Don't be fooled about the Tiger

[Bgile]

The stats show most tanks were destroyed by abandonment or destruction (and presumably abandonment). Why would they abandon the tank? I'd guess because of mechanical failure, mobility kill, or lack of fuel. Some of those can be caused by aircraft. I'm troubled by the lack of explanation of those statistics.

With respect to US tank destroyers, they had very high mobility. I think they were used offensively and they maneuvered to get side or rear shots. If the german tank turned, another TD would get a side or rear shot.

[lwd]

It is highly doubtful that we could have had many if any M-26s by D-Day. Even if we had it's not clear how many we could have landed. If we had landed them I'm not at all sure that they would have done as well in the hedge rows as the M-4 certainly they would have not have done significantly better and that's one on one. We could not have landed as many of them as we did Shermans so the net effect would have been negative. Now if the army had realized that the Panther was being built in the numbers it was and wanted something that had a better chance at it head on the M-4 could have been built in some quantities with a new turret and a 90mm gun. It still wouldn't have helped in the hedgerows but it would have elsewhere.

[JtD]

Yes, the abandonment of the tanks was to a large degree due to fuel issues. The lack of fuel became more problematic due to aircraft action, but by far isn't the only or the biggest reason for it. But the original point was that most Tigers were taken out by aircraft in a sense where it implies infliction of direct damage. This isn't the case.

Without fuel, nothing works in a modern army. So there wouldn't be a point in making that a case against the Tiger.

[lwd]

... The lack of fuel became more problematic due to aircraft action, but by far isn't the only or the biggest reason for it.

I'm not so sure of that. Aircraft particularly in France savaged the German transportation net. Even if the Germans had had all the fuel they wanted they wouldn't have been able to get it where it was needed.

But the original point was that most Tigers were taken out by aircraft in a sense where it implies infliction of direct damage. This isn't the case.

Agreed just wanted to point out that aircaft had a considerable impact on German armor. Just not what many seam to think.

Without fuel, nothing works in a modern army. So there wouldn't be a point in making that a case against the Tiger.

Well the case can be made vs German armor in geneneral. It also brings up the question of just how modern the German army was since tactically most of it's logistics support was based on horses.

[JtD]

WRT to the effect of air power against the supply columns and the effect against fuel supply, the article also shows some interesting facts and numbers as well. In case you haven't gone through it completely (i.e. just read my quote), I strongly recommend you do.

Personally, I think that air power had a significant impact on ground operations; however, I also think that the role has been greatly exaggerated by all sides after the war.

[lwd]

...I strongly recommend you do.

I'dd seen a lot of the material before but the write up was interesting.

Personally, I think that air power had a significant impact on ground operations; however, I also think that the role has been greatly exaggerated by all sides after the war.

I agree but the site above seems to be taking it a bit too far. The comment about the Germans needing more trucks when they were already short on fuel also seamed a bit off. I've also read accounts of German offensives pretty well desynchronized by air attacks. No huge losses or even huge delays but when everyone is suppose to jumpo off at 0600 and 1 unit does followed by another at 0800 and another at 1200 and another at 1700 and another the next day. It invites defeat in detail. Particularly when faced by the very flexable artillery of Britain and the US.

[JtD]

The author obviously has an agenda, which is to prove that the impact of air power was smaller than many think it was. Articles with an agenda very often go to far and appear biased. In this particular case, I'd consider the article a good deal of arguments, not the final word on the effects of air power. But that's probably all the author wanted to provide, some food for thought, otherwise he'd have written a book, not just an article.

Just like you say, numbers don't always tell the whole story. For instance, if you restricting yourself to movement at night, you end up pretty save from air attack. On the other, you'd end up in lot of other troubles, not the least of which is facing an enemy ground unit in the morning which had a good nights rest. That won't show in statistics.

[Bgile]

I'm often surprised by the credit given to artillery against tanks. I've always considered artillery to be more of a nuisance than a real threat. The odds of an artillery shell hitting a tank directly are pretty low, and I'd think a direct hit would be required to destroy a tank.

Obviously artillery can break up an infantry attack and force tanks to button up, so it's effect is to stop even an armor heavy attack. I just don't understand why very many tanks would be actually destroyed.

The effect of air supremacy could be largely psycological. If you are concerned about air attack it forces you to take measures that interfere with other things you are trying to achieve, even if it means only that you feel you have to scan the sky periodically.

I believe Rommel was nearly killed by strafing.

[lwd]

If tanks are hit by a sudden barrage you can loose tank commanders and possibly even drivers to airburst as they typically operated opened up unless under fire. Near misses can also break track and take out other suspension components as well as affect things like radio antennas, periscopes, and such on the outside of the tank. Then there's always the chance of that direct hit.

It's also hard on accompanying infantry and support vehicles.

[Bgile]

If tanks are hit by a sudden barrage you can loose tank commanders and possibly even drivers to airburst as they typically operated opened up unless under fire. Near misses can also break track and take out other suspension components as well as affect things like radio antennas, periscopes, and such on the outside of the tank. Then there's always the chance of that direct hit.

It's also hard on accompanying infantry and support vehicles.

What is your source of this information regarding near misses breaking tracks? I was a tank commander in the ANG and it's of special interest to me. I think periscope disabling is also kind of freaky. Is this stuff you think would happen, or stuff you have information on?

Obviously "sudden" attacks of any kind can kill crew. I think most of the time you have a chance to button up, though. That in itself reduces your efficiency quite a bit.

[lwd]

I've read accounts of small caliber weapons doing it. I think read if artillery doing it as well but will have to take a look and see what I can find. I do remember reading once that the US doctrine at one point didn't call for much arty use vs tanks where the Soviet doctrine did. Soviet theory was that an intense enough barrage could temporarily disable tanks and they would try and attack during that period. Could have read it in Armor magazine. The older issues are on line.

[RF]

I'm often surprised by the credit given to artillery against tanks. I've always considered artillery to be more of a nuisance than a real threat. The odds of an artillery shell hitting a tank directly are pretty low, and I'd think a direct hit would be required to destroy a tank.

I presume that you are refering here to general artillery barrages used as interdiction, as opposed to an artillery piece targeting a tank in its sights.

[Bgile]

I presume that you are refering here to general artillery barrages used as interdiction, as opposed to an artillery piece targeting a tank in its sights.

Obviously. And in any case artillery is a relatively low velocity weapon with slow traverse and poor direct fire sights and no rangefinder on the weapon, they have a lot of trouble hitting tanks directly unless the range is short. If the range is too short, they often can't traverse fast enough to hit a maneuvering tank that is aware of their presence. If a tank has a choice it won't just lumber toward you like in the movies. It will use cover and terrain and operate hull down as much as possible. A lot of people don't realize what tank combat is really like because the movies always depict them slowly moving straight at you.

It's interesting that on the one hand an aircraft has a hard time knocking out a tank with 8 rockets, but artillery with less explosive payload is supposed to be more effective, even if neither one actually hits it.

I've been involved in changing a track, and I can't imagine small arms breaking one. It would have to be a really freak occurrance, and even then it's really hard to imagine considering how big and heavy a track link is.

[RF]

What you are saying here about artillery as ineffective tank destroyers does come back to the mistakes made by the French General Staff in 1940. I would think the Maginot Line would have stopped a frontal panzer attack dead in May 1940, but here the artillery is hooked up with tank traps and proper cover for defending troops. But tanks, moving en masse in open country (by bypassing these static defences) is a different matter and one irony is that Hitler failed to learn from his own lesson. The Tigers were largely pinned down having to defend static positions, depriving them of true mobility in the Guderian sense.
Even on the Somme offensive in June 1940 the French ''hedgehogs'' deployed by Weygand held up the German panzers for four days - and the panzers had full Luftwaffe support. But once the penetration was made the game was up for the French.

[lwd]

...What is your source of this information regarding near misses breaking tracks? ....

I'm still looking but here is a related page:
https://www.knox.army.mil/center/ocoa/a ... ghty99.pdf
there's a article that shows up for 2001 but that's on AKO.
I've downloaded the index but that's still going to take some time to look through.