Karl Heidenreich wrote:I don't think is fair that I am branded as reiterative if this sort of discussions evolved the way they do, because of the tactics and rethoric of some which only purpose are to exasperate those that has made their point already.
I have come forth and showed:
1. Technical data of the Sherman and the Tiger I
Indeed you have but only some of it and only the part that supports your rather narrow definition of best.
3. The Kill Ratio accepted even by the Allied authorities (it is not disputed)
Which all go to the direction that the Tiger was a better more powerfull tank.
I don't think I've ever challenged the assertion that in a one on one dual the Tiger was more likely to win or that it was more powerful. You do keep ascribing this position to me however.
Also, in order to validate this assertion then I have brought forth not only's Willebeck's interpretation but Heinz Guderian's one. And Guderian was the father of tank warfare, at least the official one along with JFC Fuller, Basil Liddel Hart and Mikhail Tukhachevsky.
To all these lwd has brought NOTHING, or nothing of relevance, to dispute the above mentioned claim.
You have produced some quotes although not all really supported your contention. Which doesn't really matter all that much because as I stated above I haven't questioned the fact that a Tiger had an advantage in a one on one dual. What I have and do question is whether or not this is a particularly valid definition of "best". Indeed I don't think it is a very good one and have suggested a number of alternatives over the course of these discussions. I'm open to others as well.
Karl Heidenreich wrote:
You didn't say anything about favorable kill ratios you said literature about western tanks defeating Tigers.
What do you think we are talking about?
I was responding to a comment of yours. Your statement seemed pretty clear to me and I refuted it. If it wasn't what you meant to say you should word things more carefully.
Anyway you are evading the issue: when googling "death Wittman" (which is the origin of this comment) you got, again 1:2.92 Kill ratio in favor of the German side at Operation Totalize and you don't have any Sherman destroying Tigers but two regiments with a lot of Fireflies destroying seven Tigers. This was already made clear but your purpose is that the readers forget about it and put attention to your tricks.
But you said there was no literature of western tanks defeating Tigers and since Wittman's Tiger and several others were destroyed by allied tanks in that particular event it is clear that here is such literature. Now you are bring kill ratios into it which weren't in your original statement. If they had been I wouldn't have pointed out that your statement as it stood was wrong.
Then why did you start it? You are the one who ascribed to me a position I had not taken.
Because you are disputing Wilbeck's, Jentz' and Schneider's intepretation of the kill ratios without being clear to what you want to say (obvioulsy). The only purpose here is to say that their's is mistaken (without really saying it). Again, this is a reiteration, sorry.
Where have I refuted anything about the kill rations? Where have you stated their interpretations of the same that are in conflict with my statements.
It doesn't suit me because I don't think it's a good definition of best. I have not evaded the issue either. Indeed it can be argued that it's you that are doing so. I've acknowledge that there are a fair number of definitions of best and depending on which you choose the answer changes. You on the other hand keep coming back to one particular one that produces the answer you want.
This is really exasperating: it doesn't suit you because it proves you wrong once and again.
NO and NO. It doesn't suit me because it's a poor definition of best as I've stated and for the reasons I've stated.
Guderian clearly defines the role of the tank in the battlefield. Are you a more qualified thoeriscist than Guderian? Your arrogance is terrible!
The quote you listed was a pre war quote and at least parts of it were found to be somewhat off based on the experiences during the war. Furthermore it's not at all clear from that quote it supports your contention that the Tiger was "best".
If you look back through my last couple of posts you will find I've answered that question. I just don't see any reason to keep coming back to it.
And you have NOT answered the question directly, without any ambiguity, as men do: Tiger I or Sherman in the given situation? Answer!
I think I have several times.
You have been ignoring all the information I have brought forward just because it doens't suit your position.
No I haven't been ignoring it I've pointed out that there is more to the question than you seem to think.
What about info on the kill ratios, on the penetration of the contenders' guns? Nothing.
Of course. Why should I it's already been posted. No reason for me to repost it. Especially since it was not particularly important to my arguement.
Well as far as the western allies experience went the tank wasn't the most dangerous enemy of the tank.
Go and tell that to George Patton and Third Army.
I wouldn't have to. Here's some data on it see the post by "Rich" down the page a bit:
Here's the important part:
Cause of tank losses in the ETO (according to WO 291/1186)
AT guns 22.7%
SP Guns 24.4%
AT Grenade 14.2%
Note that tanks fall behind SP guns, AT guns, and mines are approximately the same as AT Grenades.
As far as for History goes that can be said for the Germans and not the Allies: it was the Germans' tanks which lacked of air cover to protect them from airborne attack, making them more vulnerable to that menace than to the allied tanks.
However air power wasn't all that effective in taking out tanks directly during WWII.
Your argument of what the Tigers were able to perform in comparison with the Shermans is flawed in extreme. The Tigers work in heavy battalions to support the rest of the army's mobile units to achieve offensive and/or defensive tasks and engaging the enemy armor. The only reason the Germans didn't succeed in the war was because the air power the allies showed (gained by numerical superiority) and by the enemy tank forces that were also numerical superior to the Germans.
But, if you check the kill ratios we have that on a one to one basis the German TIgers (amongst other weapon systems) were far superior to the allied ones.
But of course kill ratios aren't the only factor by any means. There's a rather interesting chart at: http://home.swipnet.se/normandy/gerob/pzdiv/lehr.html
It list operational, long term repair, and short term repair situation for the tanks in Panzer Lehr from June 1 through 9 Aug 44. It's worth noting that for both Panzer IV and Panzer V (unfortunately no Tigers but the situation could hardly have been much if any better for them) that after 1 June less that half of each type of tank was operational and sometimes significantly less than half. This means that when fighting an opponent whose tanks are designed for reliability and mass production one is at a huge disadvantage.
Care to point out where it supports your positions\>
A Tiger fan site that mentions none of the problems the Tiger had that I saw and repeats the exaggerated account of Wittman's performance.
This one wouldn't load for me.
Which summary is quite clear from Thorsten Wall:
plain copy and paste from description
Report Date : 2002
Pagination or Media Count : 150
Abstract : This thesis is a historical analysis of the combat effectiveness of the German schwere Panzer-Abteilung or Heavy Tank Battalions during World War II. During the course of World War II, the German Army developed heavy tank battalions to fulfill the concept of breaking through enemy defenses so faster, lighter mechanized forces could exploit the rupture. These heavy tank battalions had several different tables of organization, but were always centered around either the Tiger or the Tiger II tank. They fought in virtually every theater of Europe against every enemy of Germany. Ultimately, the German military created eleven Army and three Waffen-SS heavy tank battalions. Of the Army battalions, the German command fielded ten as independent battalions, which were allocated to Army Groups as needed. The German Army assigned the last heavy tank battalion as an organic unit of the elite Panzer Grenadier Division Grossdeutschland. The Waffen-SS allocated all of their battalions to a different Waffen-SS Corps. Because these units were not fielded until late in 1942, they did not participate in Germany's major offensive operations that dominated the early part of World War II. Germany's strategic situation after mid-1943 forced their military onto the defensive. Consequently, there are very few instances when heavy tank battalions attacked as a breakthrough force. During the latter part of the war, they were used in many different ways to provide defensive assistance along very wide frontages. This study assesses the German heavy tank battalions as generally effective, primarily because of the high kill ratio they achieved. However, based upon observations from a wide variety of examples, this study also outlines several areas where changes may have increased their effectiveness.
Sounds like a fairly reasonable report. I'd be interesting in hearing what parts you think contradict my positions.