The British covering forces did not operate with the convoy or aywhere nearby the convoys. The British had adopted the policy of distant cover to prevent their first line warships from being sunk by U-boats and land based air. The Edinburgh loss was an example of operating fleet units with or near convoys. An example of just how far distant the distant cover could be is actually North Cape. Had Bey only been on time-adhering to the time table drawn up by Schniewind's staff, he could have fallen on the convoy and returned to base before the British battle groups could have done anything about it. As it was, only the storm, by restricting Luftwaffe operations, allowed Fraser to cut off Scharnhorst from returning to base. Otherwise he could have never brought Duke of York that close to the N. Cape. They needed to stay out of range of the Luftwaffe in most cases. In the case of PQ18, with no fleet carrier, Tovey's range of operations was greatly hindered. The Britsh have only two options once the convoy reaches a position beyond bear Island if the Germans sorti-recall the convoy or risk both convoy and covering forces to unacceptable damage or loss.PQ-18 alone had some 40 destroyers, 7 cruisers, 2 battleships and 1 light carrier, plus a host of smaller escorts, in various layers of protecting the convoy...
The German naval officers understood this and this is why the high command's over timid policies were so frustrating to them.