Adm Troubridge-right/wrong-in the GOEBEN AFFAIR

[Byron Angel]

I have just finished reading Dudley Pounds book regarding the Graff Spee. It is an excellent read with very good research. But we should expect this from a writer of his stature. Perhaps his greatest attribute is his ability to stay neutral.

Of course though there were the remarks in the text that members of the Admiralty and RN officers claiming this battle vindicaGolden. reversal court martial decision dismissing Troubridge in WW1 when he turned away from the Goeben. At this point I am so disgusted that professional Naval Officers would lower themselves to this level. Children playing a computer game should not be held to the same standards nor to fully understand Naval warfare.

Last posting I went over all the technical reasons why Trowbridge (and Fawcett) were right. I encourage anyone that has any interest to look up my earlier posting. For now I will just state in general that the First Cruiser Squadron did not have the: speed, gun range or armour to fight Golden. They could have been destroyed in detail or Goober could have poured on the speed and avoided any battle. This really is that simple.

Hi barondog,

What follows is strictly my assessment/opinion ..........

Troubridge underwent two courts martial. The first was conducted under customary Admiralty conventions and Troubridge was (correctly IMO) acquitted on technical grounds. The second "court martial" was (again IMO) a covert one-man kangaroo court proceeding conducted by then First Lord of the Admiralty, the Honorable Winston Churchill in the privacy of his own office. Troubridge was found guilty on a vote of 1-Nil and sentenced to banishment in a backwater station which guaranteed the end of his naval career by the person who, by his puerile intellectual arrogance was probably most responsible for the entire Goeben embarrassment - Winston Churchill himself. Churchill could not (IMO) tolerate the personal political risk of permitting Troubridge to remain in England where he might work to rally friends and service contacts to help revive his reputation and career.

Cradock's sad demise at Coronel was arguably a direct consequence of the Troubridge affair (not to mention Churchill's continued interference in operational matters) and the RN consequently lost yet another valuable officer right at the start of the war.

BTW, if you've not yet had the pleasure of reading "Superior Force" by Geoffrey Miller, I offer my recommendation of the book, which really dissects the entire Goeben debacle.

Byron

[wadinga]

Hi Barondog,

I thoroughly concur with Byron's excellent recommendation and you can access Superior Force in full at http://www.superior-force.co.uk

However my reading of it is that it was First Sea Lord Louis Battenberg who really had it in for Troubridge, Churchill was initially far less sure that Goeben would not have "gobbled up those little cruisers". Winston's subsequent sulky cold shoulder attitude to Troubridge after his honourable acquittal is described in detail, but the Rear Admiral's appointment to the Serbian Front required significant command and diplomatic skills and resulted in promotion through Vice to full Admiral and eventually a Knighthood.

Of course Battenberg was forced to resign for appearing "too German" and Winston ended up in a muddy trench on the Western front after the Gallipoli Disaster. Sometimes it's the "loser" who comes up smelling of roses.

Unfortunately, Winston had not learned to leave operational matters to the experts when he got the First Lord of Admiralty job back in 1939, but instead of the clashes with the equally-irascible Jacky Fisher, it was poor Dudley Pound who had to try and contain the Magnificent Monster's enthusiasm for interfering.

All the best

wadinga

[Byron Angel]

The Troubridge versus Goeben episode endures as one of the great debates in naval history. I've not read either the full Board of Inquiry or Court Martial proceedings, but I will throw out a couple of thoughts and opinions in support of Fawcett Wray's dim view of things

> Even if Troubridge had succeeded in gaining contact with Goeben in the pre-dawn darkness, a great deal would still have depended upon who enjoyed the advantage of the moon's position. The opponent in the "down-moon" position would have held a significant advantage in being backed by a dark night sky; an opponent "up-moon" would have been silhouetted by the light cast by the moon. If Goeben is caught "up-moon", a rapid turn-away under smoke (and Breslau would probably have carried smoke pots)

> If the data I have on British pre-war 9.2-inch and 6-inch AP projectile is consistent with the ammunition carried aboard Troubridge's armored cruisers in August 1914, there was little to no chance of any hits actually slowing Goeben down. By contrast, Troubridge's cruisers possessed no protection whatever in terms of keeping out German 11-inch AP at any reasonable fighting range.

> According to Geoffrey Miller, "Duke of Edinburgh" was good for no better than 19.5 knots at the time. If Troubridge was to tactically manage his cruiser squadron under normal RN rules, formation speed might have been as low as 17-18 knots.

> Fawcett-Wray was (IMO) absolutely correct when he stated that the squadron's 9.2-inch guns were inferior in effective range to the 11-inch main battery of Goeben. See the 1916 Spotting Rules for the effective range distinction made by Chatfield between 9.2-inch and 12-inch+ guns

> The RN, in 1914, had only ever practiced concentration fire by pairs (see Arbuthnot at Jutland). Any attempt to concentrate the fire of an entire squadron of four ships in an organized manner upon a single target would have been difficult indeed and could well have resulted in a great deal of gunnery control confusion.

> Goeben was capable of engaging two targets simultaneously with controlled fire. Even if committing 4 guns only per target, Goeben's 4 gun weight of broadside versus the entire broadsisde of a British armored cruiser was 2,640 lbs versus 1,520 lbs; if three turrets were committed against a given target, the weight of broadside comparison would have been 3,960 lbs versus 1,520 lbs. The actual 9.2-inch rate of fire when conducting bracketing fire was likely no better than that of Goeben's 11-inch.

> The IGN was at this time far better trained and equipped for night-fighting than the RN; see Coronel as an example. If fighting in daylight, see Dogger Bank for the difference in gunnery efficiency between Beatty's battlecruiser squadron and Hipper's squadron; despite being outnumbered 4:3, Hipper's battlecruisers scored something like 3x the number of hits at ranges of 16,000 - 17,000 yards.

For what it's worth in terms of comment and controversy.

Byron

[HMSVF]

The Troubridge versus Goeben episode endures as one of the great debates in naval history. I've not read either the full Board of Inquiry or Court Martial proceedings, but I will throw out a couple of thoughts and opinions in support of Fawcett Wray's dim view of things

> Even if Troubridge had succeeded in gaining contact with Goeben in the pre-dawn darkness, a great deal would still have depended upon who enjoyed the advantage of the moon's position. The opponent in the "down-moon" position would have held a significant advantage in being backed by a dark night sky; an opponent "up-moon" would have been silhouetted by the light cast by the moon. If Goeben is caught "up-moon", a rapid turn-away under smoke (and Breslau would probably have carried smoke pots)

> If the data I have on British pre-war 9.2-inch and 6-inch AP projectile is consistent with the ammunition carried aboard Troubridge's armored cruisers in August 1914, there was little to no chance of any hits actually slowing Goeben down. By contrast, Troubridge's cruisers possessed no protection whatever in terms of keeping out German 11-inch AP at any reasonable fighting range.

> According to Geoffrey Miller, "Duke of Edinburgh" was good for no better than 19.5 knots at the time. If Troubridge was to tactically manage his cruiser squadron under normal RN rules, formation speed might have been as low as 17-18 knots.

> Fawcett-Wray was (IMO) absolutely correct when he stated that the squadron's 9.2-inch guns were inferior in effective range to the 11-inch main battery of Goeben. See the 1916 Spotting Rules for the effective range distinction made by Chatfield between 9.2-inch and 12-inch+ guns

> The RN, in 1914, had only ever practiced concentration fire by pairs (see Arbuthnot at Jutland). Any attempt to concentrate the fire of an entire squadron of four ships in an organized manner upon a single target would have been difficult indeed and could well have resulted in a great deal of gunnery control confusion.

> Goeben was capable of engaging two targets simultaneously with controlled fire. Even if committing 4 guns only per target, Goeben's 4 gun weight of broadside versus the entire broadsisde of a British armored cruiser was 2,640 lbs versus 1,520 lbs; if three turrets were committed against a given target, the weight of broadside comparison would have been 3,960 lbs versus 1,520 lbs. The actual 9.2-inch rate of fire when conducting bracketing fire was likely no better than that of Goeben's 11-inch.

> The IGN was at this time far better trained and equipped for night-fighting than the RN; see Coronel as an example. If fighting in daylight, see Dogger Bank for the difference in gunnery efficiency between Beatty's battlecruiser squadron and Hipper's squadron; despite being outnumbered 4:3, Hipper's battlecruisers scored something like 3x the number of hits at ranges of 16,000 - 17,000 yards.

For what it's worth in terms of comment and controversy.

Byron

I think the problem is tradition and that because this event happened early on in the war there wasn't the realisation that chivalry wasn't going to cut it against modern weapons. The RN history was built on being outnumbered or pulling off victory against the odds. The problem with that was that it was 100 years prior and technology had advanced way beyond what the likes of Howe or Nelson could have dreamed of. That's not decrying their achievements but more a comment that, like on the Western Front, human flesh was no match for a rapid firing Spandau...


Just my two penneth of course.

[Byron Angel]

Hi HMSVF,
I agree that "Tradition" had indeed served as a principal guiding light of the RN and stemmed from the following factors -
> For a century prior to WW1 the RN had for all practical purposes really never known defeat at sea.
> The RN had remained the largest and most powerful sea-going fleet known to mankind for a hundred years.
> The RN had come to be viewed as the bulwark of the British Empire in the popular mind.

Exactly how those sentiments reverberated psychologically within the service itself is anyone's guess, but the effect must have been very powerful.

An interesting question .....

Byron

[HMSVF]

Hi HMSVF,
I agree that "Tradition" had indeed served as a principal guiding light of the RN and stemmed from the following factors -
> For a century prior to WW1 the RN had for all practical purposes really never known defeat at sea.
> The RN had remained the largest and most powerful sea-going fleet known to mankind for a hundred years.
> The RN had come to be viewed as the bulwark of the British Empire in the popular mind.

Exactly how those sentiments reverberated psychologically within the service itself is anyone's guess, but the effect must have been very powerful.

An interesting question .....

Byron

I think for 100 years realistically the RN were unchallenged. Yes there were the French and Russia but realistically neither were going to be that challenging given Britain's economic position at the time (up to 1890's). My personal view from reading various texts is that the RN became "lazy" (for want of a better word and obsessed with "show" as opposed to "go". When you hear some of the tales about just how much effort was put into appearance - were officers promotion chances apparently could be determined on being of the right family,having the right connections and paying to keep their ship looking immaculate.

Then Germany comes along .

Not only do they have industrial muscle but they have a military tradition. Maybe not naval, but they had the organisation. And the will.


Imagine if Jackie Fisher hadnt have been around!

[Byron Angel]

Hi HMSVF,
I agree that "Tradition" had indeed served as a principal guiding light of the RN and stemmed from the following factors -
> For a century prior to WW1 the RN had for all practical purposes really never known defeat at sea.
> The RN had remained the largest and most powerful sea-going fleet known to mankind for a hundred years.
> The RN had come to be viewed as the bulwark of the British Empire in the popular mind.

Exactly how those sentiments reverberated psychologically within the service itself is anyone's guess, but the effect must have been very powerful.

An interesting question .....

Byron

I think for 100 years realistically the RN were unchallenged. Yes there were the French and Russia but realistically neither were going to be that challenging given Britain's economic position at the time (up to 1890's). My personal view from reading various texts is that the RN became "lazy" (for want of a better word and obsessed with "show" as opposed to "go". When you hear some of the tales about just how much effort was put into appearance - were officers promotion chances apparently could be determined on being of the right family,having the right connections and paying to keep their ship looking immaculate.

Then Germany comes along .

Not only do they have industrial muscle but they have a military tradition. Maybe not naval, but they had the organisation. And the will.

Imagine if Jackie Fisher hadnt have been around!

Couldn't agree more. Nothing seems to sap the warlike spirit like extended periods of peace ..... and a century is quite a long such period. I've always been fascinated by the huge difference in nature and psychology between military leaders who rise to high rank in times of peace versus those who do so in times of war. It seems to be like black and white.

Funny thing about Fisher. His initial task as First Sea Lord was to find a means of economizing the huge naval budget which, at the turn of the century, lay a like a gigantic millstone upon Great Britain's finances. Who knew how his reforms would influence events so dramatically!

Byron

[HMSVF]

I think the sad thing was that there were some good officers (like Sir Percy Scott) around but they were swamped by the British class system and the illusory idea of British supremacy in all matters. Now don't get me wrong, I'm sure that there were many fine officers who had fantastic seamenship skills,the sort who could sail into Valetta Harbour, drop anchor and swing their ship through 90 degrees and dock alongside without scratching the paint work! Where I think it went awry was in how vessels should actually be fought or more importantly how their vessels actually worked!

To be fair it was a very rapid period of technological advance. When you look at a ship from 1880 and compare it even to 1890 there is a marked difference. By 1910 its a massive difference. I do wonder however, whether those who were in control of such vessels had trained in the age of hybrid sail and steam or at the very beginning of steam. I wonder how many expected the traditional "line of battle" at a range of say 1000 yards where the British would turn up fire off a load ammunition and be home in time for tea and biscuits whilst the men polished and cleaned.

There were men like Tyron who would appear to have tried to change things but...Well we all know what happened to him. It always makes me chuckle that one of the reasons apparently for the stupid reverse tripod that Dreadnought, Orion and Hercules used was because it made the question of boat-handling easier (by using the main strut as derrick)! Now if that is true that probably just about sums up a lot. Boat handling over actual ability to spot shot without being kippered!

Fisher for all of his many faults was a godsend for the RN. Everybody goes on about Churchill in later life being the right man at the right time in 1940. I certainly think that Fisher was crucial in having a RN anywhere near fit for purpose in 1914. Had he not been there how much of the "misers hoard of old junk" would still have been present? Would we be remembering Nassau or South Carolina as the first big gun battleship if Beresford had been in charge?

[Byron Angel]

Re Tryon, one cannot help but wonder what his legacy might have been if the Camperdown disaster had not intervened ..... and how it might influenced RN tactical doctrine.

Byron

[HMSVF]

Re Tryon, one cannot help but wonder what his legacy might have been if the Camperdown disaster had not intervened ..... and how it might influenced RN tactical doctrine.

Byron

A great “what if”.

The irony of the RN in the late nineteenth and early 20th century is that they forgot that Nelson was an improviser who could react to a given situation or go for a new strategy. Pretty much the antithesis of what occurred. Tyron at least recognised the shortfalls but ironically died during one of his experimental manoeuvres.

[Barondog]

I have never thought about what would have resulted if Troubridge had managed to intercept Goeben with the First Cruiser Squadron. But after giving the matter some thought from the perspective of each commander had I have come to a conclusion. That is not much in terms of a battle.

The British cruisers did not have the speed or gun range to force a battle. Souchon in Goeben would have viewed the appearance of the Cruisers with German logic. He would have seen the attack as an attempt to slow or delay Goeben. For all he knew the British battlecruisers were just over the horizon. With this in mind he would have likely poured on the coal and outrun them. Perhaps a few rounds would have been exchanged but nothing more.

After all Souchon's orders were to reach the Ottoman Empire and deliver Goeben intact. The Kaiser planned to use Goeben to bring Ottoman Empire into the war on Germany's side not fight British warships. This is in fact exactly what Souchon did by attacking Russian ships and shore facilities under the Ottoman flag.

[HMSVF]

The map below apparently shows several points where Troubridge apparently could have intercepted the Goeben however...

https://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/co ... 4393cc2be7


"'4:49 am Troubridge signalled to Milne that:

‘Being only able to meet Goeben outside the range of our guns and inside his I have abandoned the chase with my squadron request instructions for light cruisers. Goeben evidently going to Eastern Mediterranean. I had hoped to have met her before daylight.’


So was Troubridge hoping to fight in low light conditions that would allow him to close the range? From the fragmentary tit bits I've read online it would appear so. Fawcett Wray spoke to him at 02:45 ish and pointed out that they wouldn't intercept Goeben till around 06:00,daylight,with visibility around 25 to 30 miles....



It now comes down to what Goeben decides to do (as you point out). In all likelihood Goeben piles on the speed (probably around 24knots given her issues) and does a runner as best she can. Could Troubridge have cut across his bow? Again that's apparently what perturbed Fawcett Wray. What also perturbed Wray was that the squadrons firing had been abysmal during practice. So whilst theoretically the armoured cruisers could range to 16'000 yards the chance of hitting them would be down to pure luck.





Its interesting that as late as 1919 this was still considered a hot topic

https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hans ... 8e9e3963eb


BW


HMSVF

[Byron Angel]

The map below apparently shows several points where Troubridge apparently could have intercepted the Goeben however...

https://blog.nationalarchives.gov.uk/co ... 4393cc2be7

"'4:49 am Troubridge signalled to Milne that:
‘Being only able to meet Goeben outside the range of our guns and inside his I have abandoned the chase with my squadron request instructions for light cruisers. Goeben evidently going to Eastern Mediterranean. I had hoped to have met her before daylight.’


So was Troubridge hoping to fight in low light conditions that would allow him to close the range? From the fragmentary tit bits I've read online it would appear so. Fawcett Wray spoke to him at 02:45 ish and pointed out that they wouldn't intercept Goeben till around 06:00,daylight,with visibility around 25 to 30 miles....


It now comes down to what Goeben decides to do (as you point out). In all likelihood Goeben piles on the speed (probably around 24knots given her issues) and does a runner as best she can. Could Troubridge have cut across his bow? Again that's apparently what perturbed Fawcett Wray. What also perturbed Wray was that the squadrons firing had been abysmal during practice. So whilst theoretically the armoured cruisers could range to 16'000 yards the chance of hitting them would be down to pure luck.


Its interesting that as late as 1919 this was still considered a hot topic
https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hans ... 8e9e3963eb


BW
HMSVF

Hi HMSVF,
Thanks for those Handsard references. Very interesting, except for reference being made to GOEBEN's main battery reaching to 28,000 yds. I don't think this is correct. In 1914, GOEBEN's man battery elevation was 13.5deg (as originally constructed), good for 19,500 yds. Near the end of the war, GOEBEN's main battery elevation was increased to 22.5deg, good for 25,300 yds with fresh guns (a British estimate, allowing for worn condition of GOEBEN's guns, was 23,730 yds at 22.5 deg) ..... Data from Campbell "Battlecruisers - Warship Special 1".

Question
You wrote - "What also perturbed Wray was that the squadrons firing had been abysmal during practice."

Can you provide the reference source where you found this; I'd be very interested to explore it in more detail.


Byron

[HMSVF]

Hi Byron,

Came across it here...


http://www.flamboroughmanor.co.uk/super ... apter6.htm



" Troubridge later maintained that, in addition to the arguments above, Wray had gone into far more detail on technical matters – ‘penetration of armour, and so on’ – and had tendered advice on the excellence of German gunnery, while the shooting of the First Cruiser Squadron left much to be desired".

Secondary source, but well referenced with pretty good reviews.

[wadinga]

Hello All,

There are serious discrepancies in reports of the speed Goeben could achieve as a result of boiler problems. Her perceived ability to outrun or out manoeuvre and engage in gunnery at her optimum distance against Troubridge's squadron obviously weighed heavy on his mind. The shadowing HMS Gloucester reported the enemy's speed as 26 knots after leaving Messina and 22 knots somewhat later. Admiral Souchon, writing in 1930 claims an 18 knot maximum was only maintained with the utmost effort by stokers and every available extra hand moving coal in extreme high temperatures. Georg Kopp records four stokers died through their exertions or by steam leaks. Her boilers were in a parlous state with one or more of 24 completely out of action at any one time. Some of the coal she had scrounged from various sources in Messina was of very inferior quality. She had been due to return to Germany for major refit, and relieved in the Mediterranean by Moltke.

The maximum speed Goeben could make could only be discovered by actually engaging her, and there are many cases where ship's powerplants have failed due to being overstressed in battle. Whilst Gloucester's reporting was very good on the whole, it is possible occasional overestimates by guessing closing rates at very long ranges,unduly affected Troubridge's judgement.

All the best

wadinga