Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

[Bgile]

I don't see any reason why one of the better US infantry divisions wouldn't compare well with the GD division by the end of 1944, especially if you consider logistics and the organic and other artillery and air it would be able to access during a typical day's combat. I doubt there was much difference in the ability of individual soldiers by that time, either. If you survive six months of combat you are likely to be almost as good at it as someone who has survived several years of combat, and in any case there tend to be fewer and fewer of the latter left on the German side. The quality of US replacements would also be higher.

[alecsandros]

Hello lwd,
Let's keep cool heads, shall we ? :) I learned alot from this forum and maybe I was being to arogant. I'm sorry if I offended you.

I understand that you have read a number of sources, of the internet, that concern the operational effectiveness and relative performance for its time for the Me-262.
I read the articles you provided links for, and I thank you for them. It's interesting to see how the internet media sheds light upon some particular historical events (which are obsessing me for some time now :) ) However, the bibliography they provided was: either non-existent or consisted only of general-viewing books. None of them included a book specialised in the Me-262, though the article was about the Me-262. One more thing: internet-press can be a wonderfull thing, but it can also show a very distorted view, because the industry is highly competitive adn the authors need to bring something out of the ordinary in order to keep their jobs. If they would stick to the "Me-262 was the best jet fighter of the war", it would be dull, it's all been said before! Web-sites need visitors, visitors need new info, new points of view, events, etc. And that's what the editors are giving them... On the other hand, a profesionaly-researched book is much more than that: it passes through several hands, it's approved at several levels, AND, very importantly, it serves to build a reputation, for a specialist in a particular field. That's why the research is far more serious and the conclusions far better thought through than in the articles published on the web.

Now, about the books. The development history of the P80/Meteor/Me262 is quite well presented and understood. They were all conceived, designed, constructed and first flown at about the same time (1942-1943). All 3 nations had problems with early engines, and the Germans also had the "we must make it a bomber" problem.
If you are interested in various stages of development of the planes, I'll post some here.
For the time being, I'll repeat my early conclusion from "Me-262 Arrow to the future" and add the comparison to the Meteor:

P-80 vs Me-262, tested in 1945.
"The test were not combat manouvres, but comparisons of speeds, rates of climb at different altitudes, and turning radius. The Messerchmitt had better speed and acceleration and an equal climb. The P-80 was easier to handle and had much better visibility". I'll add that the Me-262 had 4x30mm cannons + 24 AA rockets, while the P-80 carried 6x12.7mm machine guns. The maximum speed of the "normal" P-80As (i.e. non-specificaly modified for breaking records) is a subject of debate for some time now. Most sources claim it to be between 500-550mph (800-900km/h)

Meteor MkIII vs Me-262, untested, excerpt from "Me-262, arrow to the future", pg 135:
"The inevitable question arises, of course, as to how the early Meteor and the Schwalbe might have fared in combat, given two pilots of equal caliber. The consensus is generaly that the Me-262 would have been superior, on the basis of its greater speed and more lethal armament"
The max speed of the Meteor MkIII in 1945 was ~500mph (800km/h), while claims for the Me-262 vary between 900-975km/h.

[lwd]

.... It's interesting to see how the internet media sheds light upon some particular historical events (which are obsessing me for some time now :) ) However, the bibliography they provided was: either non-existent or consisted only of general-viewing books.

That's a valid critism. It does make it much harder to verify the data without sources being mentioned. However it is not sufficient to invalidate the reference.

...On the other hand, a profesionaly-researched book is much more than that: it passes through several hands, it's approved at several levels, AND, very importantly, it serves to build a reputation, for a specialist in a particular field. That's why the research is far more serious and the conclusions far better thought through than in the articles published on the web.

In some cases this is true but they are also suseptable to blind spots as well. For instance look at the number of accounts of Midway mentioning that the Japanese carriers had their decks covered with planes when the US dive bombers struck.

Now, about the books. The development history of the P80/Meteor/Me262 is quite well presented and understood. They were all conceived, designed, constructed and first flown at about the same time (1942-1943). All 3 nations had problems with early engines, and the Germans also had the "we must make it a bomber" problem.
If you are interested in various stages of development of the planes, I'll post some here.
For the time being, I'll repeat my early conclusion from "Me-262 Arrow to the future" and add the comparison to the Meteor:

P-80 vs Me-262, tested in 1945.
"The test were not combat manouvres, but comparisons of speeds, rates of climb at different altitudes, and turning radius. The Messerchmitt had better speed and acceleration and an equal climb. The P-80 was easier to handle and had much better visibility". I'll add that the Me-262 had 4x30mm cannons + 24 AA rockets, while the P-80 carried 6x12.7mm machine guns. The maximum speed of the "normal" P-80As (i.e. non-specificaly modified for breaking records) is a subject of debate for some time now. Most sources claim it to be between 500-550mph (800-900km/h)

Meteor MkIII vs Me-262, untested, excerpt from "Me-262, arrow to the future", pg 135:
"The inevitable question arises, of course, as to how the early Meteor and the Schwalbe might have fared in combat, given two pilots of equal caliber. The consensus is generaly that the Me-262 would have been superior, on the basis of its greater speed and more lethal armament"
The max speed of the Meteor MkIII in 1945 was ~500mph (800km/h), while claims for the Me-262 vary between 900-975km/h.

All good to know now we can discuss them in a bit more depth.

For instance it's been mentioned in a number of sources that the engines of the Me-262 were quite fragile and prone to combat damage. Especially if we take this into account along with the low velocity and rate of fire of the 30mm guns on the Me-262 was it really better armed for a dog fight than the Meteor? Indeed if dog fighting each other the P-80's guns may have been a very good choice (Totally inadequate if you are trying to bring down a big 4 engine bomber but that's not what we are discussing here, or is it?). Then there's the fact that the above comparisons don't even talk about reliability or maintainability issues. This is the area where the Me-262 takes a huge hit. Did the US and British engine designs have flame out problems to the extent of the Me-262? That could be another strike against it.

[Byron Angel]

Sorry but there is no escape route.
If you want to nitpick and claim that Deitrich was only referening to the morning action then I ask why he included 21 tanks in the citation. Wittmann never saw or visited the location of the other 10+ tanks (i.e not the 11 he has a valid claim for) and they were only engaged later in the day
So if you want to say the citation is only about the morning action then explain why the afternoon total was added into the mix?

..... The tanks of A/4CLY reported themselves under attack by the rest of Wittman's platoon at 1000hrs, reported themselves surrounded and in an untenable position at 1030hrs, and could no longer be raised by radio by 1035hrs that MORNING. I think that would make up those missing tank casualties that you assert as having occurred "later in the day". Also, since it was Wittman himself who knocked out the rear tank of A/4CLY when he first broke into the British column, he actually WAS at Pt 213 and obviously DID see A/4CLY - just to keep the facts straight.

There are no such updated Soviet figures on a battle by battle basis. They do not exist. There is nothing at all that even remotely approaches a total on a battle by battle basis. It is as much a fiction as the claim that german kill claims were accurate and reliable. Krivosheev does have a general brakdown but it is useless for the task you have in mind. I would urge you to publish these fabled updated Soviet figures on a battle by battle basis. In all my years at this I have never even some close to finding such a magnificent document..............

..... Now the discussion is supposed to be confined strictly to Krivosheyev? Why? Try this out -

http://rkkaww2.armchairgeneral.com/batt ... n_3_08.htm

It took me 5 minutes to find it on the web, of all places. Imagine what you might turn up if you actually took the bother to look around a bit.

I have had a lenghty correspondence on this very subject with Zetterling in the past and I know Zaloga shares my views on the absurd high kill claims made for German tanks. Over the years I have had dealings with a good number of the great and the good and other authors who work in this area . Trying to cow me with those you consider 'the experts' will not work.

..... Indeed. I've run across some your "correspondence" on other enthusiast websites. I'm hardly trying to "cow" you, sir. I'm suggesting that you take a look at some of those Eastern Front numbers, which DO in fact exist, and give us your honest assessment of the relative performance of the German tank arm. Can you do that? It would help ever so much in terms of clarifying exactly what you are arguing here.

Byron

[alecsandros]

All good to know now we can discuss them in a bit more depth.

Hello!
I'm very glad we've settled the problems :)
Now, indeed, we should be focusing on the hands-on problems.
Unfortunately, I'll be away from town for several days, and without internet..
But I'll dig this out as soon as I'll get back and try to present my point of view regarding fighter weapons effectiveness. This is a particular field of interest which I'd long wanted to discuss.

All the best and keep in touch,
Alex

[Bgile]

The armament question came up in the Korean War. Mig-15s had heavy cannon armament and wrought great destruction when they could get at B-29s, but had trouble hitting F-86s.

[Byron Angel]

The armament question came up in the Korean War. Mig-15s had heavy cannon armament and wrought great destruction when they could get at B-29s, but had trouble hitting F-86s.

..... True. I recall reading that the ballistics of the 23mm and the 37mm guns ofthe Mig-15 were not well matched for fighter combat. OTOH, the Mig-15 definitely carried a better armament for fighting jets. The Browning 50cal, even in the M3 model, was IMHO no longer really up to the air-to-air job by the time of the Korean War. The only technological feature that helped to redress the armament imbalance was the much better gyro gun-sight carried by the F-86.


Byron

[lwd]

...But I'll dig this out as soon as I'll get back and try to present my point of view regarding fighter weapons effectiveness. ...

A good starting point is: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/miltech.htm
In particular:
http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/CannonMGs.htm
http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/WW2guneffect.htm
http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/ideal.htm
and for those interested in AT performance:
http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk/tankbusters.htm

Indeed even the USN had realized that 12.7 was a bit light for figher armament by the end of WWII. However If your opponent is an Me-262 I'm not sure that's the case. If it's a B-17 there's not question about it.

[mkenny]

..... The tanks of A/4CLY reported themselves under attack by the rest of Wittman's platoon at 1000hrs, reported themselves surrounded and in an untenable position at 1030hrs, and could no longer be raised by radio by 1035hrs that MORNING. I think that would make up those missing tank casualties that you assert as having occurred "later in the day". Also, since it was Wittman himself who knocked out the rear tank of A/4CLY when he first broke into the British column, he actually WAS at Pt 213 and obviously DID see A/4CLY - just to keep the facts straight

They did not lose radio contact at 10:35. At 12:40 Viscount Cranley sought permission to destroy the tanks at Pt 213 (Page 51 Taylor VBTTL). This rules out the possibility that they were knocked out at the time of Wittmann's attack (around 9:15)


Wittmann saw 2 tanks to his right as he reached the road (RN 175) This is one of them







Note above that from this position (and the direction where Wittmann was firing from) the road rises up and then dips down slightly to reach point 213. You can not see 213 from here and Wittmann was BEHIND this tank.
So yes he saw 2 tanks from A Squadron. He did not see any of the others and was not engaged at Point 213.


Map of modern day pt 213 (now 217!)


Schematic of Wittmann's route with his start point marked in light blue.



and the real thing


As can be seen he was always moving away from Pt 213.

It took me 5 minutes to find it on the web, of all places. Imagine what you might turn up if you actually took the bother to look around a bit

You should have give it a few more minutes and you would find even more.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 80&start=0


However this is not what you said you had. Your exact words:

Here's your golden opportunity to check German tank victory claims against official updated Soviet figures on a battle by battle basis
Data for one Tank Army on one day?
The figures are not 'official' rather the work of dedicated enthusiasts who assemble some obscure and hard to find documentation..

[boredatwork]

One more thing: internet-press can be a wonderfull thing, but it can also show a very distorted view, because the industry is highly competitive adn the authors need to bring something out of the ordinary in order to keep their jobs. If they would stick to the "Me-262 was the best jet fighter of the war", it would be dull, it's all been said before! Web-sites need visitors, visitors need new info, new points of view, events, etc. And that's what the editors are giving them... On the other hand, a profesionaly-researched book is much more than that: it passes through several hands, it's approved at several levels, AND, very importantly, it serves to build a reputation, for a specialist in a particular field. That's why the research is far more serious and the conclusions far better thought through than in the articles published on the web.

I believe the premise behind your argument - that internet publishers are more likely to have "distorted" view in order to "present something new" than print publishers for financial reasons - is flawed.

I won't retype my whole argument - you may view it here: viewtopic.php?f=13&t=2925&p=29790#p29790 however the Coles Notes version:

Good research is good research no matter where it appears, likewise poorly researched, biased conclusions are not by a long shot the exclusive domain of the internet.

[Byron Angel]

Nice pictures.

"Steel Inferno - I SS Panzer Corps in Normandy", M Reynolds, pp 103-104:

quote - The 4CLY war diary records that at 1000 hours A squadron, on Point 213, reported being surrounded and attacked by Tiger tanks. These were, of course, Wittman's other four tanks. Half an hour later Viscount Cranley reported that his position was untenable and withdrawal impossible, and at 1035 hours A Squadron's radios went 'dead'. <snip> At 1240 hours Viscount Cranley, somewhere on Point 213 but out of touch with his A squadron, radioed that he was surrounded; and at about 1300 hours the surviving tanks of A Squadron and some seventeen men of A Company 1RB surrendered. Cranley was captured separately and turned up in a German prisoner-of-war camp near Argentan on the 15th. - Unquote.

By the time Cranley managed to regain contact with HQ, he was not in contact with A/4CLY, was in no position to influence events, and had no means of transmitting any order to them. Read Major Chris Milner's account of 4CLY's experience and his escape from Point 210 (sic) starting on page 244 of "Desert Rats at War" for further details.

- - -

As for Wittman and A/4CLY, he was within about 100 yards or so of Point 213, saw the tail of A/4CLY's column when he emerged onto the road, and knocked out the tail-end tank before turning toward Villers-Bocage. I think that pretty much settles that issue.

- - -

As for Eastern Front tank statistics, it seems that nothing is good enough when you don't want it to be. How convenient.


Byron

[mkenny]

"Steel Inferno - I SS Panzer Corps in Normandy", M Reynolds, pp 103-104:
The 4CLY war diary.........
1035 hours A Squadron's radios went 'dead'.

It actualy says "All stations went off air"

At 1240 hours Viscount Cranley, somewhere on Point 213 but out of touch with his A squadron

I can find no source that references the underlined text. It is a Reynolds conclusion rather than a fact. Reynolds has no footnote for this claim and I note he does not use any of Cranley's accounts in the notes section.
I have several more first hand accounts (published and unpublished) that Reynolds did not use and there is no mention of Cranley being out of touch Indeed one may ask how he was in contact by radio and asking for permission to burn his tanks if he did not know where they were. As Cranley was taken prisoner he had no contact with those left behind and could not impart this information even if it was true.

radioed that he was surrounded;

That must be just him personaly being surrounded seeing as he was out of touch with his A squadron!

By the time Cranley managed to regain contact with HQ, he was not in contact with A/4CLY, was in no position to influence events, and had no means of transmitting any order to them.

Contradicted by the radio log where he requested smoke shells at 12:39 to cover a breakout attempt(and he got them, see his account in Allen and Cawston's 4th CLY History 'Carpiquet Bound' page 12:10)(1997) )and the overheard( by Roy Akers from B Squadron) conversation between Cranley and his scout car driver:
"where are my f**king boots, I am not f**king well walking all the f**king way to f**king Berlin without my f**king boots"
Cranley says shortly after this the last radio was 'shot away'.
I wonder how Roy Akers heard that when he was at the western end of Villers and Cranley was over 3000 mtrs to the east-oh yes I forgot, he heard it on the radio Cranley did not have.

Read Major Chris Milner's account of 4CLY's experience and his escape from Point 210 (sic) starting on page 244 of "Desert Rats at War" for further details.

Strangely my copy of Desert Rats at War (1977)has it on page 63-65. He gives no timings or information that in any way support Reynold's claim Cranley was 'out of touch'.

As for Wittman and A/4CLY, he was within about 100 yards or so of Point 213,

I measured the distance in the modern day 1:25000 Serie Bleu Map of Villers (1513O)
100 yds (90 mtrs) is simply absurd. Wittmann hit the RN 175 at least 700 mtrs away from Pt 213

On the pic below Pt 213 is the red cross. 100 mtrs from Pt 213 is the white cross. The blue cross is 500mtrs from Pt 213 and the yellow cross is Wittmann's starting position.

The majority of A Squadron were a further 100 mtrs to the south of the RN 175

I think that pretty much settles that issue.

Indeed it does. The tanks at Pt 213 were still in action at 12:40 and attempts to save Deitrich's credibilty by claiming these tanks were captured/knocked out by 10:30 is a waste of time.
You are way off the mark on a number of points. Please continue digging.

[Byron Angel]

It actualy says "All stations went off air"

..... Noooooo, my quote was taken verbatim from Reynolds. I assume you are quoting from the 4CLY war diary. If so, waht's your point? However phrased, A/4CLY was out of radio communication at 1035hrs.

At 1240 hours Viscount Cranley, somewhere on Point 213 but out of touch with his A squadron

I can find no source that references the underlined text. It is a Reynolds conclusion rather than a fact. Reynolds has no footnote for this claim and I note he does not use any of Cranley's accounts in the notes section.
I have several more first hand accounts (published and unpublished) that Reynolds did not use and there is no mention of Cranley being out of touch Indeed one may ask how he was in contact by radio and asking for permission to burn his tanks if he did not know where they were. As Cranley was taken prisoner he had no contact with those left behind and could not impart this information even if it was true.

..... Your inability to find a reference to confirm Reynold's statement does not refute it. If you are skeptical, write the man and ask him. Can you provide proof or testimony that Cranley was ever physically present with A/4CLY. If so, then case closed; if not, don't try to substitute wishful thinking in place thereof.

That must be just him personaly being surrounded seeing as he was out of touch with his A squadron!

..... Lame rhetorical device once again. Cranley knew where A/4CLY was because they had halted at Pt 213 before 0900hrs. After Wittman's attack down NR175, he knew they were cut off. It's also possible that Cranley was personally surrounded at the time of his 1236/9 transmission I have no idea what his personal circumstances were at the time of his transmission. Do you?

By the time Cranley managed to regain contact with HQ, he was not in contact with A/4CLY, was in no position to influence events, and had no means of transmitting any order to them.

Contradicted by the radio log where he requested smoke shells at 12:39 to cover a breakout attempt(and he got them, see his account in Allen and Cawston's 4th CLY History 'Carpiquet Bound' page 12:10)(1997) )and the overheard( by Roy Akers from B Squadron) conversation between Cranley and his scout car driver: "where are my f**king boots, I am not f**king well walking all the f**king way to f**king Berlin without my f**king boots" Cranley says shortly after this the last radio was 'shot away'. I wonder how Roy Akers heard that when he was at the western end of Villers and Cranley was over 3000 mtrs to the east-oh yes I forgot, he heard it on the radio Cranley did not have.

..... The fact that a B Squadron radio operator three kilometers away overheard a transmission from Cranley proves exactly one thing: that Cranley had access to an operating radio around 1236hrs. It does nothing whatever to place either Cranley or his radio at Pt 213. If he was not physically at Pt 213, then he had no contact with A Squadron which was still off the air. LeFevre and at least one supporting eye witness account state that Cranley left Villers-Bocage around 0900hrs in a scout car headed up NR175 to make contact with A/4CLY. He was not with A Squadron at the start. His drive up NR175, starting around 0900hrs, would have been interrupted by Wittman's attack coming down in the opposite direction. Cranley goes silent after 0900hrs. No calls for artillery support or tactical air or anything else. The next time Cranley is heard from is several hours later at 1236/9hrs, but there is no testimony or evidence I have been able to unearth which physically places him at Pt 213 at that time either. If you have some definite proof that he reached his goal, please offer it up.

Read Major Chris Milner's account of 4CLY's experience and his escape from Point 210 (sic) starting on page 244 of "Desert Rats at War" for further details.

Strangely my copy of Desert Rats at War (1977)has it on page 63-65. He gives no timings or information that in any way support Reynold's claim Cranley was 'out of touch'.

..... Milner mentions not a single word about Cranley, nor about his physical presence at Pt 213 at any time.

As for Wittman and A/4CLY, he was within about 100 yards or so of Point 213,

I measured the distance in the modern day 1:25000 Serie Bleu Map of Villers (1513O)
100 yds (90 mtrs) is simply absurd. Wittmann hit the RN 175 at least 700 mtrs away from Pt 213

..... You are correct on that point. I concede the error on my part. But it really doesn't make any meaningful difference. In fact, whatever Wittman's exact location, it appears that he did in fact go out on foot from his off-road hide and observed the movement of A/4CLY and 1RB after being alerted to their approach by a messenger.

I think that pretty much settles that issue.

Indeed it does. The tanks at Pt 213 were still in action at 12:40 and attempts to save Deitrich's credibilty by claiming these tanks were captured/knocked out by 10:30 is a waste of time.
You are way off the mark on a number of points. Please continue digging.

..... Leaving aside your wishful theorizing, here is what is actually known. A Squadron reported itself under attack at 1000hrs, reported itself surrounded and in an untenable position at 1030hrs, and went off the air at 1035hrs - which is exactly what I posted earlier. Milner states that the sounds of tank fighting died out shortly after 1200hrs. Another account approximates the time of formal surrender at "shortly" after 1239hrs. Wittman himself drove up to Pt 213 in a jeep that afternoon to meet with Mobius to coordinate the advance into Villers-Bocage. It's pretty clear that the jig was up for A Squadron by 1300hrs and that there was no fighting into the afternoon at Pt 213 as you allege.

[mkenny]

Reynolds:

"At 1240 hours Viscount Cranley, somewhere on Point 213 but out of touch with his A squadron"

Viscount Cranley from his book 'Men And Sand:

"When all appeared hopeless I ordered all vehicles not already knocked out to be destroyed , except those that might endanger the wounded, and ordered personel that were fit to try and break out on foot in small groups under cover of smoke that I was able to get from the gunners before my last wireless was shot away "

The smoke request was recieved by radio at 12:35. The overheard conversation where Cranley was swearing was from the Scout car radio.

Cranley also had a rear area link via the 5th RHA Artillery OP Tank of Captain Roy Dunlop and it is almost certainly this tank that was used to request smoke from the gunners. This Cromwell was not seriously damaged in any way before its capture and Dunlop had used his radio previously to lay down 25pdr fire on the surrounding Germans. Below is one from a a series of photos showing Germans setting fire to it after it was captured.

[mkenny]

I assume you are quoting from the 4CLY war diary.

http://www.warlinks.com/armour/4_cly/4cly_44.html

Milner mentions not a single word about Cranley, nor about his physical presence at Pt 213 at any time.

But he did mention Cranley.
Page 65 Desert Rats At War Europe George Forty 1977, page 65

Milner states:

"The force on point 210 consisted, then, of Colnel Cranley and his TAC HQ, one depleted squadron of Cromwells, a gunner OP Officer. OC 'A' Company (RB) James Wright and all his officers (except one) the mortar section and one section only of Riflemen"

Is that evidence enough?