Reasons why Germany didn't win the war

[Karl Heidenreich]

lwd:

Logistics are a function of planning and doctrine as well as equipement. The US put some consideralble thought into support when they designed much if not all their equipement. As for all the major combatants using trains and trucks indeed they did. But the Germans relied on horses more than trucks and they had a hodgepodge of the latter that were almost impossible to keep in a good state of repair. Like wise the Soviets relied on horses as well and thier domestic trucks were less mobile and carried lighter loads than US trucks. The US and Britain also made extensive use of naval movement of parts and supplies and like the Germans on occasion arial movement of the same.

Precisely. Regardless the reasons, which is the point raised by alecsandros, the US planned their overall strategy with an incredible genius. Hitler changed his aim of attack from Britain to Russia on a personal belief basis. The US, on other hand, didn´t throw themselves in a European Invasion by the end of 1942 or mid 1943. The US went to the offensive when they KNOW they were stronger and prepared. They trained their soldiers, pilots, tank drivers, etc. etc. in safe places, with time and patience, confident that plans and production will give them the edge in due time. The Shermans were massively produced, the pilots were not sent to the different combat theaters without proper training and many units were not sent to combat at all saving them for D Day. When the US did strike they were in the superior part of the balance. And logistics were their winning card. The German Army had horses carrying the field kitchen because Adolf Hitler started the war in 1939 instead of 1945 or 1947 when the Germans would have all their superior tactical units fully motorized. Ike had all his units motorized because the US waited to invade France to 1944.

[RF]

All in all, I think the Germans outfought the allies, but

failed to finish the job in both 1940 and 1941 - and then declared war on the USA, where they couldn't touch the US mainland, even if their army was free of other commitments to do so.

[RF]

The German Army had horses carrying the field kitchen because Adolf Hitler started the war in 1939 instead of 1945 or 1947 when the Germans would have all their superior tactical units fully motorized. Ike had all his units motorized because the US waited to invade France to 1944.

Had the Fuhrer properly organised the German automotive and armaments industry in the 1930's instead of stifling it with petty bureacracy and competing gauleiters, he could have had full motorisation and more weapons by 1940 let alone 1945 or 1947.

[Dave Saxton]

Using horses are not necessarily a bad thing when you have bad or non existent roads, or mud and snow, or blown bridges....ect... Horses can go when and where wheeled (and sometimes tracked) vehicles cannot. They also don't burn gasoline or diesel. In spring, summer, or fall, in many places they can self forage. They can usually get off the roads and take better cover in the presense of enemy aircraft as well. Trucks and trains are sitting ducks unless you have complete air superiority. Horses also have brains. They don't usually get lost. They generally don't allow themselves to be put in a bad position such as swamp or a bog unless forced by their sometimes stupid human masters.

[Byron Angel]

Using horses are not necessarily a bad thing when you have bad or non existent roads, or mud and snow, or blown bridges....ect... Horses can go when and where wheeled (and sometimes tracked) vehicles cannot. They also don't burn gasoline or diesel. In spring, summer, or fall, in many places they can self forage. They can usually get off the roads and take better cover in the presense of enemy aircraft as well. Trucks and trains are sitting ducks unless you have complete air superiority.

..... I don't disagree that animal transport (including donkeys and asses which did yeoman service in Italy and Burma) can offer distinct advantages under certain tactical conditions. They can often operate in highly difficult terrain where mechanical transport cannot. And you can eat them if your rations run out. But I think it's dangerous to consider them as anything more than a specialty field expedient.


Byron

[Bgile]

Trucks and trains are sitting ducks unless you have complete air superiority.

Try telling that to the leadership of the US forces in Vietnam who spent several years trying to destroy all the NVA trucks going down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. They didn't even come close, and their capabilities far surpassed that of WW2.

[Dave Saxton]

You mean mostly the bicycles and bipedal transport of the Ho Chi Mihn trail? Trucks and vehicles were usually destroyed, but the masses of human transport (across the legal lines of demarcation) were most difficult to interdict in the jungle by air. In 1975 after we pulled out, including our air support, large convoys of trucks did indeed come right down Highway-1.

The reason the Germans lost WWII was in large measure because the Luftwaffe was defeated. The Luftwaffe's loss of control of the air undermined everything else for the Germans, and made possible bringing to bear the massive numbers of men and material against the Germans on multiple fronts. The American air campaign was most ingenious and the reason the Luftwaffe was defeated. It wasn't the direct effect of the bombing campaign per se, but the bombings forced the Germans to commit their fighters (and more importantly their experienced and skilled fighter pilots) to a gruelling war of attrition. It took many, many, months, and not weeks to wear down the Luftwaffe fighters, as Goering thought in 1940 vs RAF Fighter command, but Arnold and Spatz were more patient. The Germans were forced to pull their fighters in from the battle fronts. The great Allied air campaign that defeated the Luftwaffe was based from the British Isles, stock piled with massive amounts of air assets and high octane aviation gasoline.

Closely related to the Luftwaffe's eventual defeat by attrition, was the German defeat in the Battle of the Atlantic and the failure to prevent the massive Allied assets from being brought to Europe. Really prior to Pearl Harbor, a stronger effort agaisnt the British sea lanes was Germany's best course of action-not a second front on land against the vast frontier to the east (which contained lots of Jews BTW). But the Battle of the Atlantic was the type of war that Hitler and Goering, and Heydrich ..ect..didn't really want to fight.

[Byron Angel]

You mean mostly the bicycles and bipedal transport of the Ho Chi Mihn trail? Trucks and vehicles were usually destroyed, but the masses of human transport (across the legal lines of demarcation) were most difficult to interdict in the jungle by air. In 1975 after we pulled out, including our air support, large convoys of trucks did indeed come right down Highway-1.

..... By the late 60's, the NVA were running heavy (by their standards) and well organized truck traffic down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to service their huge logistics complexes in Laos and Cambodia. IIRC, the NVA had committed something like 60,000 people to defende the road network and keep the roads passable for the trucks. In early 1968 (Khe Sanh operation) PT76 light tanks that had come down the trail were used in overruning the SF camp at Lang Vei. Operations into the A Shau valley (an important NVA supply axis >inside< South Vietnam) discovered two laned gravel roads under camouflage and resulted in the capture of both Soviet-supplied NVA tanks and supply trucks. There was indeed a lot of manual portage, bicycle and even sampan and elephant movement of supplies as well, but these operated principally inside South Vietnam in areas of difficult terrain or where enemy surveillance and activity made such work impossible by other means.

The reason the Germans lost WWII was in large measure because the Luftwaffe was defeated. The Luftwaffe's loss of control of the air undermined everything else for the Germans, and made possible bringing to bear the massive numbers of men and material against the Germans on multiple fronts. The American air campaign was most ingenious and the reason the Luftwaffe was defeated. It wasn't the direct effect of the bombing campaign per se, but the bombings forced the Germans to commit their fighters (and more importantly their experienced and skilled fighter pilots) to a gruelling war of attrition. It took many, many, months, and not weeks to wear down the Luftwaffe fighters, as Goering thought in 1940 vs RAF Fighter command, but Arnold and Spatz were more patient. The Germans were forced to pull their fighters in from the battle fronts. The great Allied air campaign that defeated the Luftwaffe was based from the British Isles, stock piled with massive amounts of air assets and high octane aviation gasoline.

..... Very true, especially after LR fighter escort became part of the strategic bombing calculus. By late 1943, the LW was not only calling back fighter assets from the various fronts in order to bolster homeland air defense, but a number of tactical bomber units were called back as well and their pilots re-trained to fly fighters. The recall of the bomber units had a palpable effect upon the efficiency of the ground troops, especially the panzer and panzer grenadier formations. Much of the outstanding early war successes ofthese units on the eastern front had been made possible by the well coordinated tactical reconnaisance and air support provided by the LW. Whenever a panzer division ran into a difficult resistance point, they got on the radio to the Stukas and the problem was soon solved. Quesada's 9th AF tactical air support operations was simply a page from the German playbook in that respect.


Byron

[Dave Saxton]

..... By the late 60's, the NVA were running heavy (by their standards) and well organized truck traffic down the Ho Chi Minh Trail to service their huge logistics complexes in Laos and Cambodia. IIRC, the NVA had committed something like 60,000 people to defende the road network and keep the roads passable for the trucks....

I stand corrected.

[minoru genda]

For me one the main reasons Germany lost the war was that all her planning was improvised and dictated by the circunstances as the war went on. In September 1939 there wasn't a general estrategic plan on how to conduct a war. The only thing planned was the invasion of Poland. The campaing in the west was not even considered until October-November 1939 and only because France/UK declared war. The Invasion of Norway was planned in a couple of weeks, and the same applies for Sea Lion, and later the Balkans and North Africa. What did Hitler intend to do after invading Poland? Launch Barbarrosa in 1940? He was confident the west would't declare war for Poland but he was wrong. After that the whole war was improvisation. Even the Japanese had a better initial strategic plan than the Germans.

[lwd]

@lwd: some further considerations:
- the Germans used horses because they did not have enough trucks, unlike the US (again, industry)

But also because they put resources elsewhere instead of into trucks. Then there's the rather hodge podge nature of the German tactical vehicle fleet.

- the soviets benefited immensely from the American trucks, that they had aquired through the Arctic convoys. Some say that their operations 1943 - onwards wouldn't have been possible (in scope and speed) without the American trucks AND caned food (it seems the soviets did not have such an industry) (so, again, American industry)

Industry true but also planning and coordination.

- the state of the Luftwaffe on the eastern front >1943 was pretty bad, because of lack of pilots, fuel and good-order airstrips. So, even if in terms of available planes, the Germans appeared strong, in fact they were quite weak. And anyways, the soviet air force out-numbered them 4-10:1 so arguing the russians didn't have air superiority is difficult to support. This numerical advantage was achieved thanks to the russian industry.

Up until very late in the war the LW was for the most part not prevented from performing their missions this is the essential definition of air supremacy. Numbers really don't have much to do with it. See:
http://www.google.com/search?dq=definit ... d=0CAoQkAE

It is defined by NATO and the United States Department of Defense as "that degree of air superiority wherein the opposing air force is incapable of effective interference."

[lwd]

... Regardless the reasons, which is the point raised by alecsandros, the US planned their overall strategy with an incredible genius.

Is it? That's not what I got from it but maybe I misunderstood.

Hitler changed his aim of attack from Britain to Russia on a personal belief basis.

Not really. The Soviets were in his crosshairs from the very beginning. If anything it was the war in the West that wasn't planned for.

... The German Army had horses carrying the field kitchen because Adolf Hitler started the war in 1939 instead of 1945 or 1947 when the Germans would have all their superior tactical units fully motorized. Ike had all his units motorized because the US waited to invade France to 1944.

That's not at all clear. Indeed the Nazi regime may well have collapsed if htey had waited until 44 or later and of course their opponents would also have been far stronger.

[alecsandros]

But also because they put resources elsewhere instead of into trucks. Then there's the rather hodge podge nature of the German tactical vehicle fleet.

[...]

Agreed to all your additions to my post; I was thinking of air superiority, not supremacy... My bad .

All the best and keep in touch

[RF]

Horses also have brains. They don't usually get lost. They generally don't allow themselves to be put in a bad position such as swamp or a bog unless forced by their sometimes stupid human masters.

Hmmm.....Charge of the Light Brigade? You don't have to be a horse to see that was suicidal......

[RF]

For me one the main reasons Germany lost the war was that all her planning was improvised and dictated by the circunstances as the war went on. In September 1939 there wasn't a general estrategic plan on how to conduct a war. The only thing planned was the invasion of Poland. The campaing in the west was not even considered until October-November 1939 and only because France/UK declared war. The Invasion of Norway was planned in a couple of weeks, and the same applies for Sea Lion, and later the Balkans and North Africa. What did Hitler intend to do after invading Poland? Launch Barbarrosa in 1940? He was confident the west would't declare war for Poland but he was wrong. After that the whole war was improvisation. Even the Japanese had a better initial strategic plan than the Germans.

I've no argument with this.

However the Japanese plan didn't really tell the Japanese how they would have to conquer the US, in the alleged words of Yammamoto, of how the IJA would get to the White House and dictate terms in the Oval Office.

End result: still total and absolute defeat.

Rule one in starting a war: be certain of finshing it.

Rule two: it doesn't matter so much as to who fires the first shot, what counts is who fires the last and winning shot.