After a little on-line research of reviews of the mighty (and expensive) strategical tomes created by the academical behemoths Sumida, Seligmann et al it seems that their major fight is whether the mercurial mind of Fisher had eventually decided naval war in the constrained waters of the British Home Waters would be decided by submarines, mines and "Flotilla War" rather than cumbersome battle fleets, marching and counter-marching in parade ground formations. The rapid developments in torpedoes and mines, with speedy turbine driven surface launchers or stealthy underwater ones were something that had fired up his restless energy. In such a view speedy battle cruisers would race around the world protecting British trade and eliminating raiders of any ilk. In this they were just "super cruisers" bigger, better and faster. This seems to be re-inventing the French "Jeune Ecole" concept. Fisher's December 1905 observation on the two latest British potential AMCs:
was merely a transparent opportunistic attempt to divert monies to his favoured vessels which could handle both powerful enemy armoured cruisers and any unfortunate AMCs they encountered.But such vessels when armed will only be equal to the German vessels, and in war equality only would not suffice—as Nelson said, “You ought to be 100 per cent stronger than the enemy if you can!” If two ships of that type met, the result of the fight would be a “toss up,”
If a British AMC encountered a similar German liner the result might indeed be a toss-up, but that would not matter because in the tussle the German would almost certainly have her speed curtailed and be easily destroyed subsequently. There were plenty of British liners to expend in this way. The Carmania/Cap Trafalgar and Alcantara/Greif actions proved what anyone could have foretold, these armed merchantmen were soap-bubbles armed with hatpins, which could only ever win Pyrrhic victories against armed opposition. (Except as Q ships and an ocean greyhound cannot do disguise).
However the reality was that the battlefleets of Britain and Germany continued to grow and prosper but the geographical position of Germany and her lack of any developed overseas colonies with dockyards and logistical support where detached fleets could be based meant the antagonists would be constrained to the North Sea. The Hochsee Fleet would never sail the High Seas. Whilst the Austro Hungarian fleet remained a threat, the Goeben was on the loose and the Italians were undecided, a detached British battlecruiser fleet was maintained in the Mediterranean, but once the Adriatic was shut down, they were drawn back to the North Sea battlefleet scouting role. There they were intended to punch their way through enemy cruiser screens as Hood with the Invincibles did at Jutland, or screening the battlefleet from enemy scouts as Beatty did at the same time as he pushed Hipper round to the east, keeping Scheer unaware almost until Jellicoe's first salvoes landed.
There were casualties to be risked, and accepted, since the ruling triangle of armament vs protection vs speed still prevailed, and British designs favoured the first and last over the middle.
I believe Andrew Gordon's book to be a valuable source because in addition to factual and detailed description it explains the ideas and attitudes of the RN in that time and their influence on decision-making. It also highlights the cataclysmic impact between the attitudes of the "Fishpond" and more conservative elements. Nowhere is the disjunct between modern liberal thinking with encouragement and acceptance of initiative by subordinates and the attitudes of those far off times clearer than around p139. The stolid and unimaginative Evan-Thomas continues to steam towards inevitable doom at the hands of the entire HSF as Beatty races past in the opposite direction, because the flag signal ordering his turn has not been hauled down.
All the best
wadinga