Doomed to fail

[wadinga]

Hi Byron and all,

It is hardly surprising that dispatches written shortly after the event would not highlight hazardous behaviour by an officer who had just given his life (and that of his entire crew) for his country. Such things were "not done", and would have been considered "bad form" even if common knowledge amongst witnesses and at that time the "blame culture" was more concerned with apportioning guilt between commanders as to why the Germans had got away.

As for Captain Molteno, admitting that he hazarded his own ship, and the flagship of the BCF, by diving across its bows such that, even after evasive manoeuvring, the latter missed him, at a closing speed approaching 40 knots, by just 600ft, would surely lead an enquiry to question his seamanship. It would be extremely embarrassing to say he had done so in unquestioning obedience to his Rear Admiral. Who then was at fault? (Markham or Tryon?) IMHO it would be very illuminating to access a report from Duke of Edinburgh's captain as to why he failed to follow his squadron leader and aborted the attempt.

Reading, extremely carefully, the life story and career of Arbuthnot on the Dreadnought project, It is hardly an unmitigated paean of praise. It to me suggests a highly conscientious and motivated character, but self-righteous in the extreme, with a tendency to serious lapses of judgement. These include for instance, his public speaking resulting in his dismissal as Captain of HMS Lord Nelson. Respect for his expertise and motivation helps him ever upward into promotion, but assessments are tempered with serious doubts about his handling of subordinates. Not such a problem within a ship's crew, where he is Master under God, but squadron commanders need a measure of diplomacy when dealing with their captains. Interestingly, "Martinet" is not really an unalloyed compliment but is also a punishment tool similar to a cat o' nine tails.

We will never know whether HMS Defence's captain questioned the order to turn the squadron to starboard across the BCF's bows when the rest of the Grand Fleet was turning to port. If there had been nobody else to engage SMS Wiesbaden this charge might have made sense, but many BCF and GF ships turned their guns on this target which they could see just as well as Arbuthnot. It would appear that his station on fleet deployment in gun range would indeed require a turn to starboard, but to take up a watching position astern.

The Chatfield description of a dangerously close shave comes from his memoirs written somewhat later when any sensitivity to criticism of war dead was lower and comes from a man who had considered Arbuthnot a staunch friend, but still recorded this factual account for posterity.

I find Gordon's "Rules of the Game" very informative, filling in the human side of history of the RN, and giving his professional historian's insight into the motives and behaviour of those attempting to handle enormous technological and social upheavals in the Service.

All the best

wadinga

[Byron Angel]

As for Captain Molteno, admitting that he hazarded his own ship, and the flagship of the BCF, by diving across its bows such that, even after evasive manoeuvring, the latter missed him, at a closing speed approaching 40 knots, by just 600ft, would surely lead an enquiry to question his seamanship. It would be extremely embarrassing to say he had done so in unquestioning obedience to his Rear Admiral. Who then was at fault? (Markham or Tryon?) IMHO it would be very illuminating to access a report from Duke of Edinburgh's captain as to why he failed to follow his squadron leader and aborted the attempt.

> The "closing rate" was ~25 knots, not 40 knots; a quick examination of the track chart should make that evident.
> Your 600 ft clearance distance stands upon the recollection of one participant writing a book for popular consumption twenty-five years after the event.
> Molteno cited clearance of a sea mile(6,000 ft) crossing ahead of the BCF column. None of the submitted reports in the OD bear the slightest inkling of disapprobation or criticism toward Molteno for his shiphandling, not even Chatfield. Your argument that any such criticism was withheld across the board out of respect for the loss of Defence is speculative (even Cradock was posthumously criticized (by some remarkably uninformed parties) after Coronel for having left Canopus and Otranto out of his battle line). Duke of Edinburgh veered away to port because her captain was uncomfortable about getting across the head of the BCF line, since he was just catching up to 1CS at the time and the interval between Duke Edinburgh and Warrior was likely a good deal more than three cables - the BCF column was about a mile long, moving at 24-25 kts, and would have interposed a barrier for several minutes. In short, Warrior was three cables astern of Defence and Molteno presumably judged that he could safely pass ahead of Lion with a bit of help from his big friend. Duke of Edinburgh was, according to the charts in the OD, never closed up into formation with 1CS and her captain Blackett wisely made way for the BCF. To be polite, this is comparing apples and oranges. Far dicier maneuvering, by an order of magnitude, was performed at "Windy Corner", with a mass of ships ringing up emergency helm, full stop and full astern to avoid collision.


Reading, extremely carefully, the life story and career of Arbuthnot on the Dreadnought project, It is hardly an unmitigated paean of praise. It to me suggests a highly conscientious and motivated character, but self-righteous in the extreme, with a tendency to serious lapses of judgement. These include for instance, his public speaking resulting in his dismissal as Captain of HMS Lord Nelson. Respect for his expertise and motivation helps him ever upward into promotion, but assessments are tempered with serious doubts about his handling of subordinates. Not such a problem within a ship's crew, where he is Master under God, but squadron commanders need a measure of diplomacy when dealing with their captains. Interestingly, "Martinet" is not really an unalloyed compliment but is also a punishment tool similar to a cat o' nine tails.

Name me any prominent flag officer in the RN who avoided criticism and controversy. Tryon? Fisher? Beresford? Sturdee? Troubridge? Jellicoe? Beatty? , Keyes?, Bacon? Milne? Moore? Even Nelson himself was criticized. That is just off the top of my head; It came with the territory. As for Arbuthnot, for all his faults real and implied, Jellicoe recommended him for command when 2BCS was formed and later sent him to 1CS to whip a disaffected squadron into shape.


We will never know whether HMS Defence's captain questioned the order to turn the squadron to starboard across the BCF's bows when the rest of the Grand Fleet was turning to port. If there had been nobody else to engage SMS Wiesbaden this charge might have made sense, but many BCF and GF ships turned their guns on this target which they could see just as well as Arbuthnot. It would appear that his station on fleet deployment in gun range would indeed require a turn to starboard, but to take up a watching position astern.

Read the Jutland GFBOs. The responsibility of 1CS and 2CS was to screen the advance of the main body and forestall any enemy light forces from attacking the main body with torpedoes. They were also the best armed ships in the screen to deal with the cruisers of 2AG ..... which is precisely why Arbuthnot went after Wiesbaden, situated, as she was, right in the crook of the GF's deployment (only just then commencing), with the BCF coming right across her front within torpedo range. Are you suggesting that Arbuthnot should have ignored both his orders and the threat on the grounds that "somebody else can take care of it"? Please.


I find Gordon's "Rules of the Game" very informative, filling in the human side of history of the RN, and giving his professional historian's insight into the motives and behaviour of those attempting to handle enormous technological and social upheavals in the Service.

I don't disagree. That's why I have kept a 1996 first edition copy sitting on my bookshelf for 26 years. None of that changes the fact that Gordon at times displays a snarky and florid writing style which I do much care for.

[NCC1717]

Looking at the tracks for Lion, Defence and Duke of Edinburgh in Harper track chart X (Plan of Action between Main Fleets 6 p.m. to 8 p.m. 31st May 1916) I have estimated various distances and speeds. A reduced excerpt of the chart and the associated data are attached.

Observations:

1. Duke of Edinburgh is shown turning south toward the course of the BCF at 6:08, two minutes before Defence. This may be the result of non-synchronized clocks or log errors. DofE never gets closer to Defence than 2,400 yards, and is much farther away from Defence when she turns eastward at 6:12 and 6:15 (presumably to avoid the BCF).

2. The distance between Defence and Lion when Defence crosses Lion’s track is 2,200 yards. Assuming Warrior is 3 cables (600 yards) behind Defence, she would pass closer to Lion at about 1,520 yards.

3. The track does not show Lion’s maneuver to avoid Defence, and the speed based on the plot between 6:08 and 6:20 does not indicate any radical extra maneuvers. This may be due to lack of correct or complete data for the track.

Regards,
NCC1717

[wadinga]

Hello MCC1717 and all,

Thank you for this excellent representation of part of Harper's resolved plan.

I hope we are all agreed that Gordon's "Rules of the Game" is an excellent work and in this context the Appendix II on the reliability of the tracks recorded by individual BCF and 6BS navigators is especially informative. It shows the vast variation between them starting from an artificially imposed common origin at 16:00. The ships end up many miles apart by the time of the alleged near collision. We must realise that Harper's resolved plan is certainly only the best approximation he could create based on these wildly varying records and therefore cannot really be used as evidence to "correct" eye witness accounts like Chatfield's.

This may be due to lack of correct or complete data for the track.

This is a very perceptive observation and Gordon describes the many reasons why this manually plotted data data is unreliable, including, for instance, loss of Lion's original plotting chart which blew out of the window and overboard. The accumulation of huge errors in DR/estimated positions during an action like this are unavoidable prior to modern electronic navigation. McCartney's recent work, locating the wrecks of Jutland and showing the unavoidable errors in Harper's study is something which must be borne in mind when looking at this "best guess".

If some would prefer to discount Chatfield's later life memory of the event, they are entitled to that opinion but I consider it valuable as I think it was "a truth that only now can be told" about a mistake made by a deceased friend many years previously. Time heals all wounds.

If, having jammed her helm over as her captain describes Lion was travelling close to a reciprocal of Defence's course I believe the closing rate might indeed have been close to 40 knots.

The threat represented by a stopped and burning Wiesbaden many thousands of yards away from the GF was minimal at best and not worth the risks Arbuthnot took. .

All the best

wadinga

[NCC1717]

In the attached file I have attempted to add a portion of the New Zealand track from the Official Dispatches to the Harper chart (the blurry gray line). The alignment of the two plots is very speculative. I rotated the NZ track clockwise about 15 degrees so that the course from 6:00 pm would be consistent with Lion’s course, and placed the 6:00 NZ position about 1800 yards behind Lion (three intervals of 3 cables, or about 2 minutes at 25 knots). Most of the rotation could be due to the difference between true and magnetic courses.

If following Lion, NZ’s turn to starboard at 6:15 would mean a turn to starboard by Lion at about 6:12. If the relationship between the NZ and Duke of Edinburgh tracks were correct (highly unlikely I admit) then it would indicate a close encounter between Lion and DofE about that time. NZ’s turn to port at 6:20, except for being about 5 minutes too late, would be consistent with the Chatfield autobiography's description of “forcing the Battle-Cruiser Squadron off its course” which "caused us to lose sight of the enemy fleet” (page 145 in my 1942 edition). Chatfield does not explicitly say it, but I am assuming that “swung her under the stern of their second cruiser” means a turn to port to avoid Warrior.

Regards,
NCC1717

[NCC1717]

This attached file is an excerpt from the Official History plot for 6:00 pm to 6:15 pm. I have estimated the 6:09 and 6:12 positions (red marks across the tracks) of Lion, Defence and Duke of Edinburgh using the speeds I calculated from the Harper track. In this reconstruction (by Corbett?) it appears that Lion and DofE maneuvered to avoid each other around 6:12. It also appears that at the time that Defence turns south (6:09), the projected course of Lion (the red line) would allow Defence and Warrior to pass well ahead of Lion.

Regards,
NCC1717

[Byron Angel]

Hi Warren,
Your attached map image attachment is a reproduced excerpt of Map No. 30 from Corbett's Naval Operations. At 6:15pm, Harper/Corbett Map No. 30 places Wiesbaden at approximately 7,000 yards on the starboard bow of Lion - a very good torpedo position.

Lion is on approx course ESE true with Arbuthnot dead ahead on course SSW (or SbyW) in the act of crossing Lion's bow about a half-mile ahead.

Arbuthnot's 1CS is the closest cruiser command to Wiesbaden, just over 6,000 yds distant.
3rd LCS is next closest, about 8,500 yds to the N.
4th LCS is about 13,000 yds away to the NNW.
1st LCS is about 16,000 away to the NW, but stuck amidst the divisions of the GF.
2nd LCS is about 20,000 yds to the W, bringing up the rear astern of 5BS.
2nd CS is out of the picture about 20,000 yds to the NE and steaming away from the action.

According to Corbett ("Naval Operations", Vol III, pg 358) - "The Battle Orders laid it down clearly that the first duty of cruisers in a fleet action was to engage the enemy's cruisers, ..."

According to Brooks ("The Battle of Jutland", pg 269) - "But, though immobilized, Wiesbaden was still in a position to fire torpedoes at the approaching BCF, so Arbuthnot's three cruisers continued to close their quarry on a course that was taking them into great danger."

After examining the track charts and texts, my belief is that Molteno's reference to one mile separation probably refers to the distance at which Lion passed astern of Warrior. Strictly my opinion, of course.

Byron

[NCC1717]

If we were to take the Corbett Official History plot no. 30 for 6:00 pm to 6:15 pm as correct (and I think that is a big IF) the following hypothetical narrative might be created:

6:09 pm
Defence is on a course SSE with Warrior following. The distance to Warrior in the cruising formation was 5 cables or 1000 yards. 1CS had been ordered to ‘close’ at 5:42 and to ‘open fire and engage the enemy’ at 5.53 (Brooks Table 7.9). Warrior may have had the speed to reduce the distance to Defence, or may have fallen farther behind if Defence accelerated. Plot 30 shows her still about 1000 yards behind at 6:00, but I do not know if that is based on any real data for that time. Lion and the BCF is to the WSW a little more than 3 miles away, but is nearly bow on, so there is plenty of room for Defence and Warrior to pass ahead even if they turn to the south, which they do. Duke of Edinburgh is to the west about 1.5 miles and heading SE to close. Lion turns ESE. Now there is still room for Defence to pass ahead, but Warrior may not, depending on how far astern she is. Based on what happens at 6:15, these courses should be safe.

6:10 – 6:11 pm
Duke of Edinburgh turns to parallel Defence’s course. This puts her on a course to pass astern of Lion, but not the rest of the BCF. A potential collision with Princess Royal or Tiger is about 3 minutes away.

6:12 pm
Lion turns to the SE. This puts her on a collision course with Warrior (based on what happens a few minutes later according to Chatfield’s book).

6:13 pm
Duke of Edinburgh turns SE, presumably to avoid the BCF.

6:15 pm
Lion turns to port to pass behind Warrior.

Very speculatively,
NCC1717

[wadinga]

NCC1717, Byron et al,

These published maps show no avoiding action at all by Lion, nor apparently any need for it. Byron, is there anything in Lion's gunnery record to confirm Lion made a major course change to port as Chatfield describes?

NCC1717, do you have access to Rules of the Game as the Appendix shows how much difference is intrinsic in the NZ track relative to Lion? Interestingly, it is also very different to Rear Admiral Pakenham's plot recorded aboard the same vessel (NZ). Gordon, as you have done, rotated some because of the difference between magnetic and gyro compass. All the separate BC tracks show a major turn to starboard at 18:00 of about 45 degrees. Annoyingly, Gordon does not include many time marks but while the NZ track shows a straight line until 18:15ish (consistent with Harper) with another major turn to starboard annotated below as 18:15 with a further turn to starboard (18:17?) until a major turn to port at 18:30. The Lion and Princess Royal and Pakenham tracks all show a major turn to port of about 45 degrees at about 18:15. The first two show a more than compensating turn back to starboard about 5 mins later ie about 18:20. These two turns recorded by the two leading ships (a Jink to port to avoid collision) seem to me consistent with being forced to cut astern of Warrior and then turning back slightly more, shortly after.

In your attachment "Lion Defence DoE" Harper shows this major turn to port at 18:20 five minutes after crossing (without deviation) Defence's track. This radical manoeuvre does not make a lot of sense given the disruption to gunnery, and that the objective is to keep going east as fast as possible in order to take station ahead of the GF. Ground lost to the north makes that more difficult, so why do it? Looking at Harper "Plan of action between main fleets", Lion's track from 18:20 remains straight steering approx 050T for the next 12 minutes until a major turn to starboard at 18:32. The second, I believe, compensating turn recorded by the two leading ships at about 18:20 to starboard has been moved to 18:32 by Harper.

The recording by NZ of the notorious circle and its non-appearance on Lion's record should not IMHO mean one is always considered more accurate and reliable than the other. I personally believe that Harper's charts, although diligently prepared with the best information possible must only be considered a guide, as the original data is all flawed. As Gordon observes, the navigators had more important things to do than record every nuance for us "armchair tacticians" to pick apart.

As Byron has observed "Windy Corner" was a very difficult location, as without adequate reconnaissance, Jellicoe's masterly deployment was much closer to the enemy than he would have wished, and the cruisers of his front screen had no time to get tidily out of the way, resulting in a maelstrom of vessels attempting to the clear the GF's gunnery range.

All the best

wadinga

[Byron Angel]

If we were to take the Corbett Official History plot no. 30 for 6:00 pm to 6:15 pm as correct (and I think that is a big IF) the following hypothetical narrative might be created:

6:09 pm
Defence is on a course SSE with Warrior following. The distance to Warrior in the cruising formation was 5 cables or 1000 yards. 1CS had been ordered to ‘close’ at 5:42 and to ‘open fire and engage the enemy’ at 5.53 (Brooks Table 7.9). Warrior may have had the speed to reduce the distance to Defence, or may have fallen farther behind if Defence accelerated. Plot 30 shows her still about 1000 yards behind at 6:00, but I do not know if that is based on any real data for that time. Lion and the BCF is to the WSW a little more than 3 miles away, but is nearly bow on, so there is plenty of room for Defence and Warrior to pass ahead even if they turn to the south, which they do. Duke of Edinburgh is to the west about 1.5 miles and heading SE to close. Lion turns ESE. Now there is still room for Defence to pass ahead, but Warrior may not, depending on how far astern she is. Based on what happens at 6:15, these courses should be safe.

6:10 – 6:11 pm
Duke of Edinburgh turns to parallel Defence’s course. This puts her on a course to pass astern of Lion, but not the rest of the BCF. A potential collision with Princess Royal or Tiger is about 3 minutes away.

6:12 pm
Lion turns to the SE. This puts her on a collision course with Warrior (based on what happens a few minutes later according to Chatfield’s book).

6:13 pm
Duke of Edinburgh turns SE, presumably to avoid the BCF.

6:15 pm
Lion turns to port to pass behind Warrior.

Very speculatively,
NCC1717

Hi Warren,
I agree re the "speculative" nature of any attempt to sensibly analyze this event - not by any means an easy task. I did however turn up a couple of points which might serve to shed additional confusion on the issue -

("The Fighting at Jutland": The Wrecking of Arbuthnot's Squadron" - pp 159-160)
"At 5.40 p.m., while still 10 miles ahead of our battle fleet, and with speed now increased to 20 knots, gun fire was heard and gun flashes were seen about 30 degrees before our starboard beam (i.e. - about Green 60) ..."

"At about 5.47 I sighted three or possibly four enemy light cruisers about 20 degrees on my starboard bow, and I now increased speed to 21 knots to close from 1/2 a mile to 1/4 of a mile astern of Defence."

"As we closed the Wiesbaden, we passed about a mile ahead of our battle cruiser squadron, ..."
(this statement can IMO be interpreted in several ways).

- - - - -

I also ran across the following passage, which provides some context on what might be viewed as acceptable degrees of aggressive shiphandling within the RN of that era -

("The Fighting at Jutland": The Wrecking of Arbuthnot's Squadron" - pp 156-1)
"H.M.S. Yarmouth of the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron attached to the Battle Cruiser Force (sic), arrived from the southward at the same time, and an officer who was in her gives this description of the end of the 1st Cruiser Squadron:- Between 6 and 6.30 p.m. was for us the most eventful time of the whole day. First of all, the 1st Cruiser Squadron (Defence, etc) broke through the center of our squadron as we made to the eastward. The Black Prince crossed the bows of the Falmouth, our flagship, whilst the Duke of Edinburgh passed between Birkenhead and ourselves causing Birkenhead and Gloucester to alter course to port."

FWIW.

Byron

[Byron Angel]

NCC1717, Byron et al,

These published maps show no avoiding action at all by Lion, nor apparently any need for it. Byron, is there anything in Lion's gunnery record to confirm Lion made a major course change to port as Chatfield describes?

>>>>> LION's gunnery log between 6.03 and 7.12

6.03 F G 35 7,700 400 C U 2000 L 10 One salvo at a Cruiser.
6.08 Ship A/C to Starboard.
6.13 Cruiser engaged by 1st C.S. Green 68.
6.14 Battle Cruiser on Star: beam. Green 93 Left Hand ship.
6.16.5 F G 96 10,800 200 C D 800
6.17 F G 96 10,250 D 800
6.17.5 F
6.18 G 96 200 C D 600
6.18.5 F 150 C D 800
6.19 F G 96 350 C U 200
6.19.25 F 1 short L 2 Rapid
6.19.75 F
6.20 G 96 8,250
6.20.5 F U 200 R 5
6.21 F G 100 250 C U 400
6.21.5 Enemy going into mist, cant see.
Ship A/C to Starboard.
6.23 F Ship A/C to Starboard.
6.25 F Ship A/C to Port.
6.27.5 F G 84 8,300 100 C U 800 R 2
6.27.75 F
6.28 F G 84 Turned over 'spotting' to Lieut. Lake.
6.28.5 300 O[10] U 400
6.29 F G 84 U 800 R 10
6.30 F G 85 Took over 'spotting' myself.
6.30.5 F U 400 Very misty, all smoke.
6.31.5 F 500 O U 800
6.32 G 87
Enemy in the mist again.

6.38-7.07 Ship A/C to Starboard.[11]

7.12 Ship A/C to Port.


NCC1717, do you have access to Rules of the Game as the Appendix shows how much difference is intrinsic in the NZ track relative to Lion? Interestingly, it is also very different to Rear Admiral Pakenham's plot recorded aboard the same vessel (NZ). Gordon, as you have done, rotated some because of the difference between magnetic and gyro compass. All the separate BC tracks show a major turn to starboard at 18:00 of about 45 degrees. Annoyingly, Gordon does not include many time marks but while the NZ track shows a straight line until 18:15ish (consistent with Harper) with another major turn to starboard annotated below as 18:15 with a further turn to starboard (18:17?) until a major turn to port at 18:30. The Lion and Princess Royal and Pakenham tracks all show a major turn to port of about 45 degrees at about 18:15. The first two show a more than compensating turn back to starboard about 5 mins later ie about 18:20. These two turns recorded by the two leading ships (a Jink to port to avoid collision) seem to me consistent with being forced to cut astern of Warrior and then turning back slightly more, shortly after.

In your attachment "Lion Defence DoE" Harper shows this major turn to port at 18:20 five minutes after crossing (without deviation) Defence's track. This radical manoeuvre does not make a lot of sense given the disruption to gunnery, and that the objective is to keep going east as fast as possible in order to take station ahead of the GF. Ground lost to the north makes that more difficult, so why do it? Looking at Harper "Plan of action between main fleets", Lion's track from 18:20 remains straight steering approx 050T for the next 12 minutes until a major turn to starboard at 18:32. The second, I believe, compensating turn recorded by the two leading ships at about 18:20 to starboard has been moved to 18:32 by Harper.

The recording by NZ of the notorious circle and its non-appearance on Lion's record should not IMHO mean one is always considered more accurate and reliable than the other. I personally believe that Harper's charts, although diligently prepared with the best information possible must only be considered a guide, as the original data is all flawed. As Gordon observes, the navigators had more important things to do than record every nuance for us "armchair tacticians" to pick apart.


>>>>> The BCF described a 360deg circle at 7.00pm. Beatty's first BCF track chart in the OD [Plate 10] actually displays it; he later had it changed into two successive L and R 180deg turns on the BCF chart contained in the separate cased set. NZ/2BCS track chart shows the loop. Princess Royal's OD track chart delicately evades the issue by displays an apparently stunning and inexplicable slowdown between 6.50 and 7.08. Indomitable (3BCS) also evades the issue in a different way - a long spike directly to the S followed by a 180deg course reversal backtracking directly to the N. Chatfield finally provided a satisfactory cover story by admitting the loop and blaming it on a faulty gyro. At the end of the day, it is a minute footnote in the course of a great battle. But it suggests Beatty to have been a terribly insecure individual and (IMO) suggests necessity that very close scrutiny must be applied to battle accounts he has written.

[NCC1717]

“… First of all, the 1st Cruiser Squadron (Defence, etc) broke through the center of our squadron as we made to the eastward. The Black Prince crossed the bows of the Falmouth, our flagship, whilst the Duke of Edinburgh passed between Birkenhead and ourselves causing Birkenhead and Gloucester to alter course to port."

At 5:42 pm when the 1CS was ordered to ‘close’ (presumably this means take station behind the flagship) the DofE would have been 5 miles to starboard of Defence and BP 10 miles, based on the GF cruising formation. Although DofE got closer and BP may have, it does not seem likely that ‘Defence, etc’, DofE and BP could all pass through the 3LCS.

The Harper track shows DofE crossing the path of 3LCS at about 6:03, and Defence crossing at about 6:08, and DofE crossing again at about 6:23. The Official History plot 30 shows no crossings of 1CS and 3LCS tracks between 6:00 and 6:15. The Official History plot 31 shows DofE crossing the 3LCS track at about 6:22, but well after 3LCS had passed.

I wonder if armoured cruisers expected light cruisers to get out of their way.

[NCC1717]

The BCF described a 360deg circle at 7.00pm.

Gentlemen,

I just saw the second message, posted while I was working on my response to the first. Given all the conflicting historical data, it may be that we are all going in circles on these issues.

Dizzy,
NCC1717

[Byron Angel]

“… First of all, the 1st Cruiser Squadron (Defence, etc) broke through the center of our squadron as we made to the eastward. The Black Prince crossed the bows of the Falmouth, our flagship, whilst the Duke of Edinburgh passed between Birkenhead and ourselves causing Birkenhead and Gloucester to alter course to port."

At 5:42 pm when the 1CS was ordered to ‘close’ (presumably this means take station behind the flagship) the DofE would have been 5 miles to starboard of Defence and BP 10 miles, based on the GF cruising formation. Although DofE got closer and BP may have, it does not seem likely that ‘Defence, etc’, DofE and BP could all pass through the 3LCS.

The Harper track shows DofE crossing the path of 3LCS at about 6:03, and Defence crossing at about 6:08, and DofE crossing again at about 6:23. The Official History plot 30 shows no crossings of 1CS and 3LCS tracks between 6:00 and 6:15. The Official History plot 31 shows DofE crossing the 3LCS track at about 6:22, but well after 3LCS had passed.

I wonder if armoured cruisers expected light cruisers to get out of their way.

Studying Jutland is like doing a jigsaw puzzle where, not only is it necessary to find the correct piece, but the piece also sometimes has to be trimmed to fit properly. One of the real issues in deciphering the Jutland time line is remembering that time/clock synchronization (both among and, arguably, within ships) seems not to have been fully mature at the time.

Byron

[wadinga]

Hi Byron, NCC1717 and all,

Innes McCarthy, Jutland 1916 Archaeology of a Battlefield includes a photo of a four funnel cruiser. beam-on, taken at very close range and passing left to right, with bow wave and structural items of the photographer's ship in the foreground . He says this was first published in The Sailor's War by H Liddle 1985 and was claimed to show HMS Defence five minutes before her destruction. He discounts this by saying the features of the vessel suggest it is a Warrior class vessel.

The ship has a White Ensign at the foremast, ie a battle ensign, as well as one at the after mast gaff. These battle ensigns were kept pristine until action was about to be joined so this may well be a photo taken at Jutland as there were not many occasions when Warrior class ships found themselves in action. Ahead of the ship is a cloud of smoke from what appears to be another vessel not far beyond the cruiser. In Liddle's book the photo is credited to Admiral D J Hoare. Rear Admiral Dennis John Hoare 1891-1979 served in HMS Birkenhead after 1915 so to me it seems we have photograph of the moment an armoured cruiser burst through the line between Birkenhead and her next ahead as referenced by Byron from the Fighting at Jutland. That account identifies the ship as HMS Duke of Edinburgh, but since that ship veered off on the unengaged side of the battlecruisers, and was some distance behind Defence and Warrior it seems to me the ship may actually be HMS Warrior.

The close call with HMS Lion described by her Captain Chatfield may not have been photographed, but this image may well show one of Arbuthnot's ships crashing through part of the BCF in the headlong charge against the enemy and which ended in disaster.

All the best

wadinga