June 1944 battleship encounter
Posted: Mon Sep 23, 2013 5:33 pm
What if there had been a battleship encounter at the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944? This allows us to offer various alternative scenarios but I think that the American knowledge of the Japanese battleships was sufficiently limited that we can imagine a variety of Japanese forces approaching whilst we keep the American force at a constant strength and position.
The fast battleship force of the USN 3rd Fleet, Task Group 58.7 (TG-58.7) under Vice-Admiral Willis Lee, included seven fast battleships (Washington (flagship), North Carolina, Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey, South Dakota and Alabama), and eight heavy cruisers (Baltimore, Boston, Canberra, Indianapolis, Wichita, Minneapolis, New Orleans, and San Francisco) according to Wikipedia although other accounts only list four heavy cruisers.
According to http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battl ... ne_sea.htm, Rear-Admiral Obayashi Sueo's Carrier Division 3 began launching a strike of A6M Zeke fighter-bombers and B6N Jill torpedo planes at 1637 on 19th June 1944. However, these were recalled shortly afterwards following Vice-Admiral Ozawa's order to retire westwards. The same source also notes that sunrise was at 0542 on June 20th. The point of that is to indicate that a Japanese force including Yamato, Musashi, Haruna and Kongo was less than 350 miles from the American carriers at 1637 and probably significantly closer (I am not exactly sure how close they were but a Zero could not carry a 250 kilo bomb very far and hope to return). If we assume that the Japanese battleline set off towards the Americans at 1637 at 24 knots, then it seems plausible that they could be 312 nautical miles closer after 13 hours. Thus contact at dawn or just after is entirely plausible although American radar equipped aircraft will have detected the Japanese force well before that time.
As we have to predict the American reaction, it is probably worth noting an article http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-084.htm which points out that up to June 1944 the USN assumed that the Yamato class mounted 16 inch guns. Thus it seems plausible that Vice-Admiral Lee will accept action confidently against any imaginable Japanese battleline after dawn on the 20th possibly even without calling for air support if the Japanese carriers are known to be present.
Now we need to define imaginable. I think that TG-58.7 should be able to handle Yamato, Musashi, Haruna and Kongo. We could add Nagato to the Japanese battleline to recreate the Centre Force from Leyte. According to Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Nagato could manage 24.98 knots in October 1944, which might slightly slow the approach but would still allow contact at dawn. We could equally add Fuso and Yamashiro. Historically, these ships were considered of low value and no effort was made to send them after they had been involved in Operation Kon. However, they could have been there and they were only half a knot slower than Nagato. We now have a seven versus seven clash with still an edge to TG-58.7.
To strengthen the IJN battleline further, we need to start changing history more radically. The obvious possibilities are to keep Ise and Hyuga as battleships and/or to avoid smoking in Mutsu's magazines. I suspect the ten versus seven clash should be won by the Japanese until American airpower intervenes.
Finally, if the Japanese had had a die hard battleship Navy minister in 1941-2, such as Yoshida instead of Shimada, we could imagine a very poorly worked up Shinano just making the battleline, probably with workers still on board like Prince of Wales at Denmark Straits.
The fast battleship force of the USN 3rd Fleet, Task Group 58.7 (TG-58.7) under Vice-Admiral Willis Lee, included seven fast battleships (Washington (flagship), North Carolina, Indiana, Iowa, New Jersey, South Dakota and Alabama), and eight heavy cruisers (Baltimore, Boston, Canberra, Indianapolis, Wichita, Minneapolis, New Orleans, and San Francisco) according to Wikipedia although other accounts only list four heavy cruisers.
According to http://www.microworks.net/pacific/battl ... ne_sea.htm, Rear-Admiral Obayashi Sueo's Carrier Division 3 began launching a strike of A6M Zeke fighter-bombers and B6N Jill torpedo planes at 1637 on 19th June 1944. However, these were recalled shortly afterwards following Vice-Admiral Ozawa's order to retire westwards. The same source also notes that sunrise was at 0542 on June 20th. The point of that is to indicate that a Japanese force including Yamato, Musashi, Haruna and Kongo was less than 350 miles from the American carriers at 1637 and probably significantly closer (I am not exactly sure how close they were but a Zero could not carry a 250 kilo bomb very far and hope to return). If we assume that the Japanese battleline set off towards the Americans at 1637 at 24 knots, then it seems plausible that they could be 312 nautical miles closer after 13 hours. Thus contact at dawn or just after is entirely plausible although American radar equipped aircraft will have detected the Japanese force well before that time.
As we have to predict the American reaction, it is probably worth noting an article http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-084.htm which points out that up to June 1944 the USN assumed that the Yamato class mounted 16 inch guns. Thus it seems plausible that Vice-Admiral Lee will accept action confidently against any imaginable Japanese battleline after dawn on the 20th possibly even without calling for air support if the Japanese carriers are known to be present.
Now we need to define imaginable. I think that TG-58.7 should be able to handle Yamato, Musashi, Haruna and Kongo. We could add Nagato to the Japanese battleline to recreate the Centre Force from Leyte. According to Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy, Nagato could manage 24.98 knots in October 1944, which might slightly slow the approach but would still allow contact at dawn. We could equally add Fuso and Yamashiro. Historically, these ships were considered of low value and no effort was made to send them after they had been involved in Operation Kon. However, they could have been there and they were only half a knot slower than Nagato. We now have a seven versus seven clash with still an edge to TG-58.7.
To strengthen the IJN battleline further, we need to start changing history more radically. The obvious possibilities are to keep Ise and Hyuga as battleships and/or to avoid smoking in Mutsu's magazines. I suspect the ten versus seven clash should be won by the Japanese until American airpower intervenes.
Finally, if the Japanese had had a die hard battleship Navy minister in 1941-2, such as Yoshida instead of Shimada, we could imagine a very poorly worked up Shinano just making the battleline, probably with workers still on board like Prince of Wales at Denmark Straits.