Revisionist tendencies and Ambrose Sindrome

[Byron Angel]

..... That was T N Dupuy's tactical opinion: fractionally better than soldiers of the Western allies on average; about 4-5x better than typical Soviet soldiers of 1941, with the Soviets making rapid improvements to materially reduce the difference in tactical efficiency as the war progressed.

That may be what he said but I'm not sure it's supportable at least from his published studies. The confounding factor here is small unit cohesion and leadership. A very good case can be made here for at least the early war superiority on average of the German forces. Compound that with a system that did a better job of integrating replacements so as to maintain that cohesion and it's hard to actually draw conclusions on the relative quality of the individual fighting man. Similarly given the Soviet doctrine and discipline in particular the very limited intiative allowed to low level officers and their approach to NCOs.

..... I don't believe that Dupuy was arguing from the point of view of any perceived inherent ethnic or racial superiority. I think his assessment was based upon superior German tactical doctrine, training, organization, and motivational methods. History is pretty clear on the point that well trained, equipped, led and motivated men will fight efficiently and well, irrespective of race or ethnicity.


Byron

[mkenny]

.

I personally don't doubt that 11.740 German POWS were in the hands of the Allies at VE day.
But you all seem to forget that in addition to these soldiers most of the 110.000 surrendered at Stalingrad were already dead at that moment: they ONCE were POW's but ended up somewhere in Siberia
in a mass grave.....

If they were POW's they appear in the POW list.
If they were not on the POW list then they appeared in the MIA totals.
Either way both were tabulated and it is impossible for a soldier to not be listed as either KIA/POW/WIA or MIA.
You can argue about the fate of the KIA/POW but not the numbers.

. Mkenny: is this not a very interesting analysis? I am curious to your views about these casulaties. You are an eager guy!!

Bacque and his fantasy have been thoroughly debunked.
http://www.amazon.com/Other-Losses-Jame ... 1551681919

[mkenny]

However, in the suspicion that a certain imprecision or inexactitude of expression may be in play, it is probably necessary to ensure that everyone agrees upon exactly what constituted "the Western Front" for the purposes of the discussion at hand. If the Western Front in 1944/45 is defined as everywhere else other than the East, then the matter is simple. However, if one defines "the West" in terms of the Normandy invasion and the battle across France and the Low Countries to the German border, then the issue becomes more complex, with certain distinctions and allowances in order to exclude German troops actually fighting on that front versus, for example, occupation troops in Norway and Denmark, or those committed to Italy and the Balkans, or those stationed within the German homeland.

The figures do indeed list the 'Fronts' are seperate



1. Date: 7.11.1943
East: 3,900,000
Finland: 180,000
Norway: 315,000
Denmark: 110,000
West: 1,370,000
Italy: 330,000
Balkans: 610,000
Sum: 6,815,000
Source: Materialien zum Vortrag des Chefs des Wehrmachtführungsstabes vom 7.11.1943 "Die strategische Lage am Anfang des fünften Kriegsjahres", ( KTB OKW, IV, pp. 1534 ff.)


2. Date: 5.5.1944
East: 3,878,000
Finland: no figure given
Norway: 311,000
Denmark: no figure given
West: 1,873,000
Italy: 961,000
Balkans: 826,000
Sum: 7,849,000
Source: "Strategische Lage im Frühjahr 1944", presentation held by Jodl, 5.5.1944. ( BA-MA, N69/18.)

------------------------------------------------------------------------

From Müller-Hillebrand, Heer 3, p. 173:

“Ration strength in the West”, 1. March 1944 (referenced OKW War diary)

Army 806,927
SS and Police: 85,230
Foreign volunteers, mainly Eastern troops: 61,439
Allies: 13,631
Luftwaffe (air force): 337,140
Kriegsmarine (navy): 96,084
Wehrmachtgefolge (auxiliary civil personnel): 145,611
Sum: 1,546,062



----------------------------------------

From the MGFA’s “official” campaign history, Vol. 7, p. 476/477, ration strength report from Hgr. B/OQu., 1. March 1944 at BA-MA)

Army 865,180
Luftwaffe (air force): 326,350
Marine (navy): 102,180
SS and Police: 102,610
Sonstige: 91,110
Wehrmachtgefolge: 157,210
sum: 1,644,640


==============================
Heer Casualties 9 Sep 39 – 31 Jan 1945 (KTB d. OKW, Band IV, 1509-1511)
Losses in the Heer and Waffen SS
................................................KIA ..........................WIA....................... MIA................... Total
Ostheer............................... 1,105,987................3,498,059 ................1,018,365 ............5,622,411
Geb.AOK.2...........................16,639 .......................60,451....................... 5,157 ..............82,247
OB Süd-West .......................50,481...................... 163,602................... 194,250...............408,333
OB Süd-Ost .........................19,235........................ 55,069 .....................14,805..............89,109
OB West............................. 107,042..................... 399,856.................... 409,715 .............916,613
Ersatzheer ...........................10,467 ......................42,174 ......................1,337 ..............53,978
DOW ..................................295,569.......................................................................... 295,569
Heer Total ........................1,605,510..................... 4,219,211 ..................1,643,629 ...........7,468,350
Other Total ............................17,051 .........................2,687 ...........................................19,738
Total .................................1,622,561 ..................4,188,037 .................1,646,316 ..........7,546,914

These figures/tables are culled from the many threads at AHF on German losses.
I am no expert and use the work of those who are.
I did not save the links with the data so can not link directly but LWD gave some of them earlier in the thread.

[lwd]

...In Italy all German KIA's during 1943 and 1945 was 75.000, but double that amount is burried there. After the war NO German POW's were starved here so they all must be attributed to death because of being severely wounded on the Eastern Front. Who can help me with these intangibles???

Not at all sure I'd call them "intangibles".
I think however your conclusion is flawed. For instance you are neglecting accident and disease. A quick check didn't show anything for Italy but:
http://gi.grolier.com/wwii/wwii_8.html
states:

the East African campaign was a struggle against the climate and disease rather than against the Italian enemy. Between June 1940 and May 1941, British Commonwealth troops suffered only 1,154 battle casualties but 74,550 cases of sickness or accident, of which about 10,000 were due to dysentery and 10,000 to malaria; 744 of these died.

So while not as bad as ealier wars accidents and disease still caused appreciable casualties and fatalities in WWII. Furthermore dieing of wonds or combination of wounds and disease is not recorded as KIA in many cases.
And this one has some Italian specific numbers although for Italians and not Germans:
http://www.truthtalks.org/abortion/Worl ... opedia.htm

detailed Italian military and civilian dead and missing, pp.3-27. Total military dead and missing from 1940-45 were 291,376, losses prior to the September 8, 1943 Armistice with Italy totaled 204,346 ( killed 66,686, missing 111,579, died of disease 26,081), after the September 8, 1943 Armistice with Italy, 87,030 (killed 42,916, missing 19,840 died of disease 24,274)

[Byron Angel]

Bacque and his fantasy have been thoroughly debunked.
http://www.amazon.com/Other-Losses-Jame ... 1551681919

..... Indeed. Ambrose's review of "Other Losses" makes some powerful counter-arguments to Bacque's claims.

Go here - http://www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/b/bac ... e-001.html


Byron

[lwd]

..... I don't believe that Dupuy was arguing from the point of view of any perceived inherent ethnic or racial superiority. I think his assessment was based upon superior German tactical doctrine, training, organization, and motivational methods. History is pretty clear on the point that well trained, equipped, led and motivated men will fight efficiently and well, irrespective of race or ethnicity. ...

You are corect I'm sure but when one says man for man they were better and doesn't qualify it there is an implication that somehow the individual is superior. It could be training as much or more than ethnicity for instance but from what I've read German doctrine and junior leadership were probably the key elements. Indeed I remember reading somewhere that Hitler wished to raise a bigger army prior to the war but the general staff told him there wasn't time or facilities to train the junior officers and NCOs to the level desired and he accepted their decision/advice.

[Byron Angel]

You are corect I'm sure but when one says man for man they were better and doesn't qualify it there is an implication that somehow the individual is superior. It could be training as much or more than ethnicity for instance but from what I've read German doctrine and junior leadership were probably the key elements. Indeed I remember reading somewhere that Hitler wished to raise a bigger army prior to the war but the general staff told him there wasn't time or facilities to train the junior officers and NCOs to the level desired and he accepted their decision/advice.

..... I agree. As I understand it, junior officers were provided much greater leeway in terms of deciding how to carry out their orders or achieve their objective. They were generally told what to do, but not belabored with lengthy and complicated stipulations about exactly how they must go about it. This 'entrepreneurial' approach, if you will, gave greater flexibility and faster reaction times within the command structure.

Another tactical feature in which the German army had an early lead was (IIRC) in loading up relatively large amounts of firepower down to company level, a trend which actually began in WW1 as compensation for reductions in personnel strength.

[Byron Angel]

..... Interesting figures, mkenny. Thanks for posting them.

I think it is worthy of note how many German troops were tied down in the Balkans in 1944.


Byron

[mkenny]

..... Interesting figures, mkenny. Thanks for posting them.

I think it is worthy of note how many German troops were tied down in the Balkans in 1944.


Byron

Equally interesting is the vast number of mostly intact German Units in and around southern Germany/Austria in April 1945. These millions of men played no part in the final act in Berlin and once the head was destroyed they simply surrendered. Proof, if it was needed, that the huge Soviet losses there were not in vain if they prevented much bigger losses elsewhwere.

[VeenenbergR]

Iwd: thanks for your help explaining the reasons why more than 75.000 KIA Germans are burried in Italy.

Mkenny: James Baque has nothing to do with German accusations of mass starvation in the French POW camps after may 1945!
Baque accused the US supreme command of intentionally starve the millions of German POW's in the Rheinwiesen Lager: many articles point out that probably the number was not more than 30.000. Still a lot more than the dozen or two the Germans killed at Baugnez/Malmedy and even those few because the US POW"s were running away!

Mkenny: German casualties stats for the OSTHEER until 31-1-45 of about 1,1 million KIA and 1 million MIA seems far too low for me with respect to the KIA numbers (so I don't believe in German super soldiers!! )
In fact the KIA casualties up to 31-1-45 (only 3 months to go to reach the 2,5 million KIA for the Ostfront) must be reasonably between 2,0 and 2,1 million, those of the Soviets around 8 million against the Germans (Rating German soldiers versus Soviet Soldiers = 4:1. At the end the ratio was: 2,5 million KIA for the Germans versus 8,5 million KIA for the Soviets or about 3,5 : 1 (if Volkssturm units are also included in the German Army). The MIA may be about 1 million. Sources: Rüdiger Overmars and Krivosheev.

German superiority lied in its superior tactical training, its superior tactical command especially the NCO's (Feldwebels), its high motivation and the high Esperit-du-Corps! Another factor: Germans have a basic motivation to help their comrades (Landser) in battle, because they deeply believed that only in a group they had a chance to survive. Most soldiers in a company or batalion were drafted from the same village. They were natural comrades in arms. The "Landser" mentality. This kept them on the field, independant how great odds were against them. Last but not least: they had excellent weapons: the best MG in the world, very effective artillery and Luftwaffe units which were able to roam over enemy territory almost up to the end because the Soviets did nothing to intercept them. Thus German bombers (Stuka's) could fly over the Oder even in april 1945 without any Soviet fighter interception. Even Albert Speer flew over the Oder to take a view of the Soviet lines to land in Berlin unharmed in a tiny reconnaissance plane.

[mkenny]

Still a lot more than the dozen or two the Germans killed at Baugnez/Malmedy and even those few because the US POW"s were running away!

"The Malmedy incident" --
The term "Malmedy massacre" is a general descriptive term for at least 11 separate incidents over a 6-day period, involving units of the 1st SS Panzer Division "Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler,".

(a) 86 captured American soldiers on the road from Baugnez , Belgium on 17 Dec 1944
(b) 50 captured American soldiers around Bullingen 17 Dec 1944
(c) 19 other American POWs at Honnsfeld, Belgium 17 Dec 1944
(d) 93 civilians at Stavelot, Belgium 18 Dec 1944
(e) 31 captured American soldiers at Cheneux, Belgium 18 Dec 1944
(f) 8 other American POWs at Stavelot 19 Dec 1944
(g) 44 American POWs at Stoumont on 19 Dec 1944
(h) 5 Belgian civilians around Wanne, Belgium 20 Dec 1944
(i) over 100 American POWs at La Gleize, Belgium on 18 Dec, 21 Dec and 22 Dec 1944

As you say " a lot more than the dozen or two the Germans killed at Baugnez/Malmedy "

[lwd]

... many articles point out that probably the number was not more than 30.000.

That of course is misleading as well. Simply put there was not enough food in most of Europe in 45 and at least part of 46. The intent was not to kill German soldiers but to spread the food around in a more or less equitable way. Civilians were given a somewhat higher calory allowance than ex soldiers and people doing physical work a higher allowance yet but it was still below a sustainment quantity until enough food arrived and or was harvested. I believe Britain kept it's food ration sytem until very late in the 40s (or perhaps even the early 50s) and even before the war ended the RAF (and perhaos some US Bombers) flew missions over Holland dropping food and things were dire enough that the Germans in that still occupied part of Holland did not shoot at them. All a vastly differen t matter than Mamedy.

German superiority lied in its superior tactical training, its superior tactical command especially the NCO's (Feldwebels), its high motivation and the high Esperit-du-Corps! Another factor: Germans have a basic motivation to help their comrades (Landser) in battle, because they deeply believed that only in a group they had a chance to survive. Most soldiers in a company or batalion were drafted from the same village. They were natural comrades in arms. The "Landser" mentality. This kept them on the field, independant how great odds were against them.

Unit cohesion was a strong point in the German army. I wouldn't say this led to superior tactical training though. Junior Germann officers also were much closer to their troops than in many other countries.

Last but not least: they had excellent weapons:

in some cases. Not in others. Tanks that self immolate for instance hardly qualify as excellent at least from the German point of view.

the best MG in the world,

Again you really should watch your unqualfied superlatives. In many roles the M2 was significantly superior to most German mgs.

very effective artillery

Perhaps compared to the Soviets but not when compared to that of the US or Britain.

and Luftwaffe units which were able to roam over enemy territory almost up to the end because the Soviets did nothing to intercept them.

In the East. In the West the Soviets didn't have to as the US and British fighters did a very effective job of it.

[Karl Heidenreich]

lwd:

Perhaps compared to the Soviets but not when compared to that of the US or Britain.

This is an excelent example of Ambrosian Sindrome: underrate the soviets. I think that from 1943 on it was the russian artillery the one blowing German units sky high. This could be a reason of the high rate of lethal casualties the Germans had in the East compared to the much lighter casualties they had in the secondary western campaign.

From what I have reading this Sindrome extends more than just "under rate" the Germans but, also, the soviets and, in cases, even some western allied elements in favor to increase the weight of some other elements. For example George Patton is a nuisance to some because of his clearly critic views of the conduct of the war by the allied leadership and the lack of the proficiency of other allied commanders (Monty, by the way), and his vision that, at the end, the soviets were as bad (or worse) than the nazis and that it would be good to fight them right there and then before the western allied strenght diminishes and the soviet increased. Stephen Ambrose hardly dedicated Patton material while there is a lot of other, more political correct but less proficient units or persons, of the allied powers.

Also the precept that it was D Day the decisive moment of the war, when it is clear that the decision was a complex series of violent and bloody operations in the Eastern Front from the Battle of Moscow, Stalingrad, Leningrad to Kursk. After Kursk the Germans were, definitely, losing the war. Continuing this same line it is clear that the great allied commander was Zhukov and not Ike. This by no means indicated that the western allied effort was "worthless" (because it was not. Without the western intervention in the oceans and in the air, the lend lease element and the draining of German units from the East to the West in order to "close gaps" were fundamental and vital to the overall victory) but has to be brought to the adequate context, and that is stepping down in favor to the soviet effort, which loses account for more than the Axis and Western Allies all put together.

What we have learned from this, despite the efforts of some, is that:

1. The Eastern Front was the one that staged the greatest Germans offensives.
2. The Eastern Front was the one were the Germans deployed the bulk of their army and their crack units
3. The Russians stopped the Germans in huge, monumental and never seen violent battles and then turned the tide in their favor with equivalent counteroffensives
4. The level of scorched earth, sacrifice, violence and determination was un parallel in the Eastern Front by both warring parties.
5. It was the russian strategy of 1943 the one the breaked the back of the German Army
6. When D Day happened the Germans were already retreating in the East
7. The Germans deployed, in the West a smaller fraction of their army than in the East. It fraction also was composed, in some important measure, by B units in a proportion higher than those sent to the East.
8. The Germans inflicted an equivalent of the casualties suffered to numerical superior western allies when being outnumbered 4-5 million to 1,5 million
9. In the East, in the same period of time, the Germans defended themselves with 2 million against 6+ millions russians
10. The Russian victory at Berlin is the prize for the sacrificies that they, and only they, paid during the greatest conflict ever seen on Earth, a conflict between Germans and Russians.
11. The western allies could have never taken 6 million prisioners by the end of the war simply because there was not that number of soldiers then and there.
12. Since 1945 on the soviet dictatorship contributed a lot that only German originated accounts of the Eastern Front served as basis to the western historians. It has not until the last two decades that new material and information has come to attention revealing some astonishing facts of the bitter Eastern Front. Many myths regarding the soviets are being brought down, including that showing them as just hordes of cannon foders in the way of the British Army in the Somme.

[mkenny]

7. The Germans deployed, in the West a smaller fraction of their army than in the East. It fraction also was composed, in some important measure, by B units in a proportion higher than those sent to the East.

Like :
Panzer Lehr
1st SS LAH
2nd SS Das Reich
9TH SS
10th SS
12th SS HJ
17TH SS
sSS PzAbt 101
sSS PzAbt 102

8. The Germans inflicted an equivalent of the casualties suffered to numerical superior western allies when being outnumbered 4-5 million to 1,5 million

So the Allies landed 4-5 million men in Normandy?
Where can I find confirmation of this?

9. In the East, in the same period of time, the Germans defended themselves with 2 million against 6+ millions russians

Yet the Germans gave a higher figures in this report:

2. Date: 5.5.1944
East: 3,878,000
Finland: no figure given
Norway: 311,000
Denmark: no figure given
West: 1,873,000
Italy: 961,000
Balkans: 826,000
Sum: 7,849,000
Source: "Strategische Lage im Frühjahr 1944" (referenced to BA-MA, N69/18.)

11. The western allies could have never taken 6 million prisioners by the end of the war simply because there was not that number of soldiers then and there.

Reality contradicts your claim.
In 1945 the number of German POW's held was :

France 940,000
Great Britain 3,640,000
USA 3,100,000
USSR 3,060,000

[Karl Heidenreich]

mkenny:

Before we start another round, have you finnaly found the quote everybody has been asking from you?

So the Allies landed 4-5 million men in Normandy?
Where can I find confirmation of this?

This thread is now full of information on that regard. As I has point out several times, you choose to ignore it so that´s your problem.

Yet the Germans gave a higher figures in this report:

2. Date: 5.5.1944
East: 3,878,000
Finland: no figure given
Norway: 311,000
Denmark: no figure given
West: 1,873,000
Italy: 961,000
Balkans: 826,000
Sum: 7,849,000
Source: "Strategische Lage im Frühjahr 1944" (referenced to BA-MA, N69/18.)

They seem reasonable. They also showed how is impossible for the allies to take 6 million prisioners at the end of the war.

Reality contradicts your claim.

Nope: YOU contradict the claim. Reality does not: as per what Glantz, Keegan, Beevor and even wikipedia says it is YOU the one mistaken. Which accounts for your second problem in this regards.

France 940,000
Great Britain 3,640,000
USA 3,100,000
USSR 3,060,000

I wonder how many of those, if the figure is reliable at all, were Italian, Romanian, Hungarian, Norwegian, Spanish, French, etc. etc. Maybe those quantities will get into context by the analysis of that and the more important "when were they were made prisioners" question answered. Because I doubt that of russian made 3,060,000 prisioners on May 8th, 1945 but from all the conflict, which makes a lot more sense. As is with the case of the Germans took as prisioners at the early operations of the war,North Africa, Greece, Sicily and Italy as is the air and sea battles.

Anyway this has been discussed and reliable information from experts is conclusive. In case that someone thinks it is not then maybe is time for someone to write an article or a book as to counter theses arguments and see what happens.

Friday night. I think is time to shut down the PC and see some movies.