Anglo-German Naval Treaty 1935

[cheap_thrills]

Hi Everyone;

I am doing some coursework for Uni and have a section on the Anglo-German Naval Treaty, i was wondering if anyone knows anything about the effects it had, (in europe, on anglo/french relations etc) and also specifics regarding the conditions of it.

Thanks

[Terje Langoy]

A quote from Eva Harazsti´s book Treatybreakers or "Realpolitiker" - this was a French diplomat´s spontaneous remark upon the Naval Agreement in June 1935

"...It is not merely treachery, it is folly"

I´ll try to make a more substantial post on this later

[RF]

Hello cheap thrills and welcome to the forum.

Is there anything specific you need to know on this or is this just a general enquiry?

As a generalisation the treaty had two effects. One party political - it was negotiated by Ribbentropp not the German Foreign Office or Foreign Minister. Ribbentropp's apparent importance arising from signing this agreement led to his appointment as ambassador to Great Britain and later as Nazi Foreign Minister, both appointments made by Hitler himself, not by the German Foreign Office.

Secondly it legitimated German naval expansion, particulary in submarines, which were previously forbidden. However the time period from the agreement to the start of WW2 was insufficient for the Germans to build up to the agreed treaty levels. So the advantage to the Germans, though significant, were not that great.

[cheap_thrills]

Regarding what i need to know, i am doing an essay on the european status quo so it would be how the AGNA affected Europe as a whole.

Terje Langoy, do you have the book, if so can you let me know the page number that quote is on?

[Terje Langoy]

It is a quote found at p.11 in the book.

Do you have it?

[cheap_thrills]

I dont have the book but i can now reference it in my bibliography by getting the info off amazon, thanks very much!

[RF]

i am doing an essay on the european status quo so it would be how the AGNA affected Europe as a whole.

I am not clear as to what is mean't by ''european status quo.''

The AGNA was an early part of the British policy of reapproachment with Germany, which was later called ''appeasement.''

But in itself the AGNA was of little lasting significance as Germany was still not a substantial naval power and the other major European powers were faced with Germany as a land power, where strength at sea was not that relevant. The French for example had the Maginot Line to cover their border with Germany, that was what mattered to them.

[Terje Langoy]

The practical effect of the treaty was the denunciation of the Versailles treaty and the freedom granted German design- and construction offices to distribute "fleet tons" as opposed to previous "design tons" and the ability to plan for fleet strategy rather than spend their efforts on covert ship designs. It also enabled submarine construction to commence though it would serve to legitimate rather than permit this, seeing that Germany had been building submarines abroad for some time.

To study the political effects derived from the Anglo-German treaty it might be just as important to study the Geneva disarmament conference as those negotiations predates the political situation of June 1935 and therefore form basis of the french response to the treaty. Another tactical relation worth a study is the Anglo-Japanese situation as the treaty apparently had a bearing upon this.

Since both Germany and Japan, later also Italy, withdrew from the League of Nations as the result of ill-fated disarmament negotiations it may be concluded the Anglo-German treaty was made to regain diplomatic armaments control. German officials had during the Geneva conference presented the ultimatum that "other nations must either disarm to German level or permit their rearmament" which France persistently refused to do and this might be the sole reason to why they were not invited to the treaty negotiations in London.

German armaments expansion was a matter of when, not if - and in fact a limited rearmament proposal had been made by the British as early as 1932. France on the other hand maintained strict adherence to the Versailles policy and had also been responsible for the collapse of German economy with their delay to accept a suspense in the reparations payment back in 1930. Hardly a favorable record for diplomatic relations! It is easy to see how the french, though not intentionally, could have functioned as tool for Hitler´s demands. Appeasement is not reached through suppression.

"AGNA and its effect on Europe" would perhaps been given a better title with "Franco-German relations in the interwar years" since this is a recurring theme in political questions.

This post is not nearly as substantial as I had hoped for but fact is that interwar politics is a pretty, pretty huge subject and I don´t have even a fraction of the literature needed to make an extensive study of it. However I would suggest not to view the treaty as a fresh start with a "clean slate" but rather as the final chapter of the Versailles treaty era. In such a sense a naval agreement with Germany had been on the distant horizon ever since 1932.

[tommy303]

I concur completely with Terje, and would only add that the AGNA was responsible in a major part for a souring of relations between France and Great Britain. While the chilling effect of Britain's formal acceptance of German rearmament did not in the long run prevent France and Britain from uniting against the Germans after the invasion of Poland, it might have been responsible for Hitler's apparent assumption that the western coalition would not unite against him if he moved into Poland.

[RF]

tommy, the treaty was abrogated by Hitler in response to the British guarantees to Poland and Romania in April 1939, I doubt whether it really featured in Hitler's calculations over the invasion of Poland as the Nazi-Soviet Non-aggression Pact was supposed to be the clincher to keep the British and French intervening.

[RF]

France on the other hand maintained strict adherence to the Versailles policy and had also been responsible for the collapse of German economy with their delay to accept a suspense in the reparations payment back in 1930.

But that adherence didn't last for too long, as in 1934 the Maginot Line was completed (at least as far as the French wanted it completed) and the French made no attempt to stop the remilitarisation of the Rhineland in 1936

[Terje Langoy]

The "adherence to the treaty" was meant to display the French line of policy vs. German naval rearmament, nothing else.

It is to be read in the book I mentioned initially that the cause for the French response, bitter but brief, not actually was the treaty itself but rather the manner of which the British had executed armament diplomacy. These negotiations had been bilateral, not unilateral, thus the public reaction was that "the bus had left without them" - an emotional response rather than a pragmatic one, which serves as example that "the manner of which diplomacy is made may be just as important as the policy itself..."

In the aftermath of the treaty several quite interesting points were raised by Winston Churchill with regards to the 100:35 ratio system. Undoubtedly his two arguments of most merit were:

a) the ratio was based on the combined fleet tonnage of the British Empire - contrary to the scattered naval bases of the British empire any German 35 per cent fleet would be based at Baltic and North Sea borders. If the Japanese should threaten British territories in the Far East the navy would be unable to respond without decreasing her strength at home against a potent German fleet - this is why I mentioned the Anglo-Japanese relations in my previous post!

b) the German 35 per cent fleet would consist of fast and modern ships whereupon a larger portion of the British fleet were made up of older ships (Q.E. class, R class and the battlecruisers) thus much of the fleet was in fact outdated by warship standards of the time.

This post I wrote "on the go" so please excuse me for being random in my points. Perhaps they can serve to trigger further debate

[RF]

The "adherence to the treaty" was meant to display the French line of policy vs. German naval rearmament, nothing else.

Really that the French were miffed because they were not consulted or involved in the negotiations. The substance of the treaty had little strategic implication for France as the German Navy poses no threat to France. What mattered to the French was their land border, the Maginot Line was in place, did the French consult the British on that?

[RF]

In the aftermath of the treaty several quite interesting points were raised by Winston Churchill with regards to the 100:35 ratio system.

Churchill was absolutely correct in his analysis. The AGNA was done for political expediency, the strategic implications long term were not considered by the Government.

But there again the strategic implications were not worked out properly either by the Germans. And neither by the Italians or Japanese.