I didn't mention it to thrill anyone; it's a bad piece of work full of hyppocrisy (as I have written earlier ). But that's not the point of this topic - I was pointing out that several of the "mistakes" mentioned here were also mentioned in the political testament.RF wrote:If you are referring to the testament dictated by Hitler to his secretary shortly before his suicide, I would recall the secretary's reaction to it - great excitement when she was told she was about to receive the testament, then extreme disappointment when she learned the content. I think the verdict of Frau Junge says it all.alecsandros wrote:,
Several months ago I read Hitler's political testament.
Reasons why Germany didn't win the war
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Re: Reasons why Germany didn't win the war
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Re: Reasons why Germany didn't win the war
... Oh yes, the reinforcements would be late by 6 weeks - we're talking about the troops from the east, bordering China. Remember that not until mid-autumn 1941 was Stalin convinced the Japs wouldn't attack there, and decided to transfer the divisions to the western front.lwd wrote:Starting the war with the USSR 6 weeks earlier doesn't meen that the Soviet reinforcements are 6 weeks later in arriving or that they can even maintian the historical pace early in the campaign.
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Re: Reasons why Germany didn't win the war
I have to go now; hope I'll find the time to reply to your extensive post these days.VeenenbergR wrote:Alecsandros. If that is the content of Hitlers testament he is remarkbly bright to see what were the reasons he and Germany lost the war.
@lwd, RF: I'll probably miss the forum for 2-3 days, I'll read your replies afterwards (I'm sure you'll have lots of things to say :) )
Re: Reasons why Germany didn't win the war
Are we? I don't think the Siverian divisions were the only ones furthermore take a look at:alecsandros wrote:... Oh yes, the reinforcements would be late by 6 weeks - we're talking about the troops from the east, bordering China. Remember that not until mid-autumn 1941 was Stalin convinced the Japs wouldn't attack there, and decided to transfer the divisions to the western front.lwd wrote:Starting the war with the USSR 6 weeks earlier doesn't meen that the Soviet reinforcements are 6 weeks later in arriving or that they can even maintian the historical pace early in the campaign.
http://operationbarbarossa.net/Myth-Bus ... ters3.html
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Re: Reasons why Germany didn't win the war
In reference to Malta:
Where the Balkan campaign might have crippled Barbarossa was the huge loss of transport aircraft that might have been more profitably employed dealing with logistic crises later, as well as the additional wear and tear on the machines that took part, rather than an actual delay?
I thought the Malta invasion was cancelled at the urging of Rommel because he had just won at Gazala and wanted all resources for his drive on the suez, thereby allowing Malta to recover and deprive him of the resources he needed at Alamein. - Hence my original point that focussing on operational matters rather than logistics was a contributing factor to Germany's defeat.alecsandros wrote:1941-1942, air raids, naval blockade, plans for take over via paratroops. Plans put to a halt because the British air defense remained a threat.lwd wrote: They did? When?
I may have mis-remembered somewhere but I thought I had read the Balkan campaign had minimal impact on Barbarossa's time table as the thaw came unseasonably late in 1941. The "6 weeks late" was given more prominence by the Germans who wished to place the blame on the Italians for getting them involved in the Balkans as the ultimate reason Barborassa failed, to cover their own logistic and planning failures - and by the British who want to excuse their own defensive failures in Greece and Crete as ultimately being decisive factors in the war.alecsandros wrote:... Oh yes, the reinforcements would be late by 6 weeks - we're talking about the troops from the east, bordering China. Remember that not until mid-autumn 1941 was Stalin convinced the Japs wouldn't attack there, and decided to transfer the divisions to the western front.lwd wrote:Starting the war with the USSR 6 weeks earlier doesn't meen that the Soviet reinforcements are 6 weeks later in arriving or that they can even maintian the historical pace early in the campaign.
Where the Balkan campaign might have crippled Barbarossa was the huge loss of transport aircraft that might have been more profitably employed dealing with logistic crises later, as well as the additional wear and tear on the machines that took part, rather than an actual delay?
Re: Reasons why Germany didn't win the war
The Crete operation pretty much destroyed German capablility for significant airborne drops for the rest of the war.
Re: Reasons why Germany didn't win the war
Well not accourding to Wiki:alecsandros wrote:The battle for Britain lasted until the summer of 1941, because the Germans transfered 3500 planes to the east.lwd wrote: The BOB came to a halt because it became obvious they weren't winning, weather conditions were going to create increasing difficulties, and it became clear that Sea Lion was a pipe dream.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Britain
or http://www.raf.mod.uk/bob1940/bobhome.html10 July – 31 October 1940
or http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/ba ... ritain.htmthe Battle fought over Britain between the 10th July and 31st October 1940
You seem to be pretty much alone in chooseing that end date.The Battle of Britain took place between August and September 1940.
> the invasion of the UK (operation Lion) was never put into practice
Some things are and Sea Lion was one of them. The Germans were hardly clumsy but they simply weren't capable of launching a major seaborn invasion at that point in time vs Britain. For large ships operational during this period for instance they had 1 panzershiffe, 1 CA sort of, and two (or was it 3) CL's!!! They had no hope of air supremacy and could not even guarantee air superiority over the invasion fleet or beaches and indeed the RAF had a plan that would deny this to them even if they got close. Furthermore they were dependint on a few ships and a bunch of river barges to tranpsort and supply the invasion force. The German military simply wasn't structured for it.There are no "clear" things in war; there are only infromations and necessary objectives. Operation SeaLion wasn;t given the proper attention, and I don't think that was because the Germans were 'clumsy" or "incapable". It happened because Hitler gambled ("the UK will eventualy join me") and lost.lwd wrote: It was "never put into practice" because it was clear that it would have been an absolute failure.
That's hardly attempting to take over Malta. Neutralize it perhaps but no where close to a take over attempt.1941-1942, air raids, naval blockade, plans for take over via paratroops. Plans put to a halt because the British air defense remained a threat.lwd wrote: They did? When?
It had nothing to do with Iraqi oil that's for sure. There's no way he could have made it to Iraq and if he did no way what little oil they were producing there would have made it back to Germany at least in the 40s.Why did you think Rommel attacked Egypt? Was it because he wanted to take a trip to the pyramids...? Or for the favorable strategic position...?lwd wrote: They did? When?
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Re: Reasons why Germany didn't win the war
Boredatwork:
For Poland this was the loss of Enigma and perhaps a few hundred (valuable) planes.
For Norway this is one brand new large heavy cruiser Blücher; a crippled fleet and over 300-350 valuable planes (o.w. 150 valuable JU 52's).
Netherlands: 167 valuable JU 52's and capture of 2000 airborne troops and 150 valuable planes of all types.
France & Belgium: 750 tanks and 1000 valuable planes of all types. Substantial military losses of 45.000.
Balkans & Crete: 174 Ju 52's, 3000 paratroops, 750 specialized mountain troops KIA and 100 valuable planes of all types.
Eastern Front:
- 1941: 1.000.000 men KIA/MIA/WIA (240.000 KIA); 3500 tanks and 3827 airplanes.
- 1942: 750.000 men KIA/WIA/MIA (200.000 KIA), 2150 tanks and 2291 airplanes.
For the transport arm:
- airlift to the Demyansk pocket 1942/1943: loss of 262 JU 52's.
- airlift to the Stalingrad pocket 1942/1943: loss of 266 JU 52's and at least 220 other valuable planes (He111, He177, Fw200)
- airlift to the Tunesian bridgehead (pocket?): loss of 432 valuable transport planes (most JU 52's, ME323 Gigant).
The prices were high as seen from above.
For Poland this was the loss of Enigma and perhaps a few hundred (valuable) planes.
For Norway this is one brand new large heavy cruiser Blücher; a crippled fleet and over 300-350 valuable planes (o.w. 150 valuable JU 52's).
Netherlands: 167 valuable JU 52's and capture of 2000 airborne troops and 150 valuable planes of all types.
France & Belgium: 750 tanks and 1000 valuable planes of all types. Substantial military losses of 45.000.
Balkans & Crete: 174 Ju 52's, 3000 paratroops, 750 specialized mountain troops KIA and 100 valuable planes of all types.
Eastern Front:
- 1941: 1.000.000 men KIA/MIA/WIA (240.000 KIA); 3500 tanks and 3827 airplanes.
- 1942: 750.000 men KIA/WIA/MIA (200.000 KIA), 2150 tanks and 2291 airplanes.
For the transport arm:
- airlift to the Demyansk pocket 1942/1943: loss of 262 JU 52's.
- airlift to the Stalingrad pocket 1942/1943: loss of 266 JU 52's and at least 220 other valuable planes (He111, He177, Fw200)
- airlift to the Tunesian bridgehead (pocket?): loss of 432 valuable transport planes (most JU 52's, ME323 Gigant).
The prices were high as seen from above.
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Re: reasons why Germany didn't win the war
RF wrote:But all the sixteen points here are down to a failure of leadership by one individual.boredatwork wrote:My random and not extensively researched opinion as to additional reasons why Germany didn't win the war, beyond simple numerical inferiority and the poor leadership of one individual:
I would add a point seventeen. Failure to properly plan and co-ordinate with the Japanese.
The common denominator in all 16 original points is Herman Goering. Hilter and Goering were a deadly combination for the Germans. It was Goering who was complicent in allowing the Nazi's idealogical hatreds and views to become an overiding factor throughout the war and leading up to the war. Goering was major player in the war the against the Jews.
It was Goering who staffed the Luftwaffe with people like Udet unqualified for the position given him. If it wasn't for Milch and Jeschoneck the Luftwaffe's planning and stratigic vision would have been even more chaotic.
Goering continually blundered at the operational command level as well. This blundering is best illustrated by the BoB. First thing, it was folley to assume the things he did about what it would take to attain air superiority and the time table. His boasting only made more rational policies less likely to be looked at. Goering ordered that the BF-109 fighters must stay close to the bombers rather than operating independently. This put the German fighter pilots at a significant disadvantage. Even when it was demonstrated that this policy was wrong he refused to admit it or change it. Goering undermined the moral of his fighter pilots by blaming them for set backs instead of taking responsibility himself as real leader should. It was always somebody elses fault. Goering allowed the campaign to loose focus and become the Blitz that continued into the next year. Many knowlegable persons on the BoB and the British air commanders themselves; point out that the Germans may have prevailed if only they kept doing what they were doing. By changing the focus from bombing air fields and RAF production and infrastructure, to bombing cities and civilains, they gave RAF Fighter Command the respite it desperately needed at the crucial moment. This failure to attack the right targets to obtain the desired result of air superiority was also demonstrated by; not maintaining pressure on Chain Home, nor Britains vulnerable ports, dock yards, and transportation infrastructure. This would have forced Fighter Command to expose its precious fighters to battle, while degrading Britain's material logistics and military assets as well. He also did not keep up the pressure on British coastal shipping that would have forced the RAF to battle at ranges farther from their airfields and closer in many cases to Luftwaffe airfields.
A severe failure was his pathalogical hatred of the Kriegsmarine and Adm Raeder. He denied the KM a FAA and demanded that all KM air operations be conducted by the Luftwaffe. However, interservice cooperation was abysmal. He had the tools, which if added to the KM's anti-shipping efforts in a more productive way would have made real postive contributions to an effective campaign against Britain. The Luftwaffe failed to protect KM assets from air attack throughout the war (with a few exceptions here and there) and whined about being asked to do so. Lack of air support was a major factor in the Kriegsmarines surface forces weakness and lack of action post 1941. The Luftwaffe did little to help the U-boats in the Battle of the Bay. Goering further undermined Raeder's influence at the high command level. Raeder had a far more rational strategic vision than did Goering or Das Heer. But he had little influence on Hitler, with Goering constantly talking Raeder and the Navy down to Hitler.
Goering was major player in the German debacle of Stalingrad. Goering boasted that it would be okay if the 6th Army became cut off because the Luftwaffe could supply them! Hilter ignored the pleas of his generals. Hilter and Goering made quite a pair. Terrible leadership by this pair in combination.
He was also factor in the Luffwaffe failures leading up to and during Kursk.
Yet he was never sacked?
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Re: reasons why Germany didn't win the war
Dave Saxton wrote: Yet he (Goering) was never sacked?
..... Perhaps Hitler viewed Goering in the same manner as Goldman Sachs - too "big" to fail.
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Re: Reasons why Germany didn't win the war
Dave Saxton:
I do believe that boreatwork´s points, as right as they are, goes as RF has point out to just one man, Hitler, and after this it goes to Goering´s influence as Dave has rightly revealed to us.
We can point out people of small talent and great influence, as Himmler, Goebbles or Bormann, that also "helped" a lot for the nazi cuppola to disrput the military drive and proficiency so that the strategic (and even tactical at times) thinking of the Germans became entangled and negative.
What we can say is that, the origin of ALL the different aspects (that we can add up to hundreds or thousands of particular reasons) was at the heart of the nazi regime. It was because of it´s personalistic nature or wide hatred to everything or megalomaniac tendency or simply madness that such a regime was so miopic and disfunctional? Whatever it is we can trace it to Hitler and those that influence him. We can trace that from the fail at Dunkirk, the BoB, the battle of the Atlantic, the invasion of Russia, the change of target from Moscow to the South, the battle of Moscow, declaring the war to USA, plan Blue, Stalingrad, the debacle in the desert, Kursk and I think that´s it... after Kursk the war was over, maybe before that.
No super soldier, no super tank nor super battleship nor super jet fighter or super U Boat ace nor super crack units could have won when such a string of mistakes and blunders had attempted against their warmaking capacity.
My two cents...
I don´t think somebody else could have put things as right as Dave here, without any doubt!The common denominator in all 16 original points is Herman Goering. Hilter and Goering were a deadly combination for the Germans. It was Goering who was complicent in allowing the Nazi's idealogical hatreds and views to become an overiding factor throughout the war and leading up to the war. Goering was major player in the war the against the Jews.
...
I do believe that boreatwork´s points, as right as they are, goes as RF has point out to just one man, Hitler, and after this it goes to Goering´s influence as Dave has rightly revealed to us.
We can point out people of small talent and great influence, as Himmler, Goebbles or Bormann, that also "helped" a lot for the nazi cuppola to disrput the military drive and proficiency so that the strategic (and even tactical at times) thinking of the Germans became entangled and negative.
What we can say is that, the origin of ALL the different aspects (that we can add up to hundreds or thousands of particular reasons) was at the heart of the nazi regime. It was because of it´s personalistic nature or wide hatred to everything or megalomaniac tendency or simply madness that such a regime was so miopic and disfunctional? Whatever it is we can trace it to Hitler and those that influence him. We can trace that from the fail at Dunkirk, the BoB, the battle of the Atlantic, the invasion of Russia, the change of target from Moscow to the South, the battle of Moscow, declaring the war to USA, plan Blue, Stalingrad, the debacle in the desert, Kursk and I think that´s it... after Kursk the war was over, maybe before that.
No super soldier, no super tank nor super battleship nor super jet fighter or super U Boat ace nor super crack units could have won when such a string of mistakes and blunders had attempted against their warmaking capacity.
My two cents...
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Re: Reasons why Germany didn't win the war
Hello all,
It seems that this is turning into a "Germany lost the war because of Hitler" thread, that I don't fully disagree, but neither concur whole-heartedly.
First of all, some clarifications:
@Boredatwork, Bgile, Lwd: about Malta. The issue at hand was if the Axis considered Malta as an important strategic position, because in the early posts I thought I read otherwise. That being said, all the reasons presented by you and by me are, to the best of my knowledge, true:
- before Crete, there was an intent of capturing Malta, but after that battle, the plan soon losed ground. Both the focus of the reinforcements towards Rommel and the islands successfull air defence detered any invasion plan AND any plan to neutralise it.
@ Boredatwork: even with a delayed thaw, the Germans would have still won some ground in April-May 1941, if it weren't for the Balkans campaing. In 6 weeks, mechanised and armored divisions can go a long way. How long? I don't know, but it's reasonable to asume at least 200-300 km (whilst German 4th army reached within 30km of Moscow late November 1941).
@Lwd:
- I agree that in 1940-1941, the Germans lacked the means for mounting a successfull Sealion. What's intriguing is that they didn't commit to creating those means. You know, as the allies did 1943-1944 for a successfull Normandy attack? I mean, from what I've read, they didn't bother building landing crafts, stock-piling ammo, fuel, weapons, drillign troops for fighting on the beaches, elaborating plans for knocking-out defenses.. etc.. That's why I tend to believe they were purposefully ignoring a real invasion of Britain, whilst realy preparing for Barbarossa.
- the Battle of Britain. If you would read carefully on the wiki page, there's quote number 170 that favors my position. I'm not saying it's the only conceivable point of view over the BoB, just another one... Also, on the same page, quote 173 reveals that the bombings over London continued until May 1941.
- interesting link about the divisions brought to Moscow from the far east. Still, I wasn't refering only to the battle for Moscow, nor to the "autumn-winter of 1941". I was refering to the soviets capability of launching counter-offensives early 1942, drawing continous reserves 1942-1943, and thus pathcing up the holes made by the Germans. Still, from what I've read the Russians re-deployed over 1,5 million soldiers from the east to the west in late 1941-early 1942. I'll try to find my books.. In the mean time, on Wiki, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_ ... Jukes32-34, quote number 35 points to "58 divisions transfered"
- As for Rommell's attack over Egypt: I think the objectives were to clear N-Africa of British troops, seize the SUez canal, capture Egypts oil-fields and possibly strengthen some countries in the region to join the Axis cause.
It seems that this is turning into a "Germany lost the war because of Hitler" thread, that I don't fully disagree, but neither concur whole-heartedly.
First of all, some clarifications:
@Boredatwork, Bgile, Lwd: about Malta. The issue at hand was if the Axis considered Malta as an important strategic position, because in the early posts I thought I read otherwise. That being said, all the reasons presented by you and by me are, to the best of my knowledge, true:
- before Crete, there was an intent of capturing Malta, but after that battle, the plan soon losed ground. Both the focus of the reinforcements towards Rommel and the islands successfull air defence detered any invasion plan AND any plan to neutralise it.
@ Boredatwork: even with a delayed thaw, the Germans would have still won some ground in April-May 1941, if it weren't for the Balkans campaing. In 6 weeks, mechanised and armored divisions can go a long way. How long? I don't know, but it's reasonable to asume at least 200-300 km (whilst German 4th army reached within 30km of Moscow late November 1941).
@Lwd:
- I agree that in 1940-1941, the Germans lacked the means for mounting a successfull Sealion. What's intriguing is that they didn't commit to creating those means. You know, as the allies did 1943-1944 for a successfull Normandy attack? I mean, from what I've read, they didn't bother building landing crafts, stock-piling ammo, fuel, weapons, drillign troops for fighting on the beaches, elaborating plans for knocking-out defenses.. etc.. That's why I tend to believe they were purposefully ignoring a real invasion of Britain, whilst realy preparing for Barbarossa.
- the Battle of Britain. If you would read carefully on the wiki page, there's quote number 170 that favors my position. I'm not saying it's the only conceivable point of view over the BoB, just another one... Also, on the same page, quote 173 reveals that the bombings over London continued until May 1941.
- interesting link about the divisions brought to Moscow from the far east. Still, I wasn't refering only to the battle for Moscow, nor to the "autumn-winter of 1941". I was refering to the soviets capability of launching counter-offensives early 1942, drawing continous reserves 1942-1943, and thus pathcing up the holes made by the Germans. Still, from what I've read the Russians re-deployed over 1,5 million soldiers from the east to the west in late 1941-early 1942. I'll try to find my books.. In the mean time, on Wiki, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_ ... Jukes32-34, quote number 35 points to "58 divisions transfered"
- As for Rommell's attack over Egypt: I think the objectives were to clear N-Africa of British troops, seize the SUez canal, capture Egypts oil-fields and possibly strengthen some countries in the region to join the Axis cause.
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Re: Reasons why Germany didn't win the war
As I said, though I think some of the blame for losing the war can be attributed to the leaders (not only Hitler and Goering, but also Himmler, Heidrich, Goebbels and the like), I tend to place more emphasis on the following factors:
- Germany was not prepared for a world war in 1939. Remember the same leaders we've pointed fingers at were the ones responsible for taking the country out of the great depression (1929-1933), and giving jobs to millions (IIRC, in Berlin 1930 the unemployment rate was 40%. In 1935, it was less than 10%). Furthermore, Germany, in 1934, was still a war-torn country, stripped of heavy industry, technology and an army suitable for it's size and population. And, while we're at it, let's don't forget that the re-construction of German heavy industry, under das fuhrer, was made possible only by the aid provided by Ford and GM, that invested over 100mil$ in production facilities 1928-1938 in Germany (the companies heavily continued to receive dividends even when it became evident they were using slave labor. If you are not convinced, check http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/na ... cars30.htm).
- Japan and Italy proved to be disastrous allies. Japan failed to attack the soviets in 1941, instead choosing a suicidal attack on the US, thus forcing Hitler to declare war on Uncle Sam, in effect signing his death sentence. Italy's military exploits ranged from mediocre (Tunisia 1943, early stages Barbarossa, some submarine attacks on Atlantic convoys) to bad (employment of surface ships in the Med, setbacks in North Africa 1940, Balkans 1941) and to downright ridicule (landing in S-E France 1940... Russian front 1942-onwards). Italy's setbacks forced the Wehrmacht time and time again to intervene, and to dilude it's forces. And this can not be unders-stated: North Africa and the Balkans wouldn't have been invaded by the Germans if it weren't for the Italians poor, poor performance. Think about the resources available for Barbarossa without those!
- There are also other factors, both internal and external to the Reich, that are, at least for me, insuficiently understood as we speak. I'm refering to:
> Hitler's hope of a fascist takeover of the US (similar to this one http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_P ... _Committee). Remember Hitler had Henry Ford's picture hanging in his office and the strong ties between the American car manufacturers and Nazi Germany
> Churchill's allegedly bribed Spanish Generals to stay out of the war http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/w ... 944902.ece
> The alleged peace-treaty negotiation early 1943 between Ribbentrop and Molotov
> The alleged pro-american orientation of the Japanese early Zaibatsu's, that influenced the outbreak and development of the Pacific war
- Germany was not prepared for a world war in 1939. Remember the same leaders we've pointed fingers at were the ones responsible for taking the country out of the great depression (1929-1933), and giving jobs to millions (IIRC, in Berlin 1930 the unemployment rate was 40%. In 1935, it was less than 10%). Furthermore, Germany, in 1934, was still a war-torn country, stripped of heavy industry, technology and an army suitable for it's size and population. And, while we're at it, let's don't forget that the re-construction of German heavy industry, under das fuhrer, was made possible only by the aid provided by Ford and GM, that invested over 100mil$ in production facilities 1928-1938 in Germany (the companies heavily continued to receive dividends even when it became evident they were using slave labor. If you are not convinced, check http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/na ... cars30.htm).
- Japan and Italy proved to be disastrous allies. Japan failed to attack the soviets in 1941, instead choosing a suicidal attack on the US, thus forcing Hitler to declare war on Uncle Sam, in effect signing his death sentence. Italy's military exploits ranged from mediocre (Tunisia 1943, early stages Barbarossa, some submarine attacks on Atlantic convoys) to bad (employment of surface ships in the Med, setbacks in North Africa 1940, Balkans 1941) and to downright ridicule (landing in S-E France 1940... Russian front 1942-onwards). Italy's setbacks forced the Wehrmacht time and time again to intervene, and to dilude it's forces. And this can not be unders-stated: North Africa and the Balkans wouldn't have been invaded by the Germans if it weren't for the Italians poor, poor performance. Think about the resources available for Barbarossa without those!
- There are also other factors, both internal and external to the Reich, that are, at least for me, insuficiently understood as we speak. I'm refering to:
> Hitler's hope of a fascist takeover of the US (similar to this one http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_P ... _Committee). Remember Hitler had Henry Ford's picture hanging in his office and the strong ties between the American car manufacturers and Nazi Germany
> Churchill's allegedly bribed Spanish Generals to stay out of the war http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/w ... 944902.ece
> The alleged peace-treaty negotiation early 1943 between Ribbentrop and Molotov
> The alleged pro-american orientation of the Japanese early Zaibatsu's, that influenced the outbreak and development of the Pacific war
Re: Reasons why Germany didn't win the war
One item that might usefully be injected into this conversation is Hitler's professed expectation that the Soviet Union would quickly collapse upon being invaded. To paraphrase Hitler's words: "We just have to kick the front door down and the entire rotten edifice will collapse". His assessment might well have been accurate had he taken a different political approach. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, being largely of Germanic and Scandinavian stock, quickly rallied to the German side and were welcomed into the fold. But the vast and populous Ukraine as well initially greeted the advancing Wehrmacht with flowers and cheering in the streets; after all, it had been less than ten years since Stalin and the Communists had purposefully engineered the starvation deaths of 10 million Ukrainians. However, the insane National Socialist racial policy that spread in the wake of the German advance soon destroyed any opportunity for Germany to benefit from support of the indigenous populations it had overrrun. One sense of what might have been can be drawn from the Ukrainian anti-Communist guerilla groups spawned in the chaos of the war, many of which continued to fight against the Soviets well into the mid-1950's. I believe that many Ukrainians would have gladly put on German uniforms and fought against the Communists had Germany played its cards more wisely. But Hitler believed his Eastern Front campaign would be short and decisive and, on that basis, saw no need to cultivate such support. His compulsive racial hatred and his hubris bore him to his own ultimate destruction.
Re: Reasons why Germany didn't win the war
Not in itself, as the German parachute divisions did expand in size, but were used as ordinary infantry.Bgile wrote:The Crete operation pretty much destroyed German capablility for significant airborne drops for the rest of the war.
Hitler drew the wrong conclusions and forbade further airborne drops, just as after Bismarck was sunk he forbade German warships to enter the open Atlantic.
German capability for airborne drops in any case would be diminished as the war progressed due to loss of German command of the air. The only instance I am aware of a later German airdrop was the von der Hyte detachment drop of troops wearing US uniforms behind US lines at the start of the Battle of the Bulge.
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