Reasons why Germany didn't win the war

[RF]

The common denominator in all 16 original points is Herman Goering. Hilter and Goering were a deadly combination for the Germans. It was Goering who was complicent in allowing the Nazi's idealogical hatreds and views to become an overiding factor throughout the war and leading up to the war. Goering was major player in the war the against the Jews.

It was Goering who staffed the Luftwaffe with people like Udet unqualified for the position given him. If it wasn't for Milch and Jeschoneck the Luftwaffe's planning and stratigic vision would have been even more chaotic.

Yet he was never sacked?

He was sacked - in April 1945, after ''offering to take over from the Fuhrer if he was no longer able to excercise command from Berlin'' which was seen as an act of usurpation of his authority by the enraged Fuhrer. Hitler dismissed him from all his offices and ordered his arrest for treason - the arrest was never carried out as by this time Germany was almost totally overun and nobody left in the madhouse of a Fuhrerbunker knew where Goering was.

[RF]

I didn't mention it to thrill anyone; it's a bad piece of work full of hyppocrisy (as I have written earlier ). But that's not the point of this topic - I was pointing out that several of the "mistakes" mentioned here were also mentioned in the political testament.

A case of the Fuhrer being wise after the event and finding excuses for what were his failings. It was never going to be his fault in his eyes would it?

Fuhrers are supposed to be infallible. Unfortunately it cost 55 million lives to prove he wasn't.

[lwd]

...@Boredatwork, Bgile, Lwd: about Malta. The issue at hand was if the Axis considered Malta as an important strategic position, because in the early posts I thought I read otherwise.

But they never tried to take it.

... even with a delayed thaw, the Germans would have still won some ground in April-May 1941, if it weren't for the Balkans campaing. In 6 weeks, mechanised and armored divisions can go a long way. How long? I don't know, but it's reasonable to asume at least 200-300 km (whilst German 4th army reached within 30km of Moscow late November 1941).

The problem here is if the mud slows them down initially the Soviets may have more time to regroup and respond slowing them down even more. The Soviets also get more time to respond in this scenario.

@Lwd:
- I agree that in 1940-1941, the Germans lacked the means for mounting a successfull Sealion. What's intriguing is that they didn't commit to creating those means.

They didn't have the time or the resources. Germany was stretched very thin producing the military they did in the pre war period. If they have to devote the resources required to building a force that can invade Britian they can't build the army and LW they did. They also probably can't do it before the late 40's and that's if the British don't notice and react to it.

[lwd]

.... If you would read carefully on the wiki page, there's quote number 170 that favors my position. I'm not saying it's the only conceivable point of view over the BoB, just another one... Also, on the same page, quote 173 reveals that the bombings over London continued until May 1941.

Raids on Britain continued well past that. However I see no good rational or any reputable historians claiming the BOB lasted past October of 1940.

- interesting link about the divisions brought to Moscow from the far east. Still, I wasn't refering only to the battle for Moscow, nor to the "autumn-winter of 1941". I was refering to the soviets capability of launching counter-offensives early 1942, drawing continous reserves 1942-1943, and thus pathcing up the holes made by the Germans. Still, from what I've read the Russians re-deployed over 1,5 million soldiers from the east to the west in late 1941-early 1942. I'll try to find my books.. In the mean time, on Wiki, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_ ... Jukes32-34, quote number 35 points to "58 divisions transfered"

But the Soviets maintained about the same strength in the East in any case. They just raised units their and shiped them West when they could. So start the war 6 weeks earlier and they start the process 6 weeks earlier. And if the initial German attacks aren't as rapid or as successful then they aren't needed as badley.

- As for Rommell's attack over Egypt: I think the objectives were to clear N-Africa of British troops, seize the SUez canal, capture Egypts oil-fields and possibly strengthen some countries in the region to join the Axis cause.

What Egyptian oil fields? Rommel may have hoped to reach the Suez but he had little or no chance of holding it. Advancing beyond it what his force was capable of as well as being tactically very unsound. Indeed wrecking the canal and falling back would probably have been the best decision if he could have taken it.

[lwd]

...- Japan and Italy proved to be disastrous allies. Japan failed to attack the soviets in 1941, instead choosing a suicidal attack on the US,

Why would attacking the Soviets been any less suicidal? Why would they even want to consider attacking the Soviets?

thus forcing Hitler to declare war on Uncle Sam,

It by no means forced him to do so. Indeed if he hadn't it might even have given him a bit of maneuvering room if he hadn't.

> Churchill's allegedly bribed Spanish Generals to stay out of the war http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/w ... 944902.ece

I've also read that the US was giving the Spanish very favoreable terms in regards to food shipments. It was pretty clear that if the Spanish joined the axis those terms at least would dissapear if not the shipments. Furthermore Spain would have represented hundreds of miles of more cost line to defend. Weren't you complaining about Germany's choice in allies at the top of this post? Now you want to add another ....

[Bgile]

The Crete operation pretty much destroyed German capablility for significant airborne drops for the rest of the war.

Not in itself, as the German parachute divisions did expand in size, but were used as ordinary infantry.

I think you will find they weren't trained as airborne troops ... it wasn't just they weren't used that way. They were airborne in name only.

[alecsandros]

...- Japan and Italy proved to be disastrous allies. Japan failed to attack the soviets in 1941, instead choosing a suicidal attack on the US,

Why would attacking the Soviets been any less suicidal? Why would they even want to consider attacking the Soviets?

Well, it was pretty bad, that's for sure, attacking the commies.. But that had been listed as a factor I think; I was trying to present "other factors" involved in the collapse of Germany.

As for Spain, or any other potential ally for Nazi Germany: I'm just trying to picture various factors involved in their demise. In his political testament, Hitler mentioned it was "for the better" that Franco did not join the war, because he believed he would have caused the same problems as the Italians. He might have been right... Who knows? Still, that doesn't mean "just that". With Spain in the war, Gibraltar would have been threatened, maybe captured? The Med - no longer a British playground, Rommel in North Africa - much better supplied, etc...
Plus, they still had a military, and unlike, the Italians, they also had combat experience (from the civil war). That's why I tend to view Spain's neutrality as an important factor in the ultimate outcome of the war.

[alecsandros]

But the Soviets maintained about the same strength in the East in any case. They just raised units their and shiped them West when they could. So start the war 6 weeks earlier and they start the process 6 weeks earlier. And if the initial German attacks aren't as rapid or as successful then they aren't needed as badley.

You may be right about that - I mean, it's a possibility. However, what about the troops and material lost/sent to the Balkans/North African theatres? Don't you think that with those extra resources, the Germans may have obtained better results?

What Egyptian oil fields? Rommel may have hoped to reach the Suez but he had little or no chance of holding it. Advancing beyond it what his force was capable of as well as being tactically very unsound. Indeed wrecking the canal and falling back would probably have been the best decision if he could have taken it.

Egypt is one of Africa's largest oil producer - and exporter. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Egypt/Background.html
Indeed, with only 2 (severely mauled) armoured divisions and backed up by wavering allies such as the Italians, Rommel would have been in a bad position, even if he would have won at El-Alamein... But still, he would have had the chance of destroying/disabling the Suez Canal!

[alecsandros]

... even with a delayed thaw, the Germans would have still won some ground in April-May 1941, if it weren't for the Balkans campaing. In 6 weeks, mechanised and armored divisions can go a long way. How long? I don't know, but it's reasonable to asume at least 200-300 km (whilst German 4th army reached within 30km of Moscow late November 1941).

The problem here is if the mud slows them down initially the Soviets may have more time to regroup and respond slowing them down even more. The Soviets also get more time to respond in this scenario.

Russia was and still is a huge country - it spans roughly from 45* to 60* North. That means the spring defrost does not come at the same time everywhere, but has a regional aspect. It's only logical that in the colder regions (above 50-55*) the thaw comes later, whilst in the lower ones, it comes earlier. Also, the severity of the defrost is to be taken into account. And now, consider the attack patterns of the Germans in teh summer of 1941: only Army Group North attacked above 55*, while Center and South below...

That being said, I don;t think the 1941 "late thaw" would have been such a big problem in the German attack.

[VeenenbergR]

RF wrote:

The only instance I am aware of a later German airdrop was the von der Hydte detachment drop of troops wearing US uniforms behind US lines at the start of the Battle of the Bulge.

In the fall of 1943 the Germans also dropped parachutists on Cos and (in the face of AA-fire also on Leros).

They later raised 9 Fallschirmjäger Divisions, some of them fully motorised.

The reason why Germany lost WWII was mainly dominance of a few leaders (the system) dictating the military arm (wrong);
arrogance to think that they had a better military organization than the Allies...overestimation of their own power and capabilities (which was too limited to wage war on a large scale).
Lack of planning further ahead. Proof of that: no strategic bomber unit to bomb key Soviet plants in the Ural (Speer was right here, but got no weapons to do the job)
No cohesive and consequent military actions (BoB, Fall Blau); wanting to take to much too early (too greedy.......!).
Taking to much which was not really necessary: Norway, Denmark, Balcans..and only costed a lot of (manpower) resources.
At key points the Germans just failed to take control over them: Leningrad, Murmansk, Moscow, Stalingrad, Grozny, Baku, Suez Canal and finally also Malta and Gibraltar.
I think the hatred against foreign peoples and believe in a Herrenvolk by Hitler and Göring both limited the usage of the people in the East.
Germany might have well won the campaing in the East if they had mobiolised vast numbers of Ukrainians.....

[lwd]

...- Japan and Italy proved to be disastrous allies. Japan failed to attack the soviets in 1941, instead choosing a suicidal attack on the US,

Why would attacking the Soviets been any less suicidal? Why would they even want to consider attacking the Soviets?

Well, it was pretty bad, that's for sure, attacking the commies.. But that had been listed as a factor I think; I was trying to present "other factors" involved in the collapse of Germany.

There's was also little or none of the resources that Japan needed that were known to exist there at the time. Japan simply couldn't afford to attack the Soviets.

As for Spain, or any other potential ally for Nazi Germany: I'm just trying to picture various factors involved in their demise. In his political testament, Hitler mentioned it was "for the better" that Franco did not join the war, because he believed he would have caused the same problems as the Italians. He might have been right... Who knows? Still, that doesn't mean "just that". With Spain in the war, Gibraltar would have been threatened, maybe captured? The Med - no longer a British playground, Rommel in North Africa - much better supplied, etc...
Plus, they still had a military, and unlike, the Italians, they also had combat experience (from the civil war). That's why I tend to view Spain's neutrality as an important factor in the ultimate outcome of the war.

They are also going to be a drain on resources and there are going to be a lot more places to potentially invade. The Canaries would go pretty quick to the British as well which will make things harder on the U-boats.

But the Soviets maintained about the same strength in the East in any case. They just raised units their and shiped them West when they could. So start the war 6 weeks earlier and they start the process 6 weeks earlier. And if the initial German attacks aren't as rapid or as successful then they aren't needed as badley.

You may be right about that - I mean, it's a possibility. However, what about the troops and material lost/sent to the Balkans/North African theatres? Don't you think that with those extra resources, the Germans may have obtained better results?

Yes they might have or it might have made things worse. How do the losses in those campaigns compare to the produciton over that 6 week period? I've also read that the final German push in late 41 was driven in part by a large group of reinforcements that arrived in August and September. Given the timing these couldn't be speeded up much if at all so the German formations will be a lot thinner approaching Moscow if they do it earlier. Then if there are more intial forces it's going to be a greater strain on the log network which was constrained by the number of rail lines and train available.

What Egyptian oil fields? Rommel may have hoped to reach the Suez but he had little or no chance of holding it. Advancing beyond it what his force was capable of as well as being tactically very unsound. Indeed wrecking the canal and falling back would probably have been the best decision if he could have taken it.

Egypt is one of Africa's largest oil producer - and exporter. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Egypt/Background.html

That's today. What did their output look like in 1941?
http://books.google.com/books?id=S6Zzvc ... on&f=false
would indicate it was rather minimal. "Adequate to meet local needs" is the quote I believe.

Indeed, with only 2 (severely mauled) armoured divisions and backed up by wavering allies such as the Italians, Rommel would have been in a bad position, even if he would have won at El-Alamein... But still, he would have had the chance of destroying/disabling the Suez Canal!

Possibly. But historically tanks haven't held up well to naval gunfire. He'd also have a ways to go and not much of a supply line to do it on.

[lwd]

... That being said, I don;t think the 1941 "late thaw" would have been such a big problem in the German attack.

The fall mud season is usually stated as being very important. Why would a spring one have been less so? Note to cause problems it doesn't have to be a uniform thaw. Indeed a non uniform one might be worse and that spring was also a wet one from what I've read. In other words I don't share your lack of concern.

[alecsandros]

There's was also little or none of the resources that Japan needed that were known to exist there at the time. Japan simply couldn't afford to attack the Soviets.

The USSR possesed great amounts of resources. Any coutry in the world would need oil, iron, bauxite, etc. And Japan foremost, as it had very few strategic resources available.
Also, a military alliance exists only when 2 or more groups cooperate towards a certain goal. The Japs simply "couldn't afford" attacking the weakenend soviets? Than why should Germany declare war on the US..? Do you think they could afford it? Seems to me that at this level the "alliance" was uni-directional: the Germans kept their promise, the Japs didn't.

They are also going to be a drain on resources and there are going to be a lot more places to potentially invade. The Canaries would go pretty quick to the British as well which will make things harder on the U-boats.

IMO the advantages far outweigh the dis-advantages.

Yes they might have or it might have made things worse. How do the losses in those campaigns compare to the produciton over that 6 week period? I've also read that the final German push in late 41 was driven in part by a large group of reinforcements that arrived in August and September. Given the timing these couldn't be speeded up much if at all so the German formations will be a lot thinner approaching Moscow if they do it earlier. Then if there are more intial forces it's going to be a greater strain on the log network which was constrained by the number of rail lines and train available.

You are forgeting the rythm at which Russia had been invaded. There was no serious resistance from June 1941 up until October 1941 (except Crimeea maybe). Serious losses for the German side started to amount starting from October, and steadily rose in Nov-Dec in the attack towards Moscow, and that only because, as I said earlier, the Russians managed to pull off divisions from the far east, thanks to their mid-autumn certainty they wouldn't be attacked from the rear by the Japs. So, 6 weeks earlier would mean late Aug-early Sep in front of Moscow, 1 month ahead of the Russian reinforcements, with full complement from the Balkans/North Africa.

That's today. What did their output look like in 1941? [...]
would indicate it was rather minimal. "Adequate to meet local needs" is the quote I believe.

From the same source:
---"The Canal ports and Alexandria all featured oil storage facilities"
---"By the late 1930s 1/12th of Britain's normal oil supply came from the Mediteranean"
--- "The proximity to abundant oil supplies furnished the Allied forces with a decisive advantage over the Axis in the region[...]"
---"The Mediteranean Fleet could be supplied from Haifa [...] and fuel oil reserves at Alexandria and Malta"

So the capture of Egypt may have been a much harder blow than some would expect.

[RF]

Egypt is one of Africa's largest oil producer - and exporter. http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Egypt/Background.html

Not in WW2 it wasn't, any more than Libya was producing any oil at that time.

[RF]

There's was also little or none of the resources that Japan needed that were known to exist there at the time. Japan simply couldn't afford to attack the Soviets.

Particulary as the IJA had lost face over the embarassing Manchurian border shoot outs with Zhukov in 1938 and 1939.