Battle of The River Plate: Round 2
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marcelo_malara
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I did say this as a surprise move. I don't actually know how far you could get a panzerschiffe up the Parana river.marcelo_malara wrote:To Asuncion? And how was he supposed of going out?
Paraguay was so German friendly at that time the Graf Spee wouldn't have to come out! It could stay there indefinately and wait for Germany to win the war!!!!!
It would have been better than scuttling - and the British would have to keep a presence, tied up in the Plate, in case Graf Spee did come out.
If Graf Spee had remained in Asuncion until February 1945 - when Paraguay finally declared war on the Axis - it would have made no strategic difference if she had then fallen into Allied hands. I think that Paraguay wouldn't have declared war, as it would be an invitation to the Germans to open fire on the city with those 11 inch guns. If they tried to board and seize her - then she would be scuttled by the crew.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
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Karl Heidenreich
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I was reading this about the Battle of River Plate, and found several amusing things.
On December 13th, 1939, the Graf Spee was targeting the route used by merchant ships near the River Plate in Argentina. Harwood had given the Ajax, Achilles and Exeter orders to engage the Graf Spee "at once by night or day" if the ships came across her.
At 05.52, look outs on the Graf Spee saw two tall masts on the horizon. By 06.00, Langsdorff had identified one of the ships seen as being the Exeter. He decided that the ships trailing the Graf Spee were protecting an important merchant convoy and he decided to attack. The engines of the Graf Spee were put onto a battle footing - their power was greatly increased. This gave out a plume of highly visible black smoke from the funnels of the Graf Spee and the following British cruisers could clearly see her position. The Graf Spee turned to attack and at 06.17 opened fire on the Exeter. The Exeter was hit amidships and the ship sustained damage. A salvo from the Graf Spee did a great deal of damage to the wheelhouse and killed all but three of the officers in it. The captain, Bell, survived and he ordered that the remaining turrets should fire on the Graf Spee. One salvo hit the Graf Spee near its turrets.
The Achilles and Ajax were also involved in this battle but they had stayed away from the Exeter in an attempt to split the Graf Spee's fire power. It proved to be a successful ploy. More shells from the Graf Spee's 11 inch guns hit the Exeter that continued to take massive damage. However, some of the Exeter's torpedo tubes were undamaged and at 06.31, three torpedoes were fired at the Graf Spee from the Exeter. At that moment, Langsdorff had decided to turn and the three torpedoes missed. His attack on the Exeter continued and 11 inch shells hit the cruiser. However, the engine room was not damaged but electricity in the ship was lost and it was this that forced the Exeter out of the battle. Bell planned to ram the Graf Spee but he was ordered out of the battle by Harwood.
Now the Achilles and Ajax took up the battle. They were against a ship that had been hit but had suffered minimal damage at this stage even though Langsdorff had been knocked unconscious in one attack. Both ships were ordered by Harwood to approach the Graf Spee "at the utmost speed". Langsdorff, a torpedo specialist, kept both ships astern to give them the smallest possible target with regards to a torpedo attack.
"My own feelings were that the enemy could do anything he wanted to. He showed no sign of being damaged; his main armament was firing accurately; the Exeter evidently was out of it, and so he had only two small cruisers to prevent him attacking the very valuable River Plate trade."
Captain Parry - commander of the Achilles
What happened next is open to interpretation. Langsdorff went around the Graf Spee to assess the damage. He then told his navigator:
"We must run into port, the ship is not now seaworthy for the North Atlantic."
This decision, according to the Graf Spee's gunnery officer was not well received. The ship had been hit by seventeen shells but junior officers of the Graf Spee later stated that the damage done to the ship was insufficient to cause it to run to a port. At this stage in the battle, the Graf Spee had suffered 37 dead and 57 wounded out of a total complement of 1,100. In comparison, the Exeter was three feet down in the waterline and had lost 61 men killed and could only use a ship's compass for navigation with shouted orders to ensure that those orders were carried out. Harwood ordered her to return to the Falkland Islands.
All the indications pointed to the Graf Spee heading towards the River Plate and Montevideo. In fact the ship's action report states clearly that it was the navigating officer that recommended Montevideo. Langsdorff sent a telegram to Berlin that stated:
"Inspection of direct hits reveals that all galleys except for the Admiral's galley have been badly damaged. Water entering flour store endangers bread supply while a direct hit on the forecastle makes the ship unseaworthy for the North Atlantic in the winter............as the ship cannot be made seaworthy for the breakthrough to the homeland with means on board, decided to go into the River Plate at risk of being shut in there."
Whether the Graf Spee was so badly damaged is open to question. The ship had been hit by seventeen shells but one gunnery officer recorded that three of these hits had simply bounced off of the armour and that the others had hit the ship "without causing damage". The authorities in Uruguay, on inspecting the Graf Spee when it reached the River Plate, commented that the largest hit was six feet by six feet but was well above the waterline - as was all of the damage to the ship.
The Graf Spee made for the River Plate - the Plate estuary is a huge bay 120 miles across. The two remaining cruisers, Ajax and Achilles, patrolled the estuary to ensure that the Graf Spee could not slip out back into the Atlantic under the cover of dark. The crews later called this the 'death watch'.
Somehow Langsdorf is perceived, like Yamamoto or Rommel, with favourable opinions by his enemies and if theirs acts are critizcied then you are in big trouble.
But...
First: Langsdorf orders (as Lutjens´ one and a half year later) were to destroy merchant shipping, not engaging enemy warships. If he did identify Exeter why he decided to engage if doing so would endanger his position, because the British cruiser would radio his whereabouts to every British warship in the planet?
Second: After starting a battle he suddlendly disengages. He was winning in that moment! Achilles and Ajax were no match for her 11" guns and Exeter was going to began evasive manouvers due to her damage. Why he disengaged? It´s more understandable Lutjens behaivor in DS than Langsdorf at RP.
Third: instead of running away to safety he went directly to a place were he cannot hide and he cannot flee: he trapped himself. Was his ship that seriosly damaged? No, his own officers knew this. So, why he did the things he did? And why in such a way?
Did the hit that put him temporary unconscious affected his mind?
His actions doesn´t seem to me coherent or tactical sound.
Just my thoughts...
On December 13th, 1939, the Graf Spee was targeting the route used by merchant ships near the River Plate in Argentina. Harwood had given the Ajax, Achilles and Exeter orders to engage the Graf Spee "at once by night or day" if the ships came across her.
At 05.52, look outs on the Graf Spee saw two tall masts on the horizon. By 06.00, Langsdorff had identified one of the ships seen as being the Exeter. He decided that the ships trailing the Graf Spee were protecting an important merchant convoy and he decided to attack. The engines of the Graf Spee were put onto a battle footing - their power was greatly increased. This gave out a plume of highly visible black smoke from the funnels of the Graf Spee and the following British cruisers could clearly see her position. The Graf Spee turned to attack and at 06.17 opened fire on the Exeter. The Exeter was hit amidships and the ship sustained damage. A salvo from the Graf Spee did a great deal of damage to the wheelhouse and killed all but three of the officers in it. The captain, Bell, survived and he ordered that the remaining turrets should fire on the Graf Spee. One salvo hit the Graf Spee near its turrets.
The Achilles and Ajax were also involved in this battle but they had stayed away from the Exeter in an attempt to split the Graf Spee's fire power. It proved to be a successful ploy. More shells from the Graf Spee's 11 inch guns hit the Exeter that continued to take massive damage. However, some of the Exeter's torpedo tubes were undamaged and at 06.31, three torpedoes were fired at the Graf Spee from the Exeter. At that moment, Langsdorff had decided to turn and the three torpedoes missed. His attack on the Exeter continued and 11 inch shells hit the cruiser. However, the engine room was not damaged but electricity in the ship was lost and it was this that forced the Exeter out of the battle. Bell planned to ram the Graf Spee but he was ordered out of the battle by Harwood.
Now the Achilles and Ajax took up the battle. They were against a ship that had been hit but had suffered minimal damage at this stage even though Langsdorff had been knocked unconscious in one attack. Both ships were ordered by Harwood to approach the Graf Spee "at the utmost speed". Langsdorff, a torpedo specialist, kept both ships astern to give them the smallest possible target with regards to a torpedo attack.
"My own feelings were that the enemy could do anything he wanted to. He showed no sign of being damaged; his main armament was firing accurately; the Exeter evidently was out of it, and so he had only two small cruisers to prevent him attacking the very valuable River Plate trade."
Captain Parry - commander of the Achilles
What happened next is open to interpretation. Langsdorff went around the Graf Spee to assess the damage. He then told his navigator:
"We must run into port, the ship is not now seaworthy for the North Atlantic."
This decision, according to the Graf Spee's gunnery officer was not well received. The ship had been hit by seventeen shells but junior officers of the Graf Spee later stated that the damage done to the ship was insufficient to cause it to run to a port. At this stage in the battle, the Graf Spee had suffered 37 dead and 57 wounded out of a total complement of 1,100. In comparison, the Exeter was three feet down in the waterline and had lost 61 men killed and could only use a ship's compass for navigation with shouted orders to ensure that those orders were carried out. Harwood ordered her to return to the Falkland Islands.
All the indications pointed to the Graf Spee heading towards the River Plate and Montevideo. In fact the ship's action report states clearly that it was the navigating officer that recommended Montevideo. Langsdorff sent a telegram to Berlin that stated:
"Inspection of direct hits reveals that all galleys except for the Admiral's galley have been badly damaged. Water entering flour store endangers bread supply while a direct hit on the forecastle makes the ship unseaworthy for the North Atlantic in the winter............as the ship cannot be made seaworthy for the breakthrough to the homeland with means on board, decided to go into the River Plate at risk of being shut in there."
Whether the Graf Spee was so badly damaged is open to question. The ship had been hit by seventeen shells but one gunnery officer recorded that three of these hits had simply bounced off of the armour and that the others had hit the ship "without causing damage". The authorities in Uruguay, on inspecting the Graf Spee when it reached the River Plate, commented that the largest hit was six feet by six feet but was well above the waterline - as was all of the damage to the ship.
The Graf Spee made for the River Plate - the Plate estuary is a huge bay 120 miles across. The two remaining cruisers, Ajax and Achilles, patrolled the estuary to ensure that the Graf Spee could not slip out back into the Atlantic under the cover of dark. The crews later called this the 'death watch'.
Somehow Langsdorf is perceived, like Yamamoto or Rommel, with favourable opinions by his enemies and if theirs acts are critizcied then you are in big trouble.
But...
First: Langsdorf orders (as Lutjens´ one and a half year later) were to destroy merchant shipping, not engaging enemy warships. If he did identify Exeter why he decided to engage if doing so would endanger his position, because the British cruiser would radio his whereabouts to every British warship in the planet?
Second: After starting a battle he suddlendly disengages. He was winning in that moment! Achilles and Ajax were no match for her 11" guns and Exeter was going to began evasive manouvers due to her damage. Why he disengaged? It´s more understandable Lutjens behaivor in DS than Langsdorf at RP.
Third: instead of running away to safety he went directly to a place were he cannot hide and he cannot flee: he trapped himself. Was his ship that seriosly damaged? No, his own officers knew this. So, why he did the things he did? And why in such a way?
Did the hit that put him temporary unconscious affected his mind?
His actions doesn´t seem to me coherent or tactical sound.
Just my thoughts...
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.
Sir Winston Churchill
Sir Winston Churchill
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marcelo_malara
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Fair enough, I did suspect that might be the case, otherwise a chess player like Langsdorf might have thought of doing it.marcelo_malara wrote:I don´t think the Parana river would allow a ship so big to go beyond Rosario port, which is 200 nm upstream from Buenos Aires.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
Hello Karl,
What is the source of your quote?
According to Rasenack, Langsdorf on sighting the British ships, identified them initially as a light cruiser and two destroyers, acting probably as convoy escorts for a group of merchant ships including a vessel called Highland Monarch, whom B-Dienst in Berlin had told Langsdorf to expect in the Plate area at that time.
Having then identified Exeter, Langsdorf continued on his plan of attack to close the enemy quickly so he cannot shadow at long range to bring up capital ship re-inforcements. Only once he was fully engaged were the other two Allied ships recognised as light cruisers. His XO, Kay, pointed out to him that orders forbade seeking battle with enemy warships, Langsdorf overrode these orders on the grounds that the cruiser and destroyers were screening merchant ship targets.
Langsdorf was twice slightly wounded and once briefly knocked out by blast. I believe that this adversely affected his judgement and ability to make command decisions, leading, as he referred to in his suicide letter, to ''the trap of Montevideo.''
Two points arise in this:
1) Langsdorf in seeking battle showed the initiative and aggression lacking in most of his later colleagues. Would Gunther Lutjens, if he were in command, have engaged or turned away?
2) On Langsdorf being knocked out in the battle, Kay should have assumed command and have Langsdorf sent to the sick bay. Kay did do this but Langsdorf decided he was fit to continue, and Kay deferred. Kay, a Kapitan zur see himself, should have retained command, and I see failure to do this as a fatal error. Graf Spee should have sunk all three Allied ships and certainly not gone to Uruguay. Possibly Mar Del Plata as Marcelo suggested, but not a hostile neutral as Uruguay, with its democratic traditions totally at odds with nazi-ism.
What is the source of your quote?
According to Rasenack, Langsdorf on sighting the British ships, identified them initially as a light cruiser and two destroyers, acting probably as convoy escorts for a group of merchant ships including a vessel called Highland Monarch, whom B-Dienst in Berlin had told Langsdorf to expect in the Plate area at that time.
Having then identified Exeter, Langsdorf continued on his plan of attack to close the enemy quickly so he cannot shadow at long range to bring up capital ship re-inforcements. Only once he was fully engaged were the other two Allied ships recognised as light cruisers. His XO, Kay, pointed out to him that orders forbade seeking battle with enemy warships, Langsdorf overrode these orders on the grounds that the cruiser and destroyers were screening merchant ship targets.
Langsdorf was twice slightly wounded and once briefly knocked out by blast. I believe that this adversely affected his judgement and ability to make command decisions, leading, as he referred to in his suicide letter, to ''the trap of Montevideo.''
Two points arise in this:
1) Langsdorf in seeking battle showed the initiative and aggression lacking in most of his later colleagues. Would Gunther Lutjens, if he were in command, have engaged or turned away?
2) On Langsdorf being knocked out in the battle, Kay should have assumed command and have Langsdorf sent to the sick bay. Kay did do this but Langsdorf decided he was fit to continue, and Kay deferred. Kay, a Kapitan zur see himself, should have retained command, and I see failure to do this as a fatal error. Graf Spee should have sunk all three Allied ships and certainly not gone to Uruguay. Possibly Mar Del Plata as Marcelo suggested, but not a hostile neutral as Uruguay, with its democratic traditions totally at odds with nazi-ism.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
hey....
yes it is a sad thing that the Graf Spee did sink...
and i cannot understand the unfairness of the Uruguaian government...
but that happens to neutral states...
except switzerland, i believe all so called neutral states, actually did favor one or the other government (axis or allies)
sweden n uruguay were for the allies...
adios
miro
yes it is a sad thing that the Graf Spee did sink...
and i cannot understand the unfairness of the Uruguaian government...
but that happens to neutral states...
except switzerland, i believe all so called neutral states, actually did favor one or the other government (axis or allies)
sweden n uruguay were for the allies...
adios
miro
Die See ruft....
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marcelo_malara
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marcelo_malara
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hey....
yes, thats wat i meant....
thats why it would have been much better for Graf Spee to be heading to argentinia....
anyhow, we cannot change history now...
and afterwards everyone knows better than the person who did the mistake....
so lets stop judging Langstorff and leave it like that....
adios
miro
yes, thats wat i meant....
thats why it would have been much better for Graf Spee to be heading to argentinia....
anyhow, we cannot change history now...
and afterwards everyone knows better than the person who did the mistake....
so lets stop judging Langstorff and leave it like that....
adios
miro
Die See ruft....
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Karl Heidenreich
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RF:
That´s what I mean: the GS was capable to sink Exeter and send the other two cruisers heavily damaged to dry dock. But Langsdorf disengaged and went to a place where he trapped himself.Graf Spee should have sunk all three Allied ships and certainly not gone to Uruguay. Possibly Mar Del Plata as Marcelo suggested, but not a hostile neutral as Uruguay, with its democratic traditions totally at odds with nazi-ism.
An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat him last.
Sir Winston Churchill
Sir Winston Churchill
All warships of a country at war are permitted to pay courtesy visits to the ports of a neutral country once every 3 months per international law.marcelo_malara wrote:Yes, may be that is true. A British ship would have been allowed to stay longer.
As a matter of policy the British made such visits to the ports of Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile, even openly photographing the German merchant ships tied up in port.
This isn't necessarily unfair. Spain allowed German and Italian submarines to quietly refuel from Axis merchant ships in their ports, while the Portuguese authorities in Goa allowed German ships to radio information on Allied shipping movements to U-boats - until British irregulars crept in and blew them up.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
The Uruguayans didn't really want the Graf Spee, with its 11 inch guns, in their waters, you can't really blame them.....marcelo_malara wrote:Yes, may be that is true. A British ship would have been allowed to stay longer.
As their technical commission reported, the damage to Graf Spee actually was not major, the period of three days was fair given that the Germans were using the Tacoma, which strictly under International Law they were not entitled to do.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.
Sweden did a lot for the Germans in both world wars, including openly trading with the Germans, using her geographic position to outflank the British blockade of Germany.miro777 wrote:hey....
except switzerland, i believe all so called neutral states, actually did favor one or the other government (axis or allies)
sweden ..... were for the allies...
adios
miro
Specifically in WW2 Sweden:
1) Allowed direct export of its iron ore direct to Germany without routing it through Narvik in Norway when sea conditions in the Gulf of Bothnia allowed:
2) Sold weapons to the Germans in exchange for coal. This trade only stopped due to Allied pressure in September 1944;
3) Allowed passage of German troops by rail through their territory en-route to Finland, together with all their equipment.
''Give me a Ping and one Ping only'' - Sean Connery.