On the contrary the benefit of hind-sight is derived from the German Navies experiences during World War One. Had the Germans commenced unrestricted u-boat warfare throughout World War One they might have won (although I do note the introduction of the convoy system in 1917 had a drastic effect on u-boat loses and merchant ship sinkings). Furthermore throughout the interwar years the Germans developed technologies in secrete, using offshore companies, completing contracts for foreign powers.RF wrote:Oberwarrior, regarding U-boats what you say is being wise after the event.
At the initial time of development - late 1930's - Germany had a naval agreement with Britain which permitted construction of submarines for the first time, and then at first up to 35% British submarine strength and later amended to 100%. Now British submarine strength at that time was not very great, but still substantial enough to fully occupy Germany's then resources in U-boat development legally (namely within Treaty limits). The KM at that time had little up to date submarine expertise and only a small cadre of submariners. It takes years to build up a mass submarine force in terms of crew training and construction of submarines, and indeed reliable torpedoes...... The Germans couldn't really have built much faster, and to try to do so would have set the alarm bells ringing in Britain and other countries.
Now with hindsight what Doenitz and the KM should have done in those formulative years was to have put far more effort into the development of a true submarine, a boat that could move fast submerged, and dive deeper. If such efforts had led to the depolyment of the Electroboot in 1943 instead of 1945, they could have altered the course of the war - especially if the submerged rocket launching subs had been developed, giving Germany the capability of bombing the USA.
There was a certain level of alarm within the British establishment, although this was about the development of the luftwaffe and the wehrmacht. Development of u-boat technologies probably would not have caused anymore alarm that what already pre-existed. The Royal Navy had a attitude that because the u-boats had been defeated in World War One through the use of the convoy system (and because ASDIC had been developed at the end of World War One) that u-boat warfare would not be successful a second time around. However certain elements within the kriegsmarine (namely Doenitz and his staff) had learned from there mistakes in World War One (same with das heer), but they were not listened too, and given the proper economic support, Doenitz had been calling for more u-boats long before the war started.
Regarding naval treaties, everyone (signed or not signed) was looking for loop-holes and ways of circumventing the treaties. A good example is the different between the Royal Navy and the United States Navy and how they counted capital ship tonnage. Yes breaking the treaties would war a political mess, but I don't think anyone would be in a position to do much about it, similar to various situations today. Furthermore there was a large school-of-thought back then that German had been unfairly punished by treaties post-World War One.