why did the British usually replace them with lend-lease Martlets (F4F Wildcats). Later, replacing them with Corsairs was a no-brainer but, before them, Martlets were preferred to the home-grown product. The Fulmar, of course, with its extra crewman was at an inherent disadvantage in air-to-air combat with virtually any modern fighter. In fact, most Fulmars were soon used as night fighters where their deficiencies were less costly and that extra crewman was actually useful as a radar operator.

The Sea Hurricane, like most land-based planes that were forced to be used at sea, wasn't stressed for the rigors of carrier landings. They could survive the leisurely operations typical in the Atlantic but, in the Pacific, operations were more constant and demanding. I imagine that, in the Pacific, they would have had the same problems that the later Seafires did when they were used by the British Pacific Fleet; the Seafires rather quickly became operational losses. IIRC, in addition, the Hurricane had fabric covered wings. Unlike the Royal Navy, US Navy carriers carried their planes on the flight deck in deck parks (the hangars were mainly for maintenance). Salt spray would have made short work of those fabric covered wings.

[Keith Enge]

This is just an addendum to my previous post. I can't believe that I forgot to discuss the Albacore too. This is perhaps understandable since it was such a forgettable aircraft; it was supposed to replace the Swordfish but the Swordfish still remained in operation after the Albacores had been shelved. You do realize that the Albacore was a biplane with a top speed about half that of a Zero and over a hundred of mph slower than the Avengers just coming into service (a handful flew from Midway Island). Your best chance of surviving an encounter with a Zero was if the Zero pilot laughed himself to death.

[Bgile]

I believe the argument was that Japanese bombs would bounce off the armored flight decks of British carriers like so much paper mache, and they wouldn't suffer very much damage. Their flight tempo would of course be much slower and they were still vulnerable to torpedoes. They would also argue that British flak was better at that point of the war, and some of the British aircraft had radar so would be able to find the Japanese fleet better and supposedly sink Hiryu in the first attack. I suspect their actual attack would be much smaller because of the much lower rate of launch of aircraft.

[19kilo]

And the Japanese were VERY good with aerial torpedo attacks.

[dunmunro]

This is just an addendum to my previous post. I can't believe that I forgot to discuss the Albacore too. This is perhaps understandable since it was such a forgettable aircraft; it was supposed to replace the Swordfish but the Swordfish still remained in operation after the Albacores had been shelved. You do realize that the Albacore was a biplane with a top speed about half that of a Zero and over a hundred of mph slower than the Avengers just coming into service (a handful flew from Midway Island). Your best chance of surviving an encounter with a Zero was if the Zero pilot laughed himself to death.

Yes, the Avenger was just coming into service in mid 1942 but did not show up on carriers until several months later. So the proper comparison is between the Albacore and the USN's TBD Devastator, and the Albacore has twice the range, at equal or higher cruise speeds and can drop a superior torpedo at 140 knots where the Devastator is limited to 100 knots. The Albacore was also fully stressed for dive bombing and was equipped with ASV radar so it could find and strike targets in poor weather, and/or at night. The Albacore entered service in mid 1940. Rather than being forgettable it is was a key component in the FAA's inventory and served with distinction in the Med, especially from Maltese bases. The FAA was saddled with a number of older CVs with relatively short flight decks and required aircraft with excellent STOL characteristics and the Albacore fit that requirement nicely.

The FAA had hoped to build the Albacore in large numbers and actually requested production of 90 aircraft/month but the outbreak of war caused a reduction in engine development priorities and then the BofB reduced its production priorities still further. The Albacore was intended to serve from 1940-42 and then be replaced in early 1942 by the Barracuda, but these plans were derailed by factors outside the FAA's control.

[dunmunro]

Also, if the British carrier fighters were so good, why did the British usually replace them with lend-lease Martlets (F4F Wildcats). Later, replacing them with Corsairs was a no-brainer but, before them, Martlets were preferred to the home-grown product. The Fulmar, of course, with its extra crewman was at an inherent disadvantage in air-to-air combat with virtually any modern fighter. In fact, most Fulmars were soon used as night fighters where their deficiencies were less costly and that extra crewman was actually useful as a radar operator.

The Sea Hurricane, like most land-based planes that were forced to be used at sea, wasn't stressed for the rigors of carrier landings. They could survive the leisurely operations typical in the Atlantic but, in the Pacific, operations were more constant and demanding. I imagine that, in the Pacific, they would have had the same problems that the later Seafires did when they were used by the British Pacific Fleet; the Seafires rather quickly became operational losses. IIRC, in addition, the Hurricane had fabric covered wings. Unlike the Royal Navy, US Navy carriers carried their planes on the flight deck in deck parks (the hangars were mainly for maintenance). Salt spray would have made short work of those fabric covered wings.

The Sea Hurricane became the first monoplane single seat fighter to serve aboard an RN CV, despite the FAA having a number of Martlets in its inventory prior to the Sea Hurricane's introduction. The early Martlet/F4F was not combat ready as it had no armour, SS tanks nor folding wings. After these deficiencies were corrected it's performance was drastically degraded and fell below that of the Sea Hurricane. The Sea Hurricane performed brilliantly during such "leisurely" operations as HARPOON, PEDESTAL and PQ-18 where it faced off against the best the Luftwaffe could throw at it. The Sea Hurricane was probably a better carrier fighter than the F4F and also probably had a lower accident rate because of its rugged wide track landing gear. The Martlet/F4F narrow LG was notoriously poor and led to many flight deck accidents, aside from the fact that it was manually retracted/extended and required 30 seconds to retract during which time the F4F pilot was at a severe disadvantage. The lack of folding wings was the Sea Hurricane's biggest drawback and the Martlet/F4F's greatest comparative advantage. All Hurricane/Sea Hurricanes built after mid 1940 had metal covered wings.

The Fulmar was at a disadvantage against single seat fighters but, in fact, the extra crew member was an aid during combat as the observer provided an extra pair of eyes. When introduced in 1940 the Fulmar was easily the most powerful naval fighter in carrier service and the extra weight added to the F4F-4 to make it combat ready considerably reduced its performance advantage over the Fulmar II. The Fairey flaps also had a combat setting and this combined with the low wing loading on the Fulmar gave it excellent manoeuvrability and there are accounts of the Fulmar using the combat flap setting to turn inside CR-42 biplane fighters. The Fulmar saw only limited service as a radar equipped NF because it was too slow after having radar added.

[dunmunro]

I believe the argument was that Japanese bombs would bounce off the armored flight decks of British carriers like so much paper mache,

I think you are simply being silly here and are spouting nonsense rather than engaging in an informative discourse. Armoured flight decks were not invulnerable but the USN recognized that they provide superior protection during combat and adopted them ASAP:

"The main armor carried on Enterprise is the heavy armored flight deck. This was to prove a significant factor in the catastrophic fire and explosions that occurred on Enterprise's flight deck in 1969. The US Navy learned its lesson the hard way during World War II when all its carriers had only armored hangar decks. All attack carriers built since the Midway class have had armored flight decks."

Cracknell, W.H, Cmdr USN, Warship Profile 15, USS Enterprise (CVAN 65) Nuclear Attack Carrier, p56.

"As a result of study of damage sustained by various British carriers prior to our entry into the war, two important departures from traditional U.S. Navy carrier design were incorporated in the CVB Class, then still under development. HMS ILLUSTRIOUS in an action off Malta on 1 January 1941 was hit by several bombs, three of which detonated in the hangar space. Large fires swept fore and aft among parked planes thereby demonstrating the desirability of attempting to confine the limits of such explosions and fires by structural sectionalization of the hangar space. On the CVB Class the hangar was therefore divided into five compartments separated by 40 and 50-pound STS division bulkheads extending from the hangar deck to the flight deck, each fitted with a large door suitable for handling aircraft. It is hoped that this sectionalization, in conjunction with sprinkler and fog foam systems, will effectively prevent fires from spreading throughout the hangar spaces, as occurred on FRANKLIN on 30 October and 19 March. The damage experiences of several British carriers, which unlike our own were fitted with armored flight decks, demonstrated the effectiveness of such armor in shielding hangar spaces from GP bombs and vital spaces below the hangar deck from SAP bombs. Accordingly, the CVB Class was designed with an armored flight deck consisting of 3-1/2-inch STS from frames 46 to 175 with a hangar deck consisting of two courses of 40-pound STS between frames 36 and 192. Although none of the CVB Class carriers were completed in time to take part in war operations, the effectiveness of armored flight decks against Kamikaze attacks was demonstrated by various carriers attached to the British Pacific Fleet. Reference (k) reports two such interesting cases. The VICTORIOUS was struck by three Kamikaze aircraft, two of which ricocheted off the armored flight deck and over the side, causing no important damage. The third carried a bomb which detonated at frame 30 starboard at the butt of the 3-inch flight deck armor with 1-1/2-inch "D" quality (equivalent to HTS) steel. It does not appear that the Kamikaze actually struck the ship. The bomb detonation, however, depressed the 3-inch deck slightly but did not tear it open. On the other hand, the 1-1/2-inch "D" quality deck plating was ripped open over a total area of about 25 square feet. Two days were required for temporary repairs, at the conclusion of which the ship was fully operational. HMS FORMIDABLE was hit by two bombs, the first of which struck and detonated on the flight deck 9 feet to port of the center-line at frame 79, directly over a deep bent and at a juncture of three armored plates. The armored deck was depressed over an area 24 feet long and 20 feet wide. Maximum depression was 15 inches. Adjacent bents spaced 12 feet forward and aft of the point of impact were slightly depressed. A hole 2 square feet in area was blown in the 3-inch deck. Three fragments penetrated downward through the ship into the center boiler room. The damage in this boiler room, which was not described, temporarily reduced speed to 18 knots. The second bomb struck and detonated on the centerline of the flight deck at frame 94. The 3-inch deck and deep bent directly below the point of impact were depressed about 4-1/2 inches and one rivet was knocked out. However, the ship was fully operational within about 5 hours, including flight operations."[14]

http://www.researcheratlarge.com/Ships/ ... eport.html

[dunmunro]

I don't think that I would have wanted British carrier planes at Midway.

The question I posed earlier was whether or not the USN could have defeated the IJN at Midway using contemporary FAA aircraft. This doesn't imply that the each FAA aircraft was individually superior but only that as weapons systems the FAA aircraft were "mission capable".

[Bgile]

You obviously found a guy who agrees with you. US carriers worked well for US air operations in WWII. They had fast elevators ... difficult with the technology of the day if they are armored. The problem with the flight deck being a main structural deck is holes for elevators are problematic. Modern USN CVNs have all their elevators at deck edge. Obviously unless you have an extremely large ship, very thick steel flight decks effect damaged GM in a bad way because you have such a large proportion of weight so high up. I wouldn't be surprised if this made them more vulnerable to torpedo damage. British carriers were unable to warm up aircraft in their hangers, and this effected op tempo. IIRC British carriers operating with the US Pacific fleet were unable to sustain the same op tempo, and had smaller magazines and fuel stores than the Essex class. No Essex class carrier was sunk as a result of not having an armored deck. Franklin was crippled and had to be sent back to the states.

In practice, USS Midway was about twice as large as an Essex class CV by displacement. By the time she received all of her post war modifications she displaced about 74,000 tons.

I don't think modern US CVNs have armored flight decks. They have flight decks strong enough to withstand heavy jet aircraft and they are main structural members, and as a result they are several inches thick. I saw Enterprise after the accident. She had large holes in her flight deck where 750 lb bombs exploded. The fire burned out much of the aft end of the ship and was not limited to the flight deck. Undoubtedly the thick deck helped to limit damage.

[Bgile]

I don't think that I would have wanted British carrier planes at Midway.

The question I posed earlier was whether or not the USN could have defeated the IJN at Midway using contemporary FAA aircraft. This doesn't imply that the each FAA aircraft was individually superior but only that as weapons systems the FAA aircraft were "mission capable".

I think that's true.

[dunmunro]

Obviously unless you have an extremely large ship, very thick steel flight decks effect damaged GM in a bad way because you have such a large proportion of weight so high up. I wouldn't be surprised if this made them more vulnerable to torpedo damage. .



I don't think modern US CVNs have armored flight decks. They have flight decks strong enough to withstand heavy jet aircraft and they are main structural members, and as a result they are several inches thick. I saw Enterprise after the accident. She had large holes in her flight deck where 750 lb bombs exploded. The fire burned out much of the aft end of the ship and was not limited to the flight deck. Undoubtedly the thick deck helped to limit damage.

Stability is generally denoted by the GM, with a higher number being preferable.

GM (full load)
Ark Royal 6.65
Illustrious 8.3
Indefatigable: as designed 7.65, in 1944 6.91
Lexington, as built 7.31
Enterprise as built 6.38,
Enterprise as rebuilt, Nov 1943 9.64
Essex: as built 9.59
(data from Friedman)

Yet Hornet and Yorktown were very resistant to capsizing and Ark Royal took nearly 12 hours to sink. All these ships had adequate GMs.

If the post Midway USN carriers have STS decks (and they almost certainly do) then they have armoured flight decks.

[Bgile]

You don't agree that having several inches of steel several decks higher in the ship makes a difference? Because that is why FC postions weren't heavily armored. The higher in the ship the heavy armor is, the worse damaged stability is going to be. Once the list starts, you get all that weight shifted off center.