Guadalcanal: decisive naval struggle?

[Karl Heidenreich]

Lately I been reading a lot about the Pacific campaign and found a common criteria that the Japanese always tried to lure the USN to a decisive naval battle in 1942.

Well, Midway was one of such decisive naval battle in which the capability of the Japanese to expand westward and destroy the USN carriers was eliminated. But still the Japanese were expanding southward which makes the Salomons so important.

And there, at Guadalcanal, the Japanese got the decisive battle, as combinedfleet.com states it was not a single battle but as a whole campaign. If they lost the struggle they could not expand further and, if they can´t lure the USN to a trap then they couldn´t balance again the forces in the Pacific.

But looking the way in which they commited their naval forces, piecemeal even after having great succeses, it become evident that even Yamamoto didn´t recognized he was fighting the decisive battle he so much wanted. Why he sent just cruisers and old BBs to force his way into Iron Bottom Sound whilst knowing how important it was Henderson Field and the island group for the USN? He must have known that the USN would commit his CVs and main surface units if needed. There was the chance for a great battle of the CVs and the surface units, there is where his Battle Line with Yamato and Musashi would have led Nagato, Kirishima, Kongo, Hiei, etc. etc. The night South Dakota was taken out of action and Kirishima demolished could have been quite diferent if Yamato would have appeared there under cover of the CVs.

It´s quite incredible how the Japanese fail to see the importance of this struggle.

Best regards...

[lwd]

To at least some extent they had already expanded to far. Commiting the Yamats(s) and CV(s) there would have been commiting them to attack by land based air something the Japanese were very reluctant to do. This article argues that logistically they couldn't afford to comit there battle fleet there:
http://www.combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm
But as you point out I don't think they realised it was the big battle. They saw it as a string of little ones and from what I've read did not expect the US to commit battle ships to those waters. If they had the proper way to take care of them would have been to make sure there were enough DD's to guarantee some torpedo hits. This was indeed their golden opertunity to attrit the US battle fleet by wave of torpedo attack per their plan and they failed to capitallize on it.

[Tiornu]

In December 1941,the Japanese got caught halfway into a fundamental change in strategy. The entire Decisive Battle scenario, which was to follow an Attrition Campaign, was a hopelessly optimistic approach to war. It handed initiative to the enemy and assumed a particularly set of reactions by him. Yamamoto understood the flaws in this thinking and tried to adapt Japan's strategy to the latest realities in naval warfare (the rise of naval aviation). Of course, there was no strategy that had much chance of success, but I will at least credit Yamamoto for trying. You are correct that the Japanese did not identify the Guadalcanal/Solomons Campaign as a Decisive Battle setting. In fact, they reconverted their torpedo cruisers in response to it, meaning they saw the Solomons as overturning their hopes for a Decisive Battle. In fact, Midway had already done much to accomplish that, as indicated by the Ise conversions.
Once they were "out of their game plan," the Japanese had nothing to fall back on. They were basically "winging it" from a strategic viewpoint for the remainder of the war. The IJN had declined to subject its strategy to critical review in peacetime, and they paid the price for its impracticality in wartime.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Well... the Japanese succesfully created ocassions to fight at Midway. If a Japanese victory could be guaranteed then, as Yamamoto hoped, the USN could be in no position to defend neither Hawai nor the West Coast. But that didn´t happened so that oportunity to win was lost.

Then, of course, there was the Salomons, which evidently they failed to recognized as that decisive battle. And they didn´t recognized it, I believe, because the situation was created by herit´s own inertia, not as a plan formulated by their General Staff. Granted, maybe it was not the moment or place where the IJN have planed or hoped to fight it, but during the first weeks of the battle it became evident that it was the place and occasion to do it.

In November 1942 the IJN could have move in such a way to attract not only South Dak and Washington but the CVs also in order to "re fight" Midway (defeat the CVs) and sink the surface units. And they have, up to that moment, the means to do it.

Best regards...

[Tiornu]

Midway is another good example of Yamamoto's changing the basic plan. He was trying to force the Americans into a showdown, which is a significant difference from the original Decisive Battle scenario. I don't know if he had hopes of making Pearl Harbor untenable, and I'm sure he had no thoughts about the West Coast. But he specifically targeted the US fleet. That was by far the overriding concern for him at Midway.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Tiornu:

He was trying to force the Americans into a showdown, which is a significant difference from the original Decisive Battle scenario.

How´s that. More or less is the same thing: by luring the USN to defend Midway the Japanese were making sure Nimitz would commit his fleet to a Decisive Battle.

Regards...

[Tiornu]

The Decisive Battle (Kantai kessen) was to result from an American thrust into Japan's "home field," much as we see at Tsushima. This puts the Americans at a weakened state and allows for the Attrition Campaign (Zengen sakusen) before a final clash of Big Ships, Bug Guns (Taikan kyohô). The Decisive Battle was more specific than simply a big battle with potentially decisive results. The fact that carriers took the lead and that the American strength was in carriers rather than battleships are also features foreign to the Decisive Battle scenario. There are multiple obvious errors in the Japanese Midway plan, but in forcing the issue on the Americans, Yamamoto is actually improving on the standard IJN strategy.

[Bgile]

IIRC the Japanese didn't at first believe the US was capable of offensive infantry type attacks with the objective of retaking territory. They looked down on US soldiers and felt they lacked combat spirit and were completely inferior, so they didn't at first take the invasion of Guadalcanal seriously. I believe they thought the US troops would be easily brushed aside and wasn't reall worth a major effort.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Bgile:

IIRC the Japanese didn't at first believe the US was capable of offensive infantry type attacks with the objective of retaking territory. They looked down on US soldiers and felt they lacked combat spirit and were completely inferior, so they didn't at first take the invasion of Guadalcanal seriously. I believe they thought the US troops would be easily brushed aside and wasn't reall worth a major effort.

The underestimation of the enemy is such a deadly sin, such a stupid act... And you find it in every page of military history, and it has deep roots in the demagogic claims of dictators and public leaders and the ignorance and foolishness of an overgrown and insane patriotism...

Tiornu:

The Decisive Battle (Kantai kessen) was to result from an American thrust into Japan's "home field," much as we see at Tsushima. This puts the Americans at a weakened state and allows for the Attrition Campaign (Zengen sakusen) before a final clash of Big Ships, Bug Guns (Taikan kyohô). The Decisive Battle was more specific than simply a big battle with potentially decisive results.

Thanks a lot for clearing this up : that explains a lot about the odd conduct the Japanese had during the early stages of the Pacific Campaign. It´s simply stunning how they didn´t exploit their initial superiority and strategic freedom in their operation theater. After Pearl they lacked of bold and real agressive moves to make sure the USN to be completely destroyed, as a matter of fact, they gave the USN the oportunity to build up forces and regroup.

[RF]

The Japanese had no direct experience of US ground forces in action since the 1900 Boxer Rebellion in China, so didn't take the US threat seriously, despite the warnings of Yammamoto.

The Guadalcanal campaign and the land campaign in New Guinea showed that the Japanese had logistically overreached themselves - from which there was no comeback.

[lwd]

.... It´s simply stunning how they didn´t exploit their initial superiority and strategic freedom in their operation theater. After Pearl they lacked of bold and real agressive moves to make sure the USN to be completely destroyed, as a matter of fact, they gave the USN the oportunity to build up forces and regroup.

But did they really have the freedom to do this? Remember they were operating under a severe limitation in regards to fuel. And once they took the Dutch oil fields they found out that it was going to be quite a while before they would be operational again. Then there is the problem of being too successful. They fully expected to loose some CVs at Pearl they didn't expect to gain nearly as much as they did for as little loss in the opening stages. Germany had much the same problem after the fall of France. They had concetrated heavily on it and indeed it was hard to plan past it given the uncertainties in that campaign much like the uncertainties in Japan's opening campaigns.

The Japanese had no direct experience of US ground forces in action since the 1900 Boxer Rebellion in China, so didn't take the US threat seriously, despite the warnings of Yammamoto...

The Philipines doesn't qualify?

[RF]

I was referring to prior to 7 December 1941.

Bataan and Corrigidor were not exactly the sort of test to be appreciated by the Japanese as the American and Philippino forces eventually surrendered.....

[Bgile]

I was referring to prior to 7 December 1941.

Bataan and Corrigidor were not exactly the sort of test to be appreciated by the Japanese as the American and Philippino forces eventually surrendered.....

Exactly, that's the whole point. They had no reason to respect US combat capability.

[Dave Saxton]

Yes, Guadalcanal was the decisive struggle in the Pacific. Any reading of Frank makes that clear. A problem for the Japanese in this campaign and indeed as a whole was they were not unified in purpose. The IJA and the IJN were not on the same page. Guadalcanal came about from both sides confronting the classic problem of: "now what?"

For the Americans it started as simply a way to capatalize on the momentum carried over from the unexpected victory at Midway. Adm King had to push hard to bring this about, as the overall game plan was "Germany first", and most resources were being put into Torch at the time. The occupation of an airstrip created a situation of the Americans occupying a position that the enemy could not tolorate. The Americans had to be removed at all costs, if possible. Thus the Japanese found themselves in the position of fighting a battle they did not want, and one they were badly positioned to win. For the Japanese, Guadalcanal became a massive sink hole for men and materials, that cost them the war. It was the strategy the IJN had vagualy envisioned as a way to deal with the Americans; turned on it's head.

Reality, had forced the the IJN to rethink the long held decisive battle doctrine. The new IJN plan was to consolidate gains so strongly, that the Americans, with painful and shocking losses already inflicted against them, would find it too expensive in blood and treasure to wrestle it away from the Japanese, and would seek to negotiate. After this new strategy failed, the IJN was faced with "what now?"

The IJA was already bogged down in Asia and really didn't like the IJN's new approach, but the IJA was even more strongly steeped in bushido, and they held that the "weak willed Americans" would not have the stomach to fight out a long campaign of attrition. The IJA thought that they could eventually win a attrition campaign in the Solomons. In actuallity the Americans won the battle of attrition, especially in the air, as Slew McCain predicted. Both the IJN and the IJA were hoping that the Americans would defeat themselves, but not in the same exact way.

At Guadalcanal it was the IJA that set about removing the Americans. Yamamoto, was not really in agreement with the Generals to force the issue at Guadalcanal, but he saw it first as a possible way to perhaps force the USN into fight were he might inflict them with a loss.

Key to the American victory was the replacement of the defeatist and pessimistic Ghormley with Halsey. As one American Marine put it:

"Before Halsey we didn't know if we could prevail, after Halsey, the very minute he took command, we knew we couldn't loose."

[RF]

I was referring to prior to 7 December 1941.

Bataan and Corrigidor were not exactly the sort of test to be appreciated by the Japanese as the American and Philippino forces eventually surrendered.....

Exactly, that's the whole point. They had no reason to respect US combat capability.

I think you have mis-read my admittedly somewhat cryptic point. The fact that the Americans surrendered was considered a disgrace by the Japanese and they did overlook the difficulties they posed for General Homma before they surrendered. That is what I mean't by saying it was a test not appreciated by the Japanese - they didn't learn from it.

They also ignored the spirited defence of Wake Island.