New Poll: critical moment for Germany

[RF]

Is there not a degree of exagerration here as to the damage that was done?

[Vic Dale]

Is there not a degree of exagerration here as to the damage that was done?

Why would there be exaggeration?

Churchill had been wrongly accused by Roosevelt and the US military of incompetence and even disgrace and in particular with reference to the fall of Tobruk, to a successful attack by Rommel which should have been resisted. Tobruk had withstood a seige of 230 days and was in very bad shape and though far form being utterly exhausted the forces there would have to box clever to stay in the fight. The last person who should have learned this was Rommel and seeing how he attacked with such confidence and with such force at his enemy's weak points, he seemed blessed with foreknowledge. Analysis of German radio traffic indicated quite clearly that the source of Rommel's information was inside the British camp at Cairo.(Enigma had been cracked by this time).

One example of the damage done to the allied cause by this security leak can be seen with regard to the position of Malta. Rommel's actions in the Desert were heavily dependent on his train of supply and Malta was the key, since from there attacks against his convoys could be launched. Axis bombers and S/Ms struck repeatedly at Malta, trying to prevent it's resupply and therby reduce it's ability to attack axis convoys. In order to counter this, a large scale operation by the British was planned for June 12th to 13th 1942, using paratroops to knock out the air bases for Axis attacks. This British attack was planned specifically to facilitate the safe arrival of a large convoy heading to the Island.

On June 11th Col. Fellers obtained the details of the planned attack and telegraphed them to Washington using the Black Code. The sabotage units were intercepted by fore-warned and heavily armed German troops and the very next day the relief convoy was heavily attacked and forced to turn back. Malta had to wait months for the next convoy and it's ability to attack Axis convoys seriously compromised.

That incident alone was a disaster. A defeat on the magnitude of the fall of Tobruk, on which the Desert War hinged at that time, was even worse. It was aided in no small measure by Rommel's seeming ability to walk on water, provided by advanced warning. This security leak was a source of major problems which helped to undermined all operations in support of British dominance in North Africa, until it was plugged. Once the leak was plugged, Rommel's luck began to run out.

So intense had been the criticism of Churchill and the British war effort, that Roosevelt was seriously considering throwing in with his generals and turning his back on the idiot Brits. When the full truth was learned, the blow was so crushingly embarrassing to Rooselvelt that he had no alternative but to reverse his opinion and from that point there was nothing he could deny Churchill, in terms of tanks, planes and strategy in the Mediterranean, an area about which Roosevelt and the US general Staff had had serious misgivings earlier in the year.

Vic

[Bgile]

So Vic,

All our history of the desert war is wrong, and Rommel was simply a stooge who had perfect intelligence faithfully relaying all the British plans to him, including their exact tactical dispositions in the desert. Must have been some really long messages.

We have we not heard of this before? A plot by Churchill and Roosevelt to destroy all records of this embarrassing sabotage? Is this why Rommel was able to do as well as he did?

Since we all know about enigma and the US breaking the Japanese code, this must have been really hushed up right to the present day.

Maybe it didn't go on very long? When was this folly discovered?

[Vic Dale]

Bgile.

Your sarcasm does you no credit.

Clearly you simply haven't read enough to know any better.

Have a look here;

http://home.earthlink.net/~nbrass1/3enigma.htm

And here;

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=w8lN ... &ct=result

And here;

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=4iob ... &ct=result

And Here;

http://www.ww2f.com/wwii-general/24853- ... hread.html

Plus "A Man Called Intrepid" Written in 1975 and the content verified by Intrepid himself, who was very close to the heart of British/US relations Before and after Pearl harbour.

Much has been revealed since the second world war, from newly released secret documents and memoranda. So if you are based on stock reading or basic military books, then you probably won't have heard much about espionage and counter-espionage and it's relationship to the conduct of the war.

Rommel was not a stooge, but was a very energetic officer who knew how to use good intelligence to maximum effect.

[Bgile]

OK Vic ... I'm sorry I did go a bit over the line there.

I do think you sometimes look in places for a plot where there isn't one, though. :)

[Gerard Heimann]

Bgile, in direct opposition to your bout of sarcasm, your apology does you great credit. Your numberless and valuable contributions should never be pique colored.

I should add that the same can be said for other knowledgeable members of this esteemed forum.

Gerard

[Bgile]

Bgile, in direct opposition to your bout of sarcasm, your apology does you great credit. Your numberless and valuable contributions should never be pique colored.

I should add that the same can be said for other knowledgeable members of this esteemed forum.

Gerard

Thank you Gerard. I'm very much aware that I sometimes get sarcastic in ways that can be insulting. It's a weakness of mine that I need to concentrate on more. It doesn't usually contribute to a good debate. One of Vic's qualities is that no matter how nasty people get he doesn't seem to lose his cool.

[Vic Dale]

OK Vic ... I'm sorry I did go a bit over the line there.

I do think you sometimes look in places for a plot where there isn't one, though. :)

Hi Bgile.

No problem.

I don't quite understand what you mean by my looking for a plot.

Are you suggesting that I think Churchill and Roosevelt cooked up a plot to keep secrets from us? Or do you think that the secret intelligence was a plot in itself?

The true facts are, that even the work of Bletchley park has not been fully released to the public gaze yet and some of it will not be released for a further 50 years. The motive for this concealment is many faceted; to conceal elements of the true nature of code breaking, technical developments in the art of electronic warfare, the role of the individual who might be compromised in the eyes of relatives or the nation and even basic tactics which might be currently being used in various international campaigns, even today.

Very often, material is not released to us because the true importance of the secret has been forgotten. Some has been kept secret by neglect, because it has not been reviewed for so many years and the simple workload of sifting documents and memos to see if they can be released yet is just too great, so in order to be on the safe side, they are left where they are for another 10 years and we remain in the dark.

It was only quite recently that the Russians released to the world's gaze the truth of what they had done with Hitler's body. They even had a piece of his skull.

All too often though, the truth is concealed overlong, lest the public learn the truth about the mendacity of our politicians and by simple comparison learn what the current pack of jackals is up to.

For myself there are two facets to historical study. I can accept that Churchill and others were war-driven and made their dispositions on the hoof and very often after little consideration - genuine mistakes were made and happily, Churchill (to single out one individual) did not get his own way and more often than not, was convinced by sounder argument from his military advisors, who really did know what they were talking about. I know also of the disgraceful behaviour of the world's political leaders, in relation to their own people and to the people who come under their protectorate.

Hitler was a known mass murderer long before war broke out, as was Mussolini. Stalin gets a mention of his own as being perhaps the greatest domestic mass-murderer of all time, having put millions of his own people to death in order to preserve his rule. Yet Churchill, Chamberlain, Eden and Roosevelt all found they could do business with these monsters without turning a single hair. Churchill is distinguished for his refusal to have anything to do with Hitler, but this was due entirely to his acute Germano-phobia and has nothing to do with Hitler's domestic policy. He was more than willing to praise Mussolini in public even though Mussolini had been murdering working people, in order to gain and maintain industrial peace in Italy.

Churchill himself mobilised machine gun companys against striking workers in Britain and also went to view the results. Had Britain's internal history taken a turn for the worse, there is no knowing to what lengths he would have gone down the road of using armed force, against his own working people.

There were conspiracies during the war and before - there had to be. Certain events had to be "constructed" or "intepreted" (the modern word is "spun") in order to keep what was at times a very shakey alliance on track. It seems to me nothing short of a miracle that Britain who had signally failed to adequately deal with Hitler and appeared to be losing it's grip on the Middle East was suddenly able to bring the USA round to Churchill's way of thinking and back the British Middle East Military Strategy to the hilt.

You don't get a result like that by accident. You have to conspire and the intricate relationship between intellgence and counter intelligence plays a very large part indeed. I personally will not be satisfied with the story of the leaky US Embassy, until I have confirmed beyond doubt, that the theft of the US code and sellng it to the Germans was not a British inspired action. I believe something of the sort was actually being considered by somebody somwhere within the British political/intelligence elite around Churchill, prior to the USA entering the war.

There is said to be a very special relationship between Britain and the USA, yet it is certain that each have very special secrets which they keep from each other and some of those would make very interesting reading indeed.

Vic

[Bgile]

vic,

I take it you don't think much of Churchill. I don't know much about the inner workings of the British Govt. during the war (or the US for that matter), but I did have the impression that he had a better understanding of the true nature of Stalin than Roosevelt and that he was very concerned that FDR was going to give away the farm, so to speak.

[RF]

There is also the point that it was Churchill that kept Britain in the war in June 1940, as those other senior members of the government, except Attlee, were for coming to an ''arrangement'' with Hitler.

[Vic Dale]

Hi Bgile and RF.

I have a jaundiced view of most professional politicians and I can't take a position in favour or against any one individual. I have to judge their actions individually for their merits or otherwise, for example, I give no credit to Chamberlain for his apparent support of Hitler, but neither can I take Churchill's side, because his opposition to Hitler was based on blind hatred of anything German.

Chamberlain does appear, to me at least, to have had some foresight. In a changing world which had brought the major powers to war, it was becoming clear that the world could no longer support two major empires, empires which seemed to be collapsing from their own internal sickness and which, as we know, would eventually be replaced by super-powers. Britain and France had grown fat off their colonial possessions, but after more than 100 years of easy living, their respective internal and external organisations had become sclerotic and this was reflected in their declining influence in world affairs. Like an argumentative elderly couple, they both leaned on eachother, but at the same time bickered over minor details, each finding comfort in the other's misery.

With the 1930s depression, from which no nation was truly immune, it quickly became a question of life or death for the couple and like a pair of desperate anaemics they appeared to be trying to transfuse, one from the other in order to survive. The foreign policy expression of all this was that if one empire was seen to decline, it could - even though only temporarily - boost the standing of the other.

Chamberlain's aim, with an eye on the future of Europe, was to do as much as he could to see France decline and for Britain to feed off her corpse. Whilst backing Hitler on the one hand he offered the hand of treaty to France, showing France solidarity between colonial powers, though knowing that every gain made by Hitler was a stab in the back for the leading power in Europe.

In 1938, Czechslovakia was France's last large ally in Europe and Chamberlain's support of Hitler's conquest there, was the final nail in the coffin of France's hegemony in Europe. Very clever, and all the while covered by Britain's apparent weakness - not being geographically connected to Europe. "What else could I do?" Chamberlain seemed to be saying to his French allies - "Never mind, if you are attacked we will come to your aid." Knowing full well that at that time, Hitler could barely muster 6 properly equipped divisions.

Germany was divided and East Prussia a constant drain on her resources, which she would continue to maintain or yeild to the encroachment of other powers. As it turned out, Chamberlain was playing a very dangerous game, but in 1938 everything looked pretty sound. Germany the new leading power in Europe was still divided geographically and was unable to flourish as a complete entity independednt from the influence of Britain and by association the USA. It all changed just a few months later when Hitler made his approach to Pilsudsky the Polish dictator, for a road linking East and West Prussia and the possibility of a joint incursion into the Ukraine. Suddenly it appeared that Chamberlain had lost his grip on Hitler and he now performed a volte face, promising Poland help if she was ever attacked. War was never more certain.

Churchill meanwhile seems to have shown foresight of a different nature, in seeing the empire as more or less a lost cause and courting a special relationship with the USA, undoubtedly the world's strongest economic power after WWI. He engaged in secret political interaction with leading elements of the US government, acts which might in certain circumstances be considered treasonous. Under the authority of the King, secret organisations grew up, building strong lnks between British intelligence and the US government behind the backs of the US public and the British government. This organisation was even responsible for building a spur of British intelligence right in the heart of the USA under the protection of Roosevelt, who considered himelf to be Britain's best secret agent.

Many British military successes during WWII depended on this interaction between the two intelligence services and Britain's ability to resist the march of Hitler is due in large part to Churchil's unorthodox organisation and methods. Some of the actions and decisions are hair raising and others quite shocking, some of the decisions disgraceful, but over all it worked and in relation to the defeat of Hitler, appears to have worked well.

So, although I detest both Churchill and Chamberlain, I see them both as organisers and schemers, though each steering a completely different course to the other, due to their respective priorities. One saw preservation of the empire as paramount, even at the expense of national independence and the other saw the preservation of national independence as the prime concern and if the empire went west in the process, there would be no pacts with Herr Hitler. This antagonism and divergence of opinion continued well into the war and resolution was only found once the tide turned against Hitler in North Africa.

Understandably the full truth has been concealed for a very long time.

Vic

[RF]

Again there seems to be an ill-defined plot running through the above post seemingly again to be running along the marxist theories of capitalism in crisis, in describing the positions of Britain and France. This is not quite how I see things in the mid to late 1930's.
The fact that Chamberlain supported appeasement deos not necessarily mean he was a supporter of Hitler, even though like most politicians he tended to get carried away by his own rhetoric, as in his much quoted phrase of 1938 of ''my friend Adolf Hitler'' but that was before the Krystallnacht and the tearing up of the Munich Agreement in March 1939. As for Churchill his ''blind hatred of anything German'' can be understood in his recognition that Germany was fully behind Hitler and his designs and was a threat, and indeed was better informed of that threat than was the British Foreign Office.

[lwd]

... but neither can I take Churchill's side, because his opposition to Hitler was based on blind hatred of anything German.

Can you document this? Prior to your posts I don't think I've ever seen anyone raise this proposition.

...Chamberlain's aim, with an eye on the future of Europe, was to do as much as he could to see France decline and for Britain to feed off her corpse. Whilst backing Hitler on the one hand he offered the hand of treaty to France,...

Again that's not the impression I have at all. There was substantial cooperation between France and Britain during the inter war years and I wouldn't call Camberlain's actions backing Hitler. Acknowledging a fait acomply perhaps but not backing. At the same time if you look at what Britain was doing he was clearly trying to buy time while Britain rearmed.

In 1938, Czechslovakia was France's last large ally in Europe and Chamberlain's support of Hitler's conquest there,..

What about Poland? Certainly larger and in some ways closer to France. Again I'm not sure calling Chamberlains actions support is the best way to describe them. In some sences it may be accurate but it is a bit misleading.

Germany was divided and East Prussia a constant drain on her resources, which she would continue to maintain or yeild to the encroachment of other powers. As it turned out, Chamberlain was playing a very dangerous game, but in 1938 everything looked pretty sound. Germany the new leading power in Europe was still divided geographically and was unable to flourish as a complete entity independednt from the influence of Britain and by association the USA....

This is a bit off. Britain was very much unprepaired for war in 38 and Chamberlain promoted a massive rearming program that in the end may have saved Britain. In the mid 30s the world economies were already linked to some extent and none could readily fluourish indepenent of the other major players. Germany clearly was trying and indeed had seperated itself even further from the US than from Britain.

[Vic Dale]

Again there seems to be an ill-defined plot running through the above post seemingly again to be running along the marxist theories of capitalism in crisis, in describing the positions of Britain and France. This is not quite how I see things in the mid to late 1930's.
The fact that Chamberlain supported appeasement deos not necessarily mean he was a supporter of Hitler, even though like most politicians he tended to get carried away by his own rhetoric, as in his much quoted phrase of 1938 of ''my friend Adolf Hitler'' but that was before the Krystallnacht and the tearing up of the Munich Agreement in March 1939. As for Churchill his ''blind hatred of anything German'' can be understood in his recognition that Germany was fully behind Hitler and his designs and was a threat, and indeed was better informed of that threat than was the British Foreign Office.

Well ask yourself; Was capitalism in crisis at that point? I think it definitely was.

War is not caused through bloody mindedness, or even stupidity, though both these things are evident in abundance in the actions of the world's leaders, leading up to WWII and stupidity and ineptness were the triggers of both WWI and WWII.

War has it's foundations in economy. Tribal wars were fought over the food supplly, Feudal wars were fought over territory and modern wars are fought over markets - all of these things are economy. Study the undulations of international relations and you will find a rough correlation in the production cycle. When markets shrink as they are bound to do periodically when the credit runs out, international relations become frosty and protectionism sets in.

Protectionism is the general precursor to war and although war may be delayed or even avoided on occassion if a weak nation cannot fight and gives way to the dominant force, nevertheless the hand definitely moves toward the dagger when the economy is threatened.

Suez was fought because Nasser had nationalised the Suez canal.

!ran/Iraq was fought over the religious isolation of Iran's oil.

Vietnam was fought because the USA thought it could take over the colonial possessions of France.

All of the colonial wars were fought on the one side for economic freedom from the oppressive power of the colonists and on the other for continued economic dominance.

WWI was fought over colonial possessions in China and Africa.

WWII was fought precisely to prevent Hitler gaining economic dominance in Europe, which would have followed as surely as night follows day had he been permitted to reunite East and West Prussia ready for an assualt on the Ukraine, an openly declared aim. In unity with Poland, the Ukraine would most certainly have been overrun. Pilsudski definitely had this in mind, though he thought he could go it alone. Ukraine has no strategic importance, so it's only value is economic.

Does anyone really still hold to the view that Hitler was a war monger?

Hitler was a anotorious wet-pants - a manic depresssive - who found himself at the head of an economically powerful nation, which BTW had developed it's means of production long before he came to power. The Ruhr provided natural resources in abundance and although the depression which struck during the early 20s had set her industry back, the need to re-tool and gear up had developed Germany into a world-beater by 1935. It was calculated that the then German economy could produce for the needs of the whole of the advanced world if her factories had been run at full capacity. That was not Hitler's acheivement, he simply inherited a means of production second to none.

When it came to encroachment on neighbouring territory, it was not the victorious advancement of a sovereign power, but the slinking opportunism of the jackal, feeding on the carcass of a Europe ruined by war and still in the grip of the 1930s depression. In 1938 he moved on Czechoslvakia, yet he was militarily incapaple of mounting fight. He could not put 6 trained divisions into the field so he must have had encouragement from somewhere. Germany had been invaded by France in the recent past and the Czechs were France's last big ally in Western Europe. International relations were in one heck of a mess. Division and self interest governed and somehow Hitler - whose judgement as we know was not sound - seems to have chosen his ground rather well, finding loopholes through which he could make gains. The guiding hand of providence? Or a deliberate strategy in European diplomatic relations?

Germany was a divided nation, with limited capability in food production, making her liable to starvation in time of war. The depression had raised tarriff barriers as each nation sought to protect their own trade, so she would not be able to increase her share of the market. She would be dependent on other nations and as the French Empire began to collapse this would indirectly favour the British Empire.

I don't think it needs to be explained how in a world which could not support two ailing empires that if one were to be rubbed out, the other might survive for while longer feeding off it's corpse. Any diplomatic "Help" afforded the French by her British "friends" at that time, equates to the inept administration of morphine by a doctor conscious of the inevitable end. We should never forget the Mafia's dictum; "Keep your friends close but keep your enemies closer."

The great powers may be seen linking arms as they head for the negotiating table, but once there watch your back as with "the best of intentions" they give ground where it is not expected and cut the ground right from under you and when asked "WHY?" they say, "We had no choice. We don't want to upset anybody at this delicate stage."

That is the extent of Chamberlain's ineptness in his dealings between Germany and France and the pact with Poland was his only chance of keeping Hitler's Germany from uniting and finding economic independence. Of course, once the war was a certainty, Britain would need an ally - someone to do her fighting on European soil - and who better than France, though he'd better keep quiet about how he helped Hitler.

The history books say Chamberlain was inept, I maintain that he was fully conscious of what he was doing as Hitler was handed first Austria and then Czechslovakia. Neither was of military importance, their only value being economic. The last vestiges of control which Versailles could exert over Germany were economic and the aims of Hitler in securing the road-link between East and West Prussia and the port of Danzig, were purely to gain economic independence. The pact between Britain and Poland was intended to halt the economic advancement of Germany, but quickly became the hinge of fate for 58 million people.

We can clearly see from the above that every development in the lead-up to WWII was economic. Hitler was known to be too weak to wage war in 1938, yet Britain began to rearm. Why so? Who could possibly be a threat? I think it is likely that despite outward appearances, the antagonisms between Britain and France had become acute. France had lost her dominance in Western Europe, what would be next; North Africa? Hence the naval build up at Oran.

Europe had reached an economic impasse and the only solution was war and oddly European rearmament had begun as early as1935, long before Hitler marched into Austria. The only major world development at this time was the economic depression which set in after the Wall Street crash of 1929. It impacted all nations, though in keeping with marxist economic theory concerning; "The combined and uneven economic developments of all nations." it impacted Germany less than other nations because of her need to tool-up and her government's decision to assist industry where it could.

As regards Churchill's Germanophobia he was denouning German economic developments in Europe long before Hitler and he found the ability to praise Mussolini whilst denigrating Hitler for doing precisely the same things.

My sources are; Liddell Hart, AJP Taylor and Warren Tute - not a marxist among them.

Vic Dale

[Vic Dale]

... but neither can I take Churchill's side, because his opposition to Hitler was based on blind hatred of anything German.

Can you document this? Prior to your posts I don't think I've ever seen anyone raise this proposition.

...Chamberlain's aim, with an eye on the future of Europe, was to do as much as he could to see France decline and for Britain to feed off her corpse. Whilst backing Hitler on the one hand he offered the hand of treaty to France,...

Again that's not the impression I have at all. There was substantial cooperation between France and Britain during the inter war years and I wouldn't call Camberlain's actions backing Hitler. Acknowledging a fait acomply perhaps but not backing. At the same time if you look at what Britain was doing he was clearly trying to buy time while Britain rearmed.

In 1938, Czechslovakia was France's last large ally in Europe and Chamberlain's support of Hitler's conquest there,..

What about Poland? Certainly larger and in some ways closer to France. Again I'm not sure calling Chamberlains actions support is the best way to describe them. In some sences it may be accurate but it is a bit misleading.

Germany was divided and East Prussia a constant drain on her resources, which she would continue to maintain or yeild to the encroachment of other powers. As it turned out, Chamberlain was playing a very dangerous game, but in 1938 everything looked pretty sound. Germany the new leading power in Europe was still divided geographically and was unable to flourish as a complete entity independednt from the influence of Britain and by association the USA....

This is a bit off. Britain was very much unprepaired for war in 38 and Chamberlain promoted a massive rearming program that in the end may have saved Britain. In the mid 30s the world economies were already linked to some extent and none could readily fluourish indepenent of the other major players. Germany clearly was trying and indeed had seperated itself even further from the US than from Britain.

Have a read of A Man Called Intrepid. There is much there that has been released since the end of the war and the sources were very close to Churchill and his dealings with the USA roosevelt etc. Consider also that Churchill praised Mussolini, but denigrated Hitler for much the same things.

There can be no doubt that Chamberlain's assistance to Hitler systematically robbed France of her domninance in Europe, whilst at the same time maintaining good diplomatic relations between the two empires. Keep your friends close but your enemies closer.

Britain had begun to rearm in 1935 as had France and I would suggest that this was no so much in respones to Hitler's reamament as to each other's, though of course they could not say as much. At the time of Hitler's Austrian venture, the German army had nothing at all going for it, even 6 months later it could still barely muster 6 divisions and could not sustain a war. If Germany was to play even a small part in the armed coalitions as at Spain 1936-37 - we now call this "peace keeping" - she would be expected to carry her share of military expenditure. If she did 't she might be able to help her industry more and that would give her an unfair economic adavantage. So the idea that Hitler had Chamberlain over a barrel is laughable.

Alliances are not about geographical size, but economic and military power and their life is determined by the value imposed upon them by prevalent international relations. Czechoslvakia had far more to offer the French than Poland in 1938 in terms of economic grip on Europe. The rapidity with which alliances were built and destroyed in the summer of 1939 shows that they had become a form of ready currency to be quickly exchanged in time of need.

Nobody was prepared for war in 1938 least of all Germany. She wasn't ready for war in 1939 and the fact that she prevailed in Europe is due in equal parts to allied incompetence and to the French elite's readiness to accept Hitler's rule in order to get back to making profits. After the French surrender, it was business as usual.

Vic Dale