Doomed to fail

[HMSVF]

Hi all.


I've been pondering. Why did the Grand Fleet deploy armored cruisers at Jutland. They were not particularly fast (23 knots) so they were hardly likely to be able to scout far beyond the main body of the fleet. They were (reasonably) well armed but would be outmatched by the German battlecruisers and would only have a very small margin of speed against the German battleships. I wouldn't fancy their chances if they were torpedoed, so unless they can take out torpedo boats quickly I wouldn't want them acting as a screen. Did any of them have director fire?

I just don't get why the RN deployed them at Jutland. Too big to go unnoticed, to weak to fight their way out, too slow to get away. A lot is made of Mauve's participation at Jutland with his pre-dreadnoughts, but apart from Pommern they all got back. The deployment of armoured cruisers seems extreme folly.

[Byron Angel]

Hi HMSVF
It is my understanding that the GF faced a shortage of light cruisers at the time.

A look at the GF cruising formation suggests that Jellicoe exercised considerable caution with respect to the deployment of his armored cruisers. They were not placed out front.

My thoughts, anyways.

Byron

[pikeshot1600]

Hi HMSVF
It is my understanding that the GF faced a shortage of light cruisers at the time.

A look at the GF cruising formation suggests that Jellicoe exercised considerable caution with respect to the deployment of his armored cruisers. They were not placed out front.

My thoughts, anyways.

Byron

I am new here, so hold your fire . By the middle 1910s, navies were mostly trying to find a use for armored cruisers. After Coronel and Falklands they did not seem to hold much promise any longer. Commerce raiding by surface units was always a fallacy IMO, and that function soon became more the role of submarines. What the AC could offer was firepower in opposition to light forces.

I can't claim familiarity with blow-by-blow accounts of Jutland, but the ACs were probably meant mostly for countering torpedo armed ships with their longer-range guns, keeping them further from the battle line(s). The light cruisers were scouting; the destroyers were screening, and the ACs might be able to engage German "torpedo boats" (i.e., destroyers) that were able to evade the screen and threaten the capital ships. Just another thought.

[HMSVF]

Hi HMSVF
It is my understanding that the GF faced a shortage of light cruisers at the time.

A look at the GF cruising formation suggests that Jellicoe exercised considerable caution with respect to the deployment of his armored cruisers. They were not placed out front.

My thoughts, anyways.

Byron

Thanks Byron for the reply!

I just find it staggering that these ships were placed in line of battle in the North Sea. Mediterranean ? Yes. Raider hunting. Yep. Enforcing the blockade? Sure.

It makes sense what you say (in regards to a shortage of light cruisers) as to why they were brought along. Perhaps my view is tainted by Arbuthnots "charge of the light brigade" and HMS Black Prince's calamity.

[Byron Angel]

Hi HMSVF
It is my understanding that the GF faced a shortage of light cruisers at the time.

A look at the GF cruising formation suggests that Jellicoe exercised considerable caution with respect to the deployment of his armored cruisers. They were not placed out front.

My thoughts, anyways.

Byron

Thanks Byron for the reply!

I just find it staggering that these ships were placed in line of battle in the North Sea. Mediterranean ? Yes. Raider hunting. Yep. Enforcing the blockade? Sure.

It makes sense what you say (in regards to a shortage of light cruisers) as to why they were brought along. Perhaps my view is tainted by Arbuthnot's "charge of the light brigade" and HMS Black Prince's calamity.

Hi HMSVF,
In Jellicoe's book "The Grand Fleet 1914-1916" (go to archive.org if you don't hold a copy of the book proper) he commented (pg. 397) -

"The shipbuilding programmes of 1908-09, and following years up to 1912-13, included provisions for twenty destroyers each year. Subsequent to the latter date, the programme of destroyers was somewhat reduced in order to provide for light cruisers, a class of vessels in which we were woefully deficient. In spite of the continual rise in the Estimates (naval budget), there was never sufficient money to meet all the Admiralty's needs. It was intimated that one or other of the requirements had to give way at a time when the Navy Estimates were mounting up year by year, and as the light cruisers were considered to be even more necessary than the destroyers, the number of the latter class of vessel was reduced.

Although, in spite of the great destroyer programme initiated by Lord Fisher at the end of 1914, the shortage of destroyers was most seriously felt throughout the whole War, the conditions would probably have been even worse had the pre-War programme of light cruisers been sacrificed to maintain the output of destroyers to the standard desired by the Admiralty."

At Jutland,

The Grand Fleet had the following cruiser squadrons attached -
1st Cruiser Squadron - Defence, Duke of Edinburgh, Warrior, Black Prince
2nd Cruiser Squadron - Minotaur, Cochrane, Hampshire, Shannon
4th Light Cruiser Squadron - Calliope, Constance, Caroline, Comus, Royalist

The Battle Cruiser Fleet had the following cruiser squadrons attached -
1st Light Cruiser Squadron - Galatea, Inconstant, Phaeton, Cordelia
Second Light Cruiser Squadron - Southampton, Nottingham, Birmingham, Dublin
Third Light Cruiser Squadron - Falmouth, Birkenhead, Yarmouth Gloucester

Perhaps another 8-10 light cruisers were attached as super-numeraries to various Grand Fleet flagships or served as destroyer flotilla leaders.

I tend not to think too harshly of Admiral Arbuthnot. He lost his career advancement prospects in the Scarborough Raid when he scrupulously followed long-standing fleet protocol of withholding fire until the squadron flagship fired; he lost his life and his ship by following standing Grand Fleet order that obliged him to promptly engage any enemy light cruisers or torpedo boats within torpedo range of the main body (i.e. SMS Wiesbaden). He had no idea Scheer and Hipper were so near until they suddenly emerged from the gloom at 8,000 yards range. Arbuthnot, through no fault of his own IMO, didn't stand a chance.

Same with Black Prince: she was stumbling around in pitch darkness and had the misfortune of running afoul of a German dreadnought at point-blank range instead of a torpedo boat or light cruiser.

FWIW

Byron

[Byron Angel]

I am new here, so hold your fire . By the middle 1910s, navies were mostly trying to find a use for armored cruisers. After Coronel and Falklands they did not seem to hold much promise any longer. Commerce raiding by surface units was always a fallacy IMO, and that function soon became more the role of submarines. What the AC could offer was firepower in opposition to light forces.

I can't claim familiarity with blow-by-blow accounts of Jutland, but the ACs were probably meant mostly for countering torpedo armed ships with their longer-range guns, keeping them further from the battle line(s). The light cruisers were scouting; the destroyers were screening, and the ACs might be able to engage German "torpedo boats" (i.e., destroyers) that were able to evade the screen and threaten the capital ships. Just another thought.

Welcome aboard, sir.
I would never fire upon anyone who has flashed the proper recognition signal. I agree with your assessment of the duties expected to be performed by the armored cruiser squadrons once assigned to the GF.

The only point I would dispute is the notion that raiding of oceanic trade lanes by armored cruisers was a fallacy. As I read the history, that is exactly the envisioned mission that inspired the French 'Jeune Ecole' around the turn of the century to construct great numbers of armored cruisers which, in consequence, induced Great Britain to build in similar numbers in order to counter the threat.

Byron

[wadinga]

Hi All,

HMS Queen Mary's plans, shown on a recent Jutland TV documentary are marked "Armoured cruiser to be named Queen Mary". The evolution of that type into what would be called the "New Generation" battlecruiser was so fast, ships like Defence and Warrior were rendered somewhat obsolete shortly after completion.

Just as those older ships had a reasonable speed margin over the 18 knot pre-Dreadnoughts, the new generation needed a speed margin over the turbine Dreadnought fleet. Those older armoured cruisers might just be a useful shield against enemy light cruisers at Jutland, but would be in trouble if they were set upon by enemy battlecruisers. See Blucher. As HMSVF said they were close to being the British equivalent of Mauve's 5-minute ships. BTW Mauve was lucky, his ships were left behind by Scheer initially so were hardly present at the gunfight and during the night, well they were just plain lucky. Except Pommern.

The German ACs were nearly all sunk by 1916, so were not available.

As for Arbuthnot, I think he might have figured out Beatty was shooting at something big, those shell splashes weren't from popguns and charging across his bows so close Lion had to turn to avoid colliding with him was poor tactics, by any standard. Kent and Cornwall did a good job at the Falklands battle despite being under-armed ACs and if poor old Kit Cradock had Defence with him as planned, Von Spee might have taken some hard knocks.

German WWI submarines made it out to the Mediterranean, but were not able to range the world's oceans looking for prey, they did most of their killing around the UK. Cruisers could go worldwide.

Welcome indeed Pikeshot.

All the best

wadinga

[pikeshot1600]

I am new here, so hold your fire . By the middle 1910s, navies were mostly trying to find a use for armored cruisers. After Coronel and Falklands they did not seem to hold much promise any longer. Commerce raiding by surface units was always a fallacy IMO, and that function soon became more the role of submarines. What the AC could offer was firepower in opposition to light forces.

I can't claim familiarity with blow-by-blow accounts of Jutland, but the ACs were probably meant mostly for countering torpedo armed ships with their longer-range guns, keeping them further from the battle line(s). The light cruisers were scouting; the destroyers were screening, and the ACs might be able to engage German "torpedo boats" (i.e., destroyers) that were able to evade the screen and threaten the capital ships. Just another thought.

Welcome aboard, sir.
I would never fire upon anyone who has flashed the proper recognition signal. I agree with your assessment of the duties expected to be performed by the armored cruiser squadrons once assigned to the GF.

The only point I would dispute is the notion that raiding of oceanic trade lanes by armored cruisers was a fallacy. As I read the history, that is exactly the envisioned mission that inspired the French 'Jeune Ecole' around the turn of the century to construct great numbers of armored cruisers which, in consequence, induced Great Britain to build in similar numbers in order to counter the threat.

Byron

Thank you for the welcome.

The idea of the AC as a commerce raider seemed to have attraction for proponents of the Jeune Ecole, but the concept was hardly put into practice (AFAIK). In the three naval wars from 1894 to 1905 these ships did not play such a role. The USN used them as gun platforms against inferior opponents and the Japanese were rather forced to use ACs in the battle line when the IJN had lost 1/3 of its battleships to mines.

Other than that, these ships exhibited a naval presence and showed the flag. Even by the late 1890s they were too slow to lead cruisers and destroyers, and by about 1905-06 navies were no longer planning such ships. I don't know of any of them having turbine propulsion, but after a large ship like Dreadnought appeared with turbines, armored cruisers were essentially wastes of manpower and resources.

The USN built ten of these between 1905 and 1908 (and three more, 1905-06, smaller ships that were so unsuccessful that they were soon acting as depot ships and tenders). They did not provide much practical impact for the fleet, and they cost money better spent on battleships. As flagships of cruiser or destroyer squadrons, they had no use as those ship types were exceeding 30 kts as opposed to the ACs' speed of about 22 kts. As a scouting force in the Pacific, they would have been too few for that vast ocean as a watch on Japanese intentions.

That is my rant. The Jeune Ecole was a doctrine for relatively weak navies before about the mid 1890s, but by the turn of the 20th century even the French were building capital ships (again). One might think the only reason to have these ships was that other navies had them. They were costly and had battleship-size crews.

[Byron Angel]

Thank you for the welcome.

>>>>> Hi pikeshot. You are quite welcome.

- - - - -

The idea of the AC as a commerce raider seemed to have attraction for proponents of the Jeune Ecole, but the concept was hardly put into practice (AFAIK). In the three naval wars from 1894 to 1905 these ships did not play such a role. The USN used them as gun platforms against inferior opponents and the Japanese were rather forced to use ACs in the battle line when the IJN had lost 1/3 of its battleships to mines.

>>>>> I recently ran across this USN Office of Naval Intelligence document by happenstance and offer it here for for contemporary context -

The Use of the Armored Cruiser
By Dipl. Eng. Meienreis
(Ueberall, August, 1912)
Translated by Commander H. F. Bryan, USN

"It was pointed out in the first part of this essay, that scouting and resistance to hostile scouting form the second role of the armored cruiser. The idea of using the armored cruiser systematically for scouting service is not very old; it received its first clear expression at the beginning of this century. England, with the Cressy Class (1899-1901), returned to the practice of giving her large cruisers a water line belt of face hardened armor; and therefore built armored cruisers in place of the protected cruiser which had been preferred for 13 years. This Cressy Class, and its successor, the Drake Class (1901) were thought to be rather a reply to the French armored cruisers which were especially designed for commerce destroying, than typical scout cruisers of the battle fleet. Nevertheless, this latter purpose was clearly expressed in the Kent Class (1901, 1902) which displace over 4,000 tons less than their immediate predecessors, and have no heavy guns, and were given reduced armor and coal capacity to permit an increased speed, which in the last ship of the class exceeded 24.5 knots; and therefore exceeded the speed of the earlier class by about one knot. The building of the ten ships of this class can only be understood if they are considered as typical scouts which could push this service home against hostile light cruisers. England again abandoned the purpose of using her armored cruisers solely as scouts with her next large cruisers, which, with a speed one knot less, again developed greater fighting power, until, in 1907, in the Invincible Class, the jump was made to the one-caliber ship with an increased speed of three knots."

Prior to their strategic rapproachment (from 1904), Great Britain had long viewed France as its principal strategic competitor in a naval sense. France knew that it was economically unable to match the Royal Navy's battle fleet, so the Jeune Ecole succeeded in re-framing French naval strategy to focus upon Britain's maritime trade. Per "French Warships of World War 1" by Couhat, here is France's construction program for cruisers over the period leading up to WW1:

ARMORED CRUISERS (laid down between 1889/1906; completed between 1895/1910)
Amiral Charner Class (3 ships) - 4700t - 18.5 kts - Radius ?
Pothuau Class (1 ship) - 5365t - 19 kts - Radius 4500m @ 10 kts
Jeanne d'Arc Class (1 ship) - 11270t - 23 kts - Radius 13500m @ 10 kts
Kleber Class (3 ships) - 7700t - 21 kts - Radius 6400m @ 10 kts
Gueydon Class (3 ships) - 9500t - 21 kts - Radius 10000m @ 10 kts
Amiral Aube Class (4 ships) - 10400t - 21.4 kts - Radius 12000m @ 10 kts
Leon Gambetta Class (3 ships) - 12550t - 22 kts - Radius 12000m @ 10 kts
Jules Michelet Class (1 ship) - 12600t - 23 kts - Radius 12000m @ 10 kts
Ernest Renan Class (1 ship) - 13644t - 23 kts - Radius 10000m @ 10 kts
Waldeck Rousseau Class (2 ships) - 14000t - 23 kts - Radius 10,000m @ 10 kts

Totals - 22 ships; 215,849t



PROTECTED CRUISERS (laid down between 1891/1895; completed between 1891/1902)
Friant Class (3 ships) - 3800-4000t - 19 kts - Radius 6000m @ 10 kts
D'Entrecasteaux Class (1 ship) - 8114t - 19.5 kts - Radius 5000m @ 10 kts
Chateaurenault Class (1 ship) - 8200t - 23 kts - Radius 7500m @ 12 kts
Jurien de la Graviere Class (1 ship) - 5700t - <23 kts - Radius 6150m @ 10 kts
Guichen Class (1 ship) - 8300t - 23 kts - Radius 7500m @ 12 kts
Descartes Class (1 ship) - 4000t - 19 kts - Radius 6000m @ 10 kts

Totals - 8 ships; 45,714t


THIRD CLASS CRUISERS (laid down between 1886/1893; completed between 1890/1899)
Surcouf Class (3 ships) - 1850t - 19 kts - Radius 1800m @ 17.5 kts
D'Estrees Class (1 ship) - 2450t - 21 kts - Radius 5700m @ 10 kts
Lavoisier Class (1 ship) - 2300t - 20 kts - Radius 3000m @ 10 kts

Totals - 5 ships; 10,300t


SCOUT CRUISERS (first 3 of 10 ship class scheduled to be laid down in 1914; entire project cancelled)
Lamotte Picquet Class (10 ships projected) - 4500t - 29 kts - Radius 3300m @ 16 kts

Totals - 0 ships; 0 tons


In the period from 1900 to 1906, 11 armored cruisers (total of ~135,500t) were laid down in French building yards compared to only 6 new pre-dreadnought battleships (total of ~93,400t). Immediately after the formal signing of the of the Triple Entente agreement between France, Russia and Great Britain (1907?), no more armored cruisers were laid down by France and five more Danton Class PD's were immediately laid down in 1907/1908. Interesting (to me at least).

- - - - -

Other than that, these ships exhibited a naval presence and showed the flag. Even by the late 1890s they were too slow to lead cruisers and destroyers, and by about 1905-06 navies were no longer planning such ships. I don't know of any of them having turbine propulsion, but after a large ship like Dreadnought appeared with turbines, armored cruisers were essentially wastes of manpower and resources.

>>>>> The French navy really had no scout/light cruisers to lead during that period.

>>>>> The first French warships to actually go to sea with turbine propulsion (TTBOMK) were the six Danton Class pre-dreadnoughts (completed in 1911) and the Chasseur Class 450t destroyers (completed 1909-1911)

>>>>> The introduction of HMS Invincible and her consorts spelled the end of commerce destroying and trade lane interdiction as a viable naval campaign strategy.

- - - - -

That is my rant. The Jeune Ecole was a doctrine for relatively weak navies before about the mid 1890s, but by the turn of the 20th century even the French were building capital ships (again). One might think the only reason to have these ships was that other navies had them. They were costly and had battleship-size crews.

>>>>> Armored cruisers and commerce raiding were the only affordable naval option available to a nation in France's position. That is why the agreement of Great Britain to join with France and Russia to establish the Triple Entente was so crucial ..... but that is another trail for another day.

B

[Byron Angel]

As for Arbuthnot, I think he might have figured out Beatty was shooting at something big, those shell splashes weren't from popguns and charging across his bows so close Lion had to turn to avoid colliding with him was poor tactics, by any standard. Kent and Cornwall did a good job at the Falklands battle despite being under-armed ACs and if poor old Kit Cradock had Defence with him as planned, Von Spee might have taken some hard knocks.

From the looks of Lion's gunnery log, visibility was extremely poor at the time Arbuthnot cut across the path of the BCF. It only indicates (IIRC) two or three salvoes being fired over a period of about 15 minutes. Whatever the exact nature of the situation, Arbuthnot IMO really had no choice in the matter. The GF was in the midst of its deployment. Arbuthnot had 2SG in the immediate vicinity and Wiesbaden (whose exact state was unknown to him) within torpedo range of of the GF's deployment path. As commander of a cruiser squadron, it was his clear task to keep enemy light forces away from the main body.

According to Paschen (Lutzow's gunnery officer), Defence shocked everyone when she suddenly loomed out of the murk at <8000 yards. Prior to that moment, they could see nothing to shoot at.

HMS Warrior's account ("The Fighting at Jutland" - "The Wrecking of Arbuthnot's Squadron" - my page 161) -
"As we closed the Wiesbaden, we passed about a mile ahead of our battle cruiser squadron, and came under a heavy fire from the enemy battle cruisers and subsequently from the enemy battleships, but, in spite of being under this heavy fire, we were for some time unable to see the enemy, as the were hidden by mist and smoke and at no time were there more than three enemy ships visible. It was peculiarly annoying to be having the enemy's heavy salvoes falling close to us without being able either to see the ships which were firing, or make a useful report of the position, course, and speed of their battle fleet to the Commander-in-Chief - always the principal duty of a cruiser. I well remember looking back to the north-eastward, and seeing how clearly our battleships showed up in that direction against a bright skyline."

FWIW.

B

[wadinga]

Hello Byron, Pikeshot, HMSVF and all,

Interestingly, in British cruisers of the Victorian Era, Friedman has a completely different view to Dipl. Eng. Meienreis about The County class. He contradicts:

This Cressy Class, and its successor, the Drake Class (1901) were thought to be rather a reply to the French armored cruisers which were especially designed for commerce destroying, than typical scout cruisers of the battle fleet. Nevertheless, this latter purpose was clearly expressed in the Kent Class (1901, 1902) which displace over 4,000 tons less than their immediate predecessors, and have no heavy guns, and were given reduced armor and coal capacity to permit an increased speed, which in the last ship of the class exceeded 24.5 knots; and therefore exceeded the speed of the earlier class by about one knot. The building of the ten ships of this class can only be understood if they are considered as typical scouts which could push this service home against hostile light cruisers.

over the reduction in displacement and gun armament for the Counties. He says they were

primarily counters to the new "corsair cruisers" Chateaurenault and Guichen which had been modelled on the US cruisers Columbia and Minneapolis

and mentions Russian designs as well. With more ships for a given budget they could be spread in more locations around the world on trade protection duties, for which their smaller calibre guns would be adequate. With the succeeding Devonshires gun calibre went up and in later designs maximum calibre went up to 9.2" as these ships were expected to act as his chapter title says- as "The Fast Wing of the Battle Fleet". A battle fleet composed of 18 knot Pre-Dreadnoughts, however. The later concept of an all 9.2" armed super armoured cruiser proposed by Fisher evolved before birth into the "Invincibles", designed to be the fast wing for the new turbine Dreadnought battlefleet. As noted these ships and their successors up until 1911 continued to be called Armoured Cruisers.

The Germans did operate a very successful "Guerre de Corse" with Emden and Konigsberg, early on, and Von Spee might have done more overall damage to British commerce and interests, and been harder to find, by splitting all of his squadron up, to operate independently, instead of trying to get it home in pretty much one piece. Unlike the French danger, Imperial Germany did not have the overseas possessions to support so many raiders against British world trade. Any ordinary British cruiser would be lucky to survive a one-on-one encounter with either Scharnhorst or Gneisenau. Individual ships might survive by living off captured colliers in a way his combined squadron couldn't. Later tramp steamer type raiders like Mowe and Wolf were more successful than warships because they were more economical with fuel.

With so much of the world's trade carried in British hulls there was little opportunity for Guerre de Corse in the Sino-Japanese, American Spanish or Russo-Japanese conflicts, although the Russians tried to halt Japanese trade with armoured cruisers based in Vladivostok.

According to Campbell Arbuthnot's attack on the 2nd Scouting Group started as early as 17:53. Both Duke of Edinburgh and Black Prince sheered away as their leader and second cut across Beatty's bows so close Lion had to turn to avoid him at 18:15. "One mile", really? Lion had been hit by Lutzow at 18:05. Paschen (Staff Skagerrak p105 describes his surprise when Defence cut into his periscope view, presumably when he was targetting Lion and the confusion imagining this new vessel was Rostock before he opened fire. Campbell says Arbuthnot was being straddled by heavy salvoes from about 18:13. Staff p107 says Kaiser was firing on Defence from 18:18.

Any discussion of Jutland, especially attempts to compare gunnery and its efficiency by either side should pay attention to comments like this

I well remember looking back to the north-eastward, and seeing how clearly our battleships showed up in that direction against a bright skyline."

There are quotes from the other side too, confirming differing visibility in reciprocal directions.

All the best

wadinga

[Byron Angel]

As for Arbuthnot, I think he might have figured out Beatty was shooting at something big, those shell splashes weren't from popguns and charging across his bows so close Lion had to turn to avoid colliding with him was poor tactics, by any standard. Kent and Cornwall did a good job at the Falklands battle despite being under-armed ACs and if poor old Kit Cradock had Defence with him as planned, Von Spee might have taken some hard knocks.

>>>>> Arbuthnot was neither a rash nor stupid commander. Close examination of Harper's relevant track charts on the Jutland 1916 website and Campbell's charts IV (pg 106) and V (pg 148) in "Jutland - an Analysis of the Fighting", show IMO that Arbuthnot made the correct decision when he opted to pass across the BCF's path. i.e.- for the same reason that the BCF had shortly beforehand made a material course alteration to starboard: i.e.- to stay out of "Windy Corner" and avoid risking a disruption of the deployment of the fleet into battle line.

B

[wadinga]

Hello Byron and all,

As this discussion is about any remaining value in armoured cruisers by 1916 as opposed to the actions of any one officer so it would not be right to get too obsessed by Arbuthnot's action.

These were still powerful vessels and with Dreadnought strength concentrated in the North Sea for the primary tussle, they could act as mini-battleships and provide the core for squadrons overseas. Just as the battleline was not expected to be as fast as accompanying destroyers or light cruisers, their lower speed was not such a problem.

HMSVF's original point is, why were they retained for Grand Fleet scouting and his points are all correct IMHO. However, the problem was that with the detachment and renaming of the BCS to the Battlecruiser Fleet they became an independent unit. Operating at 50-60 miles away from the Grand Fleet they were not really providing the Scouting function any more. It was fortuitous Hipper actually led Beatty to the HSF, as I suspect for a very few minutes Hipper may actually have considered abandoning the Plan, and making his escape into the Kattegat, before he decided to fall back on Scheer. Beatty could have spent the whole day fighting with Hipper and never seen or reported Scheer.

Actually performing the scouting function for Jellicoe was Hood's squadron, far enough ahead, but deployed as a compact force but not spread widely enough. Somewhat closer the armoured cruisers, according to Harper's no. 2 plan on 1916.com were spread out across the GF's frontage. The interdiction of German torpedo boats was the business of British Torpedo Boat Destroyers with their superior gun armament, but the armoured cruisers weapons would be a powerful backup. It would be a worry if they were so far ahead they might be destroyed by enemy battlecruisers before the GF could come to their aid. Only the functional failure of the German scouts, both 2nd and 1st AG to be far enough ahead of Scheer to warn him he was sailing into a trap, stopped the AC screen from fulfilling a useful purpose. As it was it was Hood's ships that rebuffed 2nd AG, not Arbuthnot.

Arbuthnot's tragedy was that the promotion system put men like him full of dash, vigour, aggression and disregard for personal safety in seniority positions where valuable ships with thousands of men's lives depended on them. Despite his seniority he would have been much better suited to destroyer flotillas where his devil-may-care, get-at-the enemy at all costs whatever the consequences attitude would have been perfect. The contrast between the dilatory behaviour of some British flotilla leaders during the night action and Arbuthnot's headlong charge could not be more marked. Incidentally, I am reminded of D’Oyly-Hughes and Glorious in WWII, another firecracker who should never have been let loose with such a valuable and complex asset, but would have been perfect if retained in destroyers.

I therefore cannot personally agree with Byron's assessment of Arbuthnot, whose enthusiasm for fisticuffs was a different kind of crew control, but feel Andrew Gordon, after detailing his many eccentricities, drawing the conclusion (Rules of the Game p392) that he was,

in a colloquial, if not clinical sense, insane

is a bit strong. However Chatfield's account of the close encounter reinforces my feeling he should been given a more expendable, manoeuvrable and hard to hit command.

At that exciting moment I saw the First Cruiser Squadron leading from port to starboard across my bows. It was clear that unless I altered course drastically I should collide with one of his ships, so I jammed the Lion's helm over and swung her under the stern of the second cruiser, which only cleared us by a cable's length. [600ft Warrior was 500ft long} By forcing the Battlecruiser Squadron off its course in the low visibility, which was then only five miles, Arbuthnot caused us to lose sight of the enemy fleet and he himself took the place of the battlecruisers as the enemy's target.

All the best

wadinga

[pikeshot1600]

@wadinga, Byron, et.al.,

The last post mentioned "As this discussion is about any remaining value in armoured cruisers by 1916..." Aside from the old Brooklyn and New York (antediluvian relics from the mid 1890s), the USN had built ten CAs (ACRs in contemporary nomen.) that remained in service through WW I. These had been commissioned from 1905 to 1908, and with the appearance of the Royal Navy's battlecruisers were already effectively obsolete.

All ten of these 14,000 - 15,000 ton ships, that required about 8,000 crew, wound up being used as escorts, troop transports and in "showing the flag." Maybe they impressed someone, but at quite a cost. Essentially, they had precluded the USN from building a light cruiser force (costs and politics) that would have been much more economical - and useful.

Not that it had to do with Jutland and the World war, but in the early years following the Washington naval treaty it was thought the eight remaining CAs might be rearmed and given modern power plants and used as a scouting force. That idea soon was discarded for engineering and other technical reasons. The new cruisers allowed by the treaty would be far more practical, and the old ships were...too old.

By 1916, or before, the CAs were useful only as gunfire support for light forces, and their presence with a battle fleet, as at Jutland, was ill advised. The navies had them so they used them; sort of a case of 'you go to war with the navy you have.'

[Byron Angel]

Go here - http://www.dreadnoughtproject.org/tfs/i ... th_Baronet -
Read carefully. Compare the treatment of Arbuthnot after he scrupulously followed conservative navy protocol during the Scarborough Raid.
Arbuthnot carried out his squadron's assigned duty at Jutland.

See Molteno's personal account of Warrior's participation at Jutland ("Fighting at Jutland" p.160) -
"As we closed the Wiesbaden, we passed about a mile ahead of our battle cruiser squadron, ....."

Warrior's official report in the OD makes no mention of any collision close call between 1CS and 1BCS.

Beatty's report (OD - p.136) makes no comment about a collision close call - "At 6.15pm "Defence" and "Warrior" crossed our bows from Port to Starboard, necessitating our hauling to Port to clear".

Chatfield's report (OD - p.144) makes no comment about a collision close call - ""Defence" and "Warrior" now crossed "Lion's" bow and were engaging a Light German Cruiser, who was seriously injured by them. This caused "Lion" to cease fire and to lose touch with the enemy."

De Brock's (VAdm - BCF) report (OD - p.149) makes no comment about a collision close call - "The First Cruiser Squadron was apparently engaging a Light Cruiser, and stood out across the Lion's bows, necessitating an alteration of course of Battle Cruisers to port." Not to mention that Arbuthnot's action drew the fire of Scheer's powerful 3BS away from the BCF and onto 1CS.

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As for Gordon's "insane" remark ... it's not the only excursion into florid language to be found in "Rules of the Game". The Admiralty did not, I would imagine, entertain the idea of insane individuals for higher command posts. Arbuthnot, despite quirks, was nevertheless recommended in Jan 1915 for command of the newly minted 2BCS by no less a personage than Admiral Jellicoe (himself hardly to be considered a fire-breather). Arbuthnot was an accomplished officer and well regarded within the service.