Antonio Bonomi wrote: The disengagement had already been ordered around 2-3 minutes before, when Leach ordered the hard to port turn, the only order he gave.
Capt. Leach did not order a turn to port and after he ordered the disengagement, this is incorrect.
Capt. Leach himself explained this, so no possible doubts here, it was a single unique order and it was issued just before 06.01 and 30 seconds.
..... Once again it seems that inference and supposition are being substituted for hard evidence. Leach ordered the turn-away under smoke, with Y turret becoming mechanically disabled as a result. Is it known with absolute certitude that Leach intended to flee from the fight altogether at the time he ordered that turn-away? There is a material difference between a
disengagement to consolidate and
outright retreat from the fight. Here is an excerpt the 04 Jun 41 report. It seems to me that Leach
temporarily withdrew from the action; he did not leave the scene; he did not flee. At this point, Leach came under the orders of Wake-Walker as the next in command after Holland and PoW's actions were thereafter governed by Wake-Walker. It is worth noting that PoW's damage report was not able to be transmitted to Wake-Walker until 0707 hrs. It is also worthy of note that Wake-Walker himself went looking for Bismarck. I just do not see any logical traction for a case of dereliction of duty or cowardice.
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It was considered expedient to break off the action and consolidate the position, and the ship, after being manoeuvred round the remains of "Hood", turned away behind a smoke screen. "Y" Turret fired in local during the turn as smoke blanked the after director.
It now seems probable that the enemy turned away at the same time as "Prince of Wales" and about two enemy salvos were seen short during this period.
The "Prince of Wales" fired 18 main armament salvos. The target was crossed and recrossed and three straddles observed. No hits were seen. True range on opening fire was 25,000 yards. The true range on ceasing fire was 14,500 yards.
The 5.25" opened fire at a range of 18,000 yards but only fired 3 salvos. "Y" Turret's shell ring jammed during the turn away and the turret was out of action until 0825.
After retiring on a course of about 160 degs. "Prince of Wales" circled to port, steadying up on a course of 250 degs. And joining "Norfolk" came under orders of C.S.1 who at 0633, stated his intention of keeping in touch with the enemy. The extent of the general damage to the ship was reported to C.S.1. At 0707 C.S.1 ordered "Prince of Wales" to follow at her best speed giving his course 210 degs. Speed 26 knots. Two guns of "Y" Turret were again in action by 0720 and an amplifying report of damage was made to C.S.1.
When the debris on the bridge had been cleared away, damage was found to be less than at first thought and conning, which had been carried out in the upper conning tower, was resumed on the compass platform. Later, at 1007, a more accurate and comprehensive report of damage was made to the Admiralty.
Meanwhile, at 0737 C.S.1 ordered "Prince of Wales" to take station 10 miles on a bearing of 110 degs. In order to support him if the enemy attempted to drive him off. Courses and speeds were as necessary to open out and maintain station.
At 1126 C.S.1 was ordered by Admiralty to continue shadowing "Bismarck" even at the risk of expending all fuel in order that C-in-C. H.F. might catch up in time.
Visibility was good up to about 1200 when it became worse, and "Prince of Wales" closed "Norfolk" and was ordered to keep within one mile and conform to her movements.
Enemy at this time was estimated as bearing 260 degs. Distance 18 miles, and efforts were made to detect by R.D/F but no results were obtained. C.S.1 increased speed at 1256 to try and regain touch and "Prince of Wales" was ordered to maintain V/S touch with him.
The enemy was resighted at 1323. Shadowing continued. At 1518 a Catalina Flying Boat approached and identified herself. "Suffolk" at this time was just visible on the horizon bearing 255 degs. Ships were zigzagging independently.
Visibility continued variable and at 1715 C.S.1 signalled:-
"As in this visibility we are likely to sight the enemy within gun range, am putting you ahead."
"Prince of Wales" was made guide and "Norfolk" stationed herself on "Price of Wales'" starboard quarter. The Enemy was not in sight at this time but "Suffolk" was in touch. At 1730 "Prince of Wales" made to C.S.1-
"Presume policy is to shadow. Request permission to fire one of two salvos on turning away if enemy is sighted"
The gist of the reply to this signal was that C.S.1's intentions were to shadow from astern, not to engage the enemy closely until C-in-C H.F. came up, and to try and draw the enemy to the eastwards.
It was expected that C-in-C H.F. would be in touch soon after midnight.
Visibility was now improving and enemy was resighted at 1840, hull down bearing 230 degs "Prince of Wales" course at this time was 180 degs. Enemy opened fire on "Suffolk" who was shadowing him from astern. "Suffolk" replied and "Prince of Wales" opened fire in support at 1846, range about 30,000 yards. "Norfolk" joining in almost immediately. Course was altered 30 degs. Towards at 1850. "Prince of Wales" fired 12 salvos and enemy was twice crossed by an 800 yard bracket. No other results were observed. "Prince of Wales" was not fired at. Cease fire was ordered by C.S.1 at 1900 after enemy had turned away, and a course of 180 degs. Was resumed about 1920. "Norfolk" resumed guide and "Prince of Wales" was ordered to act independently but to remain in support.
At 1923 temporary breakdown of two guns in "A" Turret was reported to C.S.1
At 1926 signal was received from C.S.1 -
"Do not open fire except in response, as I do not want to force the enemy away to the westward."
Shortly afterwards a signal "Look out for U-Boats" - was received from C-in-C H.F. and ships were ordered to zig-zag independently.
At 1934 C.S.1 reported that the long range engagement had been broken off to avoid forcing the enemy further away.
At 2031 a signal was received from C-in-C H.F., T.O.O. 1455, indicating that torpedo bombers from "Victorious" would attack about 2200. Shadowing continued.
Sunday, 25th May
The torpedo bomber attack did not take place until shortly after midnight; bombers were sighted at 0001 and circled round "Prince of Wales" and "Norfolk" before proceeding to the target. The leader made "O.K." by light just before disappearing from view.
"Bismarck" was not in sight when the bombers went in to attack, but A.A. gunfire could be seen. A vessel, at first thought to be "Bismarck", was sighted at 0200 in the direction of the gunfire, and a signal to open fire was received. The control, however, considered that she was and American coastguard cutter, and fire was withheld. It is now believed that the ship sighted was "Modoc". Ships closed over to starboard to regain touch with the enemy.
At 0013 a signal from C-in-C H.F. Was received saying that he hoped to engage from the eastward about 0900.
At 0121 the Enemy was resighted on a bearing of 200 degs. Two salvos were fired at 0131 at a range of 20,000 yards by R.D/F. Three flashes from the enemy were observed, one of which did not appear typical of a gunflash. Only one enemy shell was observed to fall. The target then became indistinct due to funnel smoke, but it appeared that her course was about 180 degs. And an enemy report of one battleship, timed at 0130 was made to this effect. It is now realised that the enemy sighted at this time may, perhaps, have been a cruiser. This was the last occasion on which either of the enemy ships was seen by "Prince of Wales". At 0139 "Prince of Wales" was ordered to follow astern of "Suffolk", course about 140 degs. Speed 22 knots. At 0152 "Norfolk" went ahead and ordered "Prince of Wales" to follow. Course was altered to 180 degs. At 0155.
The next information of the enemy was "Suffolk's" 0213, indicating that touch had been regained by R.D/F, her report being amplified at 0225 giving enemy's course and speed. At 0401, however, "Suffolk" signalled to C.S.1 that in her opinion enemy had either worked round to the eastward under the stern of the shadowing force or turned to the westward, and that she was working on the latter assumption.
Contact was not regained.
At 0511 C.S.1 had signalled his intention to keep "Prince of Wales" in support if visibility was low, otherwise to detach her to join C-in-C H.F. As visibility was good "Prince of Wales" was detached at 0630 to join C-in-C H.F., an estimated position, course and speed was given, and "Prince of Wales" proceeded to the southward at 26 knots.
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B