BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

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aurora
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BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

Post by aurora »

Bombardment of Saipan began on 13 June 1944. Fifteen battleships were involved, and 165,000 shells were fired. Seven modern fast battleships delivered twenty-four hundred 16 in (410 mm) shells, but to avoid potential minefields, fire was from a distance of 10,000 yd (9,100 m) or more, and crews were inexperienced in shore bombardment. The following day the eight pre-Pearl Harbor battleships and eleven cruisers under Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf replaced the fast battleships but were lacking in time and ammunition.

The landings began at 07:00 on 15 June 1944. More than 300 LVTs landed 8,000 Marines on the west coast of Saipan by about 09:00. Eleven fire support ships covered the Marine landings. The naval force consisted of the battleships USS Tennessee and California. The cruisers were USS Birmingham and Indianapolis. The destroyers were USS Norman Scott, Monssen, Colahan, Halsey Powell, Bailey, Robinson and Albert W. Grant.
Careful Japanese artillery preparation—placing flags in the bay to indicate the range—allowed them to destroy about 20 amphibious tanks, and the Japanese strategically placed barbed wire, artillery, machine gun emplacements, and trenches to maximize the American casualties.
However, by nightfall the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions had a beachhead about 6 mi (9.7 km) wide and .5 mi (0.8 km) deep. The Japanese counter-attacked at night but were repulsed with heavy losses. On 16 June, units of the U.S. Army's 27th Infantry Division landed and advanced on the airfield at Ås Lito (which is now the location of Saipan International Airport). Again the Japanese counter-attacked at night. On 18 June, Saito abandoned the airfield.
The invasion surprised the Japanese high command, which had been expecting an attack further south. Admiral Toyoda Soemu, commander-in-chief of the Japanese Navy, saw an opportunity to use the A-Go force to attack the U.S. Navy forces around Saipan. On 15 June, he gave the order to attack. But the resulting battle of the Philippine Sea was a disaster for the Imperial Japanese Navy, which lost three aircraft carriers and hundreds of planes. The garrisons of the Marianas would have no hope of resupply or reinforcement.
Without resupply, the battle on Saipan was hopeless for the defenders, but the Japanese were determined to fight to the last man. Saito organized his troops into a line anchored on Mount Tapotchau in the defensible mountainous terrain of central Saipan. The nicknames given by the Americans to the features of the battle—"Hell's Pocket", "Purple Heart Ridge" and "Death Valley"—indicate the severity of the fighting. The Japanese used the many caves in the volcanic landscape to delay the attackers, by hiding during the day and making sorties at night. The Americans gradually developed tactics for clearing the caves by using flamethrower teams supported by artillery and machine guns.

The operation was marred by inter-service controversy when Marine General Holland Smith, unsatisfied with the performance of the 27th Division, relieved its commander, Army General Ralph C. Smith. *****However, General Holland Smith had not inspected the terrain over which the 27th was to advance. Essentially it was a valley surrounded by hills and cliffs under Japanese control. The 27th took heavy casualties and eventually, under a plan developed by General Ralph Smith and implemented after his relief, had one battalion hold the area while two other battalions successfully flanked the Japanese*****.Smith had blundered big time or was he right???

By 7 July, the Japanese had nowhere to retreat. Saito made plans for a final suicidal banzai charge. On the fate of the remaining civilians on the island, Saito said, "There is no longer any distinction between civilians and troops. It would be better for them to join in the attack with bamboo spears than be captured." At dawn, with a group of 12 men carrying a great red flag in the lead, the remaining able-bodied troops—about 3,000 men—charged forward in the final attack. Amazingly, behind them came the wounded, with bandaged heads, crutches, and barely armed. The Japanese surged over the American front lines, engaging both Army and Marine units. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 105th U.S. Infantry were almost destroyed, losing 650 killed and wounded. However, the fierce resistance of these two battalions, as well as that of Headquarters Company, 105th Infantry, and elements of 3rd Battalion, 10th Marines (an artillery unit) resulted in over 4,300 Japanese killed. For their actions during the 15-hour Japanese attack, three men of the 105th Infantry were awarded the Medal of Honor—all posthumously. Numerous others fought the Japanese until they were overwhelmed by the largest Japanese Banzai attack in the Pacific War.

By 16:15 on 9 July, Admiral Turner announced that Saipan was officially secured. Saito—along with commanders Hirakushi and Igeta—committed suicide in a cave. Also committing suicide at the end of the battle was Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo—the naval commander who led the Japanese carriers at Pearl Harbor and Midway Atoll—who had been assigned to Saipan to direct the Japanese naval air forces based there.

In the end, almost the entire garrison of troops on the island—at least 30,000—died. For the Americans, the victory was the most costly to date in the Pacific War. 2,949 Americans were killed and 10,464 wounded, out of 71,000 who landed. Among the wounded was the actor Lee Marvin. During the assault on Mount Tapochau with "I" Company, 24th Marines, he was injured in the buttocks by Japanese fire which severed his sciatic nerve. He received a medical discharge.

NB A greatly increase in the "butcher bill" on this occasion approx 3000 US dead and 10000+ wounded against a horrific 30000 Japanese dead.I guess you guys were getting a "tad" too close to the homelands for comfort

NB2. With General Ralph Smith's relief effected, General Jarman received orders to take over command of the 27th Division. He reported to division headquarters in the middle of the afternoon of 24 June and discovered that General Ralph Smith was at the front inspecting troops. Late that afternoon General Smith returned to the command post and remained there in consultation with General Jarman until about 0100 the next morning. The plan agreed upon for 25 June was essentially the one General Smith had already devised. Rather than continue the frontal assault on Death Valley with all three battalions of the 106th Infantry, it was decided that one battalion would be left at the mouth of the valley to contain the Japanese while the other two would circle to the right (eastward), then turn northwest and establish contact with the 2d Marine Division north of the Japanese positions that had held up the 27th Division's advance through the valley.1 Early on the morning of the 25th, while the two generals were still together, General Smith received his orders to report not later than 0530 that day for air transportation back to Pearl Harbor.2

aurora
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Re: BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

Post by Thorsten Wahl »

continuos repeating wikipedia articles is somwhat boring :whistle:
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Re: BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

Post by José M. Rico »

Aurora, there is nothing wrong in discussing Wikipedia articles here, but:

1. Do not "copy and paste" the whole article, and...
2. Add a link back to Wiki. In this case: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Saipan
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Re: BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

Post by aurora »

THANK YOU JOSE-appreciated that and wilco.

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Re: BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

Post by RF »

Thorsten Wahl wrote:continuos repeating wikipedia articles is somwhat boring :whistle:
Well, they can be informative - however there is no particular point of discussion being raised.

Does aurora have a point to make following on from the original post?
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Re: BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

Post by Djoser »

Sorry, but there seems to be a pattern here...
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Re: BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

Post by aurora »

Yes -the question asked here was regarding General Holland's handling of this part of the battle-despite having replaced General Smith; and used his plan without any reconnaissance
"However, General Holland Smith had not inspected the terrain over which the 27th was to advance. Essentially it was a valley surrounded by hills and cliffs under Japanese control. The 27th took heavy casualties and eventually, under a plan developed by General Ralph Smith and implemented after his relief, had one battalion hold the area while two other battalions successfully flanked the Japanese Smith had blundered big time or was he right???"

PS I have read the remarks about using Wiki articles and I have taken on board their import.

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Re: BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

Post by Byron Angel »

aurora wrote:Yes -the question asked here was regarding General Holland's handling of this part of the battle-despite having replaced General Smith; and used his plan without any reconnaissance
"However, General Holland Smith had not inspected the terrain over which the 27th was to advance. Essentially it was a valley surrounded by hills and cliffs under Japanese control. The 27th took heavy casualties and eventually, under a plan developed by General Ralph Smith and implemented after his relief, had one battalion hold the area while two other battalions successfully flanked the Japanese Smith had blundered big time or was he right???"

PS I have read the remarks about using Wiki articles and I have taken on board their import.

aurora
..... There is a great deal more to this than the Wikipaedia article pretends. The Army, for service-related political reasons, had long wanted to extend their control to include all land operations in the Pacific, including opposed amphibious island landings as well as overall command of USMC units in the Pacific. Holland Smith fiercely insisted upon the USMC maintaining control of such operations on the grounds that: (a) it had been the USMC that had single-handedly developed amphibious doctrine; (b) the USMC intensively exercised their troops in it during the pre-war years; (c) the USMC was much better positioned to coordinate and cooperate with the USN, whose support was essential to thesuccess of such operations; (d) the Army knew little or nothing about amphibious operations.

Viewed from an objective distance, Holland Smith was undeniably an abrasive, aggressive personality. However, the 27th Division was not a good unit and had not performed well on Saipan. In his capacity as senior commander on Saipan, with all the responsibilities associated with that position, Holland Smith was not only within his rights, but was arguably obligated to relieve Ralph Smith from command if he felt it would advance the prospects of victory. Holland Smith's relief of Ralph Smith ignited an intensely acrimonious inter-service dispute, with the US Army essentially smothering Holland Smith's career after Saipan. Further repercussions can probably be seen in the unsuccessful post-war campaign to abolish the USMC as a separate service and absorb it into the US Army.

It is not a coincidence (IMHO) that no USMC units whatsoever participated in the Normandy landing.

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Re: BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

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The relief of R. Smith probably did not make any real difference in the aggressiveness of the 27th Infantry Division. However, it did stir up a Marine Corps / Army controversy. On Saipan itself, marines began to look down on the 27th Infantry Division soldiers and the army soldiers resented H. Smith for relieving their commander and the implications made on the fighting capability of the division. Off of the island the controversy grew much greater, with several Army generals going so far as to recommending to Lieutenant General Robert C. Richardson, commander of all Army forces in the Pacific, that H. Smith was extremely prejudiced against army forces and that no Army forces should ever be put under his command again!

Major General Sanderford Jarman, who was on Saipan to take charge of the garrison operation after the Japanese were defeated, assumed temporary command of the 27th Infantry Division from 24 to 28 June. On 28 June, Major General George W. Griner, Jr. assumed command of the 27th Infantry Division. However, when he assumed command of the division, he was surprised to find out that he only had control of four infantry battalions, the rest of the division was under Corps command. Griner was told by H. Smith that he would have to "earn" the rest of the division back. By 5 July, the 27th Infantry Division and the 4th Marine Division had captured Mount Tapotchau and had pushed northward up the narrowing island. Due to this narrowing of the front, the 2nd Marine Division was pulled into reserve. By 6 July, Griner regained the control of all of the 27th Infantry Division's units. On 7 July, three thousand Japanese soldiers conducted a bonzai charge against the 27th Infantry Division. The Japanese soldiers were armed with only grenades and bayonets, yet they broke through the 27th Infantry Division on the western flank near the coast. The Japanese soldiers destroyed two of four infantry battalions and were only stopped by marines of the 2nd Marine Division after the Japanese had passed through the 27th Infantry Division's sector. By this time, H. smith had had enough of the 27th infantry Division and various reports state that he ordered the entire division withdrawn from Saipan. In reality, only the decimated battalions were withdrawn from Saipan by destroyers. However, H. Smith did order the 27th Infantry Division into reserve and vowed that he would never use the division again.
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Re: BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

Post by steffen19k »

Ok, If I understood this right...

Howlin Mad screwed up big time by telling an Army General he had to earn an Army Division back... THATS the big controversy point that I saw here.

He further messed things up by apparenlty never having taken a tour of the frontline, something the DIVISION COMMANDER BEING RELIEVED was doing. Every good General should make an effort to survey the battlefield with his own two eyes. If Howlin Mad had actually done something more instead of sit on his ass and fuss over reports and analyses, there would have been some small changes in the situation for the 27th Division.

As far as a Bayonet & grenade attack that permitted the japanese to get through the 27th Area of Operations... The 101st Airborne did the exact same thing on D-Day at St Marie Eglise. It worked just as well for them.

The benefits of grenades and bayonets is that, as the attacker, you are as silent as can be, and you can confuse the enemy, while using the simple mind set of "if you see a muzzle flash, its the enemy," and you can usually take out more than one person with grenades, especially machine gun nests. The defender is at such a disadvantage because he doesn't know where the infiltration points are, and he doesn't know how far the enemy has penetrated by the time he starts to react. The only thing that could have stopped that attack was the coming of daybreak, which would quickly deconfuse the situation.

As far as my Armchair general Prognosis, Howlin Mad Smith really did deserve the treatment he got.

As far as my personal feelings, I can't really judge one way or the other as I wasn't there to witness it with my own two eyes.
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Re: BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

Post by Byron Angel »

steffen19k wrote:Ok, If I understood this right...

Howlin Mad screwed up big time by telling an Army General he had to earn an Army Division back... THATS the big controversy point that I saw here.

He further messed things up by apparenlty never having taken a tour of the frontline, something the DIVISION COMMANDER BEING RELIEVED was doing. Every good General should make an effort to survey the battlefield with his own two eyes. If Howlin Mad had actually done something more instead of sit on his ass and fuss over reports and analyses, there would have been some small changes in the situation for the 27th Division.

As far as a Bayonet & grenade attack that permitted the japanese to get through the 27th Area of Operations... The 101st Airborne did the exact same thing on D-Day at St Marie Eglise. It worked just as well for them.

The benefits of grenades and bayonets is that, as the attacker, you are as silent as can be, and you can confuse the enemy, while using the simple mind set of "if you see a muzzle flash, its the enemy," and you can usually take out more than one person with grenades, especially machine gun nests. The defender is at such a disadvantage because he doesn't know where the infiltration points are, and he doesn't know how far the enemy has penetrated by the time he starts to react. The only thing that could have stopped that attack was the coming of daybreak, which would quickly deconfuse the situation.

As far as my Armchair general Prognosis, Howlin Mad Smith really did deserve the treatment he got.

As far as my personal feelings, I can't really judge one way or the other as I wasn't there to witness it with my own two eyes.


..... You can find a pretty objective account of the 27th Division affair on Saipan here - http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/US ... index.html

Worth reading before drawing any final conclusions IMHO.

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Re: BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

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A furore arose, with bitter inter service recriminations, and the flames were fanned by lurid press reports. Holland Smith summarized his feelings three days after the relief. According to a unit history, The 27th Infantry Division in World War II, he stated, "The 27th Division won't fight, and Ralph Smith will not make them fight." Army generals were furious, and in Hawaii, Lieutenant General Robert Richardson, commander of the U.S. Army in the Pacific (USARPAC) convened an Army board of inquiry over the matter. The issue reached to the highest military levels in Washington.

While the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney, reviewed the matter, he found some faults with Holland Smith, but then went on to say that Ralph Smith failed to exact the performance expected from a well-trained division, as evidenced by poor leadership on the part of some regimental and battalion commanders, undue hesitancy to bypass snipers "with a tendency to alibi because of lack of reserves to mop up," poor march discipline, and lack of reconnaissance.

The Army's official summary, United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific, Campaign in the Marianas (published 15 years after the operations) attributed some errors to Holland Smith's handling of a real problem, and it also gave full recognition to the difficult terrain and bitter resistance that the Army regiments faced. The history stated that:

. . . there is no doubt that the 106th Infantry Regiment of the 27th Division was late in jumping off in the attack on the morning of 23 June--even though not so late as Holland Smith charged. On the 23d and again on the 24th, the Army troops attacking Death Valley were slow and faltering in their advance. According to the testimony of General Jarman, who took over the division from Ralph Smith, the unit leaders of the 106th Infantry were hesitant and apparently confused. Although the Army troops in Death Valley sustained fairly heavy casualties, the two Marine divisions on the flanks suffered greater ones. Yet the Marines made considerable advances while the 165th Infantry registered only small gains--the 106th Infantry almost none at all.

No matter what the extenuating circumstances were-and there were several--the conclusion seems inescapable that Holland Smith had good reason to be disappointed with the performance of the 27th Infantry Division on the two days in question. . . .
Extracted from the link provided above.
The 27th Division however gave good account of itself towards the end of the campaign under a new GOC and despite a horrific "butcher's bill"

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Re: BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

Post by Byron Angel »

A full reading of the hyperwar account is IMO very interesting and far more damning with respect to the very poor performance of the 27th under Ralph Smith. Also, the account makes clear that Holland Smith did not unilaterally relieve Ralph Smith; he first had to make his case to Adm Turner, the senior USN Admiral at Saipan, and also in advance with General Jarman, the senior US Army commander there. Both concurred with H Smith and approved the relief of command.

It is quite clear that Holland Smith was there to get the business done and was willing to make hard but necessary decisions to do so.

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Re: BATTLE FOR SAIPAN-13 JUNE-9 JULY 1944

Post by aurora »

Agreed and Amen to Howling's action Byron-excellent link by the way.

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