Was the H.M.S Hood the most powerful ship for 20 years?

[Byron Angel]

I now have access to Brooks and I note he uses a Despatches-based map (fig 8.1) to suggest Lion's maximum displacement to the west of the rest of 1st BCS track was at 16:12 and was about 2,000yds only. It also shows the 2nd BCS about the same distance east of the 1st BCS track at the time of Indefatigable's destruction.

>>>>> I infer that you are referring to to Brooks' first book, "Dreadnought Gunnery at the Battle of Jutland". When I measure the cited track chart for 4.12 time (flagship Lutzow being the easternmost ship and formation guide of the line of bearing formation), I get approx 10 sea miles (20,000 yds).
Brooks' follow-up book, "The Battle of Jutland", uses the same track chart and gain gives a measurement of a bit more than 20,000 yds for 4.12. Paschen (gunnery officer of Lutzow) ordered cease-fire around this time when when his range-takers were giving readings of 190hm (approx 20,775 yds). Corbett's track-chart No. 24 covering the Run to the South comes from the map case accompanying Volume III of Naval Operations and is based upon the Harper's careful post-war reconstruction of the battle (marked Ordnance Survey 1923); it indicates a 4.12 range estimate between Lutzow and Lion of approx 21,000 yds.

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This second disaster was rather stunning, but the only sign from the Flagship was a signal, "Battle cruisers alter course two points to port" - i.e., toward the enemy.

>>>>> To repeat, there is no actual record of such a signal in the OD Signal Log Appendix. Did the navigating officer actually see the signal or did he rely upon hearsay or assumption? Was the timekeeping aboard the ships, or even among the department of the same ship, synchronized (absolutely not)? Did NZ's navigating officer mistake PR's previous turn to clear smoke?

Here is the best we have from Lion:
4.20 - Lion: Remarks - Queen Mary blew up".
4.26 signal from SO BCF via W/T > Princess Royal - "Keep clear of smoke" (origin time 4.25).
4.40: SO BCF via Flags > General - "Alter course in succession 16 points to starboard".
> Lion's gunnery log indicates as follows:
4.18.5 - Ship A/C to Starboard
4.25.5 - Ship A/C to Starboard
4.28.0 - Ship A/C to Starboard
4.32.0 - Ship A/C to Port
4.36.0 - Alteration of course of 16 points

I require further corroboration. NZ's Gunnery Log indicates: 4.35 - "A/C approx 3pts to Port". Brooks applies a timing correction of minus 6 minutes to NZ's recorded times, so the course alteration to port MAY have been undertaken at approximately 4.29 (assuming that the clocks of NZ's separate departments were all uniformly synchronized). So far, so good. But Tiger had veered to port to avoid the wreck of Queen Mary, while NZ veered to starboard. Was the a/m 4.35 entry simply a reflection of NZ's correction to resume her station in the line behind?

To make the entire issue even murkier, Brooks ("The Battle of Jutland" pg 206) argues - "After Beatty saw Queen Mary blow up, he famously remarked to Chatfield : 'There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today.' But Lion then turned two points not to port but to starboard, to S; this may have been immediately after the explosion or a few minutes later, when [Lion's] Q turret flared up and attacking German destroyers were launching torpedoes. As a result, Lion's A and B turrets were unable to bear until she turned back to SSE, probably at 4.33."

Brooks further footnotes this remark [footnote 169] as follows - "Chatfield, p.143. REL. VNE. OD, Plate 10. See F&H, p.40 for the probable origin of the legend (repeated, for example in Bennett, p.76) that Beatty ordered a turn towards the enemy."

This is far from a "slam dunk" matter.