The most successful and most unsuccessful Warships

[Karl Heidenreich]

Well, we can say this is the most unsuccesfull ship in History:

Regalskeppet Vasa

Career
Laid down: 1626
Launched: August 10, 1628
Fate: Sank on her maiden voyage.
General Characteristics
Displacement: 1210 metric ton
Total Length: 69 m
Beam: 11.7 m
Draft: 4.8 m
Height, keel to mast: 52.5 m
Propulsion: 10 Sails, 3 Masts
Sail area: 1,275 m2
Armament: 64 guns
Sailors: 145
Soldiers: 300

Regalskeppet Vasa was a Swedish 64-gun ship of the line, built for King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden of the House of Vasa, between 1626 and 1628. The Vasa capsized on its maiden voyage but was recovered in 1961 and is now on display at the Vasa Museum in Stockholm.

Construction
During 1621-1625, the work at the Stockholm shipyard was led by Antonius Monier, with Dutch-born Henrik Hybertsson (alternative spellings are Henrijk Hybertson or Hendrijk Hybertszoon) as hired shipbuilder. On the 16th of January, 1625, Henrik and his brother Arendt Hybertsson de Groote took over the shipyard and soon signed a contract to build four ships, two larger of around 135 feet and two smaller of 108 feet.

After a few years, the shipyard ran into economic problems, delaying the construction of the contracted ships. At the same time, the Swedish navy lost 10 ships in a single storm and the king worriedly sent a letter to Admiral Klas Fleming, asking him to make sure that Henrik hurried with the construction of the two smaller ships. Along with the letter were measurements for the ship the King intended, with a 120 foot keel. That gave Henrik Hybertsson new problems, because the measurements given by the king were between the planned larger and smaller vessels and the timber had already been cut. In a new letter, on February 22, 1626, the king yet again demanded his measurements for the new ship be followed. In the end, it seems likely that Henrik extended one of his started designs for a smaller 108 foot ship by adding another section to it, creating the 135 foot ship that would become the Vasa.

Henrik Hybertsson never had the chance to see the Vasa completed; he fell ill in late 1625 and died in the spring of 1627. The supervision for the shipbuilding was given to Henrik's assistant, Hein Jaconsson, another Dutch immigrant. In practice, while Henrik was ill, the responsibility was shared between him and his assistant Hein, leading to confusion and a lack of leadership.

While the ship was being equipped, Admiral Fleming ordered the stability of the Vasa to be tested. The standard stability test of the day was thirty sailors running from side to side, assessing the tendency of the boat to rock. When this was attempted on Vasa, the ship started tilting significantly after only three runs and the admiral ordered the test aborted, allegedly stating "had they run any more times, she would have went over". Surprisingly enough, neither Hein Jacobsson nor Johan Isbrandsson, the two ship builders in charge at the time, were present for the stability test. Boatswain Matsson, is said to have uttered "God hope it will stay on its keel" in response to the test.

Shortly after the disaster, Arendt Hybertsson left Sweden and returned to Holland.

Maiden voyage
On August 10, 1628, Captain Söfring Hansson ordered the Vasa to set sail on her maiden voyage to the harbor of Stockholm. The day was calm, and the only wind was a light breeze from the southwest. Her sails were not set until the southern outskirts of the harbor, but the Vasa sailed for less than a nautical mile before capsizing, once they had been rigged. In the harbor a gust of wind forced the ship onto her port side, after which water started flowing in through her open gun ports. Vasa sank to a depth of 100 feet, around 100 yards from the shore. Despite the short distance to the land, between 30 and 50 people were trapped in the ship and perished. The exact number of casualties is still unknown, as the only reports from the accident are lacking in substance and are incomplete.

Inquest
When the King heard of Vasa's fate, he was incensed. 'Imprudence and negligence' must have been the cause, he wrote angrily in a letter, demanding in no uncertain terms that the guilty parties be punished. Captain Söfring Hansson who survived the disaster was immediately put in prison, awaiting trial.

At the following interrogation, Captain Söfring Hansson simply stated "a gust came". It is known from other reports that there was almost no wind at the time, so it did not take much to sink the ship. It has been calculated that if the Vasa's center of gravity had been a mere 5-10 cm (2-4 inches) lower, she would not have capsized in the harbor.

In the end, no guilty party could be found. The person responsible for the design, Henrik Hybertsson, was long dead and buried. The ship was built according to the specifications laid out by the King and one couldn't very well punish the King. In the end, no one was punished or found guilty for negligence.

The sinking of the Vasa was also a major economic disaster; the cost of the ship was more than 200 000 riksdaler, which was about 5% of Sweden's GNP at the time.

Why did the Vasa sink?
During this period, the design requirements and calculations for building a ship only existed in the head of the shipwright. Scientific theories on vessel design or stability had not yet been developed, so important factors like the ship's center of gravity had to be estimated from the builder's experience.[3]

The Vasa was a very advanced ship for her time, and much of the design was changed while the ship was being built. The build was delayed and at the end, marked by great hurry to get the ship finished.
The original plans only called for one closed gundeck, but the Vasa was finished with two, at the king's request.
The Vasa carried insufficient ballast to counter her height. The ship's compliment of 300 soldiers was expected to increase her weight in the water, but at the time of the ship's sinking, they were not yet aboard. The result was increased instability in an already problematic ship.

Recovery
After its sinking, most of the ship's valuable bronze cannons were soon recovered with the use of a diving bell. Access to the cannons required removing the decking at several levels.

In 1956, Anders Franzén thought of the possibility of recovering wrecks from the Baltic waters, because he figured that these waters were free from the shipworm Teredo navalis. He started looking for the Vasa and found her, in an upright position, at a depth of 32 meters. The wreck was lifted in a relatively straightforward way, by digging six tunnels under the hull, through which steel cables were attached to a pair of lifting pontoons. The ship was lifted and brought to shallower water, where she was to be made watertight for the final lift. Her gun ports were closed by means of temporary lids and all the holes from the iron bolts, which had rusted away, were plugged. The final lift took place on April 24, 1961, after which she was put in a dry dock. Among the items recovered from the ship was a small statue of the Finnish olympic gold-medalist Paavo Nurmi. The finding initially caused a major stir among Swedish marine archeologists as to the origin of the item, and later received significant press attention once it was revealed that a day before the recovery, a team of Finnish students had dived down to the wreck and placed the item on the deck among other artifacts.

Conservation
Conservation of the ship itself was done using polyethylene glycol, a method that was also used years later in the conservation process of the 16th century English ship, the Mary Rose. Vasa was sprayed with this glycol for 17 years, followed by slow drying. Recent developments, however, have shown that this conservation method, in time, makes the wood brittle and fragile.

Over 26,000 artifacts have been found, including six original sails, still folded. After the lifting of the wreck, the wreck site was searched for artifacts and over 700 sculptures were found. These carvings were once attached to the ship, but the bolts had rusted away, causing the sculptures to fall to the bottom.

Museum
The ship can be seen in the Vasa Museum in Stockholm, Sweden.

It sailed less than Titanic or Bismarck which is quite a feat!

[miro777]

hey....
as i think u are interested in Hilfkreuzer n all....
how would u assess the success of the surface riders (including armed cruisers, and pocketbattleships) in WW1 compared to WW 2???


which ships were outstanding?
i do believe Penguin had the highest tonnage sinking??

adios
miro

[RF]

Well, we can say this is the most unsuccesfull ship in History:

There is another possible contender here - a British warship in 1798 was blown to bits when its magazine was detonated by a lightning strike. Unfortunately I can't recall the name of the ship.

No matter how good modern the ships are, there is no accounting for the weather or bizarre accidents.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Not being a warship but a famous ship as well we can mention Titanic. Her "fame" is due to her tragic lost. Not even "Lusitania" can be as "famous" as Titanic.

[RF]

hey....
as i think u are interested in Hilfkreuzer n all....
how would u assess the success of the surface riders (including armed cruisers, and pocketbattleships) in WW1 compared to WW 2???


which ships were outstanding?
i do believe Pinguin had the highest tonnage sinking??

adios
miro

If you include Voltaire I think Thor has the highest tonnage.

The WW1 surface raiders were handicapped by being coal-fired and short ranged.
In terms of tonnage sunk only three were significant: Emden, Mowe and Wolf. Mowe was the most successful but even here it took two cruises and was out for only up to four months. Wolf deserves recognition because she was at large for fifteen months and provided the blueprint for the WW2 hilfskreuzer.

Seeadler commands attention as the last windjammer surface raider, but her sinkings, mostly sailing ships, were not as substantial.

[XazaX]

Well I'm new and I'm a bit confused. There are so few mentions of Italian ships. I mean, Vittorio Veneto (an other ships of the same class), and cruisers Zara, Pola and Fiume. They all were exellent warships but failed to score a single larger victory, failed to protect the convoys to Africa and failed to protect the mainland from raids. Their fleet got attacked in their own port of Taranto by a single aircraft carrier, and some British ships even sailed deep into Adriatic sea to disrupt Italian communication. If that doesn't put them in "unsuccesfull" ships then...
Do correct me if I'm wrong.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Xazax,

Well I'm new and I'm a bit confused. There are so few mentions of Italian ships. I mean, Vittorio Veneto (an other ships of the same class), and cruisers Zara, Pola and Fiume. They all were exellent warships but failed to score a single larger victory, failed to protect the convoys to Africa and failed to protect the mainland from raids. Their fleet got attacked in their own port of Taranto by a single aircraft carrier, and some British ships even sailed deep into Adriatic sea to disrupt Italian communication. If that doesn't put them in "unsuccesfull" ships then...
Do correct me if I'm wrong.

Well, at least the italian fleet would never get the succesfull banner...

[RF]

I think the situation with the RM ships was something like the record of the High Seas Fleet in WW1 - they largely stayed in harbour except for the odd sortie.

A case perhaps of the most underused ships rather than the most unsuccessful.

Without wanting to be unduly pedantic, how do you measure lack of success? Many ships, such as Tirpitz, were successful in their sheer existence and the perceived threat that existence posed even though remaining harbourbound.
If the RM battleships were not a threat then why did Cunningham attack them at Taranto in November 1940?

[XazaX]

I think the situation with the RM ships was something like the record of the High Seas Fleet in WW1 - they largely stayed in harbour except for the odd sortie.

A case perhaps of the most underused ships rather than the most unsuccessful.

Without wanting to be unduly pedantic, how do you measure lack of success? Many ships, such as Tirpitz, were successful in their sheer existence and the perceived threat that existence posed even though remaining harbourbound.
If the RM battleships were not a threat then why did Cunningham attack them at Taranto in November 1940?

You have a point there.
Italy lost many of her merchant ships in the opening days of the war and had to react quickly (Italian version of blitzkrieg, maybe for another 'what if' topic) but they didn't. The fleet stayed in ports as oil reserves lowered. The question now is what would happen if Musollini had waited for a better date to declare war. Maybe until Germany captures the oil fieds on the east? This would enable the Italian fleet to operate more frequently and more agressive, assuming the Germany provides Italy with that oil.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Tirpitz case is often mentioned when referring to the success of a "threat in being". But I doubt that any Navy in the world would base it´s strategy in "not doing anything". Tirpitz was isolated and uncapable of doing any harm because the British had some warships ready to deal with her. The Germans never designed Tirpitz to sit at harbor looking how the war was lost and, with time, the ship was also lost.
The British had some important warships waiting for her and, it´s true, that handicaped the Brits to deploy them elsewhere, but that didn´t make any difference, the RN had the resources to do that.
As with my perception that the Hoch See Flotte must had fought in 1918, even if completely destroyed (which she was in time and in dishonor), the Tirpitz must have been ordered to sail and fight. If the ship was lost, then it was in a combat effort helping their comrades of the army and the air force which die by hundreds of thousands.
Tirpitz was not succesfull, but unsuccesfull.

[Bgile]

Tirpitz case is often mentioned when referring to the success of a "threat in being". But I doubt that any Navy in the world would base it´s strategy in "not doing anything".

The US has kept it's Trident submarine fleet in existence for many years based on that very idea. Hopefully they won't ever "do anything".

[Karl Heidenreich]

Bgile:

The US and the USRR had this "deterrence" strategy based in huge amounts of nuclear devices and launch platforms in the form of silos, land vehicles, bombers and subs. The whole idea in the nuclear Cold War was deterrence, not in the practical use of nuclear weapons. Tirpitz was in middle of a shooting war in which warships were meant to fight, specially if you are losing.

[Bgile]

Karl,

Let me try another tack. The existence of Tirpitz required the US Navy to keep two of it's most modern battleships present to defend the North Atlantic convoys. With the demise of Tirpitz, those ships could be released for duty elsewhere. The sooner Tirpitz is sunk, the sooner they are available to the US Navy.

[Antonio Bonomi]

Ciao all,

respectful of everybody opinion, my one about Tirpitz utilization is a lot different than the one's I have read above.

To fully understand Tirpitz one must know Bismarck story first and all the efforts needed to sink her.

Than one must study the story of the Artic convoy's and what Stalin pretended from Roosevelt and Churchill been shipped monthly to Russia thru that system.

Into that story you will read the disaster of PQ 17, when just the fact that Tirpitz had sailed out of the Fjord escorted and air protected, costed the Allied an entire convoy to be sunk.

Was this been ineffective and doing nothing ? What was the war impact of such a loos for the allied ?

What the impact for the coming months of supply to Russia ?

Just study when the Artic convoy restarted, and their correlation of Tirpitz been damaged so in condition not to sail against them again.

What was the intelligence and weapons utilization to remove that threath from the Artic convoy route ?

No other battleship in the world had such an impact on the overall sea and general war strategical scenario, and for a very long time too.

Just my opinion of course,..but it seems that Sir W. Churchill was thinking more or less the same,.....

Same story was for RM Italian battleships on the Mediterranean sea, for Malta and the convoys to North Africa.

When Italy surrended the first clause asked for the RM ships to be immediately given to the Allied.

Think about French battleships destiny too, what did the British do to avoid them been used by the Germans ?

Who owned the sea owned the world,...and battleships were important,..very important,..after was the aircraft carrier,.. now who owns the air/sea and space owns the world.

Ciao Antonio

[Ulrich Rudofsky]

Into that story you will read the disaster of PQ 17, when just the fact that Tirpitz had sailed out of the Fjord escorted and air protected, costed the Allied an entire convoy to be sunk.

"The Destruction of Convoy PQ 17" by David Irving
This is a book everyone must read. The mere existence of the TIRPITZ and a rumor that she had sailed, was enough to lead to one of the great tragedies of WWII. It is available for $2!