Don't be fooled about the Tiger

[lwd]

That's the sort of thinking that got Soviet tanks trashed when fighting the Finns. And then got their infantry trashed when they tried it alone. Armored formations are mixed tank infantry formations today for a reason. In the US army during peace time the battalions are usually "pure" either all tank or all infantry but that's for logistics purposes. In any sort of combat situation amored units are task organized with the infantry. They may be tank heave, balanced, or infantry heavy but they are mixed. Similarly you'll find panzer divsions, US armored divisions, and I believe British armored divisions all had infantry attached. US infantry divisions usually had amored units attached as well.

[Bgile]

Tanks make infantry much more effective. They provide heavy firepower to reduce strongpoints, and their machineguns are very effective at killing or suppressing enemy infantry. They are also demoralizing to enemy infantry, especially if the enemy lacks their own tanks.

[RF]

They certainly do make infantry more effective, when closely co-ordinated with them and on the right terrain.... and they are more effective also when not opposed by enemy tanks, or enemy tanks not used in the right way. Also note that one other requirement for tanks to be successful is infantry that is mobile and can keep pace with them.

[JtD]

Or hops onto the tanks. That was a very simple thing to do for the Soviets, which this way succeeded in breaking through with infantry supported tanks.

[RF]

But tanks are fighting vehicles, not taxies. ''Hopping on to tanks'' was also a favourite of American infantry, which cost some of them their lives. A tank covered with ''hangers on'' presents a tempting target for enemy machine guns, bazookas, RPG's and concealed artillery, while the tank, with its encumberance , may not be able to immediately return fire....

[Bgile]

But tanks are fighting vehicles, not taxies. ''Hopping on to tanks'' was also a favourite of American infantry, which cost some of them their lives. A tank covered with ''hangers on'' presents a tempting target for enemy machine guns, bazookas, RPG's and concealed artillery, while the tank, with its encumberance , may not be able to immediately return fire....

So, what is your point? That infantry should not have ridden on tanks because it is dangerous? This wouldn't have been done if it didn't confer an advantage, all things considered. Tanks are taxis when they need to be. In war you do what works, and sometimes an advantage is conferred by using tanks as taxis compared to the alternative, which was often tanks without infantry support or the whole formation moving at the speed of the infantry.

[lwd]

Tanks as taxis work pretty well if you are not being shot at. If you are it's a bad idea. The US tended to not use "tank riders" in combat for that reason.

[JtD]

Obviously, the first thing the infantry does when the unit is being fired on, is to dismount.

The tank also makes sure there's almost always something to take cover behind. Though personally, I wouldn't trust the guy behind the wheel 100%...there's no warning for reverse in tanks.

[epeon]

Most Tigers were taken out by aircraft. Some were taken out by tank destroyers. The Tigers were over-rated as tanks. In most respects, the Panther was better. The panther has a high velocity gun with stereoscopic sights tied into a ballastic computer. I have been told that a good panther tank crew had a 50% hit rate at 1500 yards. The problem with the soviets is that no matter the gun or armor, they did not have the ballistic computers and automated sights. They just did not have the accuracy. They had to close to get a chance to hit a Panther. And, they took lots of losses doing that.

More Panters were taken out by Sturmovik then by T-34.

As far as the Americans, it was recommended by the US Army in 1943 that they produce M26 pershings in sufficient number to have 1500 by D-Day. There was an internal debate between one faction led by Patton (against the M26) and another led by Rose (who wanted the M26). Patton's argument was that doctrine was for the M4 to avoid the advanced German tanks and leave those to the tank destroyers. He wanted large numbers. Rose argued that the M4s would not be able to avoid the german tanks and would ge slaughtered.

One other point, the loses taken by the M4s made the American tank crews, understandably, hesitant. Thus, many times a handful to Panthers could stop a whole division just by intimidation. Patton I do not think understood this in 1943. He did by late 1944.

[lwd]

Most Tigers were taken out by aircraft.

This conflicts with what I've read. On it's surface it doesn't seam reasonable. Do you have a source for this?

More Panters were taken out by Sturmovik then by T-34.

While some what more reasonable than the above this one also looks suspect to me.

As far as the Americans, it was recommended by the US Army in 1943 that they produce M26 pershings in sufficient number to have 1500 by D-Day.

From what I've read this is not the case. There was little or no demand by FORSECOM for the M26 prior to D-Day from what I've read and without their request that's not going to be the army position.

There was an internal debate between one faction led by Patton (against the M26) and another led by Rose (who wanted the M26).

I have yet to see any decent documentation that Patton was against the M26.

Patton's argument was that doctrine was for the M4 to avoid the advanced German tanks and leave those to the tank destroyers. He wanted large numbers. Rose argued that the M4s would not be able to avoid the german tanks and would ge slaughtered.

The first was the army doctrine of the time. I'm not sure that Patton was all that strong of proponent of it. The latter did not happen.

One other point, the loses taken by the M4s made the American tank crews, understandably, hesitant.

Just how often did this happen and where?

Thus, many times a handful to Panthers could stop a whole division just by intimidation.

I've not read of this happening once much less many times. Sources please.

Patton I do not think understood this in 1943. He did by late 1944.

In the larger sceme of things Patton had little to say on this matter. So even if this was his opinion it was of little relevancy but it's far from clear that it was his opinion.

[epeon]

Cooper wrote a book called, I think, Death Traps. It discussed the inferriority of the M4 sherman. I will take the summary from wikipedia:

According to Belton Cooper's memoir of his 3rd Armored Division service, the Shermans were "death traps"; the overall combat losses of the division were extremely high. The unit was nominally assigned by table of organization 232 Sherman medium tanks. 648 Sherman tanks were totally destroyed in combat, and a further 1,100 needed repair, of which nearly 700 were as a result of combat. According to Cooper, the 3rd Armored therefore lost 1,348 medium tanks in combat, a loss rate of over 580%, in the space of about ten months. Cooper was the junior officer placed in charge of retrieving damaged and destroyed tanks. As such, he had an intimate knowledge of the actual numbers of tanks damaged and destroyed, the types of damage they sustained, and the kinds of repairs that were made. His figures are comparable to those given in the Operational History of 12th U.S. Army Group: Ordnance Section Annex. Some World War II Army officers made similar arguments during the war. Other officers disagreed with the negative assessment and Gen. George S. Patton argued that the Sherman tank was overall a superior tool of war.

It also stated in that book (starting at page 29), that the US Army ordiance wanted to go into immediate production of the M26. However, there was a great fight between General Rose and Patton. Patton's argument that the M4 was lighter, use less fuel, and would be able to avoid german tanks (and leaving them for the tank destroyers). Rose argued that this was unrealistic. Patton won and the production of the M26 was de-emphasized.

This was summarized in the history of the Pershing:

Belton Y. Cooper, an ordnance officer at the Combat Command (brigade) level in the 3rd Armored Division during World War II, wrote a memoir about his experience. According to Cooper, ten Pershings were sent to the 3rd Armored Division beginning in February 1945. He claims they would have been sent sooner, had General George S. Patton not intervened. Patton favored the Sherman tank, because it required less gasoline and was more mobile. Patton's reasoning stemmed from his unwavering adherence to the offensive-obsessed Armored Force Doctrine, which held that tanks should bypass enemy armor in order to deepen their penetration into enemy territory, while follow-on tank destroyer (TD) forces would deal with enemy tanks.


As far as the airpower quote is concerned, I can find many stories, but have not found a statiscal proof, yet.

[JtD]

I keep linking to this article:

http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normand ... power.html

Evidently two of the main causes for losing Panthers were abandonment and destruction by the crews. These two categories accounted for nearly half the Panthers lost and during the period in August they constituted 80 % of all the Panthers lost. Air power only accounted for about 6 % of all the lost Panthers investigated. Those investigations showed above also included other types of tanks. Of 40 Tigers only one was hit by air weapons, of 121 Pz.Kpf.Wg. IV nine were hit by air weapons. Evidently allied air power was not really capable of destroying large numbers of German tanks.19

It should be noted that it seems that air power was an even less important cause of tank losses on the eastern front. At the Kursk battle in 1943 air power probably accounted for 2 - 5 % of Soviet tanks lost.

[lwd]

Obviously, the first thing the infantry does when the unit is being fired on, is to dismount.....

From my reading that was not always the Soviet practice and even if it was if you got to close to the front line the combination of artillery and mg fire could be very hard on the accompanying infantry.

Cooper wrote a book called, I think, Death Traps. It discussed the inferriority of the M4 sherman....

I'm aware of Cooper's book. I'm also aware that it has numberous errors.

I will take the summary from wikipedia:

...the overall combat losses of the division were extremely high.

This should be the overall combat losses of his division were very high. Highest in the ETO by a considerable margin.

...Other officers disagreed with the negative assessment and Gen. George S. Patton argued that the Sherman tank was overall a superior tool of war.

And there is a very good case that can be made for that. I've yet to see direct quotes from Patton to that regard however.

It also stated in that book (starting at page 29), that the US Army ordiance wanted to go into immediate production of the M26. However, there was a great fight between General Rose and Patton. Patton's argument that the M4 was lighter, use less fuel, and would be able to avoid german tanks (and leaving them for the tank destroyers). Rose argued that this was unrealistic. Patton won and the production of the M26 was de-emphasized.

This part is one of the places where the book is apparently in error.
From:
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ ... rshing.htm

In fact, George Patton was not involved in the decision to produce 250 T26s. The possibility that he would have inserted himself into the process in September 1943, when LTG Leslie J. McNair (responsible for ground force doctrine and equipment) was involved, is not credible. Possible production of the T26 in April 1944 is nearly as difficult to sustain.

This was summarized in the history of the Pershing:

... He claims they would have been sent sooner, had General George S. Patton not intervened. Patton favored the Sherman tank, because it required less gasoline and was more mobile. Patton's reasoning stemmed from his unwavering adherence to the offensive-obsessed Armored Force Doctrine, which held that tanks should bypass enemy armor in order to deepen their penetration into enemy territory, while follow-on tank destroyer (TD) forces would deal with enemy tanks.

That indeed is the claim but it is not particularly credible. Consider that "offense-obsessed' and not having tanks fight tanks is hardly reasonable. US TD were clearly defensive vehicles (they were suppose to ambush tanks not fight them in stand up battles). The Pershing did have a number of problems compared to the Sherman however. It was less reliable, used, more fuel, didn't work with army bridging assets, and was signficantly less transportable. I suggest you do a search for Cooper and or Death Traps on some of the armor forums for more details.

As far as the airpower quote is concerned, I can find many stories, but have not found a statiscal proof, yet.

Again I suggest you do a search on forums like axishistory or tanknet. The USAAF did a survey of KO German tanks in Normandy and found that almost none had been destroyed by aircraft.

[lwd]

I keep linking to this article:

http://web.telia.com/~u18313395/normand ... power.html

One does have to be a little careful of assesments of how effective allied aircraft were. Directly they didn't kill many tanks but indirectly they were responsible for a lot of the fuel problems that led to a fair number being abandoned. How to credit these depends on the details of what one is looking at and for.

[epeon]

This comes from Mr. Paul Sutton. Is he credible, I don't know:

Patton didn't believe in tank vs. tank conflicts. Patton was a genius in combined arms combat. He believed that you out maneuvered enemy tanks forcing them into traps and using self propelled guns or towed antitank guns to destroy tanks or used air power to destroy them. Patton didn't at first like the M-26 Pershing tank. It was slower than the Sherman. This was one of Patton's few failures. The US could have had M-26 Pershing for the D-Day invasion but it would have had to slow down production of the Sherman in order to do this. Instead it was decided to up gun the Sherman to a high velocity 76MM cannon. When M-26 Pershing did enter in Early 1945 they were a match for the German Panther and Tiger tanks. Many tank crews died because the Sherman was kept in production too long.

I have been reading about the M26, most sources say that it was in trials in 1942. Several say that it could have been available in quantity by D-Day. However, are these just sourcing from the same articles. My father in law says the biggest problem with the latter Shermans was that they could not get the HVAP rounds which the tank destroyers had. He said that the 76 mm gun with HVAP rounds was pretty effective afainst Panthers and Tigers (he means Tiger I). I asked him what did you do if you saw a Tiger II? He said, "Run" and call in an airstrike.