Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

[mkenny]

France 940,000
Great Britain 3,640,000
USA 3,100,000
USSR 3,060,000


I wonder how many of those, if the figure is reliable at all, were Italian, Romanian, Hungarian, Norwegian, Spanish, French, etc. etc.

I presume from that you are quoting Krivosheev without owning a copy of his book
This breakdown is on page 277 and 1,940,294 were taken in 1945 and 2,888,824 in the last 11 months of the war
A further 1,284,000 laid down their weapons after the totals in the table.



Krivosheev also gives a total for German and Axis losses in the East.

[VeenenbergR]

mkenny: the Malmedy Massacre indeed consists of a series of incidents but in the case of La Gleize Peiper treated the US Pow's extremely well according Reynolds his intensive study!!!
Peiper was very (very!) able and responsible commander, saved Genaral Postels 320th Division near Charkow early 1943 from anhillation with a few troops, suffered from heart attack naer Mortain and led his Regiment (KG) very well during the weeks in the Ardennes, when he himself became encircled and cut off! He released his US POW's treated them very well en saved 2000 of his men from anhillation as well. He certainly gave no personal instructions to shoot civilians or POW's although the KG was in no position (like the USA para's in Normandy) to escort US POW's to the rear.

Karl Heidenreich: you gave an excellent account of the situation on the Eastern Front compared to that of the Western Front. Yes Soviet artillery after 1943 did the carnage and did the horrible work in stopping German attempts to succesfully break out of encirclements like Brody, Halbe. They were also in a way responsible in stopping the German breakthrough attempts during Kursk when most Soviet tanks were destroyed and when the Germans would resume the advance they were blocked by heavy artillery in the North but also in the South shoulder. It was the Soviet artillery which caused so many personel losses during Kursk.

Karl, I only would not rate the dozen German crack divisions in Normandy as "B" units: Panzer Lehr was at that moment the NO 1 division in the Wehrmacht, so were also the SS Panzer Divisiosns, the 21th panzer was reinforced by many French/German asault guns and special batalions with the heavy 88mm AT "Scheunentor". The 116th I also would not rate "B", like the 3 para divisions. The 6th para rgt was crack too.

Mkenny and Karl: the numbers of mkenney are the right ones: the German Army in the East numbered between 3 and 4 million during each stage right up to the bitter end! At the end of March 1945 the Germans fielded 300 divisions again, 60% of them on the Eastern Front (= 180 divisions). With an average strength of 10.000 men each (they all were grossly understrength) there are 1.800.000 troops but then at least 250 other separare units (batalion sized) must be added, then the other units (Volkssturm, Polizei, Luftwaffe ground units), Luftwaffe air units, Naval units, Kriegsmarine personel, FLAK units), logistical and headquarter units: in total about 3,6 million men. So these 3,6 million faced 6-7 million Soviet troops. As you yourself said the Soviets had massive support from the air and their tremendous powerfull breakthrough artillery. Locally the superiority on the ground could be easily 10:1 with massive air, tank and artillery support. That the Soviet Army was short in men was also true: they used massive support from Rumanians, Poles and women soldiers. The Germans also could field about 2 million front line troops (many inexperienced, older soldiers) and the Soviets perhaps 5 milion, because in the Soviet Army the ratio between Front line units and logistical units was higher than in the German army.
Further: the Germans were etremely low on fuel, had problems with ammunition supply, spare parts: it all came together now and meant they were more or less doomed to defend on the spot and suffer what had to come: no room to maneuver aso. Stand and die as you can call that and yes they died those last 3 months with 100.000+ per month and so did the Soviets. Losses were roughly equal now.

Iwd: ass always you have valid comment on my statements, which however are only a way to have a clear picture on the things which in most articles are incomplete or one sided. Also Karl Heidenreich tries to do that and he tries to make clear how important the Eastern Front was in WWII, without neglecting the tremendous war effort of the Western Allies: their superb air forces, artillery and logistics and common sense for developing only a limited variety of weapons and going on the offensive if all conditions are fullfilled to turn it into a success.
As we have seen Hitler was more a gambler and played his show of dillusion with as much divisions in the field as possible and orderered his troops to do the impossible (in order to achieve at least something which was above the "average"). The German army certainly did that, but was eventually mislead and misused and squandered in a terrible way: in North Africa, in France and in Russia. The soldiers payed the price (5,3 million died because of Hitlers dreams and personal vendetta against the jews and the slavs) and are burried now all over Europe. The only thing they attained was the demolition of large areas in Europe (The East) and the total destruction of the cities in their own Fatherland.

mkenney, Karl, Iwd: do you all think the numbers of Krivosheev can be trusted? The numbers for the Axis seems to be exhaustive and complete, but is this also true for the Soviets?
Total number of KIA Germans against the Soviets is 2,5 million (including Volkssturm and Hitlerjugend), then there were losses for their Allies as well (Finns, Rumanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Spanish, Dutch, French, Belgians, Ests, Letts, Lituanians, Russians, Norwegians, Swedish troops), Italians).

Soviet losses of KIA must be around 9 million, with roughly 2 million per calender-year and 1 million for those 5 months in 1945.

To both bumbers the KIA als POW"s (millions!!!) must be added and those for other causes (disseases, execution, natural deaths, suicide and accidents).

[VeenenbergR]

POW's????? Krivosheev is hiding their horrible conditions and their tragic end......

What Krivosheev tries do do is:

- trying to portray the German KIA higher than it actually was;
- trying to portray the German MIA (= POW) LOWER than it actually was.

The intention: to hide the fact that millions of German POW's died in Soviet custody.
To blame the Germans while to clean the own mistreatments.
In a way this is propaganda again, with the difference that he facts and numbers are manipulated.

A very low number for may 1945......... were are the 1,5 million Germans that surrendered to the Soviets?????
Were are the 1,2 million Germans handed over by the Western Allies to the Soviets after may 1945????????
According to Keegan Times Atlas of WWII the Soviets took/got at least 3,2 million Germans as POW's not counting German civilians (1 million?) forced in labour to the USSR.

Of these 480.000 German soildiers died officially as POW's in Soviet captivity (officially they published a lower number but they admit this number may be also true) but Rüdiger Overmars thinks a million (!!) must be added to the higher number.

Then those of the German civilans and all those of other nations must be added to that totall.........ask the Hungarians, Italians and Rumanians how many (= few) came back!!!!!!!
Of the Dutch many died in Soviet custody too, although they themselves were used as forced labourers in Germany. Taken by the Soviets after 1945 they had to work
in the USSR.

Yes the Soviets were accountable for millions of death in their camps!!!

[Karl Heidenreich]

VeenenbergR:

It´s interesting your check based in the quantity of divisions deployed. The problem that I see with this, at least on the German side, is the attrition those units were subjected, specially since summer 1943 and the capability of replace the losses. So, my point is two fold:

1. The Germans never had a superb capacity to replace their losses, which is one of the reasons they lost the war.

2. The German divisions on paper were bigger than in real life. The same Germans accounted, by winter 1941-1942, for 136 division facing the soviets which in reality, according to OKH, were "just" 83 full fledged divisions.

If by the winter 1941, when the German Army was far from being beaten and the German nation intact the musted of the main military effort was on the order of 61% of the nominal strenght, what can we expect of March 1945, when Germany was a broken country?

I will mention another example that is very important: the Battle of Kursk.

Previous to that battle the Germans had lost the battle of Stalingrad and with it not only Sixth Army but many allied units at the Northen and Southern flank of Germans. The losses were huge but the Germans had enough time, according to the "replacing" theory, to replace them until June - July 1943 which is when Zitadelle started. Now, in view of that, how can it be that the Germans can only "fielded" some 900,000 men against the massive defenses the russians had? In 1941 the Germans could muster, for their Barbarossa offensive some 3 million guys. Now for a desperate battle they can only field 900,000. It´s obvious that by 1943 the Germans had to cover an enormous front but still, for such a gamble, they must have had allocated more resources. WHy they didn´t? Because those replacement didn´t even exist: they couldn´t recover as fast as their soviets enemies.

The fact remains that the German forces, by the moment the allies were invading the German territory were less than the nominal strenght, in this case 300 divisions. Maybe that is what Hitler saw on the map when, desperate in April, May 1945, he told his close colaborators of Germans units that will save Berlin.

Glantz is very clear on this and insists on the forces gathered for the final episode of that war. The Germans put on the field some 1,5 million (1,8 according to other sources) at the Western Front Campaign and were only able to muster some 1 million for the last stand. To that the western allies put 4-5 million on their end of the battle and the soviets from 6-7 million on theirs. Basically, the Germans were outnumbered in a 300% at least on both fronts.

mkenny:

Like :
Panzer Lehr
1st SS LAH
2nd SS Das Reich
9TH SS
10th SS
12th SS HJ
17TH SS
sSS PzAbt 101
sSS PzAbt 102

Ackowledging that you have a great amount of books and sources can you kindly made a comparative chart of the relative strenght those units had:

1. Eastern Front, summer 1942
2. Eastern Front summer 1943
3. Western Front July-September 1944

Please. When doing that you will kindly, after your extensive research in this thread, post also (or admitt that it was never done) the quote in which I said that the Germans fought to their deaths.

By the way, I don´t have the Krivochiev book but when stating the origin of the PoWs I wasn´t using that source (that if I have I will partially use it, too) but the numbers from Glantz. However the fact remains that, even in the case of 6 million PoWs made by the combined allied forces, those were captured during 6 years of confict from various theaters and they did not, as you imply, surrendered to Ike, en masse, on March - May 1945.

If the previous afirmation of mine is correct, then the highest tally of the German forces could have never been higher than what experts had put them: 1,5 million on the Western Front and some 2,25 million on the East.

About Krivoshiev`s reliability, answering VennenberR`s question: I can`t really say. What I can say is that whatever he says is more reliable than what mkenny`s says because, I was checking last night, I can´t find a single researcher or published book of someone with last name Kenny and given name starting with an M.

Warmest regards, on my way to work.

[VeenenbergR]

Karl.

With all my books I can try to make the picture clear for the Wehrmacht during the 5 last months of the war:

- how many POW's were captured until 1-1-1945 by whom?

- how many were KIA, MIA and WIA on this date?
- what was the remaining strenght of the German army (men, divisions): to the North, West, South, Southeast and East Fronts
- what were the losses per Front and new drafts per month?
- how many surrendered in May 1945 to whom?
- How many German POW's were trasferred from which side to whom?

According to Overmars the losses in those 5 months were the highest in the whole war, although on all fronts except the East the fighting was diminishing rapidly.

I will inform you soon with all sources used.
This is enough to answer all questions insofar.
Only keep in mind that front-line strength is different from total strength.

[Karl Heidenreich]

VeenenberR:

how many POW's were captured until 1-1-1945 by whom?

- how many were KIA, MIA and WIA on this date?
- what was the remaining strenght of the German army (men, divisions): to the North, West, South, Southeast and East Fronts
- what were the losses per Front and new drafts per month?
- how many surrendered in May 1945 to whom?
- How many German POW's were trasferred from which side to whom?

Well, that´s by far excellent!

Only keep in mind that front-line strength is different from total strength.

I was going to point out that, as a matter of fact, some time ago but was "diverted" and never was able to produce it. That´s clear. Thank you for your help in this because it will take still like two and half more weeks to have my weekend at home, and then the last thing I would be able to do is look for military casualty figures. So, I´m down to internet sources by now.

Warmest regards,

[Karl Heidenreich]

This I posted at the starting of this thread, and I think is time to bring it forth again, becauses the arguments are shifting this way:

"In reading works by the burgeois writers on World War II, I have frequently noticed their inclination to play down the Red Army victory in the summer of 1943. They try to instill in their readers the idea that the Kursk Battle was just an ordinary, insignificant episode in the war; to these ends they either barely mention it or just skip it. Very rarely have I come across such books any real assesment of the Nazi plan of revenge for the summer of 1943 as an adventurous or a bankrupt end to the strategy of the fascist generals. But, as the saying has it, deeds speak louder than words. I would mention just one elementary fact: at the height of the Kursk Battle our Allies landed in Sicily and, on 17 August, crossed over into Italy. Could they have possibly done so with even half the forces against them that we had to contend with in the summer of 1943? I think not."

-Marshall A.M. Vasilesky

[lwd]

lwd:

Perhaps compared to the Soviets but not when compared to that of the US or Britain.

This is an excelent example of Ambrosian Sindrome: underrate the soviets. I think that from 1943 on it was the russian artillery the one blowing German units sky high. This could be a reason of the high rate of lethal casualties the Germans had in the East compared to the much lighter casualties they had in the secondary western campaign.

Nope. The Soviets used massive quantities of artillery and ammo and pretty much preprogrammed barrages. That was there post war doctrine as well. US and British artillery was vastly more flexible and more effective on a tube by tube basis.

And then off you go again ...

Also the precept that it was D Day the decisive moment of the war,

Has anyone here even suggested that?

After Kursk the Germans were, definitely, losing the war.

I would have put it after Stalingrad.

Continuing this same line it is clear that the great allied commander was Zhukov and not Ike.

Depends on what you mean by "great" I guess. I'm not sure either would qualify in my book. Ike did do an excellent job of keeping the alllies on the same side which was what he was suppose to do. Zhukov lost too many troops for me to count him among the great commanders.

...
What we have learned from this, despite the efforts of some, is that:

1. The Eastern Front was the one that staged the greatest Germans offensives.

The Battle for France probably used a larger fraction of their army as of that date than any other offensive. The exception might be if you consider Barbarossa as a whole.

2. The Eastern Front was the one were the Germans deployed the bulk of their army and their crack units

Since many of their "crack units" were deployed on both fronts or even all three at one time or anther this is a rather meaningless statement.

...
11. The western allies could have never taken 6 million prisioners by the end of the war simply because there was not that number of soldiers then and there.

Not saying they did but the rational above is badly flawed.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Lee:

Nope. The Soviets used massive quantities of artillery and ammo and pretty much preprogrammed barrages. That was there post war doctrine as well. US and British artillery was vastly more flexible and more effective on a tube by tube basis.

That´s interesting, really. Where can I find some literature on that? After all this discussion my interest on the Eastern Front has re started.

And then off you go again ...

Also the precept that it was D Day the decisive moment of the war,

Has anyone here even suggested that?

I was not refering to you, in specific, but to a general tendency, which is this thread is about. You read or hear it a lot. If my memory does not betray me when the movie "A Bridge Too Far" a female narrator refers to D Day in those terms. Or the general approach of American History on that behalf, which is only logical.

I would have put it after Stalingrad.

Stalingrad is where the Germans lost the war, you are correct. In Kursk they made their final strategic offensive and since then the russians got the initiative.

Depends on what you mean by "great" I guess. I'm not sure either would qualify in my book. Ike did do an excellent job of keeping the alllies on the same side which was what he was suppose to do. Zhukov lost too many troops for me to count him among the great commanders.

Great as a the guy that commanded the forces that broke the German Army`s back. Ike, I must reckon, not being a strategic genius was a superb Supreme Commander... only to deal with De Gaulle and Monty made him earn his salary.

The Battle for France probably used a larger fraction of their army as of that date than any other offensive. The exception might be if you consider Barbarossa as a whole.

Agreed. The French Campaign was second to none from 1939 until 1941. Barbarossa was bigger and the whole russian campaign got bigger and bigger ever since.

Since many of their "crack units" were deployed on both fronts or even all three at one time or anther this is a rather meaningless statement.

Don´t think so, Lee. The units, their combat performance, muster and deployment over time are important. That´s why I´m asking for the relative strenghts of them by year.

Not saying they did but the rational above is badly flawed.

It is not, Lee. If you have six million to be taken prisioners then it´s OK. But if you claim six million and there were only 1.5 million, or 2 or 3 million, it could never happened that Ike took six million prisioners when Germany surrendered. But if you tell me that the allies took 6 million, overall, during the totality of the conflict, from 1939 to 1945, then that´s another complete different thing.

Warmest regards,

[mkenny]

If there was half a million in September 1944 and 3 Million in April then it follows that 2.5 million were taken between sept-April.

Note that the Allied and Russian bag of POW's for the last year is roughly equal.

[Karl Heidenreich]

Doing more research. It shows that it is very likely that Vasilesky was right in his statement.

A COMPARATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS
ON THE EASTERN AND WESTERN FRONTS
DURING THE SUMMER-FALL CAMPAIGN OF 1941

Ø In June 1941 the United States was at peace, and, in October, the Congress
renewed the draft by a single vote. U.S. Army strength reached 1.5 million
men.

Ø On 22 June 1941 Hitler’s Wehrmacht invaded the Soviet Union with a force
of over 3 million men, crushed Red Army forces in the border region, and
raced inexorably forward toward Leningrad, Moscow, and Kiev, leaving a
shattered Red Army in its wake.
*****
Ø The 5.5-million man Red Army lost at least 2.8 million men by 1 October
and 1.6 million more by 31 December. During this period the Red Army
raised 821 division equivalents (483 rifle, 73 tank, 31 mechanized, and 101
cavalry divisions and 266 rifle, tank, and ski brigades) and lost a total of 229
division equivalents.
*****
Ø In October 1941 Stalin evacuated the bulk of the Soviet government to
Kuibyshev and in November the Wehrmacht began its final advance on
Moscow.
Ø In November 1941 the U.S. extended $1 billion in Lend-Lease credit to the
Soviet Union.
Ø In November 1941 the British won the initial phase of the Battle of Britain
in the air and conducted an offensive in North Africa.

A COMPARATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS
ON THE EASTERN AND WESTERN FRONTS
DURING THE WINTER CAMPAIGN OF 1941-42

Ø On 7 December 1941 the United States lost the bulk of its Pacific Fleet at
Pearl Harbor to a surprise attack by Japan and declared war on the Empire
of Japan (8 December), and Germany declared war on the U.S. (11
December). U.S. Army strength reached 1,643,477 men in 4 armies and 37
divisions (including 5 armored and 2 cavalry).
Ø In December 1941, after just six months of war, the Soviet Union had lost
almost 5 million men, virtually its entire prewar army, and territory
equivalent in U.S. terms to the entire region from the Atlantic coast to
Springfield, Illinois, but survived and, during the Battle for Moscow,
inflicted the first defeat on Hitler’s Wehrmacht that it had ever experienced.
Red Army strength reached 4,200,000 men in 43 armies.
*****
Ø In January 1942 the German Afrika Corps began its advance toward Egypt
with 3 German and 7 Italian divisions against 7 British divisions.
Ø In January and February 1942, 9 Red Army fronts [army groups] with 37
armies and over 350 divisions smashed German defenses on a front of 600
miles (Staraia Russa to Belgorod) and drove German forces back 80-120
miles before the Germans stabilized their defensive front in March.

A COMPARATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS
ON THE EASTERN AND WESTERN FRONTS
DURING THE SUMMER-FALL CAMPAIGN OF 1942

Ø In June 1942 the British Army was still in full retreat in North Africa, the
Battle of the Atlantic was raging, and the United States had turned back the
Japanese advance in the Pacific at Midway. U.S. Army strength overseas at
520,000 men (60 % in the Pacific, and 40 % in the Caribbean).
Ø On 28 June 1942, Hitler launched Operation Blau with roughly 2 million
troops toward Stalingrad and the Caucasus, smashing the defenses of about
1.8 million Red Army troops in southern Russia. By September 1942
German forces had advanced to a depth equivalent in U.S. terms to the
entire region from the Atlantic coast to Topeka, Kansas.
*****
Ø In September 1942, British forces halted the German advance in North
Africa and prepared a counteroffensive with 10 divisions. U.S. strength in
Europe reached 170,000 men.
Ø In September 1942, German forces reached Stalingrad and the foothills of
the Caucasus Mountains, but, in late October, halted operations to destroy
Soviet forces in Stalingrad.

A COMPARATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS
ON THE EASTERN AND WESTERN FRONTS
DURING THE WINTER CAMPAIGN OF 1942-43

Ø In late October and November 1942, 10 British divisions, including 3
armored, with 480 tanks defeated 9 German and Italian divisions (including
2 panzer divisions), in the Battle of El Alamein, inflicting 60,000 casualties
on the Germans, and, in Operation Torch, 4-5 Allied divisions (107,000
men) landed in Morocco and Algeria.
Ø In November and December 1942, 7 Soviet armies with 83 divisions, 817,000
men and 2,352 tanks struck German Ninth Army at Rzhev in Operation
Mars. The 23 defending German divisions barely managed to repel the
assaults, but inflicted almost 250,000 casualties on the Russians (including
almost 100,000 dead) and destroyed roughly 1,700 tanks.
Ø From November 1942 to February 1943, at Stalingrad and along the Don
River, 17 Soviet armies with 1,143,000 men, over 160 divisions, and 3,500
tanks destroyed or badly damaged 5 Axis armies, including 2 German,
totaling more than 50 divisions, and killed or captured more than 600,000
Axis troops.
*****
Ø On 1 January 1943, U.S. Army strength reached 5.4 million men in 73
divisions, with 1 million men and 9 divisions in Europe.
*****
Ø From January through March 1943, In North Africa, 20 Allied divisions
with almost 300,000 men drove 15 German and Italian divisions with about
275,000 men into Tunisia.
Ø From January through March 1943, 11 Red Army fronts, including 44
armies, over 4.5 million men, and over 250 divisions conducted massive
offensives along a 1,000-mile front before being halted by German
counterstrokes.

A COMPARATIVE CHRONOLOGY OF OPERATIONS
ON THE EASTERN AND WESTERN FRONTS
DURING THE SUMMER-FALL CAMPAIGN OF 1943

Ø In July 1943 one hundred and sixty thousand U.S. and British forces invaded Sicily, defeated 60,000
German defenders, and advanced into southern Italy. The Germans lost
20,000 men and the Allies 22,000.
Ø During July and August 1943, the 2.5 million Red Army troops defeated
over 1 million Germans at Kursk and subsequently launched offensives by
over 6 million Red Army soldiers against 2.5 million Germans along a front
of over 1,500 miles and advanced toward the Dnepr River.
*****
Ø In October and November 1943 in Italy, 11 Allied divisions advanced 16-39
miles from the Volturno River line to Cassino against 9 German divisions.
Ø From October through November 1943, 6 Red Army fronts with 37 armies,
over 4 million men, and over 300 divisions assaulted German defenses in a
770-mile sector in Belorussia, at Kiev, and along the lower Dnepr River,
piercing the German Eastern Wall in four regions.
*****
Ø On 31 December 1943, U.S. Army strength in Europe reached 1.4 million
men and 17 divisions. Red Army strength reached 6.2 million men and over
500 divisions.

[mkenny]

Can you post some figures that include Naval ships and personel?

How about an Air Force Comparison.

Can the Allied Armies in Asia be factored in?

What were the distances for the advances in the Asia/Pacific?

[Karl Heidenreich]

mkenny:

Can you post some figures that include Naval ships and personel?

Don´t have that info right now but will try to look for it. However this will not show any important issue in what the land war that was raging in Eastern and Western Fronts aside to demostrate the numerical inferiority of the German Kriegmarine against the more powerfull RN and USN.

How about an Air Force Comparison.

I imagine that´s feasible too. But if you do have that information it will be quicker for you to do so. I think you are already opening some chart in some book about that. It will show, I do believe, the decline of the Luftwaffe from 1943 on and how numerical superior were the allied air forces by June 1944-May 1945. In this regard it´s likely that the Soviet Air Force will also increase in it´s respective front in relation to the decrease of the Luftwaffe.

Can the Allied Armies in Asia be factored in?

To what purpose? They were not only very different armies with very different missions but also fighting thousands of miles away from the European Theatre. However their overall size was less than of those fighting in Europe, western and eastern. Now, some units in the Pacific fought in incredible violent scenarios, specially at the islands assaulted by the US Marine Corps, which I do believe (not sure about that, have to refresh my memory) with six divisions (only three surviving nowadays). But I do suspect a special reason, or motive in your agenda, by which I think it is better that you bring forth that information, I imagine you have the book with the chart.

What were the distances for the advances in the Asia/Pacific?

That part seems to me of the naval part of this forum and serves no purpose to see what happened at Anzio, Berlin or Stalingrad. If is there is a special reason then I think you, better than no one, can bring it forth too.

While doing that can you be kind enough to admit that you were mistaken with the quotation that many persons have been asking from you for several days.

Well, good night.

[mkenny]

This one ?

Surrender was not a German characteristic. Their motto was "Victory or Death".

I take it that meant if they did not win they prefered die?
If not perhaps you could explain what it actualy means.

Some 12 million soldiers chose not to die so I do not think you can seriously claim surrended was alien to the German character.

[mkenny]

The total for Soviet Army/Navy Air Force numbers in 1945 was 11.5 million.

Total UK = 4,683,000

Total US = 11,646,000

The Commonwealth total should be added to the UK total

German Forces were around the 8 million in June 1944 and the Fins/Hungarians/Rumanians should be added.

And the Western Allies were fighting Japan as well................