May 24 1941 - Tirpitz v Prince of Wales

[Alberto Virtuani]

RF wrote: "The acid test would be for POW to continue the action for another ten to fifteen minutes. I would expect Bismarck by then to land severe hits on POW while POW may land a few more hits on Bismarck....."

Hi RF,
I do agree, even if, up to 6:00, PoW had already scored 3 hits in 7 minutes and BS had scored 2 (to 3) on Hood in 4 to 5 minutes fire, so not an extremely different hit rate. The hits scored by BS on PoW at quite short range (3 in less than 2 minutes) were not returned by PoW mainly due (IMHO) to the turn and counter-turn to avoid Hood remains, whose generated heeling clearly scrambled McMullen firing, and to the final turn away.

Two additional remarks: on May 24, Prinz Eugen was supporting BS, while the British heavy cruisers were not, so PoW could have sustained even more damaging hits, had she continued the action alone.
On the other side, however, the "torpedo alerts" forced the German ships to turn hard more times, loosing their targets (starting at 6:03 for BS and 6:04 for PG), even wooding their fore turrets (surely for PG, for BS apparently for a short interval, at least looking at the PG film).
At that time, PoW (if still in efficiency) would have had a great opportunity to inflict to BS quite more damages.....


In a one to one confrontation, against a much more unprepared Tirpitz on May 24, I would favor the less green PoW gunnery.


Bye, Alberto

[alecsandros]

Hi Alberto,
You're right with the numbers and timings,
but , as RF said, one key aspect is that PoW obtained hits while Bismarck was doing something else (firing on Hood).

[Alberto Virtuani]

Hi Alec,
yes, both RF and you are absolutely right on this aspect, but it's difficult to estimate how much PoW shells were affecting Schneider firing (as well as McMullen never mentioned he was "disturbed" by the fire of PG after 5:57 or even by the concentrated fire of the two German ships after 6:00.....)

Bye, Alberto

[alecsandros]

I don't know.
One thing that would be important, IMHO, would be the blocking of view of Schneider (for ex) due to the water columns errupting around Bismarck , and possible obstruction of the visibility for some seconds (along with the psychological - fear of death - factor)

[OpanaPointer]

Pardon a derail, but PoW brought WSC to the Atlantic Conference, and I'm told they were informed that Tirpitz was in dock, so she couldn't attempt to intercept the British on their way back to Europe. Is this correct?

[Alberto Virtuani]

Yes Alec,
I agree, but it's curious that McMullen never lamented a loss of visibility due to the many more splashes of the 2 German ships after 6:00. Just G.Brooke did mention it (but he was sitting much lower......).

Bye, Alberto

[alecsandros]

... I wouldn't expect them (McMullen or Schneider or Von Mullencheim) to lament over enemy firings, because they were supposed to be Gunnery Officers, and as such to be able to do their duty under those given circumstances (including being under enemy fire).

Another wittness from PoW (don't remember which one) did mention German salvos were falling around the ship at a rate of 1 salvo per every 15 seconds.

The effect of shrappnell and combat daamge is not to be brushed aside either. Many commanders prefered to give orders from exposed, un-armored (or littly armored) portions of the bridge, that usualy offered far better visibility then the heavily armored con towers. Thus, each enemy straddle would have the small but not zero probabilty of killing the commander.

[alecsandros]

Pardon a derail, but PoW brought WSC to the Atlantic Conference, and I'm told they were informed that Tirpitz was in dock, so she couldn't attempt to intercept the British on their way back to Europe. Is this correct?

At what moment in time was that ?

[OpanaPointer]

Pardon a derail, but PoW brought WSC to the Atlantic Conference, and I'm told they were informed that Tirpitz was in dock, so she couldn't attempt to intercept the British on their way back to Europe. Is this correct?

At what moment in time was that ?

They were on their way to the Atlantic Conference, in Newfoundland. The Conference was 9-12 August, 1941.

[alecsandros]

AFAIK in Aug 1941 , Tirpitz was not operational.

[RF]

AFAIK in Aug 1941 , Tirpitz was not operational.

Also Hitler would never have sanctioned any attempt to intercept POW, not even with Churchill on board. The destroyer escorts alone would be a torpedo deterrent......

[RF]

In a one to one confrontation, against a much more unprepared Tirpitz on May 24, I would favor the less green PoW gunnery.
Bye, Alberto

But I think it would have to be a long action, not a brief one like DS, where Tirpitz cannot simply turn away to break off the fight.

[RF]

Two additional remarks: on May 24, Prinz Eugen was supporting BS, while the British heavy cruisers were not, so PoW could have sustained even more damaging hits, had she continued the action alone.

Bye, Alberto

I think this underlines my view that Leach was right to break off the action, though in terms of timing I believe Leach should have continued up to the time Tovey incorrectly identified POW as breaking off the action.

By severe hits I mean damage that would impair POW's speed and be sufficient to render POW incapable of providing support to Tovey if and when he caught up with Bismarck. In the event lack of fuel prevented that anyway as POW had to refuel in Iceland.
In a further prolonged action POW could have been sunk, with the help of torpedoes from Prinz Eugen.

[Alberto Virtuani]

RF wrote: "....in terms of timing I believe Leach should have continued up to the time Tovey incorrectly identified POW as breaking off the action."

Hi RF,
I cannot agree more with you, as you know.

IMHO, Leach should have continued the action until he was sure he had inflicted to Bismarck damages that could not allow the German ship to escape to the Home Fleet. PoW would have been possibly disabled doing this, as her machinery was not immune against the German 15" at such short ranges, but Germans would have never lost time to finish her, especially with the RN heavy cruisers close to them. In the actual battle, after 6:03, the German turns to avoid "torpedoes" would have been good opportunities too for the British.

Instead, at the time of the break off, Leach was not even aware he had ever hit BS.....

Bye, Alberto

[RF]

This is going off topic, but I would add an aside that if Leach had continued the action and Marschall and not Lutjens was the Fleet Commander, I would have expected Marschall to allow Norfolk and Suffolk to close the range while POW gets clobbered, then Bismarck suddenly turns on Wake-Walker while Prinz Eugen torpedoes the POW. There is the possibility of all four RN ships being sunk with Bismarck, albeit damaged significantly, then free to head either back to Germany or to a Biscay port without being shadowed - all before Holland's destroyers get to the scene.