Operation Sea Lion

[RF]

The Germans could not have really tried to win by the blockade method until 1942/1943 simply because they did not have enough U-boats.

A strategy in which Barbarossa is postponed until Britain is out of the war, using a wider perspective than just Atlantic operations, would have been a better option. This would mean a heavy Luftwaffe blitz on Britain against economic targets especially ports and factories; far more hilfskreuzer and warship surface raiders; a Mediteranean strategy starting with the conquest of Malta and a much bigger Afrika Korps with the objective of penetrating through Palestine into the Middle East oilfields; and getting Japan to attack the British/Dutch colonies in east Asia without attacking the US.

[Dave Saxton]

I agree with all those alternatives generally RF, but they would need to re-think their allocation of resources first thing. It doesn't have to be all on the shoulders of the U-boat arm. They need a rugged long range four or six engine bomber that can also be an effective marine patrol bomber and a long range excort (not the BF110 but perhaps a twin 109 or something) for one thing. But think of the resources soaked up by Barbarossa and if these are put toward a completely different approach. Barbarossa should have been canceled altogether- not just postponed.

[wadinga]

All,

The invasion of Britain was never on Hitler's agenda whereas the invasion of Russia always was. Ever since Mein Kampf was published Communism and "International Jewry" were the Fuhrer's targets. Britain and France were supposed to have acquiesced whilst the Nazi legions went East into Poland, but things didn't work out that way. Richard J Evans in "The Third Reich in Power" (a recommended read) describes how appalled many Nazis were that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, since it looked like a betrayal of their "principles". Of course, Barbarossa happened less than two years later. Just a ploy whilst Hitler built up his strength.

Britain was supposed to stop fighting when France collapsed. Britain was supposed to ask for terms under the threat of invasion, but with the Kriegsmarine decimated off Norway and a ramshackle fleet of unseaworthy river barges the only method of getting across the Channel, a seaborne attack was never really feasible. Having myself sailed in the Channel, the idea of towed barges capable of maybe three knots being swept helplessly up and down by Spring tides whilst the RN slaughters them seems by far the most likely outcome. Since the RAF can always fall back to northern bases the Luftwaffe can never defeat them sufficiently to get total domination over the Channel even for the few necessary hours.

German paratroops had a very limited capability early in the War and depended on relief by ground forces very soon after landing. They even dropped without any weapons heavier than pistols, having to recover heavier weapons from seperate containers. Relief by regular forces was not something easily done over 22 plus miles of salt water.

All the best

wadinga

[RF]

But think of the resources soaked up by Barbarossa and if these are put toward a completely different approach. Barbarossa should have been canceled altogether- not just postponed.

Note that Germany was not fully mobilised for total war until 1944.

Had Germany been properly mobilised as efficiently as Britain and the USA were mobilised, with full utilisation of the female labour force, concentration on labour productivity and outputs, standardisation of weapons and ammunition from 1939 then the German resources and options would have been much greater. Even by 1941.

Strategically Barbarossa has to be considered - from the standpoint that Stalin could launch a surprise pre-emptive strike on Germany. Substantial military forces would be required in eastern Europe to deter Soviet attack. Rather like the Cold War.....

[RF]

All,

The invasion of Britain was never on Hitler's agenda .

In the summer of 1940 it was. Hitler issued a War Directive ordering it giving it a codename of this thread title that proves it,

[RF]

Richard J Evans in "The Third Reich in Power" (a recommended read) describes how appalled many Nazis were that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was signed, since it looked like a betrayal of their "principles".
wadinga

Just as Hitler signed a non-aggression pact with Poland in 1934......

Most people ''in the know'' were well aware of the real purposes of the Nazi-Soviet Non Aggression Pact. This is recorded by Guderian in his book ''Panzer Leader.'' As Guderian records, most of the criticism from within the Wehrmacht was about the Soviets moving westward and occupying eastern Poland. Opposition in the NSDAP would be contrary to the ''Leadershgip principle'' and would be muted by memories of the ''Night of the Long Knives'' in 1934......

[RF]

All,

Britain was supposed to stop fighting when France collapsed. Britain was supposed to ask for terms under the threat of invasion, but with the Kriegsmarine decimated off Norway and a ramshackle fleet of unseaworthy river barges the only method of getting across the Channel, a seaborne attack was never really feasible. Having myself sailed in the Channel, the idea of towed barges capable of maybe three knots being swept helplessly up and down by Spring tides whilst the RN slaughters them seems by far the most likely outcome. Since the RAF can always fall back to northern bases the Luftwaffe can never defeat them sufficiently to get total domination over the Channel even for the few necessary hours.

German paratroops had a very limited capability early in the War and depended on relief by ground forces very soon after landing. They even dropped without any weapons heavier than pistols, having to recover heavier weapons from seperate containers. Relief by regular forces was not something easily done over 22 plus miles of salt water.

But none of this was recognised at the time. The British regarded invasion as a serious threat.

And Hitler had no idea of the problems of crossing the English Channel. Certainly not when he issued his War Directive for the invasion of Britain.

I agree that had the Germans attempted a seaborne invasion it would (as planned) have ended in disaster. But the Germans, including the SS and Dr Six were deadly serious in their plans for an occupied Britain.

For the record, it was in September 1940 that Hitler decided to attack the USSR in precedance of an invasion of Britain. The decision was not purely one of ideology but in reaction to Soviet moves westward, in particular their annexation of Bessarabia from Romania, which threatened Germanys' oil supply.
Had the Soviets not made these moves westward then it is possible that Barbarossa would have been considered for 1942 rather than 1941.

[wadinga]

All,

For the record, it was in September 1940 that Hitler decided to attack the USSR in precedance of an invasion of Britain

According to Laurence Rees' excellent "The Nazis, a warning from history" it was on the 31st July 1940 at the Berghof that Hitler told his Senior Officers that defeating Russia was the key to beating Britain.

http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaste ... uly%201940

Military Planning Conference at the Berghof, 31 July 1940

This meeting included Hitler, the Chiefs of Armed Forces High Command (OKW), Army High Command (OKH), and Navy High Command. These notes are from the war diary of General Franz Halder, the Chief of Staff in OKH:

"[According to Hitler] Britain's hope lies in Russia and the United States. If Russia drops out of the picture America, too, is lost for Britain, because elimination of Russia would tremendously increase Japan's power in the Far East. Russia is the Far Eastern sword of Britain and the United States pointed at Japan. ... Russia is the factor upon which Britain is relying most. Something must have happened in London! (i.e., a reference to Britain's pre-war anti-communist stance being reversed) ... With Russia smashed, Britain's last hope would be shattered. Germany will then be master of Europe and the Balkans. Decision: Russia's destruction must therefore be made a part of this struggle. Spring 1941. The sooner Russia is crushed, the better. Attack achieves its purpose only if Russian state can be shattered to its roots with one blow. Holding part of the country will not do. Standing still for the following winter would be perilous ... Resolute determination to eliminate Russia."

Source: Halder, Diaries, pp. 533-4 (31 July 1940)

Conversations and Military Planning Conferences in 1940 during which Hitler Stated His Intention to Attack the USSR:

"In another conversation with Field-Marshal von Rundstedt on 2 June 1940 recorded by the l; General von Sodenstern who was present, Hitler said that now that he imagined England was ready for peace, he would begin to settle the account with Bolshevism.

Entries in [General] Halder's diary:

3 July 1940. (Recording a conversation with the head of his Operations Section) The most pressing problems at the moment are England and ... the East. As regards the latter, the main question is how to deal Russia a military blow which will force her to recognize Germany's preponderant role in Europe.'

13 July 1940. (After a conversation with Hitler) The question in the forefront of the Führer's mind is why England is still unwilling to make peace; like us, he thinks that the answer is that England still has some hope of action on the part of Russia.

22 July 1940. (Recording a conversation with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army [Brauchitsch]) The latter appears to have summed up his impressions of a discussion he had had with Hitler the previous day by the following instruction: 'The problem of Russia must be dealt with. We must begin thinking about this.'

30 July 1940. (An extract from an appreciation of the situation worked out with the Commander-in-Chief of the Army [Brauchitsch]) If we cannot reach a decision against England, the danger remains that England will ally herself with Russia; the question then is whether we should carry on a war on two fronts, one of which would be Russia. Answer: Better remain friends with Russia.

31 July 1940. (Some of Hitler's statements in the Berghof) ... Russia must be dealt with. Spring 1941. ... Destruction of the power of Russia. To be achieved by:

1. A thrust towards Kiev with flank on the Dnieper.

2. Thrust through the Baltic States in direction Moscow. Finally, pincer operation from north and south. Later a separate operation against the Baku oil fields. We can then see the extent to which Finland and Turkey are involved."

Source: Warlimont, Inside, pp. 112-113, 135.""

By the end of July 1940, German senior commanders were already aware that an invasion of Bolshevik Russia was at least as likely as Sealion. Rees says Halder's War Diary recorded his planners, under his personal orders, evaluating an invasion of Russia in early July 1940, but like many German military leaders who survived the Nazi period, Halder repositioned himself as just another good trusting soldier sent off on an agressive war by a "mad Fuhrer" rather than someone developing ideas of his own to boost his status in the Nazi hierachy.

Hitler Directive No 16 Of 16th July "“As England, despite her hopeless situation, still shows no sign of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to prepare and if necessary to carry out a landing operation against her. The aim of this operation id to eliminate the English motherland as a base from which war against Germany can be continued, and, if this should become unavoidable, to occupy it to the full extent."

The Arch Murderer is already weaseling with "if necessary" and "if this should become unavoidable".

Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Sea_Lion records accurately:
"The view of those that believe, regardless of a potential German victory in the air battle, that Sea Lion was still not going to succeed included a number of German General Staff members. Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz believed air superiority was "not enough". Dönitz stated, "we possessed neither control of the air or the sea; nor were we in any position to gain it".[15] Erich Raeder, commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine in 1940 argued:

".....the emphatic reminder that up until now the British had never thrown the full power of their fleet into action. However, a German invasion of England would be a matter of life and death for the British, and they would unhesitatingly commit their naval forces, to the last ship and the last man, into an all-out fight for survival. Our Air Force could not be counted on to guard our transports from the British Fleets, because their operations would depend on the weather, if for no other reason. It could not be expected that even for a brief period our Air Force could make up for our lack of naval supremacy."[16]

When Franz Halder, the Chief of the Army General Staff, heard of the state of the Kriegsmarine, and its plan for the invasion, he noted in his diary, on 28 July 1940; "If that [the plan] is true, all previous statements by the navy were so much rubbish and we can throw away the whole plan of invasion".[17]

Alfred Jodl, Chief of Operations in the OKW, argued, after Raeder argued that the Kriegsmarine could not meet the operational requirements of the Army; "then a landing in England must be regarded as a sheer act of desperation".[18]"

SS bureaucrats may have busied themselves with lurid plans for the elimination of resistance after a successful invasion of the British Isles , but the Fuhrer had already informed their bosses he was thinking about eliminating the true Racial Enemy, Jewish dominated Russia! Lebensraum! If the Luftwaffe succeeded in driving Britain to the negotiation table in August or September, then fine. The bluff of invasion had to be maintained, but who was bluffing who? Telling the Fuhrer that your part of the Wehrmacht was incapable of delivering the goods was a sure path to the concentration camp, so you had to tell both him and your troops it was "On".

Looking at things from the British point of view it was ridiculous not to take the threat of invasion seriously, and every feasible measure was taken. However, Churchill did not lead a country wholly behind him, and many, including members of his government still hankered for peace, and peace at any price. Hitler offered peace. Peace under a currently targetted aerial bombardment with the twin threats of all-out slaughter from the skies terror bombing and invasion in the future. France had negotiated a peace in abject defeat that allowed them to keep the majority of their territory (if not their war making capability). To Churchill, convinced that the Nazis must be destroyed as soon as possible, not left to dominate continental Europe before turning again, vastly stronger and more capable against Britain in the future, the threat of invasion was a gift. The threat of jackboots on British soil, and SS Stormtroopers executing at will would be a great unifying force on a stunned British public still to experience "Their Finest Hour". So Corporal Jones sometimes the advice is "Do Panic, do panic, just a bit, just enough!"

One of the things Churchill did to put the invasion beyond any possibility was to attempt to eliminate the hostage French Fleet. No augmented Kriegsmarine, no possibility of invasion. Brutal but necessary.

For RF, maybe many people "in the know" did know what the Non-Aggression pact was about, but the vast majority of Nazi supporters who had been injuring, imprisoning or murdering Communists with State sanction since 1933 could not be let into the secret. What they saw was the Leader getting cozy with the Bogeyman.

For Dave, I'm sorry, I'm not getting you.....the invasion of Britain was on Hitler's agenda because he said it was on his agenda?

Recommended further reading:The Silent Victory by Duncan Grinnell-Milne and 1940 Myth and Reality by Clive Ponting

All the best

wadinga

[Dave Saxton]

For Dave, I'm sorry, I'm not getting you.....the invasion of Britain was on Hitler's agenda because he said it was on his agenda?

I havn't attempted to describe what Hitler's true agenda was...I think. I'm more apt to be in agreement with you here. He told Adolf Galland during the BoB that he wasn't ever serious about Sea Lion or really continued fighting vs England.

My perspective is that once the Germans found themselves in the June 1940 dilema of what to do now, the best way to deal with this problem was to adopt a serious and long term naval strategy vs GB rather than trying to solve (or ignore) the question by a massive land war to the east. It's the biggest blunder in military history in my opinion. It's testimony to the absolute strangle hold the evil dictator and his henchmen had on the German nation and the Wermacht that they went along with this madness.

However, Churchill did not lead a country wholly behind him, and many, including members of his government still hankered for peace, and peace at any price. Hitler offered peace. Peace under a currently targetted aerial bombardment with the twin threats of all-out slaughter from the skies terror bombing and invasion in the future.

This may be one reason Churchill stated that his greatest fear was loosing the Battle of the Atlantic and he later stated that the situation from late 1940 was graver than admitted up until the tide finally turned in May 43. Attacking the civilian population from the air and occupying your enemy's homeland is a sure way to steel the will of that enemy against you. On the otherhand ecomonic and possibly literal starvation and low morale on the home front, along with constant news of military set backs, will likely inspire the political opposition that always exists on your enemy's home front, to end the war rather than win it at great price. Attacking the center of world wide socialism however, is a good way to insure that the far left and the labor unions in England will unite behind the war effort against you rather than be in opposition to the enemy's political leadership intent on prosecuting the war.

[RF]

wadinga, there are alot of useful references in your post and the main feature that comes out is the confusion of objectives that Hitler had.

The USSR at this time was expanding westward, a by-product of the Non-Aggression Pact the scale of which Hitler did not foresee. That process didn't end with the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland, but also featured the Winter War in Finland (which reduced German fears of the Red Army when it suffered such reverses initially), annexation of the Baltic states, including Lithuania which was supposed to be in the German sphere of influence under the Pact, and then Soviet seizure of Bessarabia from Romania, right next to the Ploesti oilfields. That scared Hitler who could only identify continuing British resistance to the Soviet bogeyman.

A lot of Hitlers' comments came as ''table talk'' and throwaway comments in which he often contradicted himself. Another feature of Hitler's military leadership was his adoption of other peoples' ideas as his own and also his tendency to criticise some of his own policies and plans when they became evident they weren't going to work, as if the original idea wasn't his. The summer of 1940 has numerous examples of this.
But it is clear that Hitler wanted to invade Britain, as well as court Britain and to attack the USSR. Indeed one point not mentioned in your post is that at one point in July 1940 he told his generals to attack the USSR in September 1940. As with the plan of attack in the west during the ''phoney war'' Hitler kept changing his mind and ''dilley-dallied'' over whether to attack or not, a record list of ''unalterable'' decisions that were altered.

With respect to Churchill, the influence of the appeassors in May/June 1940 was quickly reduced once Operation Dynamo retrieved the BEF from France. From September 1940 Britain wasn't doing too badly - apart from the Blitz at home and the Battle of the Atlantic Churchills' foreign policy of dispersing German strength started to work and British forces started to trample on the Italians.

[RF]

I havn't attempted to describe what Hitler's true agenda was...I think. I'm more apt to be in agreement with you here. He told Adolf Galland during the BoB that he wasn't ever serious about Sea Lion or really continued fighting vs England.

I suspect that Hitler didn't know what his agenda was either. Hence he was both in favour of invading Britain and against it. Whichever was convenient at the time and to whom he was talking to. Nothing was ever the Fuhrers' fault when things didn't go according to plan.

[Dave Saxton]

LOL That sounds like Obama. Sad.

[wadinga]

All,

I'm still of the opinion Hitler wanted a negotiated peace with Britain so he could get on with his real longer-term objective, and he was certainly still making announcements offering it in late July-

14th July Churchill gave a speech justifying the attacks on the French Fleet concluding;-

"Should the invader come to Britain, there will be no placid lying down of the people in submission before him, as we have seen, alas, in other countries. We shall defend every village, every town, and every city. The vast mass of London itself, fought street by street, could easily devour an entire hostile army; and we would rather see London laid in ruins and ashes than that it should be tamely and abjectly enslaved. I am bound to state these facts, because it is necessary to inform our people of our intentions, and thus to reassure them."

http://www.winston-churchill-leadership ... riors.html


"Reacting to such blatant and unprecedented defiance, Hitler assembled the Wehrmacht High Command on Tuesday, July 16, 1940, and ordered them to plan for the conquest of Britain.
Meanwhile, three days later, Hitler the politician ascended the world stage once more, giving a speech to the Nazi Reichstag, broadcast live on radio in Germany and around the world. He portrayed Churchill as a war monger and himself as a reasonable man desiring peace. "I feel a deep disgust for this type of unscrupulous politician who wrecks whole nations," Hitler said of Churchill. "I feel it to be my duty before my own conscience to appeal once more to reason and common sense in Great Britain as much as elsewhere. I consider myself in a position to make this appeal since I am not the vanquished begging favors, but the victor speaking in the name of reason."
Once more, Germans took the Führer at his word, concluding the British would be to blame for any continuation of the war. Hitler by now had learned to play his own people like a master fiddler. He even confided to the Italian ambassador, "It was always a good tactic to make the enemy responsible in the eyes of public opinion in Germany and abroad for the future course of events. This strengthened one's own morale and weakened that of the enemy."

Undoubtedly, the Luftwaffe's inability to decisively defeat the RAF frustrated him, since the paper tiger of his invasion fleet was not having the desired effect either.

"By early August the British were even thinking of deploying resources elsewhere:-

There is evidence, however, that Churchill and senior military commanders did not think that it would ever come to this. On 10 August the CIGS, General Sir John Dill, sent the Prime Minister a list of the reinforcements that he had selected to send to the Middle East. These included a regiment each of light, cruiser and infantry tanks; 48 2-pdr anti tank guns; 48 25-pdr field guns; 500 Bren Guns; and 50,000 anti-tank mines. The reinforcements sailed in a convoy on 22 August. [3] This decision was, of course, approved by Churchill. At just this time British intelligence sources, including Enigma decrypts, in the words of the official historian, ‘at last confirmed that Germany was indeed making preparations for an invasion’. [4]To decide to send an armoured brigade and such quantities of equipment out of the UK at this point suggests either a reckless gamble with the nation’s security, or an extremely high level of confidence that the Germans could not invade, or such an attempt would be defeated by the RAF and the Royal Navy. The major debate surrounding the decision was not whether to send the forces in the first place, but the route that the convoy was to take: the faster but more dangerous route through the Mediterranean, or the slower passage around the Cape. In mid-August 1940 Churchill and Dill were looking beyond the threat of invasion of the UK, to what they saw as the real challenge to Britain’s strategic position: the imminent Italian attack on Egypt."

http://www.rusi.org/analysis/commentary ... E2591AE95/

It may be, that as many have suggested, that the accidental bombing of central London, and most particularly the RAF reprisal raids on Berlin that followed, actually put Hitler back on the aggressive path against Britain, but the stop/go approach to Sealion meant it was by now far too late. Clive ponting says by 11th September only 60% of the required invasion craft (river barges!) and 25% of the tugs required were available.

"Hitler was furious. It was yet another blow to his prestige by the bombastic British. On September 4th, he told his people, "When the British Air Force drops two or three or four thousand kilograms of bombs, then we will in one night drop 150, 230, 300 or 400,000 kilograms. When they declare they will increase their attacks on our cities, then we will raze their cities to the ground. We will stop the handiwork of those night air pirates, so help us God! The hour will come when one of us will break and it will not be National Socialist Germany!"

Even after France fell, Churchill was fighting off those who wanted "Common Sense" to prevail:-
"During the period of the 'phoney war' contacts with prewar personal British friends convinced highly placed Nazis that the British were irresolute. German diplomats and secret agents were alerted to the possibility of making peace with Britain. The armistice sought by Marshal Petain on 16 June 1940 gave new urgency to British peace feelers, which were now being extended in Spain, Switzerland and Sweden.

There is no known verbatim record of the conversation that took place when on 17 June 1940 R.A.B. Butler (Halifax's deputy) met Bjorn Prytz, Sweden's minister in London. But long after the war Prytz published the telegram he sent to Stockholm as a result of that meeting. According to Swedish records, Butler told Prytz that 'no opportunity of reaching a compromise peace would be neglected if the possibility were offered on reasonable conditions." Butler was seeking peace terms on behalf of his boss, and in an unmistakable reference to Churchill and his supporters he added that Lord Halifax specifically promised that 'no diehards would be allowed to stand in the way."

Churchill was unable to attend a meeting of the war cabinet at 12.30 pm the following day. One item has since been deleted from the official minutes of that cabinet meeting but the diary notes of Alexander Cadogan, head of the Foreign Office, who was present, provide a tantalizing clue to what the closely guarded secret might be.

"Winston not there writing his speech. No reply from Germans." It seems that Churchill's authority was flouted by men determined to sue for peace.

Halifax and Butler were not alone in their quest. Lloyd George, who had been prime minister in the First World War, had seen little chance of a British victory in the Second. The Americans would not enter the war, he said, and he made no secret of his readiness to take over his nation in defeat, as Petain had now taken over France. How many others were of like mind can only be guessed. The Duke of Windsor who as Edward VIII abdicated from the throne in 1936 and his wife, the infamous Mrs. Wallis Simpson, were outspoken admirers of Hitler and his Third Reich. Bitterly divided from his family on account of his marriage, there are suggestions that Edward hoped to assume the throne of a defeated Britain with Hitler's blessing.

But nothing came of the peace feelers. At 9 pm on 17 June Churchill spoke on the radio for two minutes before the evening's news bulletin.

In a hastily prepared response to the French collapse he told the world: "The news from France is very bad, and I grieve for the gallant French people who have fallen into this terrible misfortune." He went on: "We shall defend our island, and, with the British Empire around us, we shall fight on unconquerable until the curse of Hitler is lifted from the brows of men. We are sure that in the end all will be well."

At 3.45 the following afternoon, while the Germans were still considering how to react to the hints, questions and off-the-record conversations, channelled through their ambassadors in neutral capitals, Churchill stood up in the House of Commons and delivered the speech that he had been writing when he was absent from the cabinet:

The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war ... if we fail, then the whole world, including the United States, and all that we have known and cared for, will sink into the abyss of a new dark age made more sinister, and perhaps more protracted, by the lights of a perverted science.

Let us therefore brace ourselves to our duty and so bear ourselves that if the British Empire and its Commonwealth lasts for a thousand years men will still say "This was their Finest Hour!


Halifax and Butler were warned to stop putting out peace feelers but were in touch with the British Ambassador in Washington after the Fuhrer's peace speech on 19th July, Lord Lothian, who was getting the available German peace terms direct from their diplomats.

Eventually, Halifax was sent off to the States, Samuel Hoare elsewhere and the doubters put in their place, but 1941 the deputy Fuhrer still thought there was a chance for negotiated peace before Barbarrossa got going, so Hess got in his plane and flew to Scotland.....

All the best

wadinga

[RF]

I'm still of the opinion Hitler wanted a negotiated peace with Britain so he could get on with his real longer-term objective,

I think that is one thing about Hitler that was abundantly clear - he wanted a free hand in Europe in return for a guarantee of the British Empire.

But a Europe dominated by one country could never be in Britains' interests. And as the British ambassador in Switzerland famously said (quoted in the film ''The Battle of Britain'') ''history shows that the guarantees of Herr Hitler guarantees nothing''.

[RF]

,

"By early August the British were even thinking of deploying resources elsewhere:-

There is evidence, however, that Churchill and senior military commanders did not think that it would ever come to this. On 10 August the CIGS, General Sir John Dill, sent the Prime Minister a list of the reinforcements that he had selected to send to the Middle East. These included a regiment each of light, cruiser and infantry tanks; 48 2-pdr anti tank guns; 48 25-pdr field guns; 500 Bren Guns; and 50,000 anti-tank mines. The reinforcements sailed in a convoy on 22 August. [3] This decision was, of course, approved by Churchill. .........In mid-August 1940 Churchill and Dill were looking beyond the threat of invasion of the UK, to what they saw as the real challenge to Britain’s strategic position: the imminent Italian attack on Egypt."

It seems clear that Churchill expected any attempted German invasion to fail, indeed he may well have wanted the attempt to take place because it would expose Germany to a clear military defeat.

Churchill did have strategic vision, certainly a more realistic one than Hitler. He recognised Italy as a paper tiger. He saw the way of weakening Germany was by expanding the scope of the war, in particular drawing Germany into the Med and the Balkans and stirring things up with Russia. In that strategy he succeeded.
The one problem of course for Churchill was the third, more distant enemy, that he could do little about. Fortunately for Churchill that problem blew up in December 1941, instead of July 1940 without attack on PH......